Bulletin No 22 - Frühjahr 2001

Martin Broek/Frank Slijper
Theatre Missile Defence in Europe: Process by Stealth[1]

Executive Summary

The National Missile Defence (NMD) program of the US is widely covered by the mainstream media. NMD is one of the legs of Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD). The other leg, the so-called Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) is not so much part of the debate on BMD. In this essay the argument is made that TMD must be part of the debate on ballistic missile defence as well.. The necessity of this has become evident recently, with the US charm offensive aimed at taking away international concerns about NMD, partly by offering a place for allies under the missile defence umbrella. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld recently illustrated this development by stating that the U.S. will no longer differentiate between TMD and NMD.

NMD is a system to create a shield over all 50 states of the US to protect against Inter Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), while TMD is a system against Tactical Ballistic Missiles. TMD is a mobile system created for protecting forward deployed troops as well as smaller countries or regions. There are generally speaking three kinds of TMD systems: systems defending the lower tier of the atmosphere, upper tier systems and systems targeting enemy missiles during their boost phase.

Drawing a line between TMD and NMD is difficult. Russian opposition against the Vardo radar station in Norway becoming part of the US NMD policy, is explicitly connected with the naval Aegis system, which is generally seen as a TMD system. This does not mean that any distinction between NMD and TMD is artificial. Differentiating between both is still possible on technical grounds as well as for military strategic reasons.

Technically TMD is less ambitious than NMD. While NMD is being developed to protect the whole of the United States, including Alaska and Hawaii, TMD is designed to defend ‘areas of operations’, which are smaller in size. NMD will target Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), while TMD is directed against Tactical Ballistic Missiles (TBMs) with a range of up to 3,500 km. Testing TMD interceptor missiles against ICBMs is not allowed by a protocol to the ABM treaty. However, the US Senate has yet to vote on this protocol.

On the level of military strategic arguments the difference between NMD and TMD is significant. When looking at the balance of power between the U.S. and Russia the advantage will shift towards the US. The thousands of nuclear warheads delivered by ICBMs still deployed by Russia are nevertheless a force to reckon with. These ICBMs cannot be intercepted by TMD, but could in time be countered by an extended NMD, if the technological problems were overcome. Current plans are limited to the deployment of 100 launchers.

In this context it is notable that for East Asia the situation is very different. The Chinese armed forces possess 20 nuclear-armed ICBMs. NMD could be sufficient to neutralise any Chinese attack with those ICBMs. But TMD has even more strategic consequences for China. Their introduction is changing the regional balance of power in favour of US allies South Korea and Japan. US-made TMD systems may also be used to defend Taiwan against China. So NMD as well as TMD have serious effects on a region which already has a very fragile security situation.

TMD however should also be part of the security debate concerning Europe. The strategic impact of TMD on the situation in Europe differs from the effect it has in East Asia. In view of:

• the still increasing capabilities of the weapon systems developed for TMD,
• the close links between TMD and NMD,
• the proposals to have a NMD program evolving from TMD
• and currently implemented and planned capabilities of TMD (like the possibility that a boost-phase intercepting system will be able to counter a ICBM when close enough to the launch point),

it can be expected that TMD will be able in the future to target ICBMs also. So in the longer run TMD can turn into a system for national missile defence against missiles with a longer range than 3,500 km.

The distinction between tactical and strategic shields against missiles can be defended if seen from the perspective of defending U.S. national territory, but is a misconception if seen from a non-US perspective. Moreover, TMD also has a strategic value for the US, because it can be used for defending strategic interests abroad.

After this first contextual part of the essay, the ongoing efforts in Europe for creating a TMD capability are examined. The political decision-making process in NATO is crucial in this. Since 1995 serious efforts are ongoing in NATO to create a NATO-wide BMD program. Since the NATO summit in Washington all member states have committed themselves to acquire the necessary means for this task. The Dutch involvement is taken as an example.

When reading through the numerous articles, reports and analyses of TMD, one very often gets the impression that TMD is science fiction. However, the U.S., along with other countries, is currently developing, testing and improving TMD. Among these countries is the Netherlands, which is:

• equipping its new air defence frigates with TMD capable radar and missile systems;
• organising in co-operation with Germany and the U.S. one of the biggest TMD exercises in the world, Joint Project Optic Windmill (JPOW). Part of the JPOW exercise is to practice interoperabi-lity and to refine tactics, techniques and procedures - all key aspects of the TMD system. JPOW is meant to integrate new concepts and technologies such as ABL, SBIRS and naval TMD;
• acquiring upgraded the Patriot (PAC-3), while the Ballistic Missile Defence Organisation (BMDO) named the Netherlands as one of the likely future purchasers of the upper-tier TMD Standard Missile SM-3; and
• together with Germany and the US, the Netherlands has formed in 1999 the 'Extended Air Defence Task Force' (EADTF). This task force can deploy air defence units at very short notice and can quickly form a fully integrated combined TMD clus-ter overseas.

At present the most important step is the NATO feasibility study for an alliance-wide lower and upper-tier TMD system. Major defence companies of Europe and the US, like EADS, Boeing and Raytheon together with several smaller companies from Canada, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and Turkey have teamed in four groups to compete for the study.

Looking at ongoing naval programs is shedding some light on the ‘hidden’ tracks toward (naval based) TMD. For example close contacts between US, Dutch and German arms manufacturers and military planners ensures that technology is developed in a way that it needs only minor modifications on German/Dutch vessels to introduce advanced missiles for upper-tier defence which are now developed for the US Navy. Technology is being developed ahead of the political decisions concerning actual acquisition.

Although protecting intervention forces looks like the primary task of TMD, it will be possible in the future to expand it to protect complete countries or regions. The authors are aware of the technological and financial hurdles which have yet to be taken. The programs however do progress and the ‘lesser known anti-missile weapons’ must be monitored closely to prevent creating a destabilising European NMD, as it is already taking shape in East Asia.

Two tables and a list at the end of the essay give an overview of (potential) TMD-capable weapon systems.

[1] Martin Broek and Frank Slijper work for the Campagne tegen Wapenhandel in Amsterdam. The complete version of this documents including footnotes and appendices is only available in pdf-format.