

Berthold Meyer

With an Excursus by Dörthe Rosenow

## **The Concept of “Innere Führung” and Its Translation Into the Agenda of Socialisation of German Soldiers**

German Case

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## 1. Introduction

When the Allies allowed Western Germany to build a new army, the Bundeswehr, they intended to prevent the rebirth of German militarism. But they also wanted a strong German army being able to protect the western side of the Iron Curtain against an aggression of the Soviet Union, while at the same time aiming for an army which none of the western allies had to fear. Therefore, after the Bundeswehr was founded in 1956, on the one hand the German soldiers were to be well equipped and trained and on the other hand the army was fully integrated into NATO immediately. Moreover, the political leadership of the Bundeswehr was assigned to the civil Ministry of Defence but had to be transferred to the Federal Chancellor in a case of war, while at the same time no General Staff was installed for taking over the military leadership.

To avoid the rebirth of the German militarism, even before the first new soldier was enlisted, also a completely new image of a democratic soldier was created called “citizen in uniform”. This term suggested that the soldiers should not longer belong to a profession *sui generis*. Instead, they were supposed to be seen by the society and to see themselves as citizens with more or less the same civil rights as civilians and doing their jobs, armed, just like ordinary unarmed citizens. To identify soldiers<sup>1</sup> as “citizen in uniform” is, as Jürgen Groß mentions, not the best characterization, as also policemen or firemen and other service men wear uniforms. But naming the soldiers “citizens in uniform” aimed at emphasizing their new democracy-oriented education which was introduced by General Wolf Graf von Baudissin as the central aspect of his concept of “Innere Führung” at the outset of the Bundeswehr. This concept of leadership, training and civic education and its realisation will be described and analyzed in the centre of the following report. But before, an overview of the scope of education and training in the Bundeswehr will be given.

## 2. The Training of Soldiers

The Bundeswehr calls itself a conscription army, although during the Cold War about 50 percent of the soldiers were longer or shorter-service volunteers or professional soldiers. After 1990 the total number of military personnel was reduced in several steps from 495.000 to 244.865 (Dec. 2007), while the proportion between normal compulsory soldiers<sup>2</sup> (33.597) and “voluntarily longer serving draftees”<sup>3</sup> (21.409) on the one hand and

1 In this paper the male version of soldiers is used for the time until women were allowed to serve voluntarily in all sectors of the Bundeswehr.

2 They are serving for nine months, either continuously for all this time or in one phase of six months for the general basis education as well as a short time training and afterwards during the next two years the rest in two training phases of six weeks each.

3 They are serving between 10 and 23 months and earn in this time to their regular service pay (351,30 €) an additional salary of 613,50 €(10th -12th month), 675 €(from 13th month on), 736,30 €(from 19th month on).

longer or shorter-service volunteers<sup>4</sup> and professional soldiers (189.859) on the other hand shifted considerably towards the latter.

Today, the Bundeswehr has the following number of soldiers, here divided into the respective military branches:

|   |        |
|---|--------|
| Army (Heer)                                     | 99.998 |
| Air Force (Luftwaffe)                           | 44.183 |
| Navy (Marine)                                   | 18.830 |
| Military basis organisation (Streitkräftebasis) | 54.332 |
| Central Medical Service                         | 18.472 |
| Others  | 9.050  |

## 2.1 The General Basis Education

All recruits (draftees as well as volunteers) take part in a general basis education (“Allgemeine Grundausbildung”, AGA) during the first three months after joining the army. During this time they are informed about their rights and duties and on the relevancy of the military service. The recruits receive political education, combat training including firing a gun, sports, medical instructions, and the so called “formal-service” instruction (marching in file, greeting of superiors etc.). This basis education and training phase is in principle the same for all three military branches Army, Air-force and Navy as well for the organisational branch “Military Basis”. Only those who serve in the Central Medical Service and will not have combatant status later, do not need intensive training in fighting and shooting. Therefore, their basis education only lasts two months. Also, the course for the recruits of the navy is a little different: They receive six weeks general military education and six weeks special navy education.

During the general basis education the recruits also receive important prerequisites for later education units of the non-commissioned officers and officers. In addition, this time is used for preparation for deployments abroad. A special high point during the general basis education is the solemn promise of the draftees and the solemn oath of the volunteers which they usually give/swear at the end of the AGA.

4 Men and women have the choice to make contracts over four, six, eight, twelve or 15 years, a prolongation up to 20 years is possible.

At the end of this education phase the soldiers join the units in which they stay for the following period of time, with the length of their stay depending on their status. Those who are regular draftees will not take part in missions abroad, but those who stay in the Bundeswehr for up to 23 months or as volunteers or professional soldiers normally will be involved in a deployment and get intensive training for this.

## **2.2 The Education and Training of Non-Commissioned Officers**

Persons who want to become non-commissioned officers have to contract for four years or longer with the Bundeswehr. Those, who want to obtain special skills like an electronic technician or a member of a submarine crew have to contract for at least six years.

There are two different careers for non-commissioned officers in the Bundeswehr: one for those who join the technical specialist service (“Fachdienst”) and one for those who join the combat service (“Truppendienst”). Non-commissioned officers of the technical specialist service are assigned to special tasks for a longer period of time, e.g. as an IT-specialist, a medical-technical assistant or a musician. They often join the Bundeswehr after getting a first qualification in this field in their civil life, but they receive higher qualifications during their time in the army which can be very useful for a later civil career. It is possible for members of this service to change into the combat service.

The career of non-commissioned officers in the combat service is designed for men and women who join the troops not only with a certain qualification but who intend to take over responsibility as military superiors. Their training differs depending on the branch they are assigned to (Army, Air Force, Navy, Medical Service and Military Music Service). But in general, it alternates between phases of theoretical education (including leadership qualifications) and practical training. The training and education to the rank of a non-commissioned officer lasts 15 months and to the rank of a sergeant four years. Soldiers who receive the rank of a sergeant or a first mate become leaders of a group of up to ten recruits.

## **2.3 The Education and Training of Officers**

Young men and women who want to become officers of the Bundeswehr have to have completed either final secondary-school examinations (“Abitur”) or secondary-school I certificates plus professional education (“Fachhochschulreife”). All officer candidates of the Bundeswehr receive specific education and training for 15 months before starting their studies at one of the Bundeswehr-Universities.<sup>5</sup> In the Army this phase starts with a course for officer candidates (OAL) of six months in one of three officer-candidates-battalions. During this course military basic knowledge is to be learned: general basis

5 Die neue Offiziersausbildung im Heer <http://treff.bundeswehr.de/C1256FC400421173/Print/W16YCKJ..> (05.05.2008). A brochure of the Personalamt der Bundeswehr on “Offizier der Luftwaffe” (officer of the air force), however, says that those who want to become officer of the air force have also the possibility to start studying either after 15 or after 12 months with the autumn term of the university.

education, combat service, physical training and deployment-related training, military law under the special aspect of the rights and duties of superiors as well as human resources management. The focus of this course lies on learning of a common military tool and on the training of infantry combat and shooting. In a recent information sheet the Bundeswehr stresses that in the new organisation of this course the former division between “classical” combat service and training for conflict prevention and crisis management has been “deliberately cancelled”.<sup>6</sup>

Afterwards, the officer candidates have to pass three further education modules, each of three months. The first aims to qualify them to manage the tasks of a lieutenant of the Army. The second prepares for international deployments by gathering the standardized capability profile “3332” in English. The last module serves to become acquainted with the practice of taking command of a military unit. At the end of these 15 months the officer candidates are promoted to the rank of a *Fahnenjunker* (ensign).

Then the young officers with commitments of at least 12 years join one of the two universities of the Bundeswehr in Hamburg and Munich for the time of about three years (see below). Those who stay less than 12 years start with a second officers’ course or a specific training with the weapons they shall use in a deployment or with aeronautical education and training.

After finishing their studies the officers go back to military service, receive training in leadership and afterwards – similar to the shorter voluntaries for whom it was not possible to study – participate in a second officers’ course or a specific training with the weapons they shall use in a deployment or with aeronautical education and training. Officers with good qualifications in their military education and/or in their deployment practice then have the possibility to pursue a career in the Ministry of Defence, the Bundeswehr itself and/or NATO. It is common that those who qualify for the highest ranks switch between the ministry, command functions in the military service and NATO Headquarters from time to time, attending courses at the German Military Academy (*Führungsakademie*) of the Bundeswehr in Hamburg inbetween. At this academy all professionals of the combat service take part in basic staff courses (*Stabsoffizierlehrgang*). During this part of their training and education it is also possible to gain cognitions for planning the further employment of the officers. After successful examination they receive the rank staff officer. Most of them later take part in an advanced training course for staff officers (*Stabsoffizierfortbildungslehrgang*), but only few are chosen for the participation in the course for the service in the general- or admiral staff (*Lehrgang Generalstabs-/Admiralstabsdienst*) (cf. *Führungsakademie* 2008).

6 Die neue Offiziersausbildung im Heer <http://treff.bundeswehr.de/C1256FC400421173/Print/W16YCKJ..> (05.05.2008).

## 2.4 Contents and Goals of the Non-Military Teaching Agenda at the Bundeswehr Universities

Studying of the officers at the Bundeswehr universities serves for different purposes, last but not least for the implementation of “Innere Führung” (see below, Ch. 3). When Helmut Schmidt as Minister of Defence initiated the foundation of these Universities, they were to be organized similar to civil universities and not to serve as academies for only military purposes. Therefore the professors and other members of the teaching staff are civilians. The opening of the universities in 1973 was an important measure to form new generations of democracy-oriented officers, because all officers who wanted to stay at the Bundeswehr for 12 and more years or who wanted to serve as professional soldiers have had to take part in lessons of a so called “integrales Anleitstudium (EGA)” (integrated general studies) with a special focus on political and social sciences, psychology and educational sciences, independent of their specific study programme (for example Mechanical Engineering or Business Administration). This strategy aimed to facilitate the integration of educational, social and intercultural demands. Further it is supposed to help to reflect the own political actions in professional contexts.

A report of the Bundeswehr University Munich from 2002 summarises that also thirty years later there is a consensus in the ministry, in the single parts of the Bundeswehr (Teilstreitkräfte) and in the two universities that the EGA concept makes sense. But the changed societal framework conditions and demands to the graduates of the university would make it urgent to come to reforms. As 80 percent of the students leave the Bundeswehr after 12 years and have to find a civil job, also the demands of enterprises, administrative institutions and other potential employers come into play. The actual situation shows “that the EGA concept is more attractive than ever, but that the reality is judged to be disappointing by the students as well as by their professors”. The Bundeswehr University Munich meets these demands with the new concept “studium plus”: re-launch of working in small groups, orientation at current issues and relation to occupational areas, horizontal information in issue oriented seminars, procurement of action-oriented knowledge by practical training (cf. Universität der Bundeswehr München 2002).

The faculties are not identically at the Helmut-Schmidt-University of the Bundeswehr, Hamburg, and the University of the Bundeswehr Munich which includes a university of applied sciences (Fachhochschule). But at both universities it is possible to attend a broad scope of studies from technical over economical to social sciences and the humanities. The level of studies and the degrees are comparable to those at civil universities in the States of Hamburg and Bavaria. At both universities it is possible to attain a doctoral degree and to habilitate.

In spite of all named similarities with civil universities, studying at the universities of the Bundeswehr differs from studying there under several aspects: 1. The learning conditions for officer-students are generally better than for civil students, because lieutenants get their salaries during the whole time and can therefore concentrate on their studies which enables them to finish earlier, while civil students often have to work while study-

ing at the same time. 2. That makes it possible for these universities to organize the study programme in three terms of three months a year with the aim to finish in three years, while civil students have two terms of nearly four months a year which – before the implementation of the Bologna process and the introduction of Bachelor and Master Degrees – meant that Diploma- and Magister-courses would take four or more years to finish. In accordance to the Bologna process the Bundeswehr-universities also have changed their system to Bachelor and Master Degrees. That means that their curricula are compatible not only in Germany but all over Europe. While it is principally possible for civil students to study at a Bundeswehr-university, this has never happened in reality.

Besides the possibility to study at a good university under better economic conditions than civil students, longer or shorter voluntary serving officers as well as non-commissioned officers are offered to take part in comprehensive courses to find a good way back into an appropriate civil job when leaving the military. As the economic situation of Germany is improving, the Bundeswehr finds itself competing with private enterprises for “narrow human resources” – a situation that keeps demanding “new (recruiting) efforts”. In this competition important factors for the attractiveness of the Bundeswehr are “remuneration, learning opportunities, modern methods of working and particularly the modern human resources management which is not only administrating the personnel but also taking great care of the justified concerns of the members of staff,” said the department chief for Human Resources Management in the Ministry of Defence, Wilmers, in November 2006.<sup>7</sup> This sentence is supposed to describe reality. In view of the fact that the “corporate identity” of many members of the Bundeswehr at the same time has reached a very low level (Cf. BundeswehrVerband 2007; Meyer 2007: 27), however, it has to be asked whether the introduction of military norms which are conform to democracy – as the concept of “Innere Führung” aimed at from the beginning – has led to a commensurate human resources management, selection of personnel, training and political education. Before answering this question, it is necessary to look at this unique German concept in detail.

### 3. The Leadership Concept of “Innere Führung”

#### 3.1 A Short History of the Development

In 1950, long time before the Federal Republic was allowed to found a new army, a group of military experts installed by Federal Chancellor Konrad Adenauer wrote the “Himmeroder Denkschrift”, a memorandum on the functions, the macrostructure and the internal microstructure (“Inneres Gefüge”) of the future German armed forces as part of an international Western European army. This memorandum contains the following important sentences reflecting the problematic distance between civil society and its army in the first German democracy, the Weimar Republic (1919-1933): „The German contingent must not become a ‘state inside the state’. The whole body as well as the individual

<sup>7</sup> Bundeswehr, Streitkräftebasis: *Das richtige Personal zur richtigen Zeit am richtigen Platz* (2006) p. 2.

soldier have to support the democratic state and lifestyle out of their own belief.”<sup>8</sup> One year later, Graf Baudissin as member of the “Office Blank”, the predecessor of the Ministry of Defence, presented the first version of his concept of “Inneres Gefüge”. In this concept, he tried to develop a third way between the restoration of the old military and a revolution: “The conditions of a total war and our concept of a democratic state are in contradiction to an exceptional position of the soldier and instead lead to the free, arms-bearing citizen, who provides this service as a part of his political responsibility. As a result, the basic rights retain full validity also for the soldier as far as they are compatible with the character of his service.”<sup>9</sup>

The term “Inneres Gefüge“ (internal microstructure) which was used during the preparation time of the Bundeswehr was some years later substituted by “Innere Führung”. It is difficult to translate this wording. “Internal Leadership” is not really an adequate translation because “Führung” in German means leadership and education as well as the result of both on the level of behaviour. The concept was supposed to define the internal relations of the members of the armed forces and the communication processes in the military hierarchy which were not or not primarily to be characterized by order and obedience<sup>10</sup>, but instead by information and insight into the necessity for the requested action. On the Bundeswehr website the following description is found today: “The concept of “Innere Führung“ binds the army during the performance of its mandate to the values of the basic law. The concept has the task to adjust and to help tolerate tensions which exist between individual rights of free citizens on the one hand and military duties on the other hand.”

It would exhaust the scope of this paper to present the genuine concept of Graf Baudissin in detail and to comment on its conclusiveness and the question whether it was too idealistic, as it was hostiled to by many conservative former Wehrmacht officers who were taken over by the Bundeswehr (cf. Bredow 1973: 52-76). But in 1957, when the first conscripted soldiers entered the new armed forces, the Ministry of Defence edited a cen-

8 Own translation from: “Das deutsche Kontingent darf nicht ein ‘Staat im Staate’ werden. Das Ganze wie der einzelne (Soldat) haben aus innerer Überzeugung die demokratische Staats- und Lebensform zu bejahen.“ (Himmeroder Denkschrift 1950: 339)

9 Own translation from: “Die Verhältnisse des totalen Krieges und unser demokratisches Staatsbild widersprechen einer Sonderstellung des Soldaten und führen zum freien waffentragenden Staatsbürger, der diesen Dienst als einen Teil seiner politischen Verantwortung ableistet. Hieraus ergibt sich vor allem, dass die Grundrechte auch für den Soldaten Geltung behalten, soweit sie irgend vereinbar sind mit dem Wesen seines Dienstes.“ (Baudissin 1951: 356)

10 In this context it is also important to look at § 11 of the Soldiers’ Law on „obedience“ which contrasts this new democratic soldiers’ law strictly to the self perception of the Nazi-Wehrmacht, known as „Kadavergehorsam“ (slavish obedience) : „(1) The soldier has to obey his superior. He has to carry out the orders completely, consciously and immediately. Disobedience is not the case, if an order is not being followed which violates human dignity or is not service-related; ... (2) It is not allowed to obey an order, if obedience would mean to commit a crime. If the inferior obeys such order all the same he is only guilty in case he realizes or if it is under the known circumstances obvious that obedience will result in a crime.“ Own translation from: „(1) Der Soldat muss seinen Vorgesetzten gehorchen. Er hat ihre Befehle nach besten Kräften vollständig, gewissenhaft und unverzüglich auszuführen. Ungehorsam liegt nicht vor, wenn ein Befehl nicht befolgt wird, der die Menschenwürde verletzt oder der nicht zu dienstlichen Zwecken erteilt worden ist; ... (2) Ein Befehl darf nicht befolgt werden, wenn dadurch eine Straftat begangen würde. Befolgt der Untergebene den Befehl trotzdem, so trifft ihn eine Schuld nur, wenn er erkennt oder wenn es nach den ihm bekannten Umständen offensichtlich ist, dass dadurch eine Straftat begangen wird.“

tral service directive including guidelines for the education of soldiers based on Baudissin's concept. At the same time, the Ministry of Defence also published a Handbook "Innere Führung" with the subtitle "Hilfen zur Klärung der Begriffe" (Facilities for disambiguation) but this handbook did not reach a consensus on the terms and aims behind inside the Bundeswehr (cf. Dörfler-Dierken 2008: 65, 73). No. 4 of the guidelines reads: "The soldier is a citizen. Therefore, military education shall continue with civic education. Above all, this includes the education for being conscious of joint political responsibility and to protect individual dignity. Crucial for the success of civic education is the humanitarian attitude of all soldiers as a basic principle of the military life style."<sup>11</sup>

Some paragraphs later, No. 10 reads: "All soldiers – from small to large military units – have to be fraught with the moralities of the free community they are appointed to protect. Only a troop which has grown together to such a companionship is able to withstand extraordinary charges."<sup>12</sup> This sounds very elevated, but it characterizes the image of the democratic soldier in the time of the Cold War. In addition to that, it was important for the resolution of the internal conflict on the political level of the early Federal Republic of Germany, where the Social Democratic Party as the strongest opposition party in Parliament had difficulties to accept any "rearmament" until their Programme of Godesberg 1959 –the term "rearmament" was perceived to imply a continuity from the Wehrmacht, while the concept of "Innere Führung" and the installation of a Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces (see below, Ch. 4) showed that the Bundeswehr was supposed to be an absolutely new and society-integrated army, which was acceptable also to most of the Social Democrats.

To foster the civil acceptance of the concept of "Innere Führung" and to develop a permanent dialog with the society, the then Ministry of Defence, Franz Josef Strauß appointed the first "Advisory Council on Questions of "Innere Führung" (Beirat für Fragen der Inneren Führung) in 1958. Its regular members are appointed for four years and meet three to four times a year in plenary sessions, but more often in working groups on special topics. It is the task of the Council to advise the Minister of Defence in all aspects of "Innere Führung" with expert opinions. Most of the members of this council are civilians and persons of high standing with professional experience in the fields of education and personnel management. The Council is completed by five *ex officio* guests: the Commander of the Centre for "Innere Führung", Koblenz, the Authorized Representative on Education and Training of the General Inspector of the Bundeswehr, the speaker of the Central Council of Liaison Officers (Gesamtvertrauenspersonenausschuss) in the Minis-

11 Own translation from: „Der Soldat ist Staatsbürger. So soll die soldatische Erziehung auch seine staatsbürgerliche Bildung fortführen. Das schließt vor allem die Erziehung zum Bewusstsein politischer Mitverantwortung und zur Wahrung der persönlichen Würde ein. Entscheidend für den Erfolg der staatsbürgerlichen Bildung ist die menschliche Haltung aller Soldaten, aus der sich der Stil des militärischen Lebens formt.“ (Zentrale Dienstvorschrift 11/1 1957: 389)

12 Own translation from: „Alle Soldaten – von der kleinsten Gruppe bis zum großen Verband – müssen erfüllt sein von den sittlichen Grundsätzen des freien Gemeinwesens, zu dessen Schutz sie berufen sind. Nur eine so zur Gemeinschaft gewachsene Truppe hält schweren Belastungen stand.“ (Zentrale Dienstvorschrift 11/1 1957: 390)

try of Defence, the directors of the liaison offices of the Protestant Churches and of the Catholic Church in the Bundeswehr. Since 2006, the 12<sup>th</sup> Advisory Council is at work.

In a resume of the concept of “Innere Führung” Graf Baudissin remarked in 1965 that the civic requirement of the concept is primarily addressed to military superiors, but not to recruits: “The soldiers’ law requires superiors to stand up for the free and democratic constitutional structure. This demand makes sense, as only convinced citizens can further civic education convincingly.”<sup>13</sup>

When Helmut Schmidt took over the Ministry of Defence in 1969 as first social democrat in this office after World War II, he wanted to reform the Bundeswehr under several aspects in accordance to the device of Chancellor Willy Brandt’s first government declaration “Mehr Demokratie wagen!” (Daring more democracy!). One of Schmidt’s first orders was to write a new directive on “Innere Führung” (Cf. Dörfler-Dierken 2008: 65). In 1972, when the Ministry of Defence finally edited the central service directive on “facilities for “Innere Führung” (Zentrale Dienstvorschrift [ZDV] 10/1 1972), Schmidt held another ministry and his successor on the Hardthöhe, Georg Leber, also a social democrat, had no ambitions as reformer but only wanted to become a “father of the soldiers” with the consequence that he did not enforce the realisation of the new directive (Cf. Dörfler-Dierken 2008: 73).

This document describes how superiors should lead their subordinates according to the leitmotiv that both sides shall have good human relations and that orders have to be understood by the subordinates and are not to be followed blindly. Other parts of the document include the constitutional basic principles of the Bundeswehr as well as the rights and duties of the soldiers and how some of the basic rights which are guaranteed in the German constitution are restricted by the soldiers’ law.

This central service directive was replaced in 1993 by a new one, only named “Innere Führung” (ZDV 10/1 1993), which was in force until January 2008, when it was again replaced with a directive with the same number (ZDV 10/1 2008) but the more ambitious title “Innere Führung. Selbstverständnis und Führungskultur der Bundeswehr” (“Innere Führung. Self-image and management culture of the Bundeswehr”). The versions of 1993 and of 2008 contain *expressis verbis* invitations to the soldiers to participate in the further development of the concept of “Innere Führung” which could influence the next version of the central service directive. But the long periods of validity of the previous versions show that specific experiences in the soldiers’ every day life are less important for the development of the concept than dramatic changes of the surrounding conditions.

Thus, it was for example necessary to develop a new directive after the German unification at the end of the East-West-conflict in 1990. In that moment it was necessary to integrate some thousands members of the dissolved Nationale Volksarmee of the former GDR who had been instructed up to this day that the Bundeswehr was the enemy. And in the following years the Bundeswehr had to accommodate a generation of young draftees

13 Own translation from: Von Vorgesetzten „verlangt das Soldatengesetz, jederzeit für die freiheitlich-demokratische Grundordnung einzutreten. Diese Forderung leuchtet schon deshalb ein, weil nur überzeugte Staatsbürger überzeugende staatsbürgerliche Erziehung treiben können.“ (Baudissin 1965: 410)

born and educated in the former GDR who also had been instructed in their political education at school and in the communist youth organisation that Federal Republic of Germany and its bourgeoisie was the “class enemy”

The next revision of the ZDV seemed to be necessary after the tasks of the German armed forces changed from national defence to participation in international deployments which had severe consequences for the soldiers involved. But it took more than a decade from the first military missions with German soldiers and the experience of more than 200.000 of them to edit a new version of this directive. The reasons for this long time will be mentioned later.

### **3.2 Important Contents of the Central Service Directive From 1993**

The Central service directive (ZDV 10/1) from 1993 consists of three chapters: 1. Basic principles; 2. Aims and fundamentals; 3. Application. The last chapter is divided into eleven sub-chapters: I. Preface; II. Human resources management; III. Personnel management; IV. Law and soldiers’ order; V. Support and Welfare; VI. Medical service; VII. Pastoral care to the soldiers; VIII. Arrangement of the service and (military) training; IX. Political education; X. Information service; XI. Organisation.

This overview of the chapter “Application” shows the variety of fields in which “Innere Führung” is involved, but also that there are two general perspectives, one regarding everything that could be subsumed under “human relations” inside the Bundeswehr and the other regarding the army of a democracy and its soldiers as “citizens in uniform”.

In his reasonings in the early 1950ies Graf Baudissin had often used the term “Betriebsklima” (working atmosphere) which stems from the industrial sphere (cf. Bredow 1973: 71) and aims at good human relations between employees on the same level as well as on different levels in a factory or a business company. Especially the sub-chapters of the ZDV on human resources management and personnel management are pointing in this direction where topics like “trust” (ZDV 10/1 1993: No. 309) or “co-operation”, “law of participation” and “motivation” (ZDV 10/1 1993: No. 310), “co-operative leadership” and “teamwork” (No. 311) and “coherence” (ZDV 10/1 1993: No. 312) are stressed. But this perspective is also important for the sub-chapters on support and welfare and medical service. They show the concern of the Bundeswehr for the well-being of its members and its will to assist everybody “according to his abilities and beliefs” (ZDV 10/1 1993: No. 334). It is mentioned that soldiers have a dangerous job, but that neither they themselves nor their families have to fear that they will not receive social support from the Bundeswehr (ZDV 10/1 1993: No. 333 and 336). Also the sub-chapters on medical service and pastoral care to the soldiers belong to this “human relations” perspective.

This perspective is again taken up in the sub-chapter on the arrangement of the service and (military) training, although it takes on a different character. Here, it is stressed that “training is the main task of the armed forces in peace times” (ZDV 10/1 1993: No. 345). “Mutual trust and understanding are important preconditions for a training which is perceived as reasonable and necessary. Superiors are demanded to lead impeccably, talk openly and explain the contexts as well as to share difficult training situations with their

subordinates.”<sup>14</sup> “Basic and specific military knowledge, skills and abilities must be geared to the tasks during a deployment. They are to be communicated in such way that their necessity becomes reasonable, that they can be understood within the general context and that they can be accomplished independently even under stressful conditions. The soldiers are supposed to understand that the level of safety necessary for accomplishing their tasks under deployment conditions requires training the skills and behaviour patterns by drill.”<sup>15</sup> The keywords of the whole sub-chapter are reasonability and insight into the necessity as well as independent accomplishment of the tasks. It should be kept in mind that this ZDV 10/1 was edited in 1993. Thus, conditions of deployment are mentioned, but because the Bundeswehr abstained from international deployments at that time, it seemed necessary to stress that the training situation should “create adventures” (ZDV 10/1 1993: No. 344) and “prepare for a life in a soldiers’ community especially under hardship and danger” (ZDV 10/1 1993: No. 345). Because the vast majority of the soldiers had to wait a long time for a real deployment, superiors were supposed to establish the basis for an effective arrangement of the training through a diligent time-management and a combination of routine training, special events and tasks on the one hand and leisure time for the soldiers on the other hand (ZDV 10/1 1993: No. 349).

The concept of “Innere Führung” ascribes great importance to the political education of the soldiers. Although it has only four paragraphs in the core sub-chapter of the ZDV 10/1 in its version of 1993, measures of political education are supposed to clarify the values and norms of the free and democratic constitution to the soldier and to contribute to it “that he recognizes and respects the meaning and necessity of his service for peace, freedom and justice” (ZDV 10/1 1993: No. 356). The “citizen in uniform” is to perceive his service in the armed forces as no “severe disruption to his familiar way of life. Similarly, he should feel that he can adhere to the same basic values in his service for the army as he did before as a civilian. Therefore, political education is directly linked to human resources management.”<sup>16</sup> It is proposed that the political education should deal with situations, experiences and conflicts from the soldiers’ every day life instead of a mere knowledge transfer (ZDV 10/1 1993: No. 357). “Political education is a duty of all superiors and must be of special concern to all disciplinary superiors. It should take place whenever there is an opportunity and it should be linked to concrete events of every day

14 Own translation from: „Gegenseitiges Vertrauen und Verständnis sind wichtige Voraussetzungen für eine als sinnvoll und notwendig empfundene Ausbildung. Vorbildliches Auftreten und Handeln (Vormachen – Mitmachen), offenes Gespräch und Erklären der Sinnzusammenhänge sind ebenso Forderungen an die Vorgesetzten wie das Teilen von Härten mit den unterstellten Soldaten im praktischen Ausbildungsdienst.“ (ZDV 10/1 1993: No. 347).

15 Own translation from: „Die allgemeinmilitärischen und militärfachlichen Kenntnisse, Fertigkeiten und Fähigkeiten der Soldaten müssen sich an den Aufgaben im Einsatz orientieren. Diese sind so zu vermitteln, dass ihre Notwendigkeit einsichtig wird, im Gesamtzusammenhang verstanden und auch unter belastenden Einsatzbedingungen eigenständig ausgeführt werden können. Die Soldaten sollen einsehen, dass die für die Auftragsbefüllung unter Einsatzbedingungen notwendige Sicherheit das drillmäßige Einüben von Fertigkeiten und Verhaltensweisen erfordert.“ (ZDV 10/1 1993: No. 351)

16 Own translation from: „Der Bürger soll den Dienst in den Streitkräften ohne wesentlichen Bruch zu seiner gewohnten Lebensordnung empfinden und die Grundwerte, für deren Erhalt er eintritt, auch im täglichen Dienst erfahren. Politische Bildung steht daher in enger Wechselbeziehung zur Menschenführung“ (ZDV 10/1 1993: No. 357)

service. Besides knowledge, political education requires the superior to have an opinion of his own, to be open for discussion and to show personal credibility.”<sup>17</sup>

“The soldiers are to be involved in the planning and facilitation of civic education. Subjects which are controversial in politics and society, have to be presented and discussed as such. This strengthens the soldiers’ ability for judgement and critical facility and reduces the danger of partial information or party-political influence.”<sup>18</sup> This last paragraph of this sub-chapter is insofar important, as it stresses the – for the FRG characteristic – pluralistic view on the process of political decision-making and shows that the armed forces are neither excluded from this process as a non-political zone nor are they a field of political indoctrination by the government and the leading party of the state, as had been in the undergone GDR.

While this sub-chapter is dedicated to intra-military political education, the next one describes the role of the soldiers for the political information of the society. Some tension arises between these two sub-chapters, as those soldiers who have the task to inform the public on military affairs have to present the official Bundeswehr point of view even if the issue in question is controversial in politics and society. Although the Bundeswehr information service is to give an “open presentation” of the security policy (ZDV 10/1 1993: No. 360), it aims above all to “create confidence in the armed forces, to find acceptance among the people as well as to gain new personnel” (ZDV 10/1 1993: No. 361). Moreover, “soldiers influence public opinion though their judgement on their service, armament and training and also by their performance and behaviour. Therefore the soldier has to be aware that he is practicing public relations all the time whether he wants to or not.”<sup>19</sup>

Criticism about the reality of “Innere Führung” in the 1990ies and early 2000s will follow below (chapter 4)

### **3.3 The Revision of the Guidelines 2008**

#### *3.3.1 Reasons for the Revision and Overview*

As already mentioned, the central service directive 10/1 (1993) was in force for 15 years, before the Ministry of Defence edited a new version in January 2008 despite the

17 Own translation from: „Politische Bildung ist Pflicht aller Vorgesetzten und muss ein besonderes Anliegen der Disziplinarvorgesetzten sein. Sie sollte bei jeder sich bietenden Gelegenheit stattfinden und an konkrete Ereignisse des dienstlichen Alltags anknüpfen. Neben der Sachkenntnis bedarf es in der politischen Bildung eines eigenen Standpunktes, der Gesprächsbereitschaft und der persönlichen Glaubwürdigkeit des Vorgesetzten.“ (ZDV 10/1 1993: No. 358)

18 Own translation from: „Die Soldaten sind an Planung und Durchführung der staatsbürgerlichen Unter- richtung zu beteiligen. Themen, die in Politik und Gesellschaft strittig sind, müssen als strittig dargestellt und diskutiert werden. Dies stärkt die Urteils- und Kritikfähigkeit und vermindert die Gefahr, dass die Soldaten einseitig informiert oder parteipolitisch beeinflusst werden.“ (ZDV 10/1 1993: No. 359)

19 Own translation from: „Soldaten beeinflussen durch ihr Urteil über Dienstgestaltung, Ausrüstung und Ausbildung und durch ihr Auftreten und Verhalten die öffentliche Meinung. Der Soldat muss sich daher bewusst sein, dass er stets, ob gewollt oder ungewollt, Öffentlichkeitsarbeit betreibt.“ (ZDV 10/1 1993, No. 363)

fact that the structure and functions of the armed forces had changed during this time in several ways. The structure of the personnel changed insofar as there was a further reduction of the number of soldiers, especially of the share of draftees,<sup>20</sup> while the ministry tightened the criteria for conscription in order to avoid a complete change into a professional army (cf. Meyer 2005). Another important structural break was the opening of the army for women in 2001.<sup>21</sup> The main functional changes were caused by the growing expendability of the classic functions deterrence and defence of the own country, as, firstly, the united Germany took up a central position in NATO- and EU-Europe and, secondly, after the Federal Constitutional Court in July 1994 allowed deployments abroad with the result that more and more German soldiers were involved in such international deployments. Thus, it was necessary to stay abreast of these changes through a new central service directive on “Innere Führung”.

There were different initiatives for a further developing of the principles of “Innere Führung”. One was by the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces which led to the installation of an independent “Arbeitskreis Weiterentwicklung der Inneren Führung” (Working group Further Development of Internal Leadership) early in 2002 (Groß 2008b: 101). In May 2003, the Deutsche Bundestag (federal parliament) formed a sub-committee to the Committee of Defence with the title “Weiterentwicklung der Inneren Führung” (Further Development of Internal Leadership) which met 32 times until autumn 2007 and then gave a confidential report of its recommendations only to the Committee of Defence.<sup>22</sup> It seems that there was no remarkable communication between these two discussion circles.<sup>23</sup> But also the ministry itself was forced to reconsider the quality of internal leadership, after a horrible affair became known to the public in November 2004: in a training situation in Coesfeld soldiers simulated the capture of a group of comrades during a mission abroad including the application of torture – a heavy violation of human rights and also of the principles of internal leadership. This incidence made it obvious that the soldiers’ preparation for international deployments had to be given more attention and weight in the regulations on “Innere Führung” and that the ZDV 10/1 from 1993 had to be updated urgently (cf. Thies 2007). But the ministry’s initiative stems from March 2005 when the “Zentrum Innere Führung” got the order to review ZDV 10/1. The findings from “Coesfeld” had influence to the ZDV 10/1 insofar as it got an annex “guidelines for superiors” which is dedicated especially to younger superiors (Cf. Bericht

20 The volume of the Bundeswehr was reduced from 495,000 in 1990 to 250,000 up to now, while the percentage of draftees decreased from more than 50 % to about 25 %. After 1994 the contingent of draftees was split into those who follow their regular compulsory military service of then 10, meanwhile 9 months, and those who are called voluntary longer serving draftees (Freiwillig länger dienende Wehrpflichtige), who stay up to 23 months at the army. Only this part of the draftees are allowed to participate in deployments abroad.

21 The number of female soldiers lies about 13,000 or 7 % of the temporary and professional soldiers; 8,000 of them are non-commissioned officers and 1.300 are officers; about 30 % of the army medical corps are women.

22 This report was not available for the author.

23 Cf. answer of the member of the sub-committee Birgit Homburger (FDP) to the author on April 25, 2008.

des Bundesministeriums der Verteidigung zu Konsequenzen aus dem "Coesfeld-Prozess" 2008: 3).<sup>24</sup>

How far the report of the sub-committee of the parliament could influence the formulation of the ministry is dubious. It seems a bit strange that the Deutsche Bundestag on March, 6, 2008, exactly five weeks after the Minister of Defence had published the new version of the ZDV 10/1, had a first public debate on the results of the sub-committee together with the First Reading of three drafts of motions on strengthening and further developing the "Innere Führung" (Deutscher Bundestag Drucksache 16/8370, 16/8376, 16/8378), although the chairman of the sub-committee said in the debate that the minister had included "essential results" of their work into the new ZDV 10/1 (Lamers in Deutscher Bundestag 16/148).

The new ZDV 10/1 is much more voluminous than the old one. Moreover, it is not an internal publication "only for official use" but a publicly available glossy brochure which can also be downloaded from the internet. In addition to that, the two versions differ in composition. The new one includes six main chapters: 1. Self-conception and demand; 2. Historical background; 3. Basic principles; 4. Aims and requirements; 5. Norm of behaviour and culture of leadership; 6. Areas of application of "Innere Führung". Chapter 3 contains six sub-chapters in which the basic principles are divided into ethical, legal, political societal aspects as well as "Principles of Innere Führung". Chapter 6 consists of three sub-chapters: I. The important role of superiors; II. Central areas of application: a) Human resources management; b) Political education; c) Law and soldierly order; III. Other areas: a) Arrangement of the service and (military) training; b) Information service; c) Organisation and personnel management; d) Support and welfare; e) compatibility of family and service; f) Pastoral care to the soldiers and exercise of religions; g) Medical service.

In an official press release, the Ministry of Defence highlights the following points as "essential changes" in comparison to 1993:

"(the new ZDV has) a stronger reference to the reality of deployments, political legitimization and human resources management;

the historical derivation of "Innere Führung" for the first time in a special chapter;

an additional presentation of the ethical, legal, political and societal principles of the "Innere Führung";

emphasis on personal development, ethical competence, ability to moral judgements and inter-cultural competence;

emphasis on the special role of superiors as role models and facilitators of "Innere Führung";

addition of compatibility from family and service;

<sup>24</sup> This report contains a list of 52 measures on different levels of the Bundeswehr as reaction to "Coesfeld" and as efforts to prevent replications.

incorporation of guidelines for superiors with a focus on young superiors;

additions to the guidelines on the self-image and understanding of traditions in the Bundeswehr.” (Bundeswehr 2008: 2)

### 3.3.2 *Political Education*

It is remarkable that it obviously seemed not so important to the Ministry of Defence that the sub-chapter on political education got a higher rank in the document, while many of the highlighted aspects of “human relations” only are summarised under the sub-chapters called “other scopes”.

In our context, it is most important to compare the new sub-chapter on political education with its version from 1993: There are some important additions stressing the fact that political education is not a mere addition but an essential part of the education of all soldiers. In this sense, the entrance definition of the aim of political education in ZDV 10/1 2008: No. 625, which has partly the same wording as in ZDV 10/1 1993: No. 356, closes with the advice that political education is a binding duty in the Bundeswehr following § 33 Soldiers’ Law<sup>25</sup>. Above, the 2<sup>nd</sup> para of § 33 Soldiers’ Law, “The soldiers are to be informed about their duties and rights under civic and international law”, is cited in No. 626 of the new ZDV which seems relatively similar to the old No. 327 in other respects. But it has to be mentioned that in No. 626 the perspective has changed from the position that the – meanwhile stressed as male and female – soldiers should not experience their service in the army as a “severe disruption to his familiar way of life” (ZDV 10/1 1993: No. 327) to a “severe disruption of the value system of the Federal Republic of Germany”. Also the sentence “Therefore political education is directly linked to human resources management” from ZDV 10/1 1993: No. 327 is supplemented with the words “and the impartation of values involved”.

New is a catalogue of aims of political education: It “deepens historical knowledge, explains political contexts, supports political power of judgement, improves intercultural competence, develops the consciousness of values and motivates (soldiers) to active participation in political decision-making”. It is emphasized, that “all male and female soldiers have the *duty to inform themselves about politics* and to strive towards knowledge

25 “§ 33 Instructions in civic relations and international law. (1) The soldiers get instructions in civic relations and international law. The superior in charge of the instructions must not reduce the treatment of political questions to statements of a partial opinion. The lessons are to be shaped in a way that the soldiers are not influenced in favour or against a certain political direction. (2) The soldiers are to be informed on their duties and rights under civic and international law.” Own translation from: „§ 33 Staatsbürgerlicher und völkerrechtlicher Unterricht (1) Die Soldaten erhalten staatsbürgerlichen und völkerrechtlichen Unterricht. Der für den Unterricht verantwortliche Vorgesetzte darf die Behandlung politischer Fragen nicht auf die Darlegung einer einseitigen Meinung beschränken. Das Gesamtbild des Unterrichts ist so zu gestalten, dass die Soldaten nicht zu Gunsten oder zu Ungunsten einer bestimmten politischen Richtung beeinflusst werden.(2) Die Soldaten sind über ihre staatsbürgerlichen und völkerrechtlichen Pflichten und Rechte im Frieden und im Krieg zu unterrichten.“

and education in order to fulfill the model of the ‘citizen in uniform’” (ZDV 10/1 2008: No. 627)<sup>26</sup>

More details of the new aspect of intercultural competence are found in the next para: “Against the background of deployments abroad political education gains additional importance. Male and female soldiers have to be informed early and adequately about the political background and security-political interests as well as the resulting necessity of the deployments of the Bundeswehr. *Before, during and after a military mission*, superiors of all levels have to contribute by *political education* that the male and female soldiers entrusted to their care gain the necessary knowledge on the current deployment, the country where it takes place and its special conditions. This is to support the acting of the inferior soldiers in the sense of superior leadership, to strengthen their motivation and to bear them out in their identity as ‘citizens in uniform’” (ZDV 10/1 2008: No. 628)<sup>27</sup>

Regarding the aspect of gaining intercultural competence, particularly the last para of the sub-chapter on political education of ZDV 10/1 2008 is remarkable, as it reflects the twofold complexity of the preparation of more or less western contingents for multinational deployments in countries with a totally different culture: “The service in a multinational context demands that all deployed members of the Bundeswehr are familiar with the organisational principles and management culture of the armed forces of other nations as well as of NGOs. It is also indispensable to obtain knowledge on politics, culture, country and people in the region of a particular deployment. This aims at enabling adequate contact with persons of different cultural origin according to the values and norms of the Basic Law and the mandate of the Bundeswehr. Vice versa the members of the Bundeswehr acting in an international environment are responsible for acting in respect to their own principles of leadership, moral and mentalities. A special concern of political education is to prepare the soldiers for possible tension between respecting human rights as they are to be protected by the Bundeswehr and conflicting cultural and social peculiarities in the area of deployment.” (ZDV 10/1 2008: No. 634)<sup>28</sup>

26 Own translation from: „Alle Soldatinnen und Soldaten haben die Pflicht, sich politisch zu informieren und sich um Wissen und Bildung zu bemühen, damit sie dem Leitbild vom ‚Staatsbürger in Uniform‘ gerecht werden.“

27 Own translation from: „Vor dem Hintergrund von Auslandseinsätzen gewinnt politische Bildung zusätzlich an Bedeutung. Die Soldatinnen und Soldaten müssen über die politischen Hintergründe, sicherheitspolitischen Interessen und die daraus hervorgehende Notwendigkeit von Einsätzen der Bundeswehr rechtzeitig und angemessen informiert werden. Vor, während und nach dem Einsatz sollen die Vorgesetzten aller Ebenen durch politische Bildung dazu beitragen, dass die ihnen anvertrauten Soldatinnen und Soldaten die notwendigen Kenntnisse über den aktuellen Einsatz, das Einsatzland und die jeweiligen besonderen Bedingungen erwerben. Damit unterstützen Vorgesetzte das Handeln der ihnen untergebenen Soldatinnen und Soldaten im Sinne der übergeordneten Führung, stärken deren Motivation und bestätigen sie als ‚Staatsbürger in Uniform‘.“

28 Own translation from: „Der Dienst im multinationalen Umfeld erfordert, dass alle dort eingesetzten Angehörigen der Bundeswehr im Organisationsprinzipien und Führungskulturen von Streitkräften anderer Nationen sowie von Nicht-Regierungs-Organisationen vertraut sind. Darüber hinaus sind Kenntnisse über Politik, Kultur, Land und Leute in den Einsatzgebieten unverzichtbar. Ziel ist der angemessene Umgang mit Menschen unterschiedlicher kultureller Herkunft im Sinne der Werte und Normen des Grundgesetzes und des Auftrags der Bundeswehr. Umgekehrt stehen die Angehörigen der Bundeswehr im multinationalen Umfeld auch für die Achtung der eigenen Führungsprinzipien, Sitten und Mentalitäten ein. Ein be-

An adequate preparation of such deployments requires from the superiors on all levels that they act as role models for their subordinates. Therefore, the superiors and their responsibilities are in the centre of the ZDV regulations. And because in a hierarchy of many ranks countless men and women are superior to other members of the organization and even many of the recruits will once occupy a superior position to the just beginning recruits, the ZDV highlights the responsibility of all members for other comrades: “Male and female soldiers always have to be able to live and to act responsibly for themselves and to take over the responsibility for others. To gain this *core competence*,

- they consciously participate in the arrangement of their life in the military community and live as real comrades,
- they stand up for the values and norms of the free and democratic order at any time and
- sharpen their conscience and develop moral power of judgement.

This way, male and female soldiers make a crucial contribution to their *own personality development*.”(ZDV 10/1 2008: No. 508)<sup>29</sup>

To demand mutual responsibility like this would be yet very ambitious for the normal service operations in a large organization. It is much more difficult in times of war and armed conflicts in which the soldiers have to fight including the possibility to kill others or to be killed at service. In the ZDV version from 1993 the words “crisis” and “war” only are used in one para (No. 301), while the named consequences are glossed over by pointing at “special stress situations” (“besondere Belastungssituationen”, ZDV 10/1 1993: No. 303). This and other euphemistic wordings (for example: “maximum of military effectiveness” (“Höchstmaß an militärischer Leistungsfähigkeit”, ZDV 10/1 2008: No. 302) are sometimes also used in the new version, but early on, a rather explicit remark reads that military service includes the “dedication of one’s own health and life and demands in the last consequence also to kill in a fight” (ZDV 10/1 2008: No. 105). Under the headline “Human Resources Management” another important note is to be found: “In times when soldiers have to prove themselves in common stress and danger, issues come up which touch upon existential questions. *Topics like injury and death, handling fear or*

sonderes Anliegen politischer Bildung ist es, auf mögliche Spannungen zwischen der Beachtung der Menschenrechte, für die auch die Bundeswehr eintritt, und entgegenstehenden kulturellen und sozialen Eigenheiten im Einsatzgebiet vorzubereiten.“

29 Own translation from: „Soldatinnen und Soldaten müssen stets in der Lage sein, selbstverantwortlich zu leben und zu handeln und Verantwortung für andere übernehmen zu können. Um diese Kernkompetenz zu erreichen,

gestalten sie das Leben in der militärischen Gemeinschaft bewusst mit und leben Kameradschaft, treten sie jederzeit für die Werte und Normen der freiheitlich demokratischen Grundordnung ein und schärfen sie ihr Gewissen und entwickeln eine moralische Urteilsfähigkeit.

Auf diese Weise leisten die Soldatinnen und Soldaten einen entscheidenden Beitrag zu ihrer eigenen Persönlichkeitsbildung.“

*questions of blame and failure must not be repressed or played down, but have to be discussed honestly and sensitively.*" (ZDV 10/1 2008: No. 609)<sup>30</sup>

The fact that meanwhile nearly 100 soldiers have lost their lives during the deployments has made it necessary to give advice also on spiritual "succour in cases of wounding and death" in the sub-chapter on "pastoral care to the soldiers and exercise of religions" (ZDV 10/1 2008: No. 672).

### *3.3.3 Male and Female Soldiers as Part of the Society*

It is the democratic society which demands from her soldiers to bear such so dramatic and other severe stress situations, but as the German soldiers are no mercenaries, the society represented by the federal parliament and the federal government feels responsible for them as "citizens in uniform" – so the basic of Baudissin's concept of "Innere Führung". Therefore the ZDV 10/1 2008 stresses "Men and women in the Bundeswehr are part of the society" (No. 313) and "The basics of 'Innere Führung' ... find in the following criteria a concrete specification" whereby "integration in state and society" is named in the first place. This is the main reason that a new sub-chapter on "compatibility of family and service" (No. 664-669) is to be found in the ZDV 10/1 2008 and some other new wordings as well in the sub-chapters on "law and soldierly order" (635-642) and "support and welfare" (No. 660-663). To find regulations on the compatibility of family and service became necessary after the inclusion of many women in an age when they have or want to have babies or little children. In this context, it is remarkable that the word "family" is always complemented with the word "partnership" which also is used in cases of stable gay relations. That it is not allowed to discriminate these persons show No. 641, where on the basis of the "Soldatinnen- und Soldatengleichbehandlungsgesetzes" (Law of equal treatment of female and male soldiers) "superiors have to assure that nobody under the female and male soldiers is discriminated because her or his gender, race, ethnic family background, religion, Weltanschauung or sexual identity".

In the before mentioned first debate of the Bundestag on the report of the subcommittee on "Further Development of "Innere Führung"" on March 6, 2008, the speakers of all fractions – including the Left, which usually has a very critical attitude against the Bundeswehr – agreed with the "Innere Führung" in general. Three motions were tabled in relation to the debate aiming to strengthen the concept of "Innere Führung" and to develop it further, one by the FDP opposition (Deutscher Bundestag 16/8370), one by the Green opposition (Deutscher Bundestag 16/8376) and a concerted one of the coalition of CDU/CSU and SPD (Deutscher Bundestag 16/8378). They all stress the necessity to improve political education in the Bundeswehr. A common aspect in the motions from FDP and CDU/CSU/SPD is that the Bundeswehr should improve the compatibility of family and service for example through creating part-time jobs.

30 Own translation from: „In Zeiten gemeinsamer Belastung, Gefährdung und Bewährung kommen auch Dinge zur Sprache, die an die menschliche Existenz rühren. Themen wie Verwundung und Tod, Umgang mit Angst oder Fragen nach Schuld und Versagen dürfen dabei nicht verdrängt oder heruntergespielt werden, sondern müssen ehrlich und einfühlsam besprochen werden.“

### 3.4 Military Traditions – A Source of Prestige and Pride?

Soldiers seem to need to identify with role models like ancient heroes – especially such of their own nation. Armies like to look into the own history of successful battles and glorious victories. In the case of the West German Bundeswehr it was difficult to do so because the German Army (“Deutsches Heer”<sup>31</sup>) under Emperor Wilhelm II lost World War I., and the last predecessors, the “Reichswehr” of the Weimar Republic acted as an antidemocratic “state within a state”, and the “Wehrmacht” of the “Third Reich” was involved in aggression and war crimes of World War II.

In the preliminary remarks of ZDV 10/1 from 1993, one remark points out that guidelines on military traditions are closely connected with the basics of “Innere Führung“. “At the time of the edition of this service directive the inventory and evaluation of important events of the newest German history is not completed. But it is beyond dispute that the – by the German unification – dissolved Nationale Volksarmee (of the former GDR) is unsuitable to found a tradition for the Bundeswehr, because it had the character of a political party and class army of a communist system. The guidelines to the understanding and maintenance of traditions from September 20, 1982 are still in force.”<sup>32</sup>

Also the new version of the ZDV 10/1 includes the “guidelines to the understanding and maintenance of traditions” from September, 20, 1982 in its annex. These guidelines advocate a deliberate handling of the German military history, as it contains deep breaks. Therefore, the guidelines demand: “In the maintenance of tradition of the Bundeswehr, such historical references, attitudes and experiences are to be preserved which are also in our times exemplary and worthy remembering because of their ethic value as well as their accordance with the rule of law, liberal and democratic traditions.” (Richtlinien 1982: 15)<sup>33</sup>

In this sense, the Prussian military reforms initiated by Scharnhorst and Gneisenau (1807-13) serve as a link to the reform of “Innere Führung” initiated by Graf Baudissin. This may be a reason for the decision of the authors of the new ZDV 10/1 to include a whole separate chapter on the Baudissin-Tradition in the directive.

It seems like grasping at straws, when the German Navy recurs to a parliamentary tradition by celebrating June 14<sup>th</sup>, 1848, as birthday of the first German Navy and celebrates this day every ten years with great effort. At that day, the first democratic German parliament, convened in the Paulskirche (Paul’s Church) of Frankfurt on the Main, decides

31 This was the official name of the armed forces in the German Empire because it consists of the armies of Prussia, Bavaria, Saxony and Württemberg. Only the navy stood directly under the emperor.

32 Own translation from: „Zum Zeitpunkt des Erlasses dieser Dienstvorschrift ist die Bestandsaufnahme und Bewertung wesentlicher Teile der jüngeren deutschen Geschichte noch nicht abgeschlossen. Unstrittig ist jedoch, dass die mit der Vereinigung Deutschlands aufgelöste Nationale Volksarmee wegen ihres Charakters als Partei- und Klassenarmee eines kommunistischen Systems keine Tradition für die Bundeswehr stiften kann. Die Richtlinien zum Traditionsverständnis und zur Traditionspflege in der Bundeswehr vom 20. September 1982 gelten weiter.“ (Zentrale Dienstvorschrift 10/1 1993 I-3)

33 Own translation from: „In der Traditionspflege der Bundeswehr sollen solche Zeugnisse, Haltungen und Erfahrungen aus der Geschichte bewahrt werden, die als ethische und rechtsstaatliche, freiheitliche und demokratische Traditionen auch für unsere Zeit beispielhaft und erinnerungswürdig sind.“

to spend six millions Taler for building a common fleet for protecting the German Confederation under the democratic colours black, red and gold (Salewski 2008a: 8). In his commemorative speech at the 160<sup>th</sup> anniversary of this decision, the historian Michael Salewski therefore named the first German fleet a “Parlamentsmarine” (navy of the parliament) (Salewski 2008b), although the Parliament of the Paulskirche as well as the Parliament of the German Empire after 1871 had only the power of the budget but not like the Bundestag of our days also influence on the deployment.

In the guidelines from 1982, it is highlighted that the Bundeswehr “exclusively serves the purpose of defence” (Richtlinien 1982: 9) which is absolutely conform with Article 87 a, para 1 of the Grundgesetz (German constitution). Since the former Minister of Defence, Peter Struck (SPD) declared in 2002 that the classical task of defence on the country’s own territory had become obsolete and Germany was also being defended at the Hindukusch, it is disputed whether the different deployments the Bundeswehr is involved in are defensive actions or pure military interventions. This problem cannot be ignored by an “Army in deployment” which the Bundeswehr has called itself for several years. But the new ZDV 10/1 tries to brush it aside arguing that “The security policy of Germany is lead by the *values and norms of the Grundgesetz* and by the aim to safeguard the *interests of our country.*” (ZDV 10/1 2008: No. 311). Then follows a catalogue which stems from the Whitebook 2006 (Weißbuch 2006) of the Federal Government, where it remains rather vague which interests have to be safeguarded by military and which by civil means (cf. Meyer 2007).

Last not least it should be remarked that the Bundeswehr tries to develop traditions from its own history since 1956. Into this context belongs a public debate during 2007 on a cenotaph for the growing number of soldiers who died doing their duty for the Federal Republic of Germany in missions abroad. The Minister of Defence, Jung, wants the positioning of the cenotaph in the yard of the Bendler-Block where the top of his ministry is located since the capital of Germany went from Bonn to Berlin. The Bendler-Block itself has in a double sense the character of a memorial: It had been the Headquarters of the Wehrmacht of the “Third Reich” and in this context it was the location where the officers of the resistance of July 20<sup>th</sup> 1944 (Graf Stauffenberg and others) were put to death. In this debate, a minority of politicians argue that the cenotaph should be build in front of the building of the Reichstag where the Deutsche Bundestag is meeting because the Bundeswehr is an army of the parliament and the members of the parliament are responsible for the missions abroad. Both positions have good reasons because there is a double responsibility for the soldiers as well by the ministry as by the Bundestag.

### **3.5 Institutions of Training Soldiers Considering the Concept of “Innere Führung”**

The realisation of the concept of “Innere Führung” requires learning and training on all levels of the Bundeswehr. Superiors are supposed to have internalised the concept to teach it not only to young recruits during the first phase of their education but also later in other situations. For this, the Bundeswehr has established the Centre “Innere Führung” in

Koblenz. In addition to serving as the central steering unit of the Bundeswehr for “Innere Führung”, the Centre is a training centre where year after year about 14.000 soldiers and other persons take part in training courses.

The centre consists of a staff group and four departments in Koblenz, with a fifth department being located in Strausberg. The first department is called “Basic Groundwork” and has the task of further development of the concept of “Innere Führung”. It organizes the education and training units for military superiors who prepare for a mission abroad und seminars for civil teachers or journalists.

The second department concerns “Human Resource Management, Support and Care”. The courses organized by this division comprehend amongst others military coaching, moderator training, supervision for peers and moderators, personnel management and training of superiors for special missions abroad. As basic issues of the second department, among others the following are listed: “Stress management in every day life and in deployment”, “team development and team building”, “intercultural competence as key qualification”, “‘angst’ – physical and psychological aspects”, “social perception as leadership competence”, “hostage taking and captivity” and “handling of injury and death”. Besides a multitude of information material (audio- and video-cassettes etc.) the division has also produced a children’s book: “Karl der Bärenreporter im Einsatz”. In this book a little bear reporter tells the reader/listener about a parent’s deployment abroad and the every day life in a military camp. It aims to help children who smart under the absence of their parents (Zentrum Innere Führung 2007).

The third department deals with “Political Education” and has the task both to communicate to soldiers the free democratic basic order and to facilitate acceptance of the necessity of the military service for peace, liberty and law. It is important that the self description of this division mentions to be geared to the common political education in Germany and committed to the basic consensus of the several actors of political education (“Beutelsbacher Konsens”) which demands, among others, the precept of controversy which means that issues which are subject to public dispute in politics and society should be presented as such in political education. Topics of the department are e.g. “didactics and methodology of political education”, “Security policy”, “intercultural competence”, “extremism”, “new media”, “future risks”, “Islam/Islamism” (Zentrum Innere Führung 2007).

The fourth department concerns “Law” and presents courses and educational materials on the law of equal treatment of male and female soldiers, participation rights, and questions of military order. Seminars are held on legal aspects of security policy, the framework of international law for deployments abroad, and also as part of the preparation for concrete deployments. Among the working papers of this department is one on the soldier’s right to freedom of expression and the restrictions to this right by the soldiers’ duties. A sub-division is the “Documentation Centre for the Prevention of Addiction” (Zentrum Innere Führung 2007).

The fifth department, the outpost of the centre in Strausberg, was established in 1994, four years after German unification, in Eastern Germany to disseminate the philosophy of

the “army of (German) unity” to people in the new “Länder” (federal states) and to seminar participants from memberstates of the NATO-“partnership for peace” (Zentrum Innere Führung, 2007).

Other important institutions of the realisation of the concept of “Innere Führung” are, as mentioned in chapter 2.4 the Bundeswehr Universities.

## 4. Norms of Conflict Settlement, Lawfulness and Argument

### 4.1 Institutions of Conflict Solution, Internal and External Control Agencies

As cited, political education is seen as “directly linked to human resources management and the impartation of values involved”. Therefore, many tasks of the superiors, as described in ZDV 10/1 under the topics political education and human resources management intend to prevent conflicts by communication and conflict solutions in cases of infringement the principles of “Innere Führung”.

The primarily internal institutions of conflict solution and control agencies for the compliance with the principles of “Innere Führung” are higher ranking superiors in the chain of superiors. But possibly, there are situations where the direct use of the right of remonstrance is a risk-aggravating factor for a concerned soldier.

In a position between internal and external supervision for critical situations and very helpful in this function are those persons who are engaged in pastoral care for the soldiers. Often, they are asked in situations when the inferior is in doubt if he or she has to follow an order which brings him or her into conflict with his or her conscience. Therefore military pastors do their service not only in locations with barracks of the Bundeswehr but also in the missions abroad.

The most important and effective control agency is the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces. He or she is monitoring the actual practice of “Innere Führung” and serving as a kind of external Ombudsperson for the soldiers. Every member of the Bundeswehr can write to him or her if he or she has the impression that his or her superior infringed upon the principles of “Innere Führung”. In addition to following each complaint, the Commissioner presents an annual report on his work to the Parliament and the general public (cf. e.g. Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 16/8200). Also, he or she can inform the public in the meantime on severe infringements as the before-mentioned example “Coesfeld” shows. All in all, the role of the Commissioner is complicated as he or she has on the one hand to control the activities of the ministry and the military superiors related to “Innere Führung” and on the other hand to intermediate between these institutions and the draftees or other concerned soldiers. The different tasks of the Commissioner are described and analysed by Dörthe Rosenow in the following excursus.

Regularly the Commissioner as well as the Head of the labour union of the Soldiers (the BundeswehrVerband) are interviewed by newspapers and electronic media, especially in cases they suspect that infringements have happened. This was the case for in-

stance in October 2006, after the Bild-Zeitung had published pictures of German soldiers in Afghanistan with skulls in their hands. This example shows that external control by the media works. Immediately after such publications also the Members of the Bundestag, especially those of the oppositional parties, call for being better informed by the Ministry of Defence, because then also the mass public is interested in questions of “Innere Führung” which normally is not the case.

## 4.2 Excursus: The Different Tasks of the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces<sup>34</sup>

### 4.2.1 Control

According to the Grundgesetz, the task of the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces, or Armed Forces Commissioner (AFC) is to „help“ Bundestag in its exercise of parliamentary control. It is written in the “Law of the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces.” (AFC-Law) that the AFC acts as he sees fit either when a soldier’s basic rights are violated or when something is in breach of the principles of the Innere Führung. For any further exercise of control the AFC needs to be instructed by parliament. The question is how to differentiate between Parliament’s and the AFC’s tasks of *control*. The former AFC Willfried Penner defines the AFC’s primary task as exercising control at the *individual level*:

“Constitutionally, the Defence Committee, being a special committee of the German Bundestag for the portfolio of the Ministry of Defence, has a significant role to play, because it has the rights of an investigation committee. It exercises parliamentary control in principle and as a tendency over the Bundeswehr as institution, while the Armed Forces Commissioner focuses on the “soldier as individual”. However, this does not mean that he may not control the Bundeswehr as such or parts of it.” (Penner 2003: 117)

The concession in the last sentence elucidates Penner’s realisation that an exclusive reference to the individual is not in accordance with an all-encompassing understanding of control. It makes sense, however, to focus on the individual, because the AFC’s instruments are most adequate for a control at this level. Nevertheless, in practice such an understanding can lead to neglecting the Bundeswehr as institution. Gleumes makes clear that the purpose of parliamentary control is to “enable Parliament to recognise grievances and problematic developments to which it can politically react” (Gleumes 2005: 19). These grievances and problematic developments might concern the Bundeswehr as *institution* – the more if the principles of the Innere Führung are understood in an all-encompassing way.

Consequently, the AFC must sum up insights out of individual cases to a broader picture and must point at fundamental tendencies in the Bundeswehr as an institution that contradict the principles of the Innere Führung. He must present these tendencies in Parliament and in the public sphere to enable redress.

34 This excursus is a translation of chapter 2.6 of Dörthe Rosenow’s study on the Commissioner (2008: 29-37), originated as a master thesis in the context of our project.

#### 4.2.2 Protection

Beside the task of *control* the Grundgesetz allocates the task of *protection* (“protection of basic rights”) to the AFC. For years, there had been controversial legal discussions about the AFC’s status. Some commentators argued that the task of *protection* establishes the AFC as an independent constitutional body and that the task of *control* makes him a body that is dependent from Parliament. Today, there is agreement that the AFC is dependent from Parliament in every aspect, because the task of the protection of basic rights is considered as part of his task of *control*. This is sensible: The AFC must protect soldiers if their basic rights are violated by their seniors. This *protection* entails *controlling* these seniors. They must then be again protected from their seniors, which continues up to the most senior person, which is the Minister of Defence. *Protection* is part of the task of *control* if it refers to the *individual level*, which is the relation of singular soldiers to their seniors and among themselves. Wiesendahl defines this level as the *meso-level* of the Innere Führung.

However, if one assumes that the task of *control* also refers to the Bundeswehr as *institution* (from now on called *institutional level* in contrast to the *individual level*), this might lead to a conflict between both tasks in the AFC’s self-understanding of his role. He might need to protect (= the individual soldier) what he must control at the same time (= the Bundeswehr as (abstract) institution, which in real life is composed of the individuals he needs to protect).

#### 4.2.3 Administration

According to Bernhard Fleckenstein, the AFC’s tasks have changed in the first decades of his work. His primary function was to *control* the basic rights and principles of the Innere Führung in the interaction of seniors and subordinates. In practice, these tasks have shifted towards *administration*, meaning the ‘administration of welfare and care’ (Fleckenstein 1975: 5). However, to differentiate between *administration* and *control* is difficult, as the principles of the Innere Führung remain undefined. The legal academic Hartmut Maurer argues that the principles of the Innere Führung compass everything that has got to do with the soldier’s place and function in the Bundeswehr. Therefore, the AFC’s task is to monitor and control the whole area of the inner military order (Maurer 1965: 32). Such an understanding sums up the *social tasks* of welfare and care under the principles of the Innere Führung. In practice, these tasks have begun to dominate over the original task of protecting the soldiers’ basic rights, and have thereby changed the institutional character of the AFC. With exaggeration, to make a point, one could say that the AFC has become the “social worker” for the Bundeswehr’s soldiers.

Consequently, the task of administration can better be defined as the “administration” of petitioners’ concerns at the individual level to represent their interests. At this level, the task is part of the task of control and does not contradict it. In principle, it can be equalised with the task of *protection*. However, within this task, the area of social concerns has become dominant and has led to a neglectance of the original protection of basic rights.

#### 4.2.4 Representation of Interests

As it has already been explained under 2.4, the first AFCs had severe conflicts with the Ministry of Defence and were generally rejected by the Bundeswehr. Matthias Hoogen was the first AFC who tried to overcome this hostility in his annual report of 1968:

“Experience has taught us that the best way to achieve the aim of the military constitution is when the AFC understands his role both as being a delegate of the Bundestag in the army and as being the soldiers’ representative before Parliament. Such an understanding defeats mistrust and reservations towards the AFC, as he serves the interests of the individual soldier and the army.” (Annual Report 1968: 4) (emphasis added)

In this quotation, Hoogen first defines himself as the “soldiers’ representative before Parliament” and then talks about how he wants to serve the “interests of the individual soldier” as well as of “the army” in general. In this notion, the “administrator” becomes the representative of the interests of the army before Parliament. The task of administration is no longer part of the task of control, as it has been elaborated upon under 4.2.1, but turns into becoming the task of generally representing the army’s interests. It established itself as a second task beside the task of control. Therefore, in this study, the term *administrator* will be used from now on only in the sense of 4.2.1. The representation of the interests of soldiers and the army as such within the realm of Parliament will be called, in contrast, the task of the *representation of interests*.<sup>35</sup>

Hoogen was rewarded with positive feedback from both Parliament and the government for this self-understanding. The CDU-MP Egon Klepsch even advocated a rewriting of the AFC-Law in his general comment on the decisive Annual Report:

“We especially like the way the Armed Forces Commissioner delineates his understanding of his role. (...) Here the Armed Forces Commissioner defines his task in the same way as it is defined by the Committee (of Defence), even though we are all aware of the fact that the reality of his work needs an adaption of the formal legal text.” (Egon Klepsch (CDU), German Bundestag 27/06/1969)

This positive echo led Hoogen to a further delineation of his self-understanding in the Annual Report of 1969. He argues that the AFC needs to be an “institution for social conflict regulation” that provides the individual soldier with an “emergency phone” via the right of petition. He can use this “phone” if he thinks that his concerns are not heard otherwise. Therefore, the AFC is a kind of “social early-warning system” (Annual Report 1969: 4). The constitutional lawyer Paul Huster comments on this understanding in a drastic way:

“I cannot believe it, but it is true. In front of everybody the institution of the Armed Forces Commissioner autonomously changes its constitutional task. This is an unparalleled act that should challenge every parliamentarian and should alarm the public. But what does happen? Nothing, absolutely nothing. (...) No Member of Parliament protests against this incredible perversion of the constitutional task of control. Do we really allow an institution

<sup>35</sup> It has to be taken into account, however, that the task of administration that has been described under 2.6.3 of course compasses the representation of petitioners’ interests. But in order to have clearly defined terms, I will use the term administration to describe this task and the term representation of interests to describe the representation of interests of the army as such.

that exists to strengthen parliamentary control to be changed into an institution of the representation of the interests of the army in Parliament?" (Huster 1970:1ff.)

However, this comment does not consider the institution's volitional ambivalence that accompanied the AFC from the moment his institution was founded. Moreover, Huster does not refer to the problematic of the AFC-Law that established the basis for Hoogen's understanding by making the AFC a body of petition. He only looks at the constitutional task.

If the AFC becomes a representative of the interests of the army beside the task of controlling it, he does not only see his task from the perspective of control, but also from the perspective of the Bundeswehr. That means: As institution of control, the AFC takes on the perspective of control and looks at problematic developments within the Bundeswehr (for example, through stressing the increasing development of authoritarian thinking patterns within it). In contrast, as the representative of interests of the Bundeswehr, he criticises from their perspective e.g. their insufficient funding. This form of representation of interests has nothing in common with the administration of singular petitions of one or several soldiers in the Bundeswehr, but is about "the" institution Bundeswehr as such.

It is often difficult to say, however, whether a statement of the AFC expresses concern about the institution or the individual soldier. For example, if the AFC complains about the lack of social welfare for the soldiers – does he already represent institutional interests or administer the concerns of individual soldiers? I cannot give a clear answer to this question at this point. It depends on the individual case in which the AFC must balance this constellation of tensions. The new independent task of representing institutional interests becomes problematic if it completely replaces the original task of control, meaning the external controlling perspective on the institution. Moreover, the new task is problematic if it leads to the control of the original control institution, namely Parliament (e.g. if the AFC demands to provide more funding for the Bundeswehr). This is another constellation of tensions that the AFC must balance. From the perspective of the principles of the Innere Führung, such a "control of the control institution" can even be regarded as a sensible development. Parliament's decisions do concern these principles, for example if parliament decides about a military intervention that is questionable from the standpoint of international law. Again, it remains decisive that the AFC sticks to his original task of control. In this context, it is also important that to represent the perspective of individual soldiers can lead to a lifting of the task of *protection* to the *institutional level*. This can be the case if the AFC for example aims to protect soldiers from public allegations in terms of right-wing extremism. In this case, the lifting can be sensible if soldiers are for example suspected across-the-board. But it can again lead to a loss of the perspective of control.

Statements such as the above-mentioned of Matthias Hoogen who equalises his task of control with the task of social conflict regulation prove the latter. Such an understanding narrows the task of control down to the *individual level*.

Hoogen's role understanding can be traced throughout the later AFCs' terms in office. His successor, Fritz Rudolf Schultz, states in his Annual Report of 1974 that the relation-

ship of the Bundeswehr (including the Ministry of Defence) and the AFC has changed considerably once “the AFC started to see his task not just one-sidedly as the control of the area of defence, but growingly as the representation of military interests in the realm of Parliament” (Annual Report 1974: 19). Interestingly, there is no further discussion of the change of tasks in the academic literature after the novellation of the AFC-Law in 1982 – as if the novellation had resolved all problems. But Hoogen’s understanding is still present in the self-understanding of the current AFC Reinhold Robbe:

“It is important to note that the institution that has been added to the Grundgesetz with article 45b does *not* characterise the Wehrbeauftragter as the soldiers’ commissioner. According to the law he functions as a supporting body of the *Bundestag* in the latter’s exercise of parliamentary control. Nevertheless, he is “*administrator*” of the interests of the members of the army.” (Robbe 2005: 5) (emphasis added)

#### 4.2.5 Mediation

After the Committee for Security in Europe had agreed on the establishment of the AFC, the Committee for Law and the Constitution discussed it. There, the SPD-MP Adolf Arndt countered fears of a blurring of competencies between Bundestag and government with the well-known metaphor of the “shock-absorbing element sitting between two big blocs of power to both elastically connect them and to separate them” (Adolf Arndt (SPD): Committee for Law and the Constitution 02/02/1956: 12)

This *connecting-element-* or *mediation* task represents the AFC’s tasks at the *institutional level*. If he represents the soldiers’ perspective, this task is exercised as *representation of interests* or as *protection*. On the other hand, if the AFC takes on the perspective of the controlling parliament, he exercises his original task of *control*. However, considering what has been said under 2.6.4, it must be stressed again that the representation of the soldiers’ perspective can be a sensible step under certain circumstances, for example when there is a debate about the legitimacy of an intervention. It becomes clear again that the AFC moves on a thin grade between completely giving up the perspective of control and having a too narrow understanding of control that does not take into account problematic political decisions for the Bundeswehr. Of course he can understand his task of mediation as a purely “neutral” one – but it is questionable whether this is in accordance with his task of control.

#### 4.2.6 Defence

The task of *mediation* or being a *connecting element* between Bundeswehr and politics can be expanded to the relation of society/the public and the Bundeswehr. According to Busch, the Annual Report of 1988 can be taken as an example. Following Busch, 1988 was the year in which the Bundeswehr and its mandate became less and less accepted in parts of the public, among others due to the flight accidents in Ramstein and Remscheidt, the hedgehopper-discussion and the feeling of a decreasing threat from Eastern Europe. The AFC explained in his Annual Report that soldiers would complain about being perceived as “peace disturbers” and “killers” in the public (Annual Report 1988: 4). Busch comments: “This elucidates the AFC’s genuine task of mediation between Bundeswehr

and society, between soldiers and civilians, between the command of defence in the Grundgesetz and the public awareness of it (...)." (Busch 1999: 99)

In that year, the AFC consequently stressed the merits of the Bundeswehr in keeping peace and freedom, and appealed to the public to support the army. Busch goes on saying: "Consequently, the AFC also understands himself as the soldiers' defender. Even if a threat is not perceived as being acute anylonger, the soldier may not be pushed to the margins of society." (Busch 1999:100)

One can conclude that the task of defence is the task of representing interests in a reinforced way at the institutional level. It is exercised if the institution as such needs to be defended.

#### *4.2.7 The Relation of Tasks: Overview*

Following tables show the relation of the different tasks of the AFC; the first time showing it according to the original norm, the second one representing the current reality:

**Table 1: The Different Tasks of the AFC: Original Norm**






|                            | <i>AFC: Representing the soldiers' perspective</i>   | <i>AFC: Representing the perspective of control</i>   |
|----------------------------|--|---|
| <i>Individual level</i>    | <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Control</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;">↓</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Administration</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Protection</i></p> | <p style="text-align: center;">-----</p> <p style="text-align: center;"> </p> <p style="text-align: center;">-----</p> <p style="text-align: center;">↓</p> |
| <i>Institutional level</i> |  | <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Control</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;">( = <i>Mediation</i> )</p>   |


Control is supposed to be exercised both at the *individual* and at the *institutional level*.

*Protection* and *administration* are part of the task of *control* at the *individual level*. The AFC represents the perspective of the soldiers who come to him. He then forms a

controlling picture out of the impressions he gets from his work at the *individual level*. From the perspective of control he conveys his insights about problematic tendencies that contradict the principles of the Innere Führung to Parliament. In doing so, he enables Parliament to act.

**Table 2: The Different AFC-tasks: Current Reality**

|                            | <i>AFC: Representing the soldiers' perspective</i>   | <i>AFC: Representing the perspective of control</i>                                  |
|----------------------------|--|--|
| <i>Individual level</i>    | <p><i>Control</i></p>  <p><i>Administration</i></p>  <p><i>Protection</i></p>  <p>„Social worker“</p> |  |
| <i>Institutional level</i> | <p><i>Representation of interests</i></p>   |  |



At the individual level, the task of *administration* leads to an over-emphasis of topics that lead to the AFC becoming a kind of “social worker” for the soldiers. The tasks of *protection* and *administration* have an effect on the task of *mediation*, insofar as the perspective of the Bundeswehr emerges beside the perspective of control. Due to that, the tasks of *representing intererests* and *protection* have become independent tasks beside the task of *control* at the *institutional level*.

### 4.3 Violation of Law and Rules and the Punishment of Soldiers

The annual reports of the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces contain chapters on defiance of subordinates and abuse of the power of order (Drucksache 16/8200: 18). In many of the named examples of such infringements the superiors or comrades stood under the influence of alcohol. A high quota of these cases came about in training companies for young recruits. It is reported that the superiors have gotten an adequate disciplinary punishment.

But in another chapter the Commissioner reports that the use of the disciplinary right in the Bundeswehr has a lot of deficiencies. An important problem is that officers are taking interrogations being not qualified to do. The same is mentioned in view to the handling of complaints. Many notifications to complaints would contain mistakes or would be missed totally. The Commissioner comes to the result that such situations are not acceptable and that those who are responsible for personnel management have to ensure that superiors are able to exercise their disciplinary authority in all respects (Drucksache 16/8200: 20).

Soldiers can either violate the military disciplinary order or general penal laws or both by one action. In all cases firstly it is to ask if a soldier has done something during his

service or in his private life. In respect of the behaviour during the service exists a special disciplinary order of the Bundeswehr (Wehrdisziplinarordnung) which contains regulations for appreciation of special attainments on the one hand and regulations for punishments on the other hand. Measures of the punishment given by superiors (chief of a company and higher ranks) reach from admonishments to confinement between one day and three weeks. Stronger punishments like cutting of the emoluments, degradation or remove from the military service can be ordered by special army's service courts (Truppendienstgerichte) of the Bundeswehr. The chambers of these courts consist of one professional judge and two honorary judges. A person only can become honorary judge in such a court if he or she is or has been soldier. One of the two honorary judges shall have the same rank as the accused, and none of the honorary judges is allowed to be superior of the accused or of the other honorary judge.

In difference to normal legal procedures the trials of the army's service courts are not open to the public. While the accused can request to open it, the chamber is allowed to exclude the public for the whole trial or a part of it to protect the Bundeswehr or one of its institutions (Wehrdisziplinarordnung, § 105).

It is possible to appeal against a judgement. In the last instance a case comes to the Federal Administrative Court in Leipzig which has a special chamber for disciplinary cases of the Bundeswehr (Wehrdienstsenat).

Besides infringements of the disciplinary order, soldiers can also commit a scope of service related criminal offences from arbitrary absence of more than three days over desertion, disobedience and other offences against the duties of subordinates, but also cruelties, abuse of the right to give orders and other offences against the duties of superiors. The punishment of these cases is regulated by the Military Penal Code (Wehrstrafgesetz). Especially the catalogue of offences against the duties of superiors shows that the principles of "Innere Führung" are also important for this penal code. But if soldiers commit other criminal offences in their private life they are answerable to a regular penal judge.

#### **4.4 Problems of Realisation and Positions in the Disputes on "Innere Führung"**

The positions to the concept and realization of "Innere Führung" in the army and the ministry can be divided into four categories:

- The representatives of "incompatibility", often also characterized as "traditionalists", arguing that military and democratic society do not fit together because the profession of the soldier would be a profession *sui generis* with own, "eternal" values oriented mainly at being able to fight.
- The representatives of "identity", arguing that there would be a broad congruence between military and democratic society and that the profession of the soldier is one like any other; only with the special task of peace keeping.

- A “functionalistic position”, supporting the introduction of modern participatory practices in the army, but not as a democratic value but for the reason of increasing motivation of the soldiers and efficiency of the army.
- An “indifferent” or “pragmatic” position of those who are able to ignore “Innere Führung” in their every day service because it seems not to be important for fulfilling their tasks (Groß 2008a: 15f.).

The first position was very influential during the foundation phase of the Bundeswehr. Then many officers who were supposed to train young soldiers had been members of the former Wehrmacht. They first had to change their own minds from traditional forms of order and obedience to the mindset of “Innere Führung”. A large number of them did not want to accept the necessity of structural and mental change under the primacy of political decisions in a democracy (cf. Bredow 1973: 57ff.; Bald 2008: 47ff.). Graf Baudissin and the other representatives of the second position struggled enormously to enforce “Innere Führung” against those traditionalists. During the 1970s, the policy of the social liberal coalition and the institutionalisation of the reforms via Bundeswehr universities facilitated the realisation of the concept in the military practice, also because the international framework of the Cold War demanded of the soldiers to learn to fighting with the aim of deterrence while not using their weapons. This brought the third, functionalistic position forward. Another fact was important: Those officers who had served in the Wehrmacht retired. Rather, the new generation of officers included many who sympathised with or even were members of the coalition parties, especially of the SPD. As in Germany a change of government does not mean the replacement of the whole administration, the second and – particularly – the third position stayed relatively strong for some years after the turnaround of 1982, when the Federal Chancellor and the Ministry of Defence were not longer Social Democrats, but members of the conservative CDU.

In the long run this turning point did not lead to a return to pre-democratic positions. But under the Minister of Defence Volker Rühle (CDU) the principles of “Innere Führung” degenerated especially from 1994 on in connection with the tasks of the Bundeswehr changing from defence to worldwide engagements. That was the reason for an insider to formulate five theses on the “decline of Innere Führung” in 2000 (Hamann 2000; 2008) which were reprinted in a book of very decisive advocates of this concept, titled “Zurückgestutzt, sinnentleert, unverstanden: Die Innere Führung der Bundeswehr” (Trimmed, Devoid of Meaning, Misunderstood: The Innere Führung of the Bundeswehr) (Bald et al. 2008).

In this book also the current positions are described. They partially differ from the older. Groß analyses the present situation according to Wiesendahl and develops the following positions:

- A position of a “normative partial revision”: the representatives of this position are representatives of “Innere Führung” in its original meaning and try to save it through a contemporary further development under the changed political and societal frameworks.

- A position of “conservation” of “Innere Führung” which is indefeasible for them, so that they can be called “new traditionalists”.
- A position of “practice-oriented partial revision” which is *prima facie* similar to the first position but favors an accommodation of “Innere Führung” to the realities of deployments.<sup>36</sup>
- A position saying that “Innere Führung” has proved itself also in deployment situations and that there is no necessity for revision.
- And a position pledging for a “total revision” which argues that “Innere Führung” is dysfunctional under the conditions of international deployments (Wiesendahl 2007: 15f.; Groß 2008a: 17f.).

The first two positions stem from the old identity position, the third and the fourth follow the old functionalistic position and the last corresponds to the incompatibility position with arguments (Groß 2008a: 18). A look at the new version of the ZDV 10/1 clearly shows that the third position had the most influence (see chapter 3.3).

In another article in the same book, Groß analyses the structural decline of the importance of “Innere Führung” since the phase of its conceptualization: In the time of the “Office Blank” the “Independent Group Innere Führung” was directly subordinate to the Head of the “Military Department” which was then the highest officer. When the “Office Blank” was enlarged into the Ministry of Defence, the “Independent Group” was changed into “Sub-department Innere Führung” which contained four sections (Referate). During the 1960ies only a “Sub-department Innere Führung: Personnel” existed which was not directly subordinated to the General Inspector, while two levels of hierarchy were put between him and this sub-department. Meanwhile only one section from altogether 27 of the Steering Staff of the Army (Führungsstab der Streitkräfte) is responsible for the “trade mark” “Innere Führung” (Groß 2008b: 91f.).

Groß describes the same tendency related to the responsibility for the Zentrum Innere Führung: Formerly it was directly subordinated to the Vice General Inspector but during the transformation of the Bundeswehr it was subordinated to the Streitkräfteamt and to the Inspector of the Streitkräftebasis (i.e. military basis organisation for personnel affairs). Moreover, in 2006 a new hierarchic level was installed between the Head of the Streitkräfteamt and the Commander of the Zentrum Innere Führung: A “Kommandeur Bundesweherschulen und General streitkräftegemeinsame Ausbildung” (i.e. Commander for all schools of the Bundeswehr and common education units of the parts of the army in the rank of a General) (Groß 2008b: 92). Both can be seen as signs for declining interest in “Innere Führung” on the top level of the ministry and of the army itself but also as indications of growing bureaucratisation of the Bundeswehr.

<sup>36</sup> This is also the position of Hartmann who argues that it may be helpful for a pragmatical development of “Innere Führung” that some of the older representatives of the concept have retired in the meantime (Hartmann 2007: 19f.).

## 5. Conclusion

This report shows that there is a central theme in the development of the German army's educational efforts from its restart in the early 1950s up to now called "Innere Führung". It analysed that this does not mean that the concept behind is really internalized by all who are involved in military affairs, bureaucrats as well as soldiers. One reason is that the term "Innere Führung" is not as clear as it has to be for a realisable educational goal. The several versions of the ZDV 10/1 have not made it easier to come to a common interpretation, but are suggesting that its realisation is a complex and difficult task. Therefore, it can be observed that the Bundeswehr as a whole and most of its members seem to hold "Innere Führung" in high esteem, but possibly do their jobs without minding it much. But as the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces and the media take their watchdog function seriously the principles of "Innere Führung" will not be forgotten.

There is an additional problem which results from the fact that a growing number of German soldiers take part in international missions in which they have to co-operate with comrades from other NATO-countries in which the concept of "Innere Führung" is not known or not accepted in the same way, but mocked as militarily unprofessional or useless for winning a battle. In the last decade it seemed that the representatives of the Bundeswehr in the international staff of these missions did not advertise strongly or courageously enough for the concept that others were prepared to transfer the concept (cf. Groß/Meyer 2005: 216). Yet, recently there is the insight on the political level as well as in the new version of ZDV 10/1 that especially peace keeping and peace enforcement missions require soldiers with a high degree of sensibility for communication and intercultural competence and that therefore an education in the sense of "Innere Führung" could be very helpful.

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