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The Defence System of the Republic of Slovenia – Normative Construction and Civil-Military Relations

Slovenian Case

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Introduction

Slovenia, like the rest of the central-European formerly socialist states, has made an enormous progress in the sphere of the democratisation of civil-military relations after the end of the Cold War, i.e. in the period, which was, in Slovenian case, marked also with newly established state sovereignty in 1991. Therefore, it was not only the end of the historic period, influencing the way of introducing new patterns of behaviour in security sector¹ of Slovenia, but also the fact, that newly independent state had to establish nearly all institutions of political life and governance from the scratch. The political elite tried to enforce those features of defence policy, which would clearly show the democratic relations within security sector to the citizens of the state. It was needed to regain legitimacy of defence system, which lost most of its prestige in disputes between former Yugoslav army and Slovenian civil society in eighties. There was also new phraseology deployed in order to label new processes. For example, there were broad public discussions on de-politicisation and departisation of the armed forces, on the appreciation of the human rights within the military sphere, civilian control of the military, and on the transparency of defence policy and defence budget. All these, as many other issues have shown the tendency towards civilian supremacy in all crucial defence policy questions. However, the introduction of multiparty systems, reformed or new political institutions, and modern phraseology, did not automatically result in democratic civil-military relations, neither in democratic relations between the security sector and the civil society.

There are certain complications of constitutional, legislative and political nature within the civil-military relations sphere which underline civil-military relations as a sophisticated phenomenon and emphasise the need for tolerance in time of their taking shape on the one hand; on the other, the civil-military relations in society that is being democratised are presented as extremely fragile. And it is within this context that the strengthening of the civil society and the part played by the public in general can be understood as the precondition for the development of the civil-military relations.

Some analyses of Slovenian civil-military relations show the deviations from the pattern of civil-military relations, as established in the developed democratic society. Interestingly, there are no deviations originating in interventionist posture of the military, but on the other, civilian side of the military-civil spectrum. Slovenia shares the non-interventionist posture of its military (Danopoulos, Zirker, 2002: 126) with other Central and Eastern European post-communist states.

¹ The term »security sector« is used to approach the security more holistically, and not to narrow it to questions of military involvement in politics, or civilian control over the armed forces. The first usage of the term security sector is concerned with militarised formations authorised by the state to utilise force to protect the state itself and its citizens. The second approach defines security sector as organisations and activities concerned with provision of security (Edmunds, 2003:11).
Civilian political elites have tendency to abuse the military as a whole or chosen military units to fight their own political disputes. The civilian control over the armed forces is in many cases narrowed to the clashes between civilian elites on who is going to guard the guards. The understanding of control over the armed forces as fights within the political elite for the predominance and influence on the armed forces is very near to the Huntington’s notion of subjective civilian control of the military (Huntington, 1995). In other words, the armed forces were the victim of politicisation, i.e., an instrument for political clashes. In moot points the civil society (and the public with it) cast merely in a role of a badly informed onlooker, and a puppet manipulated by the fighting political elite. The rationalising of the moot points in the domain of civil-military relations has often taken place on the level of affiliation to the parties of “the Slovenian national awakening” as opposed to the parties of the ex-communist provenance.

The survey of the Slovenian case of civil-military relations has brought us to a conclusion that Slovenia is to build its civil-military relations in line with its own tradition, political culture and needs, taking into consideration general standards appertaining to the model of civil-military relations in the states of the liberal-democratic type.

1. Democratic Oversight of Defence and Security – Legal and Institutional Issues of Concern

Cottey, Edmunds, and Forster (2002:31-56) argued that forming core institutions for the political control of armed forces belongs to the first generation problematique of civil military relations. The second generation problems of establishing effective structures for the democratic governance of the defence and security sector are becoming more important when the institutions are formed according to the legal prescriptions, but they lack of substance.

Various countries establish civil-military relations and democratic political control over armed forces according to their historical experience, cultural traditions and political culture. However, there are some least common denominators, which could be summarized as follows:

- a solid constitutional and legal framework,
- the accountability of the armed forces to the Government through a civilian defence minister,
- the co-operation of military representatives with qualified civilians in the process of defining defence requirements, policy and budget,
- the division of professional responsibility between the civilian and the military sphere,
- the supremacy and scrutiny of the parliament over armed forces and defence matters in general and
the internal and external (international) transparency of security and defence matters of the state.

In Slovenia, the key legal solutions of civilian oversight over the defence and security sector are embodied in the Constitution, Defence Act and some other acts of the Republic of Slovenia. The legal framework is important for understanding the way in which the country establishes civil-military relations according to its own legal and historic tradition. Previously mentioned common denominators of democratic control over the armed forces are embodied in Slovenian legal framework of civil-military relations.

The Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia provides a general legal framework regulating:

- the adoption of multi-party parliamentary democracy,
- the division of power – legislative, executive and judicial branches of power,
- the adoption of national security policy by the National Assembly,
- the embodiment of all executive defence activities in a single body – the Ministry of Defence, that is led by a civilian.

The Constitution, Defence Act and other acts provide a sound legal basis for the development of democratic civil-military relations with the following characteristics:

- the division between civil and military power, the latter being subordinated to the former,
- the Supreme Commander of the armed forces is the President of the Republic,
- all crucial national security related decisions are made by the National Assembly,
- the role of the military in the decision-making process is professional only and not political,
- the military is strictly depoliticised and limited to the professional military roles.

According to the Constitution, the citizens have the right to conscientious objection (Article 46), for religious, philosophical and humanitarian reasons (Article 123). If they are not ready to co-operate in military activities, they should be enabled to co-operate in the defence of the country in some other way.

Against the Constitution is any encouraging of national, racial, religious or other inequality and inflaming national, racial, religious or other hatred and intolerance. Any encouraging of violence and war is also counter-Constitutional (Article 63).

The state of emergency is declared when major and general danger threatens the existence of the state. The decision on the declaration of war or state of emergency, the introduction of precautions and their abolition is made by the National Assembly, upon the proposal of the Government. National Assembly decides on the use of defence forces. In case, the National Assembly could not meet, the above mentioned obligations
are performed by the President of the Republic who is obliged to seek the confirmation of the National Assembly as soon as the latter is able to act (Article 92).

The President of the Republic represents the Republic of Slovenia, and he/she is a Supreme Commander of the defence forces (Article 102).

The sort, scope and organization of defence, intangibility and integrity of state territory are defined by the Defence Act, which is adopted by a two third majority in the National Assembly. The exercising of defence is controlled by the National Assembly. While assuring its security, the state emanates above all from peace policy and the culture of peace and non-violence (Article 124)

The Defence Act forbids the use of armed forces for any kind of political and party activity, and does not allow the professional officers to be members of the political parties. The armed forces are apolitical and non-party and their tasks are purely professional. Military courts were not introduced at the first stages of institutional forming of the independent state’s structures and the members of armed forces are subjected to civil legislation and courts. The right of conscientious objection is very liberal, as seen before, there is a variety of reasons respected, the length of service is the same as for those who serve in the armed forces, and the request for conscientious objection to be recognised could be submitted before the military service starts, during it or after it (in the reserve units). There was significant development through years on this issue. The first Act in 1991 was about Defence and Protection and it recognised the conscientious objection status if applied for it before the service. The Defence Act, released in 1994, established a lot more liberal system, according to which the applications were received before, during and after the compulsory military service. After these regulations were introduced, the number of applications grew very rapidly.

The Slovenian army could be referred to as apolitical, and as such hardly exerts an influence upon political decisions, even when the issue in question is of military corporate interests. The relation between the army and society could be said to be professional; however, in Slovenia, the harmony between the two is sometimes relatively low.

The National Assembly, as the highest legislative body, defines the national security policy of the state and exercises the control over the armed forces, especially through committees as Defence Committee, Committee on Budget and Finance, Committee for Control of the Intelligence Services and Committee for Control of the Realisation of National Security Resolution adopted by the National Assembly. Through allocation of defence funds, the National Assembly supervises the development and equipping of the armed forces.

The Government has the executive role in the defence sphere, and it is accountable for keeping the unity and concordance of the defence forces in line with the national security

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2 One case of that kind was the passing of law regulating the length of service for officers; the latter are expected to sign ten-year collaboration contracts that may be extended for 5 years. The officers hardly said anything for their own benefit, they were forced to accept what was decided by the Government.
and defence policy. The Government is also responsible for exercising the defence measures, on the basis of the decisions made by the National Assembly.

The President of the Republic, as seen before, is a Supreme Commander of the defence forces, i.e. Slovenian Army.

In the process of achieving solid solutions in civil-military relations, the international security co-operation plays an important role, as well. The desired compliance with EU and NATO countries' standards in that field and the co-operation within OSCE increase the transparency of defence matters. Transparency in the field of security and military affairs becomes a crucial element of co-operation and partnership between states, and an important link in the democratic parliamentary control of the armed forces that foster constitutionality and legality in the security field.

2. Parliamentary Oversight of the Security and Defence Sector

The National Assembly exercises its control over the security sector by passing the laws, by creating the budget and through many other channels of financial kind. The Defence Committee is supposed to be the most powerful and professional body of the parliamentary oversight. It is composed by the deputies with very modest defence expertise and knowledge. Many of them have no direct experiences from the Slovenian military. If they were military trained, it was due to their military service in former Yugoslav military, not in the Slovenian military. Therefore, many judge Slovenian military according to their experiences in former military, and they are not aware of the fact that Slovenian military is very different, smaller in size, with shorter compulsory military service and with growing number of all volunteers in units for international cooperation.

It happened some times in the period between 1990 – 2000, that the Defence Minister effectively deprived the President of the Republic and Supreme Commander-in-Chief of relevant confidential information on the preparedness of the armed forces. The Constitution allowed it, because when it was introduced, there was no detailed legislation on the control of the armed forces. Beside, the Defence Ministers were the sources of political tensions and scandals. Although they were civilian defence ministers, they stimulated the intrusions of the party politics into the army, contributed to the lowering professionalism of the Slovenian military establishment, and reflected the insufficiently developed democratic political culture in the area of defence.

The National Assembly would need more defence knowledge to decide on defence issues, and even more urgently, to exercise professional control over the armed forces. As currently stays, the National Assembly benefits from the low professionalism of the other side, the military establishment, unable to fight for its professional interests, it is no serious partner in the control issues.
3. The Transparency and Division of Power

According to Slovenia’s Constitution, the President of the Republic has not very powerful position. He (or she) is non-executive president and titular Commander-in-Chief. Although the Prime Minister chairs the National Security Council, he (or she) has no specific power in defence area. Even more, the National Security Council has advisory function only. In practice, the key defence official in peacetime is the Defence Minister, who is civilian politician from one of the parties that constitute the current ruling coalition. The Prime Minister can overrule the defence Minister’s actions. The General-Staff of Slovenian Armed Forces is a part of the Ministry of defence. Therefore, the Commander-in-Chief is not directly subordinated to the President of the Republic. He must prepare his reports for the Defence Minister, who decides what to proceed to the President and what must stay at the defence Ministry. Once a year, the Commander-in-Chief reports directly to the President, in presence of the Defence Minister.

Defence sector was from the beginning of the Slovenian independence very difficult governmental sector. There were some powerful personalities holding the Defence Ministry post in the period between 1990 (first multiparty elections and government) and 2007, but many were replaced or were forced to resign due to the incidents at the Ministry. In this period, seven different ministers hold the post, coming from four different political parties. The situation calmed finally with the last two ministers, one of them leading the Ministry in the period 2000 – 2004, and the current one being in power from the end of 2004 on.

The Defence Minister’s actions are exposed to the scrutiny and pressure from the Defence Committee of the National Assembly or from the National Assembly as a whole. The actions of Defence Minister and the activities of the Defence Ministry are exposed to the public scrutiny as well. The public criticism on defence issues has been openly expressed and published in printed and electronic media, which in several occasions served as the basic information for the Defence Committee from the National Assembly to begin its parliamentary procedure of the critical oversight. It happened that the media were in many cases better informed, or in details informed on issues that should be subjected to the parliamentary, i.e. political civilian control of the defence sector. Therefore, the Committee members may become aware of the defence problems while reading or following the mass media, and on the basis of the information, received from open sources, they ask for more in-depth analysis or data from the defence sector agencies.

The Party Affiliation of the Defence Committee reflects the whole Assembly political picture with majority that belongs to the opposition and chair is always in the hands of the most powerful opposition party. The Defence Committee mostly engages in incidents provoked by the Defence Ministry and not so much by the Slovenian military. It means that the members of the defence Committee are well aware of the subordinated posture of the general staff and the military within the structure of the Ministry of Defence. Therefore, there are some sympathies and awareness of the MPs to understand the military as a tool of the executive power, and the structure that must be controlled while
using the military tool, is actually the civilian side of the Ministry with its Directorates, Intelligence and Security Service, inspectorates and others.

4. Oversight of the Intelligence and Security Agencies

Parliamentary oversight of the intelligence and security agencies was established as a part of the newly defined parliamentary control over the security sector after 1990. Although the constitutional and legal framework has set more or less clear channels of control, it happened that these agencies did not work very professionally. In some cases, they were under strong impact of one of the ministers, be it Defence Minister or Minister of Interior, and they used their data to support the power ambitions of these personalities. In other cases, they have given their information to the powerful historical personalities of the Slovenian Independence Movement from 1991. It happened also, that the data from the Secret Archives of the States were copied and stored in unknown places (also in the foreign countries) in order to put the Government or leading personalities under pressure. In 2003, the secret data of the Police Archives from the Former Yugoslavia were put on the Web site of the private company owner from Australia, Dušan Lajovic. He is of Slovenian origin and served as Honorary Consul of Slovenia for Australia and New Zealand. The secret data on thousands of Slovenian citizens were made public, despite the fact that they should be protected as personal secrercies. The incident has shown how fragile is the human right to expect from the government to store personal data in a safe place, and especially, how quickly is the governmental ability to neutrally care for all citizens destroyed. The case shows that the oversight of the intelligence services must include the expectations and imperatives for professional work of these services.

5. Civilians and Military in Defence Planning

The Slovenian Defence Ministry is predominantly staffed by civilians. It means that there are very few jobs within the ministry, which are not part of the General Staff, that are basically formed as military jobs, or uniformed jobs. This is in contrast with the practices at the federal defence ministry level of the former Yugoslavia, in which jobs were mainly occupied by soldiers, which was criticised over years, and clearly neglected in the basic structure of the newly independent state of Slovenia. Many practices, although maybe good, were abolished and forbidden, just because they rooted in the hated system of former Yugoslavia. The way in which the professional military was placed under firm and several layers of overwhelming civilian control was the result of criticism towards former Yugoslavia’s instruments of defence sector. Bebler argues that one of the most important reasons for the exceedingly high degree of civilian domination in defence sector lies in the numerical and intellectual weakness of military professionals (Bebler, 2002: 167).
Prior to the independence in 1991, Slovenia had military professionals in former Yugoslav army, and many of them returned from their working places in Yugoslav military to Slovenia immediately after war for independence in June-July 1991. These were predominantly officers of lower ranks and non-commissioned officers, very few among them were senior officers or of the rank of general. The officers from lower ranks were commissioned in the Slovenian military. The nationality of the officer was not important, if he had or obtained Slovenian citizenship, left the Yugoslav military during the armed conflicts or after them in a very limited period of time. It happened that many non-Slovenian officers who previously worked in the Yugoslav units within Slovenia, knew the procedure of changing the sides and accepted it, whereas many Slovenian officers working in other parts of former Yugoslavia, stayed in their regions, within the former Yugoslav military until its total disintegration in 1992. After that year, they were not accepted into Slovenian military anymore, no matter how professional they would be. Many of them are still looking for jobs in Slovenia with very low chances to get something on the level of their education. Their degrees from Yugoslav military academies gave them the Bachelor of Military Science, and occupation “the officer of Yugoslav Army”. With such degree they were fully uncompetitive on the Slovenian labour market.

The only Slovenian general, previously worked for the Yugoslav military, and after independence advising the President of the Republic of Slovenia on military issues, was general Milovan Zorc. He was the only general of the former military, who was in some way commissioned for the Slovenian defence needs after 1991. He asked for demobilization and retirement from the Yugoslav military before the clashes between Slovenian defence forces and Yugoslav units in 1991 began. He realised very soon in 1990 that the aggressive Serbian policy, empowered by the appetites of the Yugoslav army, being put under control of the Serbian politicians, would cause the disintegration and bloody destabilisation of the federal state. But, as already said, he was only one general, and he worked for the President of Slovenia. Other military professionals were placed in different ranks and places within Territorial Defence Units of Slovenia, but for some years they were under firm scrutiny of other Slovenian military professionals, coming from the reserve units and from the newly established system of military officer training.

The military professionals from the former Yugoslav Army were controlled and stopped in promotion, and they were not very influential in issues of professional military activities. Instead of educated military officers, the reserve officers and other civilians hastily filled the officers’ ranks of developing Slovenian military. They often had neither proper military qualification, or if they have it, it was gained in short officers’ courses, nor professional experiences, except the experiences gained from the Ten-Day Slovenian War for Independence. The Slovenian officers were numerous, but professionally very weak, with the underdeveloped corporate identity and low political profile, therefore they were not influential in military decision-making. Distrust and discrimination against former officers of the federal army were overruled in last three years, when many of them took the highest places in the General-Staff of Slovenian army.
Very high degree of civilian domination over the Slovenian military results from the rejection of the militarist and praetorian tendencies of the autonomous military, experienced in former Yugoslavia. The parliamentary system of civilian oversight over the small military establishment gave this civilian domination its constitutional and legal foundation. The political culture without elaborated military traditions and with high degree of public interest in defence matters, if they are not in concordance with human rights, added to the civilian supremacy additional dimension, i.e. overcivilianisation of the defence sector and especially of the military establishment.

The reduced level of military professionalism and overcivilianisation of the defence sector have radically changed the substance of usual civil-military relations. In many areas of defence policy, the civil-military interface has been supplanted by de facto civil-civil relations (Bebler, 2002: 168). Most defence-related issues are decided by the civilian officials or by people who entered the military as civilian workers, loosing job opportunities elsewhere, but holding their civilian corporate identity instead of getting the new military identity and culture. The professional military can only partly influence the formulation of Slovenia’s defence policy. The strategic areas of defence planning are out of their impact.

6. Civil Society in Security Sector Reform

The Civil Society

The Slovenian civil society in times of the former Yugoslavia, and particularly in the second half of the 80s showed an explicit sensitivity to the interference of the armed forces with the civil sphere, and to attempts of militarising the society. Yet, one can notice a certain public yielding to the army in the civil society, now that the armed forces is considered "ours" (i.e., Slovenian and no longer Yugoslav). A part of the intelligentsia has grown quite non-critical of the armed forces as an institution within the independent state, though in former times used to be extremely critical of the former Yugoslav army. It has to be emphasised that the Slovenian armed forces in contrast with the former Yugoslav armed forces had none of the "Preatorian" ambitions and its relationship with the society is legally of an entirely different nature. Standards and criteria to assess the role of the army within the civil society are fundamentally more sophisticated. The civil society should preserve its criticism of the army as an institutional body on the one hand. On the other, it should never forget that the army, too, has a state-forming role.

A substantial part of members of the civil society associations that opposed the former Yugoslav military incentives to militarise society, strong and influential when Slovenia was developing the plural political system and becoming independent, "went over" to the governmental and parliamentary authoritative bodies (accordingly, former political dissidents were in power) of the political system of Slovenia. This process we labelled as a process of etatism. It shows that even the most aggressive members of civil society has to gain the state force in order to put their ideas into power. The dangerous is that they alone
turn into hated governmental officials and provoke the new waves of public criticism, and new civil society associations as well. It happened in Slovenia, where many old peace activists from eighties, being in the forefront of the clashes with former Yugoslav army, became high officials in the new independent political system, where they were asked to form the new defence sector of Slovenia. They realised that a lot of their peace activism has to remain outdoor when the state interests have to be protected by all means, also military.

**The Public Opinion**

It goes without saying that the military elite in Slovenia is interested in public appreciation, acceptance and support, which means a certain degree of legitimacy necessary for its normal existence and operating. The last public opinion poll showed that what the public expects from the armed forces is to carry out its functional and societal imperative. The former is the public's expectation of the army to effectively deprecate the aggression, and should the latter occur anyway to successfully defend the state. The societal imperative is about the public's expectation of the army to appreciate the fundamental social values, norms and rules of behaving, in short, the army is not to form its own subculture alienated from the society. Furthermore, the army is expected to participate in various - conditionally said - social programmes. With regard to the societal imperative (help during natural disasters and other accidents in particular) Slovenian expectations are practically identical with those of the Austrian, Italian, Swiss and German public.

Resulting from the information available is a fact that the Slovenian public attributes a rather high level of socialisation and social-economic part to the armed forces, yet disapproves of its interference with political affairs. Concerning the process of political decision making, the armed forces are supposed to participate only in military-defence decisions. Furthermore, the majority of the public is in favour of the reduction of armed forces as well as of the military budget; the armed forces be mostly conscript with a small professional nucleus, the term of office for the military service should be seven months, and the officers should not be partisans of any political party.

**The Role of the (Defence) Studies**

Studies, sociological and defence in particular, play an important role in controlling the armed forces, and accordingly in the development of a suitable model for civil-military relations. In Slovenia, there is one educational and one research academic defence studies institution. They are part of the University of Ljubljana. The Defence Studies Division is educational branch, placed within the Political Science Department of the Faculty of Social Sciences. The Defence Research Centre is research branch, placed within the Institute of Social Sciences. They both are an important segment of the civil society (some might say a segment of the "defence community or strategic community"), and contemplated from the sociological and political science aspects they instructively, and analytically study and research the national security, and especially the defence system. Since Slovenia has become independent, there is a noticeable discrepancy between the development of the defence establishment on the one and the defence studies on the other hand. The defence
establishment has in the last few years grown in its quality and quantity, but the defence studies which should, at least up to a certain level, meet the personnel needs of the former and strengthen its work through research and analyses, have remained the same in the number of its staff. The institutional needs for the expertise, surveys and other academic activities have grown up enormously. Other academic disciplines do not take a sufficient part in the studies concerning the national security. If they did, they would complement the defence studies theory covering specific areas, such as political economy of the national security, international war and humanitarian law, the psychological and social aspects of disasters and others.

When the defence institutions, especially the top of the Ministry of Defence, were first formed, the technical aspect and professionalism were quite ignored and recruitment was carried out on the principle "it is not important what and how much a candidate knows, as long as he is ours". Consequently, people were employed, if certain criteria were met, such as the right political affiliation, or an absolute loyalty to the top of the Defence Ministry (speaking of ways of recruiting new personnel, there were other ministries that followed the same principle). Still it has to be emphasised that the relevance and consideration of the defence studies have lately become quite noticeable. Some time ago, everybody seemed "to become an authority for whatever the problem"; also, complex questions on national security turned to be somewhat simple, not in themselves, of course, but merely due to being simplified by some people out of ignorance. The present day situation can be said to have changed; defence studies has been gaining ground. And if some time ago the discussion about questions on (national) security was quite general, since the concept, doctrine and the security system were to change, today the discussion deals with specialities and individual cases.

7. Issues of Security Sector Reform: Crisis Management, Peacekeeping, Regional Security

In 1997, Slovenian Armed Forces and Slovenian Police began to cooperate in international peacekeeping. This fact brought many new aspects and issues of democratic control. Who would guard the professional military, units of all volunteers in their foreign missions? If the answer is clear, adding this task to the National Assembly and to the Government, the more sophisticated question on “how” to control the, stays open. According to the established practice in 10 years, members of the parliamentary Defence Committee pay visits to the places where Slovenian soldiers are serving, but due to the fact that these visits are more formal and not so much devoted to the discussion of military problems, the control is limited to the level of getting information on problems. The resolution of these problems sometimes comes to the Assembly’s schedules, although very rarely.

From 1997, Slovenia contributes its military units and civilian policemen to the peacekeeping operations in the turbulent neighbourhood of the South-Eastern Europe. The civilian policemen are taking part in UN led mission UNMIK in Kosovo and in Macedonia, as also in EU police mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The soldiers are
part of the KFOR mission in Kosovo, ISAF in Afghanistan, UNIFIL II in Lebanon, and were included into SFOR mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Some 350 soldiers are currently deployed in operations abroad. In past 10 years, the deployment of soldiers and policemen was predominantly part of the foreign policy, and to a lower extent also part of the security policy. The deployment of troops abroad was one of the prerequisites of the rapprochement policy towards the EU and NATO. Therefore, Slovenian political elite some times decided to send units into peacekeeping to fulfil its promises regarding EU and NATO membership. Many of these promises were not in concordance with Slovenian security policy and sometimes they overestimated the capacities of Slovenian army to train, send and maintain the numerous peacekeepers abroad.

The last most important political decision in this regard is deployment of motorised battalion in Kosovo in February 2007. The Slovenian soldiers have had its own area of responsibility around city of Peč, they had one subordinated unit (Hungarian company) and together with other battalions they formed the military structure of the Multinational Task Force West, Peč.

8. Conclusion

Slovenian civil-military relations rooted in the last few years of the former Yugoslavia’s existence. In the period between 1998 and 1991 the military dominated public issues coloured the political debates and fights. Very high political and civil society interest for defence issues finished in successful armed victory of Slovenian Defence forces in Ten-Day War for Independence in 1991. After independence, the social prestige of the defence matters and military occupation has decreased significantly. The reluctance among the general public and especially among young population against the military and defence issues in general resulted in decreasing willingness of young men to enter the military service, increasing number of draftees asking for the status of conscientious objector, and in increasing refusal of the compulsory military service in public. The government and the National Assembly recognised public feelings in the regulations that lead to the abolishment of the military duty in 2003. These changes brought alone new challenges of the civilian oversight of the armed forces, since after 2003, the Slovenian Parliament and Slovenian Public have to exercise the democratic control over the all-volunteer armed forces only.
9. Sources


Documents


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