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Koordinationsgruppe in der HSFK:
Dr. Bernd W. Kubbig, Martina Glebocki und Mirko Jacobowski

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Isil Kazan
(Copenhagen Peace Research Institute)

Turkey between National and Theater Missile Defence

Introduction

The reactivation of the National Missile Defence (NMD) program by the US presents a dilemma for Turkey. On the one hand there is great concern about the negative effects on international security settings, such as sparking an arms race and increasing polarisation, but on the other hand Turkey is also worried about instability in the surrounding regions. This is especially true about the increased efforts of its southern and south-eastern neighbours to develop the WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction), and long-range ballistic missiles as the means of delivering them. Thus, it seems that the Turkish position is biased towards obtaining a missile defence system for regional purposes. Turkey is also becoming increasingly involved with the US and Israel, its post-Cold War strategic partners, in the Middle Eastern TMD (Theatre Missile Defence) project. Turkey's regional concerns, and dependency on the US provides the leverage for American pressure on Turkey to participate in the NMD program. The silence of the Turkish political elite on NMD is an indication of the depth of Turkey's dilemma in choosing between its global level concerns, or its regional level security perceptions and measurements. The issue of NMD, and the NATO TMD project adds also a new dimension to the Turkish-European security relationship, which has been fading since the end of the Cold War, and provides a new basis for co-operation.

The Missing Debate

There has been an unusual 'silence' shown by the Turkish political elite about President George Bush's plan to establish a new anti-missile defence system, the so-called National Missile Defence. The visit to Turkey by US Assistant Secretary of State, Marc Grossman in May 2001, part of a shuttle tour to consult US allies, provided a good opportunity for Turkish attitudes on the issue to be debated. The Turkish press covered the visit, the issues, and the statements made by Grossman, but there was no open public statement made by the Turkish authorities. This 'silence' had not passed without notification:

"...our heroic politicians, who talk all the time about 'national pride' and 'national interests'... do not utter a peep."¹

Ein Projekt aus der FG Rüstungskontrolle und Abrüstung (Leiter: Prof. Dr. Harald Müller)
In Zusammenarbeit mit der Arbeitsstelle Friedensforschung Bonn (Leiterin: Dr. Regine Mehl)
Mit freundlicher Unterstützung der Evangelischen Kirche in Hessen und Nassau,
der Berghof Stiftung für Konfliktforschung GmbH und der W. Alton Jones Foundation

¹ (my translation) Aydin Engin, "Kilic Kalkan ve Fuzelere Kalkan", *Cumhuriyet* 6 May 2001, (electronic edition).

Turkey's role within the missile defence system proposed by the US is to deploy interceptor missiles in the eastern and southern regions of Turkey, intended to destroy ballistic missiles from Iraq and Iran in the air soon after being launched.² Turkey is reportedly in agreement with the US in principle, but is also concerned about some unintended consequences of it. The Turkish concerns are about two main issues. Firstly, the NMD strategy could spark new global and regional tensions and conflicts, including polarisation and arms escalation, which would create significant security problems for Turkey, since Turkey shares borders with Iran, Iraq and Syria, all of which receive technical and material support from Russia in their efforts for nuclear armament, according to government sources reported in the Turkish press. Therefore, from the Turkish point of view, the missile defence strategy must not be allowed to spark new global tensions, especially with Russia and China. To avoid this it is important to listen to the Russian and Chinese concerns, and to obtain their consent for this project. Secondly, Turkey insisted that the proposed missile defence system must not be a cause a division within NATO, and the project must be one which involves the whole of NATO, with the consent of all its members.³

While Turkish officials and politicians have remained silent, some Turkish press commentators have already been questioning the issue generally, Turkey's role in it, and the consequences it may have. What is striking is that they are basically in agreement with the official position regarding the danger of initiating a new round of global polarisation and arms escalation, and especially, in the case of Turkey's participation, an escalation in tension in its relations with Iran, Iraq and Russia.⁴ Even the Islamists share these concerns even though they reject any threat from Iran and Iraq⁵, thus placing themselves in a substantially different position from the other political factions.

In the context of Turkish political conditions, perhaps the silence is understandable. Neither the scale of arms build-up, nor what kind of military equipment is needed had ever been questioned seriously among the Turkish political elite, including the Islamists. Thus, an issue such as missiles is left to be decided by the Turkish military authorities. Yet, because of the far-reaching political and strategic consequences, the silence on this issue is interesting in itself, and reveals something of the difficulties and dilemmas that Turkey faces not only in this regard, but also towards the post-Cold War security environment.

The Turkish Perceptions of the Post-Bipolar Security Environment and Measures

By 1989, with the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the big question for Turkey was that of the future strategic importance of Turkey for the West. The break-up of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia has created a host of new, more or less unstable states around Turkey, in particular a range of Muslim and Turkish states with strong connections to Turkey. The awakening of ethnic and religious consciousness in the region has strengthened the Islamic, Kurdish and Turkish movements even in Turkey itself. These crucial developments have affected the Turkish security debates deeply. Turkish attention has been drawn more and more towards the regional security environment in parallel with the acceleration of the

² "Türkiye füze kalkanına istekli", *Cumhuriyet* 4 May 2001; "Dogu'ya yeni füze rampaları", *Türkiye* 4 June 2001; "U.S. Defence Secretary begins visit to Turkey", *Turkish Daily News* 4 June 2001 (electronic editions).

³ "Füze kalkani kaygi yaratti", *Cumhuriyet* 12 May 2001 (electronic edition).

⁴ See for example, "Füze kalkani yeni Soguk Savas politikasi mi?" by Erol Manisali in *Cumhuriyet* 21 May 2001; "Yeni savunma mimarisinde Türkiye'nin rolü" by Ferai Tinc in *Hürriyet* 4 June 2001; "Bir guvenlik sorunu daha..." by Sami Kohen in *Milliyet* 1 June 2001; "Nükleer yaris yeniden baslmasin" by Yasemin Congar in *Milliyet* 14 May 2001 (electronic editions).

⁵ For example, "Rumsfeld'in ve F.Hüseyni'nin Türkiye'si" by Akif Emre in *Yeni Safak* 5 June 2001 (electronic edition).

conflicts in the Balkans and the Caucasus, and with the Kurdish conflict on both sides of the Turkish Southern border. With the change in focus from global to regional level, the discourse of the 'Bermuda Triangle' has become the definition of Turkey's security environment during the 1990's:

"Geographic destiny placed Turkey at the virtual epicentre of a "Bermuda Triangle" of post-Cold War volatility and uncertainty, with the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East encircling us."⁶

The Turkish civil-military authorities' perceptions of the 'geography of the threats' has shifted dramatically away from the north, towards the south and south-east. The post-Cold War defence concept assessed the internal threat, Kurdish separatism, as the primary danger, and identified Syria, Iraq and Iran as the origins of that perceived internal threat in 1992. The danger of Islamic fundamentalism was also identified as a primary internal threat, and added to the so-called National Security Policy document in 1997. These twin internal threats of Kurdish separatism and Islamic fundamentalism, and the risks emanating from Turkey's south-eastern neighbours have not been changed since, and reportedly retained in the new document (in preparation). The new document also points out the improvement in relations with its southern and south-eastern neighbours, but also emphasises the continuation of close military ties with Israel.⁷

Regionalisation of Turkish security is also mirrored in Turkey's worries about its position in, and importance for the 'West'. A new strategic partnership between Turkey and the US has developed during the 1990's, based primarily on the value of Turkey's position on the periphery of several strategically important regions. On the other hand Turkey's relationship with the EU, and the prospect for Turkish membership of the EU has become more problematic, in spite of the 'restoration' of the relationship by the acceptance of Turkey's candidacy for membership by the EU at the Helsinki summit of 1999. In other words, seen from Turkey, the term 'West' has been replaced by two different units, the US and the EU, in the post-bipolar security environment. While Turkey's strategic partnership with the US has become one of the new Turkish alignment strategies in the post-bipolar security environment, the other being the strategic partnership with Israel.

The Turkish-Israeli military co-operation agreement of 1996 was one of the most important developments since the end of the Cold War. This new development in the region has produced a strong reaction from the Arab world and Iran, who have claimed that it was a military alliance against them. Subsequent denials by Turkey and Israel have not changed their neighbours' view of the situation, and this alignment has become one of the main features of the Middle Eastern post-bipolar regional order. The Turkish-Israeli strategic partnership increased significantly the deterrent power and manoeuvrability of both Turkey and Israel.⁸ This rapprochement in the security field was thus unique in the history of the two countries in terms of its depth, variety and intensity, and this is why it has attracted so much

⁶ Speech by H.S.Turk, the former Minister of Defence, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 3 March 1999.

⁷ Mahmut Bali Aykan: *Türkiye'nin Kuveyt Krizi (1990-1991) Politikası*, Ankara: Dis Politika Enstitüsü 1998, p.10; Gencer Ozcan: "Doksanli Yillarda Türkiye'nin Degisen Guvenlik Ortami" in Gencer Ozcan and Sule Kut (eds.): *En Uzun On Yil: Türkiye'nin Ulusal Guvenlik ve Dis Politika Gundeminde Doksanli Yillar*, Istanbul: Boyut Kitaplari 1998, p. 18-19; "Iste o belge" in *Hürriyet* 9 August 2001; "Military prepares a new Security Policy document" by Lale Sariibrahimoglu in *Turkish Daily News* 8 August 2001 (electronic editions).

⁸ See for example: Michael Eisenstadt: "Turkish-Israeli military co-operation: an assessment" , *POLICYWATCH*, no. 262, 24 July 1997; (retired) Gen. Cevik Bir:"Reflections on Turkish-Israeli relations and Turkish security" in *POLICYWATCH*, no. 422, 5 November 1999.

interest. The agreements also included semi-annual strategic dialogue meetings between high ranking officers to discuss and co-ordinate positions on regional threats.⁹

Turkish Threat Perceptions and Measures

Turkey has had security concerns in regard to the build-up of armaments, including WMD, in the Middle East during the Cold War, however, the issue was regarded as mainly of concern to the players in the Arab-Israeli and the Gulf conflicts. The attitude of cautious indifference shown by Turkey – based on its membership of NATO, and its non-involvement policy in regard to Middle Eastern issues – began to be deeply questioned at the end of the Cold War. On the eve of, and during the 2nd Gulf War, the Turkish authorities became worried for first time about the direct military threat from its southern neighbours, who had been involved in an arms race, including WMD, since the 1950's. The Turkish view was that its position in NATO, and NATO's commitment to Turkey, was being weakened at a time when the future of NATO was being brought into question after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact.¹⁰

Many articles written immediately after the 2nd Gulf War also mirrored the increased level of Turkish concern. In these analyses it was emphasised that even though other states like Israel have WMD and TBM (tactical ballistic missiles) capabilities in the region, there was not likely to be any serious conflict with those states in the future. But hot conflicts between Turkey and its Middle Eastern neighbours, Syria, Iraq and Iran, were much more likely due to a combination of factors. Because these neighbour states have mainly based their military strategies on the use of WMD, these weapons constitute a real and serious threat to Turkey in the coming years. After elaborating on the three neighbours' capacities, the analyses have all reached similar conclusions: These states still lack the means to deliver these weapons, such as missiles, which they cannot develop before the end of the century. However, it was deemed advisable to acquire an anti-missile system in the near future.¹¹

In the meantime, it seems that Turkey has been continuously engaged in modernising and developing its defensive missile capability. According to the Turkish press, in late 1998, Turkey started talks with the British authorities on joint production of short-range surface-to-air Rapier-2 missiles, and modernising the 72 Rapier-1 in the Turkish arsenal.¹² It was also reported that Turkey was interested in obtaining Patriot missiles.¹³ Within the framework of the Turkish-Israeli military agreement of 1996, Turkey decided to purchase Popeye-1 missiles, and signed a memorandum of understanding for the joint production of Popeye-2 missiles.¹⁴ However, Turkey has been more interested in participation in the US-Israeli joint production of Arrow missiles. First it was reported that Turkey and Israel had agreed in principle. Then, because of American disapproval with reference to the MTCR (Missile

⁹ Gencer Ozcan and Ofra Bengio: "Changing Relations: Turkish-Israeli-Arab Triangle" in *PERCEPTIONS*, 5(1) March-May 2000, Ankara; Alan Makovsky: Israeli-Turkish Relations: A Turkish Periphery strategy?" in Henri J. Barkey: *Reluctant Neighbor: Turkey's role in the Middle East*, Washington 1997.

¹⁰ Mahmut Bali Aykan: *Türkiye'nin Kuveyt Krizi (1990-1991) Politikası*, Ankara: Dis Politika Enstitüsü 1998, p. 12.

¹¹ Sitki Egeli: "Suriye ve Ortadogu'da NBC/Balistik Füze Tırmanması" in *Dis Politika Bulteni*, 4(1), Sonbahar 1992, Ankara: Dis Politika Enstitüsü, p. 76-77; Cemal Acar: "Degismente olan Dunyada Silahsızlanma ve Türkiye" in Sabahattin Sen (ed.): *Yeni Dunya Düzeni ve Türkiye*, Istanbul: Baglam Yayinlari 1992, 2nd ed., p. 259-270; Muammer Simsek: "Defense Industry in Turkey" in *Foreign Policy*, Ankara, XV(1-2) 1990.

¹² *Cumhuriyet* 10 August, 4 November 1998 (electronic edition).

¹³ *Cumhuriyet* 10 May 1999 (electronic edition).

¹⁴ *Cumhuriyet* 31 January, 9 June, 30 September 1999 (electronic edition).

Technology Control Regime), Turkey and Israel reportedly agreed on a new project, which would resemble Arrow but its name and specifications would be different.¹⁵

In the late 1990s it appears that there was a series of talks between Turkey, Israel and the US. For example the 'rising missile threat in the Middle East' was on the agenda of the semi-annual strategic dialogue meeting between Turkey and Israel of May 1998.¹⁶ In February 1999 Israel's defence minister announced that they were considering a region-wide missile defence system, which would 'provide protection also for Turkey, Jordan and Palestinians'.¹⁷ It has also been reported that Turkey and the US have had differences on the issue. Turkey preferred a missile defence system project developed within the framework of NATO, whereas the US wanted a project in a bilateral framework addressing the threats originating from the Middle East.¹⁸

While the establishment of an US-Turkish bilateral working group on the TMD, and education of the Turkish officers under its auspices have been the concrete outcomes of this process, there were also differences among the senior officers in the Turkish Armed Forces on what kind of ballistic missile strategy they should be pursuing. Reportedly, there were three groups. One group preferred to go with the NATO missile project, which was proceeding slowly. Another group thought Turkey should secure an offensive missile system in order to provide a deterrent, which would be in contravention of the international anti-proliferation agreements, of which Turkey is a signatory. The third, and prevailing, group favoured obtaining defensive systems as soon as possible, and in co-operation with the US and Israel.¹⁹ That this third view has won out over the other two is borne out by Turkish activities in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Another divergence of opinion existed between the Foreign Ministry and the General Staff, where Turkish diplomats were worried about co-operation with Israel, which would cause annoyance among Turkey's Muslim neighbours, with whom Turkey has been seeking better relations. This divergence has disappeared in parallel with the neighbouring states' increased efforts to develop long-range missiles, especially Iran.²⁰ In July 2000 Iran tested its Shahab-3 missile for the second time, and thereby provided confirmation of the Turkish concerns. The USA and Israel were the first to react to the missile test. Turkey's reaction came later and was expressed in cautious terms. The Turkish Deputy Foreign Ministry spokesman stated that:

"Turkey is following a sensitive policy for the prevention of the proliferation of WMD and the means of delivering them, due to Turkey's geographic proximity to the regions where the risk is very high. The armament efforts of some neighbouring countries are a cause of concern. In this context Iran's Shahab-3 Missile test has created sensitivity in Turkey. The developments are being closely watched."²¹

The new analyses on the issue point out that Turkish territory is under a potential missile threat, given the current capabilities of Iran. The conclusions reached in these analyses are similar to those reached in the early 1990s, that in order to be ready for the 2000's a defence

¹⁵ *Turkish Daily News* 23 December 1997, 20 and 24 April 1998 (electronic edition).

¹⁶ *Turkish Daily News* 22 April 1998 (electronic edition).

¹⁷ *Turkish Daily News* 2 May 1999 (electronic edition).

¹⁸ "ABD'den NATO önerisine hayir" *Cumhuriyet* 25 November 1999 (electronic edition).

¹⁹ "Turkish military splits on ballistic missile defense" by Lale Sariibrahimoglu in *Turkish Daily News* 19 January 2000 (electronic edition).

²⁰ "Israel to host Turkey and U.S. for second missile meeting: Cooperation represents regional dimension of missile defence system" by Lale Sariibrahimoglu in *Turkish Daily News* 5 June 2001 (electronic edition)

²¹ (my translation) quoted in "Ankara'da Sahab-3 Kaygisi" , *Cumhuriyet* 21 July 2000 (electronic edition).

system should be obtained, despite the fact that it could take another decade for Iran to develop nuclear weapons and long-range missiles.²² The Turkish military authorities' increased interest in anti-ballistic missile defence systems has also been revealed through rare comments on the issue in the Turkish press. For example:

"It is obvious that Turkey needs just such a defence system when one looks at the surrounding countries. We are a country encircled by missiles... Besides our three southern neighbours, there are missiles also in Armenia and in the Greek part of Cyprus, and these missiles apparently are not directed towards other places (but Turkey)."²³

The summer of 2001 witnessed high-ranking Israeli visits to Turkey. Among other issues, the Arrow missiles were on the agenda again. It was reported that the two countries had agreed to develop the Arrow anti-ballistic missile system, and they were trying to obtain US approval.²⁴ There was also speculation in the Turkish press about possible Turkish participation in the NMD in order to get US approval to obtain the Arrow and/or Patriot missile defence systems.²⁵ The bilateral Turkish-Israeli alignment has also been strengthened, and reportedly it was decided to start joint land-force exercises.²⁶

Besides this series of bilateral talks between Turkey, the US and Israel, a trilateral co-operation between these states has also emerged over the Middle East. For example, it is reported that the second TDM meeting between these states was going to be held during the summer of 2001, as the regional dimension of the NMD program.²⁷ Another new development during this summer was a trilateral air-exercise in Turkey for the first time,²⁸ in addition to the institutionalised trilateral naval exercises in the Eastern Mediterranean since 1998.

An interesting factor in Turkish calculations relates to Russia. The Turkish post-bipolar policy towards Russia has been 'co-operation and competition' with regard to the Caucasus and Central Asia. In this framework, Russia has also been in competition with the US for Turkey's defence procurements, offering a cheaper alternative, and without the reluctance to allow technology transfer to Turkey. The last example relates to the ballistic missile defence issue, where Russia has offered its S-300 long-range missiles to Turkey in the context of US disapproval of Turkey's Arrow-project.²⁹ Almost a year later, in spring 2001, the US reportedly proposed the purchase from Russia of S-300 missiles and deployment of them in ally countries such as Turkey, all part of seeking Russia's approval of the NMD project, and changes in the Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) of 1972.³⁰ This last point makes it clearer

²² For example, Prof. Dr. Hasan Koni: "Iran'ın Nükleer programı ve Füze Sistemleri" in *Savunma ve Havacılık*, (Defence and Aerospace), 14(80), 4/2000, p. 56-57; Gen.(retired) Ahmet Corekci: "Fuze Meraklisi Komsu" in *Ulusal Strateji* (National Strategy), 2(15), November-December 2000, p. 22-27.

²³ (my translation) The Office of the General Staff quoted in "Washington dedi ki..." by Sedat Sertoglu in *Sabah* 18 May 2001 (electronic edition).

²⁴ "Türkiye-İsrail tam gaz" in *Cumhuriyet* 11 July 2001; "İsrail'le Arrow pazarlığı" in *Cumhuriyet* 28 July 2001; "Israeli Defense Minister visits Ankara" *Turkish Daily News* 10 July 2001 (electronic editions).

²⁵ "Kalkana karşılık Arrow" in *Cumhuriyet* 23 July 2001; "Israel to host Turkey and U.S. for second missile meeting: Cooperation represents regional dimension of missile defence system" by Lale Sariibrahimoglu in *Turkish Daily News* 5 June 2001 (electronic editions).

²⁶ "Türkiye-İsrail tam gaz" in *Cumhuriyet* 11 July 2001 (electronic edition).

²⁷ "Israel to host Turkey and U.S. for second missile meeting: Cooperation represents regional dimension of missile defence system" by Lale Sariibrahimoglu in *Turkish Daily News* 5 June 2001.

²⁸ "Konya'da Türkiye, ABD, İsrail tatbikati" *Hürriyet* 4 Juni 2001 (electronic edition).

²⁹ "Russia offers Turkey upgraded, longer-range S-300s" by Lale Sariibrahimoglu in *Turkish Daily News* 4 March 2000 (electronic edition).

³⁰ "Türkiye'ye S-300" *Milliyet* 31 May 2001 (electronic edition).

why Turkey is concerned by Russian reactions to the NMD project. At the global level negotiations between the US and Russia could cause, for example, a change in the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty (CFE) of 1990. Russia has long sought to change the treaty in its favour with reference to its Caucasian backyard, while Turkey wants it to remain as it is. The CFE treaty, implicitly acknowledging Turkey's stake in Middle Eastern security, also granted Turkey, at its own request, a so-called 'exclusion zone' in the south-eastern area of the country that borders Syria, Iraq and Iran. Within this zone there are no limits on the number of troops and equipment that Turkey is allowed to deploy.³¹

While the Turkish defence authorities have remained silent about the NMD, they seem to be already seeking to acquire missile defence systems as a measure against the capabilities of its neighbours. On the one hand the Turkish policy is still based on being part of global and regional anti-proliferation agreements and efforts.³² On the other hand acquiring 'Air/missile defence capability against the WMD' constitutes the other pillar of the Turkish policy in a world described as following:

"New politico-military strategic environment... dominated by instabilities and uncertainties in the Caucasus, Middle East and Balkans, (render) it necessary for the Turkish Armed Forces to prepare themselves for an unforeseeable future... In the current political military strategic environment where the global and regional balances have yet not been fully formed, the Turkish Armed Forces (must be) capable of ensuring the security of Turkey, as well as contributing to regional and global peace and stability..."³³

Concluding Scenarios

Turkey's membership of the EU, which could change the Turkish security perceptions, is not likely to happen, at least in the foreseeable future. Besides the shortcomings in Turkey's economic standards, it is precisely these Turkish security concerns, especially internal ones, which hinder the Turkish political elite from hastening the democratic reforms that are necessary to become a member of the EU. This dilemma has recently been defined by Mesut Yilmaz, the Deputy Prime Minister, as 'national security syndrome', and caused a harsh response from the military and started a wide-ranging debate in Turkey.³⁴ Nevertheless, the subsequent National Security Council meeting signalled the slowing down of constitutional amendments, amongst other proposed reforms that are needed for an eventual Turkish membership of the EU.³⁵ This 'slowness' has marked the Turkish-EU relationship since the Turkey first applied for membership, and that is perhaps not such a bad thing. After all it provides a framework for the relationship, and also keeps Turkey's efforts towards democratisation on track. On the other hand it also causes a number of issues to continue to create tensions, such as Cyprus, and Turkey's concern about being excluded from the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

The most likely scenario then, is that the current trends will continue as they are. Turkey, staying outside of the EU, would continue to define its security concerns differently and separately from the EU. In this context NATO becomes more important for Turkey, also with regard to its security relations with the EU-Europe. Indeed, Turkey seems to be tied to its

³¹ Alan Makovsky: "Israeli-Turkish Relations: A Turkish 'Periphery Strategy'?" in Henry J. Barkey (ed.): *Reluctant Neighbor: Turkey's role in the Middle East*, Washington: United States Institute of Peace 1996, p.158; Yavuz G. Yildiz: "Ortadogu'da Silahlanma ve Militarizm" in Sabahattin Sen (ed.): *Su Sorunu, Turkiye ve Ortadogu*, Istanbul: Baglam Yayinlari 1993, p. 168.

³² "WMD", tsk.mil.tr/genelkurmay/digerkonular/kitleimhasilahlari_eng.htm (accessed 6 August 2001).

³³ "Mission", tsk.mil.tr/genelkurmay/genel%20konular/gorevi_eng.htm, (accessed 5 September 2001).

³⁴ Turkish newspapers in 8-9 August 2001 (electronic editions).

³⁵ "Delay constitutional changes urges MGK" *Turkish Daily News* 22 August 2001 (electronic edition).

new 'strategic partnerships' with Israel and the US in order to counter its perceived regional threats, including WMD and ballistic missiles. This will mean continuing Turkish efforts to obtain anti-ballistic missile defence systems.

The big question then is about the NMD, and its drastic, difficult to predict global consequences. If the project is abandoned by the US, it is more likely that Turkey's regional level efforts (TMD) would continue, as would the European efforts at the TMD level, though more slowly. If the US continues with the project, there will be hard times for both policy makers and the globe ahead. However, one thing is clear. The issue of ballistic missile defence, both NMD and TMD, constitutes a common security issue, and is therefore a co-operation opportunity for Turkey and the EU, and closes the gap between differentiated security agendas of these actors since the end of the Cold War. The issue of NMD, with its attendant global consequences is of special importance. The European reluctance concerning NMD further expands Turkey's room for manoeuvre, 'caught' as it is between TDM (regional concerns) and NMD (global concerns).

Recommendations

Both Turkey and the EU share concerns about the dangers of the NMD project to international security, and these concerns provide a common ground for co-operation. Nevertheless, there are many problems which serve to increase tensions between the EU and Turkey, and push Turkey closer to the US and Israel. In a world marked by uncertainty, instability and more room for manoeuvre of units and regional security dynamics, it is time to reconsider Turkey's role in European security also taking into account NMD and TMD. As the EU Helsinki-summit of 1999 wisely put the Turkish-European relationship back on its usual track, it would be wise not to allow the problems to reach a point of no turn, and keep Turkey on the path towards membership.

On the other hand it is time for the Turkish authorities to realise that to become a member of the EU represents an alternative strategy in the struggle to overcome the perceived post-bipolar security concerns, as expressed by many in Turkey. At least, pragmatically, the EU 'connection' provides more room for manoeuvre with regard to the Turkish dilemma between NMD and TDM created by dependence on the US.