



**Peace
Research
Institute
Frankfurt**

Has Missile Defense Lived Up to Its Promises?

**State of the Art, Transatlantic Relations,
and international Challenges**

Opening Remarks and Conference Outline

PRIF's/FES's Third Transatlantic Conference on the Middle East/Gulf

**“Missile Defense, Russia and the Middle East:
Coping With Transatlantic Divergence – Exploring Common Solutions”**

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Introduction: Two Transparent Ways of Assessing Whether Missile Defense Has Increased Security

What are weapons, including missile defense (MD), systems for? The answer is simple: They are designed to maintain or even improve security. In the case of missile defense (or anti-ballistic missile systems), they are to protect against a limited number of incoming warheads on (ballistic) missiles. Protect whom? The American territory, the U.S. allies as well as the interests of the United States of America and of other states. Protect against whom? Usually “countries such as” North Korea and Iran are mentioned, but some experts think that China is another candidate, while leadership in Moscow is convinced that Russia is the actual target of the current U.S. plans to deploy ten interceptors in Poland and a radar facility in the Czech Republic. On the sub-state level, terrorist organizations launching missiles are an additional challenge. I think we all are united to fight the proliferation of missiles, be they conventionally tipped or equipped with atomic, biological, and chemical warheads (the three variants of weapons of mass destruction, WMD). We may disagree though on the question whether (and, if so, to what extent) missile defense is an appropriate tool in combating WMD proliferation.

Twenty-five years after Ronald Reagan’s historic “Star Wars” speech of March 23, 1983, and six years after the unilateral abolition of the bilateral Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty by the current George W. Bush administration, it is time to assess missile defense specifically in the East-West context, but also in the Middle East, including the sub-state actors Hamas and Hezbollah.

There are two ways to answer the question whether (and, if so, under what conditions) missile defense contributes to security. First, by assessing the standards and promises as put forward by MD supporters, and secondly, by developing transparent criteria. I will (hopefully in all fairness) pursue the first option and then briefly outline the yardsticks that guided the outgoing Clinton administration in 2000 for its deployment of a territorial shield: the threat from ballistic missiles, the costs, technological feasibility, as well as the implications for the international strategic environment and for arms control. These criteria structure a great deal of our conference panels. Although there is some overlap between the two ways, my assessment of whether missile defense has so far lived up to the standards and promises as put forward by its own supporters, does not intend to pre-empt the results of this conference.

For both ways of assessing MD and its results, it is imperative to weigh the pros and the cons – science and scholarship is supposed to be a (self-)correcting process. Therefore, we have tried hard to get a balanced mixture of MD supporters, on the one hand, as well as skeptics

and critics/opponents on the other hand. We have admittedly not been too successful in obtaining the equal amount of MD supporters especially from the U.S. government, from NATO, and from industry. Although we addressed our letters of invitation to specific decision-makers, some of whom we know personally, in most cases and to our great surprise, we did not even get an answer. Nevertheless, the public, the media, and the decision-makers both in governments and parliaments deserve assessments presented as results of transparent procedures.

This conference has a title and a subtitle. It is not only about missile defense, but in fact goes beyond it. If MD turns out to be deficient, what role are other anti-proliferation tools, notably diplomacy, to play? What is more, following the tradition of our previous international gatherings, PRIF's/FES's *Third Transatlantic Conference on the Middle East/Gulf* can be called exclusive by being inclusive. We start from the premise that security should be organized in a cooperative way that includes all dialogue-willing parties. We consider it imperative *not to talk over* the heads of our colleagues especially from the Middle East/Gulf (as they will not hear us), but to talk *directly to them and listen to them* of what they have to say about our assessments, perceptions, fears, and expectations. The result is hopefully to identify common ground, but also divergence. I am therefore grateful that major Middle East countries are represented at this conference.

As you all know, the rumors of an Israeli or American bombing of Iranian nuclear facilities dominate the headlines in the media these days. We would like to provide a forum especially for the representatives from Iran and Israel to maybe come up with a solution which does not mean war – another war would not be a solution – while at the same a diplomatic perspective has, of course, to be compatible with Israel's security needs.

Against this backdrop, the question whether missile defense has so far lived up to its own standards and promises can be broken down into six dimensions which I will present in the following. All in all we hope to bring to bear the fruits of MS research especially in this country and to show how the supporters, skeptics and critics/opponents interact and are linked to the international community.

1. First Dimension: U.S. Proponents Were Able to Forge a (Law-Based) Consensus on Missile Defense – But Only in Their Country

There is neither a homogeneous community of MD supporters nor of skeptics, and critics/opponents. This relates both to the United States and to all other countries in which MD plays a certain role. When we talk about missile defense (or anti-ballistic missiles), we

have to address three variants: the continental/territorial, the regional and point defense variants, i.e. the protection of soldiers/individual buildings or small areas. It should be plausible that in the context of this transatlantic conference American MD proponents deserve special attention, as both the executive *and* legislative branches in Washington have taken the lead in pushing and proliferating anti-ballistic technologies at home and worldwide. Thus, in many if not most cases supporters of missile defense are in the following identical with the MD constituency favoring especially the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system in the United States in order to protect, above all, the American territory against a limited number of incoming missiles (possibly WMD-tipped) from a hostile country; the GMD is the centerpiece of the Bush administration's multilayered anti-ballistic missile architecture, and used to be called National Missile Defense in the Clinton era. As indicated at the beginning, an American multilayered umbrella would not only include the North American continent, but also the entire populations (or at least metropolitan areas) in allied territory in Europe, the Middle East/Gulf, and in Asia. In case of troop operations (for example, in the context of an invasion), anti-tactical missiles are supposed to protect the soldiers in a hostile WMD environment.

Let me share with you in this context some *major findings* of a comparative study edited by my colleague Axel Nitsche and myself in early 2006 ("The Domestic Politics of Missile Defense"). This collection of case studies written in most cases by experts from the individual country analyze the MD policy of 16 different nations. It concludes: *Over the years, there has emerged a fairly stable, law-based consensus in the United States on all three variants of an anti-ballistic missile system. The experts from the other 15 countries conclude in their individual case studies that an American multilayered umbrella has strong supporters, but is not broadly legitimized, as evidenced by continuing criticism in several countries.*¹ (There seems to be a political consensus in Israel as well, but to the best of my knowledge it is not law-based.) This finding of 2005/2006 needs to be modified and specified in view of the declaration of the Bucharest Summit in early 2008 (see below).

¹ As of 2005/2006, the "pro camp" which principally favours the US multi-layered architecture consists of: the new democratic members of the North Atlantic Alliance – Poland, the Czech Republic, and, with reservations, Hungary, when it comes to the willingness to host MD-related facilities; the old NATO ally Denmark and the possibly evolving strategic American partner in Asia, India (as can be derived from New Delhi's pragmatic position on the abrogation of the ABM Treaty); and probably Israel [...]. By contrast, in the group of the sceptics, critics and outright opponents are: Canada, France, Germany, Japan and South Korea (both as tacit sceptics), Russia, The Netherlands, Turkey, and the United Kingdom." (Bernd W. Kubbig, "Missile Defence in the Post-ABM Treaty Area: The International State of the Art, German Foundation for Peace Research," Forschung DSF No. 10, Osnabrück 2007, p. 16. - In light of the developments in the Polish government, it remains to be seen whether Poland belongs unequivocally to the "pro camp."

A second major finding of our book with its 16 case studies is that almost all democracies share a consensus on Theater Missile Defense (TMD) (or anti-tactical ballistic missiles) for the protection of troops/small areas. Taken together, these two results reflect a deep split among the examined countries along the line of a continental shield versus point defense. The most important reasons for a broad acceptance of anti-tactical ballistic missiles are: Some of the states have indigenous capabilities in this area as shown by the Russian SA-300/400, the French Aster, the French/Italian SAMP/T project, and the U.S.-German-Italian development of MEADS. Moreover, many of the examined democracies began their activities in the anti-tactical missile area during the Cold War. As their programs did not violate the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (see *Second Dimension*) and did not raise concerns of instability, those countries regarded them as ‘good.’ Actually none of the criticism of the territorial shield is applied to anti-tactical missiles. They are regarded as affordable weapons systems (albeit involving conflicts of priorities among military projects, not to mention civilian ones), and they are also seen as technologically feasible, although the results, for instance, of the last war against Baghdad revealed severe problems.

Where do we stand today, as regards consensus, almost three months after the Bucharest Summit of early April, 2008? It is important to note that ‘consensus’ was usually reached on the government level and in some cases on the parliamentary level, while the public was involved only in very few and most recent cases (in Poland and in the Czech Republic – see below). The Bucharest declaration univocally endorsed the deployment of U.S. interceptors and radar in Europe. It was decided to explore “ways to link this capability with current NATO missile defence efforts.” But no concrete procurement decision was made. The summit underscored the principle of solidarity and indivisibility of security, tasking the North Atlantic Council with developing options for the protection of NATO territory and populations not covered by the MD systems in Poland and in the Czech Republic. A more detailed plan for an Alliance-wide anti-ballistic missile system is expected to be presented at the 2009 summit, when NATO turns 60. In addition, the Bucharest declaration called for stronger cooperation with Russia, including exploring “the potential for linking the United States and Russian missile defence systems *at an appropriate time*” (emphasis added).

In NATO circles, the decisions at the Bucharest Summit have been hailed as a “major breakthrough in defining the Alliance’s stance on missile defence.”² Along the same lines (but

² Quoted from: NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Science and Technology Committee, Missile Defence: The Alliance Perspective, Draft Special Report by Michael Mates, (United Kingdom), *Special Rapporteur*, May 5, 2008, p. 1 (I was invited by the committee chairman to comment on this version on May 24, 2008, at the committee meeting during the spring session of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in Berlin).

slightly more cautious) is the first assessment of the Bucharest summit by Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs Daniel Fried before the Europe Subcommittee on April 23, 2008:

“Fast forward 14 months, and you have NATO formally recognizing that ballistic missile proliferation is a problem, missile defense is a way to deal with the problem, and endorsing the U.S. – both the U.S. system and the U.S. offers of cooperation with Russia. So that’s progress. Not there yet, but it’s a real step forward.” (p. 29)[...]

I’ve spent a lot of time discussing this with the Europeans, and the way the issue exploded in Europe in early ’07 wrong-footed us. We were at a disadvantage, and we paid – we worked the next year to catch up and had to make a lot of arguments – [...] And slowly, as Europeans began to get away from the notion of missile defense as the Star Wars of this decade and started thinking about Iran and North Korea and contingencies, I noticed, we all noticed a sobering up. And the argument is no longer the same. So my answer to you is, they actually have agreed with the premise of our argument. And they agreed so in a formal way at the summit. And now we’re working out the details.” (p. 32)

Certainly, on the declaratory level the Bucharest Summit marks progress regarding NATO’s coherence. Although in the more recent declaration issued on June 10, 2008 – at the meeting in Slovenia with Premier Janez Jansa and the EU leaders José Manuel Barroso and Javier Solana – the shield in Central Europe was not mentioned. Instead it was emphasized that the MD problem needed to be solved within the NATO framework.³ What is more, there are clear indications that under the surface – for instance on the societal level both in Poland and in the Czech Republic – the majority of the populations are (albeit by different margins) against the envisaged deployment. Moreover, a *new* transatlantic cleavage has evolved regarding the assessment of the threat. Warsaw, which has traditionally shared Washington’s threat perception, regards Russia (and not Iran) as the menace justifying the 10 interceptors on Polish territory. Therefore, the current Polish government demands additional (and costly) security measures from the Bush administration. The U.S. government, which fears Iranian long-range missiles, does not share the threat assessment of the Polish government regarding Moscow. It remains to be seen how the Bucharest declaration will be implemented after the utterly MD committed Bush administration leaves office in January 2009.

Let me get back to the consensus issue: Domestic acceptability on a broad scale will continue to be based on sand if this Alliance of democratic states continues to treat its major MD feasibility study as if it were a non-paper. If and when the secrecy turns into transparency and the results of the obviously more than 10,000 page long NATO commissioned study will stand scholarly analysis, both Alliance cohesion and domestic acceptability could triumph – provided that the reached results are convincing and cost-effective. If this is not the case, then

³ *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, June 11, 2008.

it will be difficult, for instance, to put a ‘NATO tag’ on the American-Polish missile defense project – the Polish government reportedly requests that any American anti-ballistic site built in Poland eventually should be part of a NATO and European security architecture.

In the past, the United States has structured the entire issue area of anti-ballistic missiles to a considerable degree. And yet, with all its influence, the United States is a necessary but not a sufficient factor in explaining the policies of other countries in this policy field (these are also two additional major findings of our collection of case studies which compares MD policies in 16 countries).

The United States as the ‘sole superpower’ is in the unique position of enjoying a technologically superior position which is second to none. Its MD budget of some \$9 billion to \$10 billion per year is many times higher than the expenses of all its countries in this military field combined. The George W. Bush administration has continuously and energetically enhanced and enlarged its cooperative security and technological relationships. The structure of U.S.-initiated activities is that of a wheel with spokes – all lead to the American hub in the center, while collaboration among Washington’s partners remains limited or is even sanctioned for non-proliferation and/or economic reasons.

Economic interests are, however, only one element of Washington’s policy in this area. Regional and global interests are at least as important from the perspective of the superpower. Its cooperative plans with Japan and its interest in selling Patriot weapons to India can be seen as steps to enhance and forge strategic alliances with democracies in view of the rise of China. As far as the ‘Old Continent’ of Europe is concerned, Washington has applied its ‘coalition of the willing’ approach towards negotiating the establishment of MD-related facilities in the new democracies in Poland and in the Czech Republic. This was also a way of using the backing of the new loyal Alliance members to put missile defense on the agenda of the 2002 NATO Summit Meeting in Prague – and to put pressure on the old and skeptical NATO allies to come to terms with this issue. Washington’s interest in multilateralism with its focus on the Alliance has been secondary.

All in all, the United States is in the process of building a new hegemony in the post-Cold War era consisting of a system of ‘coalitions of the able and willing’ and based on a technology which is to a high degree unproven and not thoroughly tested. Today (and probably for the time being) the Iranian missile and nuclear-related activities legitimize the American presence on the ‘Old Continent.’ In the current controversy on the U.S. deployment plans in Central Europe the essential issue in the East-West context is in my view how to delineate spheres of interests between the United States and a re-emerging Russia. Deploying

missiles and radars in Poland and in the Czech Republic seems to be an instrument of consolidating the former post-Soviet sphere of influence as part of “the” West, while stationing MD systems in the Ukraine, Georgia or Aserbaidjan would mean intervening into the dynamics of these countries with the aim of enlarging that zone.

Given that the U.S. administrations, especially the current one, comprised the central pushing power in the missile area – what does that mean for the future? In other words, how stable is the reached consensus in the United States on anti-ballistic missiles and what would this mean for Alliance coherence in the years ahead? Let me therefore briefly identify some of the major factors determining the missile defense policy *in the U.S.* and outline a probable trend *in the transatlantic zone*. First of all, this policy field continues to be governed by U.S. law – regardless of whether there will be a Republican or Democrat administration elected on November 4, 2008. Sections 2 and 3 of the “National Missile Defense Act of 1999” signed into law by the Democrat President Bill Clinton reads:

“It is the policy of the United States to deploy as soon as is technologically possible an *effective* National Missile Defense system capable of defending the territory of the United States against limited ballistic missile attacks (whether accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate) with funding subject to the annual authorization of appropriations and the annual appropriation of funds for National Missile Defense.

It is the policy of the United States to seek continued negotiated reduction in Russian nuclear forces.” (Emphasis added)

The bipartisan political consensus is likely to continue. What is more, the continuous and high funding levels of about \$9 billion to \$10 billion per year have created an enormous and densely knit network. Especially in the era of President George W. Bush, the anti-ballistic missile sector has been constituency-driven, not technology-driven. Missile defense with all its variants has become a solid part of the identity of the Republican Party. After many years of domestic controversy, the current administration felt obliged to fulfill its pledge to its constituency. Its *fait accompli* policy meant to terminate the ABM Treaty (see second dimension) and to deploy a system.

The stable network of actors and interests has turned the “ABM, SDI, BMD, MD animal” into a hungry dinosaur which will look for food all the time. It may be unstoppable, yet it has several weaknesses – cost overruns and slippage of various programs – which could lead to some corrections, even if the next administration continues to be a Republican one. These corrections could affect the pace of the program, the level of funding and a greater emphasis on projects which are oriented to meet the risks associated with short- and medium-range missiles. Moreover, a deeper NATO involvement at least into the European-related architecture could become a stronger request from Congress. (The irony of the planned

missile shield in Central Europe is that it is to protect against Iranian long-range missiles that might evolve, whereas it does not constitute an antidote to the medium-range missiles which can already reach parts of NATO.)

There may be one area where the overall bipartisan consensus in Washington would not apply in the future and where major modifications could not be excluded. In my view, the new testing philosophy of the George W. Bush administration is the Achilles heel of the entire MD initiative, as it represents a radical departure from the consensual testing policy after World War II. This ‘spiral development’ or ‘We fly as we buy approach’ of the current U.S. administration lacks performance parameters and operational criteria by which one can judge success. If the hearings conducted by Representatives John Tierney (D-MA) and Ellen Tauscher (D-CA) are a telling indicator, then the central criteria of technological effectiveness and transparency will become more decisive for the future pace and structure of the entire anti-ballistic enterprise.

From a non-American perspective it will be interesting to see how the legislative and executive branches in Washington live up to the central stipulation of the “National Missile Defense Act of 1999” which requests the deployment of an effective system. However, the Pentagon’s Missile Defense Agency conceded in early 2007 that the initial capability of the U.S. missile defense system is not sufficient to protect the United States from the extant and anticipated rogue nation threat.

If the criticism can be validated that the long-range Ground-based Midcourse Defense system deployed in California and Alaska is still unable to differentiate between simple warheads, on the one hand, and decoys and countermeasures on the other hand; if it is true that lack of demonstrated performance of the GMD system against realistic threats is characteristic also of the MD policy of this administration; if most experienced and knowledgeable critics are right that recent GMD flight tests have actually been simpler and less realistic than the tests more than five years ago, as they have not included decoys and countermeasures – then from a non-technician’s perspective the following question becomes urgent: If the new two- and three-stage interceptors to be deployed were cars – would anybody in this audience ‘deploy’ them in their garage, not to mention would anybody dare to drive them and rely on them?

2. Second Dimension: American MD Supporters Fulfilled the Promise of Abolishing the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty – Yet They Have Failed to Establish a New Security Framework

On December 13, 2001, U.S. President George W. Bush announced the unilateral withdrawal of his administration from the ABM Treaty signed and ratified with Moscow in 1972 by

former Republican President Richard Nixon. From an arms control point of view this bilateral agreement was in the first place one of the few treaties which effectively constrained both Washington and Moscow – it forbid an arms build-up in an entire area. But this treaty stood also for détente and cooperative security; with the principles of predictability, irreversibility, and transparency the ABM Treaty contained (at least for three decades) the achievements of traditional treaty-based arms control. In short, the ABM Treaty meant that more security could be achieved through foregoing weapons options.

For the Bush government, however, this bilateral agreement as a relic of the Cold War had not only become anachronistic, but dangerous for the security of the United States, as it ruled out the paramount measure against the growing proliferation of missiles and weapons of mass destruction. From this perspective, technological self-restraint means potential collective suicide. The Bush administration presented itself not only as the destroyer of an obsolete and dangerous treaty norm, but also as the innovative modernizer of Russian-American relations. By abolishing the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the George W. Bush government wanted to remove a stumbling block that perpetuated the Cold War relationship based on distrust and mutual vulnerability (see below). The U.S. administration promised a new strategic framework. In his programmatic speech on May 1, 2001, at the National Defense University, the President declared:

“This new framework must encourage *still further cuts in nuclear weapons*. Nuclear weapons still have a vital role to play in our security and that of our allies...

I am committed to achieving a credible deterrent with the lowest-possible number of nuclear weapons consistent with our security needs, including our obligations to our allies...

Russia and the United States should work together to develop a new foundation for world peace and security in the 21st century. We should leave behind the constraints of an ABM Treaty that perpetuates a relationship based on distrust and mutual vulnerability. This Treaty ignores the fundamental breakthroughs in technology during the last 30 years. It prohibits us from exploring all options for defending against the threats that face us, or allies and other countries.

That’s why we should work together to replace this Treaty with *a new framework that reflects a clear and clean break from the past, and especially from the adversarial legacy of the Cold War*” (emphases added).

Although this new framework is vaguely defined, President Bush’s speech contains three criteria: First, further cuts in nuclear weapons. Second, a cooperative security design with Russia. Third, a clear and clean break from the past. *Seven years after this speech, at the end of the entire George W. Bush era, the actual policy does not live up to these three standards: First, as to further cuts in nuclear weapons: The bilateral Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), signed on May 24, 2002, by Presidents Putin and Bush, aims at reducing*

“strategic nuclear warheads” to between 1,700 and 2,200 by December 2012. And yet, the treaty text does not define “strategic nuclear warheads” and, therefore, does not indicate whether the two parties will count only those warheads that are “operationally deployed.” This implies that those warheads held in reserve are not necessarily counted at all. As of January 2008, the American stockpile contained an estimated 5,400 nuclear warheads and some 1,260 additional warheads held in reserve in the responsive force or inactive stockpile.⁴ Moreover, SORT does neither limit delivery vehicles nor impose limits on specific types of weapon systems. It is not cooperative in the sense that it provides for each party to determine its own “composition and structure of its strategic offensive arms.”

Thus, SORT is a “sort” of reductions agreement which is in several respects weaker than the older START I and II Treaties. The arms control deficits of SORT are even stronger when related to the strengths of the START III Framework that was discussed between Yeltsin and Clinton in March 1997 in Helsinki. At that time, both presidents agreed to explore possible measures for limiting a broader spectrum of weapons, i.e. long-range, nuclear armed, sea-launched Cruise Missiles *and* tactical nuclear weapons. Both Yeltsin and Clinton agreed to explore proposals to enhance *transparency* and *predictability* and to promote the *irreversibility* of warhead reductions, i.e. to foster the essential arms control achievements. But the George W. Bush administration rejected this approach, as it wanted to retain U.S. flexibility and the ability to restore warheads to deployed warheads as provided for in SORT. *Second, as to a cooperative security design with Russia:* From today’s perspective it seems safe to conclude that such a cooperative security design is not in sight. On the contrary, the controversy about missile defense highlights how far both Washington and Moscow have been apart. Elements of a broader strategic framework reportedly have been discussed recently during U.S.-Russian high-level talks. Yet it is too late to elaborate on it seriously in the last months of the outgoing “lame duck” administration, as too much “non-cooperative time” has been wasted.

Skepticism about the likelihood and effectiveness of such a cooperative design in the more narrow and specific MD area is warranted, too. It seems unlikely that increased political instability could be mitigated by an increased level of MD-related cooperation with Russia. This skepticism is due to the numerous (half-hearted) attempts during the East-West conflict and after the demise of the Soviet Union to seriously cooperate with Moscow and with Russian firms in various parts of the missile defense area. There are a number of historically grown structural obstacles in this area which are hard to overcome. Among them are: *political*

⁴ Robert S. Norris/Hans M. Kristensen, U.S. nuclear forces, 2008, in: *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 64, 1, 2008, p. 50.

hurdles in terms of reservations and mistrust against Russia as an equal member under the envisaged umbrella; *economic impediments*: Russian and Western firms compete in the same area, in particular in the sector of anti-tactical missiles; *technological asymmetry*: by and large especially the U.S. technological superiority (and the policy of secrecy that is associated with it to keep this position) are an obstacle for real cooperation.

Third, as to a clear and clean break from the past: Contrary to the perspectives and promises presented in his programmatic speech on May 1, 2001, President George W. Bush and his administration have not been willing and able to forge an adequate, namely a coherent and differentiated arms control/reductions concept that tackles and integrates the vital dimensions as a response to current and future challenges. The energy that this U.S. administration has invested in arms build-ups across the board as well as in blocking and/or not pursuing arms control options has led to a tremendous jam.

A clear and clean break from the past would not necessarily be productive, as it would mean ignoring the unaccomplished arms control missions: This regards especially the conclusion of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and of a Fissile Material Cut-off Agreement, the strengthening of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the further development of the self-binding missile-related regimes (Missile Technology Control Regime/Hague Code of Conduct against the Proliferation of Ballistic Missiles). Partly because of its missile defense plans, arms control treaties have become an endangered species, one reason being that Russia (be it as a pretext, be it as a welcome occasion or as a true reaction) has already suspended the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. What is more, although the U.S. Congress has repeatedly denied Pentagon requests for funds to explore space-based anti-missile system options, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has resurrected that request for Fiscal Year 2009 (starting October 1, 2008). MDA is seeking \$10 million to begin creating a space-based test bed for which funding is to rise annually to \$123 million by Fiscal Year 2013. The reaction by Moscow and Beijing to deny Washington in the mid- and long-term a military monopoly in space is highly likely. Yet at present, there is good news, as the governments of Russia and China on February 12, 2008, presented a joint draft of a treaty banning weapons of space to the UN Conference on Disarmament.⁵

What is more on the positive side, both Moscow and Washington on October 25, 2007, introduced a “Joint Statement” in the UN General Assembly on universalizing the bilateral Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty of December 1987 which eliminated an entire category of most advanced ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles. In order to

⁵ *International Herald Tribune*, February 13, 2008.

live up to the promise of a new comprehensive and common strategic framework, this joint initiative could be a good starting point. Needless to say that major “non-integrative non-proliferation instruments”⁶ such as the Proliferation Security Initiative and UN Security Council Resolution 1540 should be assessed.

All in all, it will be helpful to revive vital traditional arms control standards and achievements such as transparency, irreversibility, and predictability, if one wants to be future-oriented in a constructive way. To look back does not at all exclude the innovative framework presented by the “Gang of Four” of U.S. Elder Statesmen (George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn). Their second programmatic article “Toward a Nuclear-Free World” (*The Wall Street Journal*, January 15, 2008) is oriented towards a vision that has a Republican as well as a U.S.-Soviet tradition (catchword: Reykjavik Summit in October 1986), and offers at the same time concrete steps, including a role for missile defense.

3. Third Dimension: One School of Missile Defense Supporters Thinks that This Military-Technological Path Is Morally Superior to Nuclear Deterrence and Should Replace It

Within the community of MD supporters there is a split of whether this “defensive option” should *replace* the offense-dominant nuclear deterrence system – or whether MD should aim at the opposite objective by *enhancing* that very security structure based on nuclear deterrence. The dichotomy of the replacement and enhancement paradigms has been visible at least from President Ronald Reagan’s historic TV speech of March 23, 1983, onward.

The vision of a (virtually) impenetrable shield envisaged by the former Republican president was supported by a considerable number of conservative intellectuals mostly outside U.S. governments. For them, the Strategic Defense Initiative (as MD was called during the Reagan era) was to overcome the existing security system based on mutual assured destruction by replacing it with a security system based on mutual assured survival: Instead of providing security by menacing the annihilation of the attacking enem(ies), bullets were to hit bullets.

What a good idea – if (an identifiable threat presupposed) it ever was technologically feasible, financially affordable and not counterproductive in that it did neither lead to an arms race nor had negative effects on the political and military stability. So far, the technology has been the most insurmountable hurdle. The new security arrangement would amount to a truly profound revolution in military affairs including thinking, doctrine, and the operational level. If the nuclear age is any guide for the development of missile defense, there must be a revolutionary

⁶ Oliver Meier, Non-integrative arms control. Assessing the effectiveness of new approaches to preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction, in: *Sicherheit und Frieden/Pace and Security*, 26, 2, 2008, p 53.

military innovation at some point such as the nuclear bomb as a minimum precondition – yet a silver bullet has not been found in the missile defense area.

To be sure, the goals of the morally superior security system of mutual assured survival were used as a selling device to the (American) public even by those who favored missile defense for the opposite objective of enhancing deterrence. Nevertheless, in none of the U.S. administrations, be they Republican or Democrat, did the replacement paradigm become entrenched. In fact, attractive as it may be, the security system based on mutual assured survival remained an alien element even in the Reagan administration. The legendary strategist and (later) arms control proponent Paul Nitze, supported especially by the military, became the first leading representative of that Republican Reagan government whose criteria turned the replacement paradigm into its opposite – until today the major goal of missile defense is to enhance nuclear deterrence. *To conclude, the original goal of replacing the currently dominant security arrangement based on nuclear deterrence has not been fulfilled.*

4. Fourth Dimension: For a Second School of MD Supporters This Option Is to Enhance Nuclear Deterrence (And They Claim That It Has Already Done So)

Most of us at this conference share the discomfort (“Unbehagen”) with atomic weapons as a basis of security for a variety of reasons. At least at first glance, many supporters of a territorial shield are dissatisfied with a specific aspect of nuclear weapons. They doubt that the major assumption of conventional deterrence theory can be applied any longer. In their view, the new (potential) enemies at the state and the sub-state level (terrorist organizations) cannot be regarded as rational, i.e. as deterrable actors, who are frightened to use weapons of mass destruction even if they face a devastating nuclear retaliation by a country such as the United States. The events of 9/11 are cited as evidence of the irrationality of actors who are willing to commit collective suicide. The second school of MD supporters does not aim at replacing nuclear weapons, but at making nuclear deterrence more effective or reliable by adding (tactical) missile defense – neither mutual assured survival nor nuclear disarmament are realistic goals for them.

For assessing the promises of missile defense, the crucial relationship between defense and deterrence generates at least four major questions. First, how really convinced are MD supporters that the leaderships in Pyongyang and Tehran would not act rationally, that is to say would risk a nuclear retaliation as an (American or Israeli) response to a North Korean or Iranian attack or to intense political blackmailing? Second, are the premises and scenarios, for example, regarding an Iranian threat credible? Third, under what conditions could MD

provide an additional, tangible value to strengthen the existing security arrangement based on mutual assured destruction? Fourth, is the claim that the currently deployed anti-ballistic weapons have already enhanced nuclear deterrence, empirically sound? My premise is that in order to deal with the deterrability issue in an adequate way, it is vital to differentiate between states and sub-state terrorist actors.

First, as to the views of many MD supporters regarding the deterrability of states. A closer look reveals that even strong proponents of anti-ballistic programs (are compelled to) rely on nuclear retaliation. Conservative realists in the Bush administration, including hardliners such as former Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Robert Joseph, have indicated that they regard the regimes in Pyongyang and Tehran hardly as suicidal. The relevant statements predate the last National Intelligence Estimate on Iran of November 2007 by all 16 U.S. intelligence services (“Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities”). The intelligence community unanimously declared the Iranian leadership as rational decision-makers: Its decision to halt the Iranian military nuclear program in 2003 was “primarily in response to international pressure.” This indicated that “Tehran’s decisions are guided by a cost-benefit approach rather than a rush to a weapon irrespective of the political, economic, and military costs.”

Outside the Bush administration the statements by Keith Payne, one of the leading and staunchest supporters of American MD programs, reflect at least an ambivalent attitude towards the deterrability issue. Payne made two interesting remarks in this regard on July 18, 2007, before the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee chaired by Rep. Ellen Tauscher (D-CA). His first statement reads:

“In the contemporary environment of multiple WMD threats and deterrence uncertainty, it’s critical that the U.S. approach to deterrence strategy includes, rather than eschews, defensive capabilities. *A balance of terror will not provide predictable protection against perplexing leaders such as North Korea’s Kim Jong Il or Iran’s President Ahmadinedjad.* Deterrence can and likely will fail unpredictably in the future as it has in the past, and in those instances it will be most important to limit damage to our society and to our economy to the extent possible.” (p. 14, emphasis added)

When asked later in the Hearing by Rep. David Loebsack (D-IA) whether he had said that “deterrence would probably fail against Kim Jong Il Ahmadinedjad,” Keith Payne gave a different assessment about the effect of nuclear deterrence related to Pyongyang and Tehran:

“No. What I said is as we look into the future, given the uncertainties of deterrence, I think we can be confident that deterrence will fail in the future as it has failed in the past. *Whether it will be specifically against North Korea or Iran is an open question.*” (p. 30, emphasis added)

In short, from Keith Payne's last remark one can cautiously conclude: One of the most articulate and fervent MD societal supporters in the United States does not exclude that nuclear deterrence may be sufficient regarding North Korea and Iran. It is this dimension of deterrence that brings us to *the heart of the entire MD debate* in which that nucleus is usually ignored. At the end of the day the essential question of the MD debate regards (nuclear) deterrence, not missile defense, as an essential component of security.⁷ To conclude with the classical statement by former U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen of April 26, 2000:

“We have a retaliatory capability that if anyone should ever be foolhardy enough to launch a missile attack of a limited or expanded nature against the United States, they would be destroyed in the process. That ordinarily should be a sufficient deterrent for the North Koreans, Iran, Iraq or Libya or any other country that would seek to acquire this capability.”

Second, as to the credibility of the premises and scenarios, for example, regarding an Iranian threat. These two states (especially the Islamic Republic) are regarded as *the* rationale behind the planned deployment of the ten interceptors in Poland and the radar system in the Czech Republic – there is no other country on the list of additional emerging nuclear powers and, therefore, would-be-proliferators. In this context, Assistant Secretary Daniel Fried stated before the Europe and Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade Subcommittees of the House Foreign Affairs Committee chaired by Rep. Robert Wexler (D-FL) on May 3, 2007: “We do not want Iran to be able to use a nuclear arsenal to extend its power, *nor to threaten Europe*. That is the relationship, the configuration we wish to avoid [...]” (p. 15, emphasis added)

As a European, I wonder: Why should any Iranian president intend to attack his most important trading partner, the European Union? I know of no statement even by the usually aggressive President Ahmadinejad in which he has threatened Europe. By the same token, the MD supporters in the Bush administration have not come up with clear-cut and convincing examples of a threat uttered by the Iranian president towards the United States (the situation for Israel is of course entirely different).

The deterrability-related aspect emerges as a political variant in scenarios by MD proponents in which a (nuclear) Iran blackmails Europe. The reverse side of this concern is the objective of gaining additional freedom of action in the Middle East by missile defense. MD proponents cite two scenarios. According to the first one, a multinational coalition would in an Iraq war-like manner invade Iran in order to prevent a nuclear Islamic Republic. In this case, the soldiers would be protected by anti-tactical missiles. I have to leave open how effective those

⁷ Again, this does not mean that the nuclear posture should and could not be drastically reduced – on the contrary.

systems against Iranian short-range missiles would be. At the same time, I would submit that I find such a scenario fairly far-fetched and hardly realistic.

A second scenario (presented by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Fried before Congress on May 3, 2007) assumes the following:

“What Ahmadinejad [in a statement by the Iranian President that Fried had quoted earlier, BWK] was telling the Europeans is, ‘Iran may be in a position to threaten Israel, and I will make sure that Iran is in a position to threaten you so that you cannot come to Israel’s assistance.’ [...] The situation we want to avoid is one where Europe would be in a position of absolute vulnerability through an Iranian nuclear capability, even a small one, thereby decoupling transatlantic security, also giving Iran an ability to use its other (sic!) forces – its support for terrorism in the Middle East, and perhaps at some point conventional forces – to threaten Israel.” (p. 14f)

This scenario and its premises are doubtful in many respects. Three aspects deserve special attention:

- First, the Iranian leadership, President Ahmadinejad included, is again not only regarded as a risk-taker, but, at first glance at least, also as non-deterrable. But it is noteworthy that Assistant Secretary Fried, in outlining this scenario, remarked on May 3, 2007, before the Congressional Subcommittees chaired by Rep. Wexler: Ahmadinejad “may be an extremist, but he is not stupid.” p. 14) – and, one would hasten to add, he is not a suicidal actor either.⁸ The virtue of missiles is that they have a tag which identifies the sender as a likely target for (nuclear) retaliation.
- Second, the scenario takes the increased freedom of action provided by missile defense as an indisputable fact. This, however, would presuppose the technical feasibility of this military technology. Yet this premise is highly doubtful (see below).
- This very scenario is missing in a remarkable article written by Uzi Rubin, the technical father of the Israeli anti-ballistic missile system “Arrow,” on the “Essence of the Trans-Atlantic Missile Shield” (*Defense News*, May 19, 2008, p. 29). The reason could be that Rubin regards the Fried scenario not as (that) important and/or as (that) realistic.

Third, as to the conditions under which MD could provide an additional, tangible value to the enhancement of nuclear deterrence. This point was addressed by Assistant Secretary Daniel Fried on April 23, 2008, before the Europe Subcommittee:

“[...] I would not want to have no recourse to an Iranian nuclear missile –a nuclear armed missile – other than preemption or retaliation. *I want to have an alternative.* Or,

⁸ One should note that any Iranian president is not identical with the heterogeneous elite in that country and that he is supposedly not the central figure within the command and control structures, but the religious leader who would have his finger at the nuclear trigger. Ahmadinedjad may not get re-elected anyway in 2009 and lose against the more moderate and low-key president of the Iranian Parliament, Ali Laridjani.

to put it in another way, Ahmadinejad with nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles really worries me. The thought of that bothers me. [...] I want the United States to have an option to protect its homeland and its allies from that contingency.” (p. 30f., emphasis added)

Assistant Secretary Fried’s claim (“I want to have an alternative.”) implies that MD will provide such an alternative to pre-emption or retaliation. But he does not specify under which conditions this option would be credible. One essential precondition is technological feasibility, which in turn, presupposes reliable results from realistic testing. Yet this premise is highly questionable, it is at least highly controversial. Therefore, it seems appropriate to consider Assistant Secretary Fried’s claim as wishful thinking – or as a way of providing false security.

If anti-ballistic weapons are considered that important – would it not be plausible to expect them to play a vital role on the doctrinal and operational level at least in the United States? To the best of my knowledge, this is hardly the case. This is best and authoritatively reflected in the Pentagon’s spring 2005 draft of its “Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations” which incorporates the Nuclear Posture Review and other important directives. This new doctrine describes missile defense as an instrument to protect military troops only. It mentions defense of the population only three times and always in a secondary role after protection of military forces.

This reversal of priorities is in contrast with President Bush’s former policy when he announced the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in December 2001, emphasizing that defending the American people was his “highest priority as commander in chief,” and that “I cannot and will not allow the United States to remain in a treaty that prevents us from developing effective defenses.” One objective of protecting military forces is to enhance U.S. offensive nuclear strike capabilities. The new doctrine reaffirms an aggressive nuclear posture of modernized atomic weapons maintained on high alert. Planning for regional nuclear-strikes is seen by some observers as an “increasingly expeditionary aura that threatens to make nuclear weapons just another tool in the toolbox. The result is nuclear pre-emption, which the new doctrine enshrines into official U.S. joint nuclear doctrine for the first time [...]”⁹

More recent basic strategic papers presented by the U.S. civilian and military leadership do not provide a clear role for missile defense either.¹⁰ On paper the U.S. military strategy with missile defense as an integral part looks coherent (see Appendix 5), but in practice, for

⁹ Hans M. Kristensen, The Role of U.S. Nuclear Weapons: New Doctrine Falls Short of Bush Pledge, in: *Arms Control Today*, 35, 7, 2005, p. 18.

¹⁰ This applies to: The President of the United States, National Security Strategy, March 16, 2006; U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 6, 2006; Chairman (Peter Pace) of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, February 13, 2006.

instance towards Iran, the broader concept is inconsistent. The planned deployment in Central Europe may undercut the strategy of isolating Tehran by using the instrument of sanctions. It could easily signal to the Iranian elites that the sanctioning states do not believe in the expected effect of the applied coercive measures – a missile shield would be a kind of reassurance with respect to the Islamic Republic that stubbornly pursues its nuclear option. Moreover, the fielding of the ten interceptors and the radar is incompatible with the concept of regime change. Ideally, such a shield would not be needed against a democratic elite in Tehran – or does an umbrella signal that its (neo-conservative) supporters in the United States do believe a) that a new government in Tehran would not give up its atomic aspirations?

In addition, it is unlikely that the deployed missiles will protect Europe or the United States against Iranian (asymmetric) military measures in case of regime change and a bombing of its nuclear facilities. For the Pentagon's Missile Defense Agency on February 5, 2007, in its budget requests for Fiscal Year 2008, candidly acknowledged that the Ground-based Missile Defense system has no demonstrated effectiveness to defend either American territory [or Europe, one could add]: "This initial capability is not sufficient to protect the United States from the extant and anticipated rogue nation threat."

Assistant Secretary Daniel Fried chaired by Rep. Wexler:

To summarize, the MD fielding will not play a protective role in the current Iranian crisis. For the time being as well as in the long-term the prospects for this role look bleak, if one concurs with Assistant Secretary Fried's assessment of April 23, 2008, before the Europe Subcommittee:

"Preemption has its downsides, rather serious ones. So does retaliation. *When I think 25 years into the future*, a modest missile defense system can be deeply stabilizing. A massive defense system is probably unachievable technologically. That is, if you're trying to defend against the Russian strategic arsenal, can't do it. So don't try. Against smaller threats, there's a strong strategic argument." (p. 31, emphasis added)

Fourth, as to the – empirically not corroborated – assertion that the currently deployed anti-ballistic weapons have already enhanced deterrence. MD proponents relate this claim to North Korea. What is more, leading military and civilian Pentagon officials of the Bush administration have tried try to square the circle by assuming that even the current Ground-based Missile Defense system has had a moderating effect on Pyongyang's behavior even before the GMD system can be regarded as operationally effective.¹¹ On July 4, 2006,

¹¹ The testimony of General James E. Cartwright, Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, on March 28, 2007, before the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Service Committee is a rhetorically impressive example of how this can be done – although the general's interpretation of the facts is questionable. In answering to Senator Nelson's (D-FL) question whether a national missile defense system does have to be operationally effective to be credible, the commander replied: "If you are on a path that is credible – and we are a relatively

Pyongyang tested seven missiles, its long-range missile Taepo-Dong 2, which according to U.S. official assessments can reach American territory. For the first time, the Bush administration reportedly put its missile defense system on alert. The Taepo-Dong 2 test failed. The claim by American MD supporters that the North Korean test activities have been deterred by U.S. missile defense programs, as Pyongyang did not continue the testing of the long-range missiles, misses the point. For it is highly likely that the interruption is a reaction to UN Security Council Resolution 1695 which threatens economic sanctions if the North Korean regime resumes testing. Moreover, MD as a deterrent did not work, as the regime in October 2006 even conducted a nuclear underground test.¹²

To summarize, the answers given to the four deterrence-related questions lead to the conclusion: The claims and promises of MD supporters have either not been fulfilled or their assertions are linked to conditions which have not become reality. First, many MD supporters are not really convinced that the leadership in Pyongyang and Tehran would risk nuclear retaliation as an (American or Israeli) response to a North Korean or Iranian attack or to intense political blackmailing. Second, central premises (Iran threatening Europe militarily) as well as the far-fetched and unrealistic scenarios regarding the blackmailing of Europe are not credible. Third, the (technological) conditions under which anti-ballistic systems could provide an additional, tangible value to nuclear deterrence have not yet materialized. Fourth, the claim that the currently deployed anti-ballistic weapons have already enhanced deterrence in the case of North Korea's test activities on July 4, 2006, are not empirically sound.

Finally, let me be brief on the question whether terrorist organizations are deterrable. They are probably not, and here I am less optimistic than Keith Payne in the corresponding context of the mentioned testimony on July 19, 2007. My counterargument would be that missile defense is not an answer to terrorists' activities, as they might try to launch bombs from ships near the coast of a country regarded as hostile; they might try to smuggle the WMD components into such a target country – or, even more likely, if the events of “9/11” are any guide, they might continue their asymmetric warfare by using low-tech-tools such as airplanes. Against this backdrop missile defense is anachronistic.

open society, so people watch tests, they watch and openly debate whether things worked or didn't work. But as you gain momentum and credibility in your test program, you *may well start to influence* deterrence before you are operational. And that has *to some extent* occurred with missile defense.

It takes [...] more than one side to this equation. We had an adversary in this case who was positioned in the area where we were developing missile defense. He, around the Fourth of July, decided to fire off some missiles. We had capability. That was discussed very openly. The dialogue went back and forth. All of that *has lent* to the credibility of deterrence. That is *maybe ahead* of the actual operational capabilities we intend to field, but certainly recognizes where they're going and that there is *credibility in the vector that it's on.*" (p. 30f.; emphases added)

¹² I would like to thank PRIF's expert on North Korea, Hans-Joachim Schmidt, for his advice on this issue.

5. Fifth Dimension: MD Is to Prevent or at Least to Slow Down Proliferation – Yet Exporting Anti-Ballistic Missile Technology Means Spreading Missile Technology

The claim ‘Horizontal arms control by missile defense’ has not been fulfilled so far. This argument contradicts the claim of virtually all MD supporters that the pace of proliferation has increased. Even if one does not buy this assessment, there is no tangible evidence that MD has so far deterred other countries from pursuing their activities in the missile and nuclear area. The arms control argument is based on the premise that the governments in question give up or slow down their programs, because they realize that the U.S. shield cannot be sufficiently penetrated by their missiles. Not only the already mentioned North Korean test activities, but the missile programs of the Islamic Republic of Iran contradict the horizontal arms control assertion.

What is more, this claim includes at least indirectly the dimension of vertical proliferation, too. To the extent that North Korea and Iran have accelerated their given programs, MD proponents have a hard time validating their case.

Additional examples for missile defense as an impediment for a country to go nuclear could be Japan and South Korea. Here again, the findings are ambivalent at best. In Japan only some pro-MD analysts who represent a minority view have suggested that missile defense could be a useful substitute for a nuclear deterrent. South Korea is a clear-cut case for a strong mood in the public to go nuclear if the reconciliation process with the North fails; missile defense is simply not seen as an efficient option to counter Pyongyang’s arsenal. Again, MD supporters have not convincingly addressed this issue.

Florence Nightingale once said: “Whatever hospitals do, they should not spread diseases.” Because of the enormous technological overlap, I am afraid that the spread of MD technology violates the principle of Britain’s most famous nurse. For exporting and licensing anti-ballistic technology inherently contributes to the proliferation of missiles and is therefore potentially counterproductive. These activities undermine the existing missile-related control regimes.

6. Sixth Dimension: Missile Defense Is “Purely Defensive”

The assessment of this promise is dependent on scenarios and policies. The overall result of this promise is mixed at best. The German Patriot anti-tactical missile system fielded in Israel during the last two Gulf Wars, with the Israeli government being passive, supports the MD supporters’ claim. The export of the Patriot was seen as unproblematic because it was in fact regarded as ‘purely defensive.’ In the missile defense-related debate of late 2002 through

early 2003, prior to the looming American-led invasion to topple Saddam Hussein, German politicians obviously assumed that Israel would again behave as it did in the Gulf War in 1991. The clear-cut characterization of the Patriots was used in conjunction with the moral obligation to help the state of Israel secure its physical existence, an argument present since the early days of the Federal Republic.

When the government in Ankara requested Dutch and German Patriot batteries to defend especially the eastern cities of Diyarbakir and Batman against Iraqi tactical ballistic missiles, the government in Berlin decided in mid-February 2003 to deliver 46 Patriot interceptors via the Netherlands to Turkey. Yet, this delivery was subject to conditions, as the seemingly defensive Patriot rockets could be used in an offensive scenario. This is shown by Berlin's threat in the early days of the Iraq war to withdraw its Patriots, as well as by its Airborne Early Warning and Control Systems (AWACS). The threat was conditional in case Turkey became directly involved in the war on Iraqi territory, since the weapons would then become part of an offensive strategy. This scenario-dependent reasoning was complicated by the fact that about 4,000 Turkish soldiers were already positioned in northern Iraq. Neither the AWACS nor the Patriot systems were actually withdrawn, as the Berlin government saw the Turks abide by its conditions.

The non-delivery of German missile defense systems to the United States was not scenario-dependent but reflected policy priorities. The Schröder/Fischer cabinet said 'No' to the Bush administration which at the end of 2002 turned for support to Berlin. These requests were a major test for Chancellor Schröder's campaign position that Germany would not participate in military operations. On the other hand, the wish list was also a major challenge by Washington. The Bush administration was asking for solidarity from its closest and most faithful ally on the key issue of its foreign policy. Berlin's highly symbolic 'No' to the delivery of Patriots reflected the broader and deeper 'No' to the U.S.-led war against Saddam Hussein.

Looking into the future, missile defense schemes that live truly up to the standard of being 'purely defensive' are possible on a case-by-case basis. Whether this assessment is a solid basis for the foreign policy identity of democracies or an ensemble of democratic states in the framework of NATO (with its nuclear first-use policy) or the European Union is a different issue.

7. Overall Assessment: (Under What Circumstances) Does Missile Defense Increase Security?

My way of assessing the promises of MD supporters has all in all led to a skeptical to negative result. It is all the more important to turn in a first step to my commentators and ask them: Are my mentioned claims fair and correct? Are they empirically sound? Did I miss others? Are my assessments one-sided or are they transparent and plausible?

In a second step we shall be entering the sequence of panels which are structuring our conference according to the four Clinton criteria: the threat from ballistic missiles, the costs, technological feasibility, as well as the implications for the international strategic environment and for arms control. In addition, we shall be discussing the missile (defense) problem on the sub-state level. Yet we look beyond technological answers to basically political problems and shall be assessing the role of other foreign policy tools, sanctions, bombing, and diplomacy. The final round will put these tools – of course, missile defense among them – into the visionary context of (nuclear) disarmament, as suggested by four Elder – and I hasten to add – Wise Statesmen.

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