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**Phase 3: Results and Analysis of Fieldwork**
The Spanish Case

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Research Project „The Image of the Democratic Soldier: Tensions Between the Organisation of Armed Forces and the Principles of Democracy in European Comparison“
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1. Introduction

This document is a fieldwork whose technical characteristics are detailed in the Annex 1. The conceptual structure is specified in the Annex 2. The document of the interview that is conformed by different open, half-closed and closed questions was configured with this structure. Under the circumstances and technical characteristics of work, this should be considered like a pilot study. This investigation has permitted concretizing the studied variables. A posterior study -if it took place- would be able to, on the one hand, being executed with a bigger number of questions closed (which would make easy the posterior analysis) and, on the other hand, it would make possible to refine more the conceptual structure of the whole study. Redaction has been accomplished following the indications of the coordinators of the research project. For it, the text is structured in six paragraphs of different extension.

2. What motivated Spanish military to choose this career? How they understand their professional model and which ones are their ideals? Do these vary from the democratic ideals?

2.1. Motivation to elect the military career.

The interviewees indicated as reasons that pushed them to elect the military career:
A.- With sufficient or much importance
1. A stable job (71%).
   - Men and women give too much importance to this factor (71-75 %)
   - It is the same for officers (69 %) and more for NCOs (85 %)
   - Decreases for warriors 1 (58 %) and it are very elevated for technicians (92 %).

1 We have named «warriors» to the members of General Corps (Infantry, Artillery, Parachutists, pilots, seamen, etc). and Marine Corps, also known as Combatant Corps. We have named «technicians» to the members of the Corps of Intendance, Engineering and Technical Corps and Defence’s Common Corps (Medical, Juridical and Auditor). The dichotomy between «warriors» and «technicians» will be used, from this time on, not to have to detail all the Corps implicated in each case.
2. A service to the other ones (71 %)
   - It is very important for men (77 %) and not much for the 75% of women
   - It is very important for officers (70 %) as well as for NCOs (67 %)
   - It is very important for warriors (70 %) and also, but in minor amount for NCOs (67 %)
3. To lead a life more dynamic (68 %).
   - It is very important for men (67 %) and very important for women (75%)
   - It is very important for officers (74 %) and sufficient for NCOs (67 %)
   - The same importance for warriors (67 %) and technicians (68 %)

B.- With not much or no importance
4. It is a familiar tradition for the 64 %.
   - A third part of men affirms that it had influence; and the 50 % in the case of the women.
   - A third part approximately of the officers and NCOs assure that it had influence.
   - It was important at the moment of choosing for 42% of warriors and 25% of technicians.
   - 46 % of Air Force, 50 % of the Navy Fleet and 56 % of Army claim to be within tradition.
   - This percentage descends to the 33 % for Defence’s Common Corps.
5. The possibility of carrying an orderly and disciplined life (60 %).
   - Women give unimportance to this factor; however it is important for 45 % of the women
   - 35 % of officers consider it important; but, for NCOs, this percentage increases to 71 %
   - This factor is important for 53 % of warriors and go down to the 16 % for technicians.
6. The social prestige (59 %)
   - Men give unimportance to this factor (57 %) and women, less still (75 %)
   - For officers (57%) and, more, for NCOs (67%) this factor did not cause the career choosing
   - The same happens for the half of warriors (47%) and almost the technicians’ totality (92%)

Other mentioned variables are patriotism and, in some case, the hazard like factors that they contributed to the choosing of the military career. About if the reasons that implied to elect the military career have changed with the step of the years, 72 % affirm
that no. But a third part of men, officers and warriors they say that those reasons have changed, while that all women, 86 % of NCOs and 92 % of technicians say no. If we observed the change of opinion with the step of the years, we can see that motivation keeps highest between those who take less than 20 years of service (from 100 to the 92 %); but, for those who take between 21 and 30 years of service, it falls down to 57 %; and, between those that exceed of 30 years of professional activity, only a third part maintains the motivation of the beginning.

If the above is correct, it means that job security is a factor highly appreciated by all, especially for NCOs and technicians. The three fourth parts consider his work as a community service; although women would not have that perception and warriors would be who they would have that concept in more worth. The great majority chooses this profession because it allows leading a life more dynamic. The general perception is that one; a little bit bigger between women than between men; a little bit more between officers than between NCOs; and at the same level between warriors and technicians.

Otherwise, the motives that less have had influence over the choice of career are: the familiar tradition, although this cause is important for the men's third part, the women's half, 42 % of warriors and 25 % of technicians; carrying a ordered and disciplined life did not have influence at all in women and has very poor importance for technicians, however, it is important for 42 % of men and 53 % of warriors, and really important for 71 % of NCOs; the social prestige is not much significant in general, but very little for 92 % of technicians and for 75 % of women.

This would mean that this profession is chosen generally by people that they appreciate highly the community service (although the majority does not expect recognition for that); that they wish to carry a professional active life, that the high incomes do not worry them, but they wish to see compensated this factor with the stability on-the-job and, in the case of men and more of the NCOs, they look for a certain order in their lives. The auto recruitment (those that choose the profession of their parents or familiar surroundings) would affect to a third part of these professionals and, in bigger proportion, to women and warriors.

The officers warriors (men) are more inclined to lose the references in the initial moral values that led them to the military career, and this change of moral values, recover special importance after 20 years of service. Therefore, to have a Armed Forces motivated and conscious that they render a community service, it would require, in the Spanish case, to articulate a procedure in order that a third part of the officers of General Corps - they are destined to attain the topmost levels of responsibility- may pass to professional civil activities after 20 years of service.
2.2. Self-image

91% of military believe that their profession is socially useful in the present world and a 3% than no, oscillating between the 84% and the 100% the affirmative replies, according to cases. The result about social necessity/utility of the existence of Armed Forces oscillates between 82% and 100%. Only 6% of those that serve in Army affirm that the military figure is not necessary, and 18% of Air Force's personnel does not know or does not answer. Otherwise, two third parts of those that carry more than 30 years of military profession maintain that it is necessary, and a third part does not know or does not answer.

80% perceive themselves like protectors of a series of ideals and 11%, no. Men look at themselves in 84% like protectors of a series of ideals and that percentage descends to 50% for women. The difference in percentages is similar between officers (75%) and NCOs (100%). For groups of years of service, that perception is maintained until the 30 years, and, form that point on, a third part affirms that they are not protective of a specific category of ideals. The perception about which ones are such ideals it is detailed in the following Paragraph 1.3.

Relating to if they look themselves within any military tradition in the military, 49% said yes, 46% said no and 5% did not know or did not want to answer. 53% of men, 71% of NCOs and 68% of warriors claim to be within a military tradition. 75% of women, 54% of officers and 58% of technicians deny being within this tradition. Referring to his perception about his style of command and his ideals were in agreement in that it was very or enough important the following: stimulating and organizing teamwork (100%), being an example for subordinates and technical and professional preparation (97% in both), promoting the subordinates’ initiative (91%), the participation of subordinates (as far as possible) in decision making (85%), the capacity of persuasion (74%), protection and service to community (61%), and, last of all, imposing discipline (55%). Other factors that were indicated were being loyal with commands and subordinates and to meditate the orders.

There are no significant differences between officers and NCOs and warriors or technicians regarding the importance of the organization of teamwork. The capacity of persuasion is very important for all the women (100%) and something less for the men (71%), for 78% of the officers it is very important, and it has only any importance for 50% of NCOs. The participation in decision making is very important for officers (87%) and NCOs (80%), warriors (78%) and technicians (90%), for women (100%) and a little less for men (83%). With regard to impose discipline, women (67%) emphasize something more this aspect in respect of the men (53%); officers (56%) more than NCOs (40%); warriors confer a lot of importance to it (72%) and technicians nothing or just a little (70%).

Therefore, the Spanish military perceive themselves as rendering a service to their country and as defenders of a series of moral values. Their opinion is divided with regard
to if they are immersed or no in a determined tradition, being more inclined to be considered within a tradition the NCOs warriors (men).

As to how they perceive their ideals, applied in the style of command, the males and women, officers and NCOs and warriors and technicians concede great importance to teamwork, exemplarity, professional preparation, the encouragement of the initiative in the subordinates, the capacity of persuasion (more in women, less in NCOs) and to the participation in decision making (more in women and technicians).

But, recognizing the value that discipline has, women, officers and warriors give to it more relative weight, while the NCOs and technicians only give any importance to this factor. Although these variables would require a study more detailed, we can say that professionals of Spanish Armed Forces hope to obtain their subordinates' obedience more through their professional good-doing, their example and the implication of their subordinates than by means of the application of the disciplinary standards.

2.3. Ideals

Military that look at themselves as defenders of a series of ideals indicated like very or enough important that such ideals are represented for: protection and defense of the national territory (97 %), defense of the Constitution and protection of Human Rights (86 %), to help in case of catastrophes (outside and inside of Spain), to take part in operations of peacekeeping and in UN, NATO and UEO missions (83 % in the three cases); in minor measure, to help in the vigilance of frontiers is indicated by the 55 % (if it would be necessary). They do not give importance (or just a little) to the protection of the private property (39 %) or the participation in the fight against the drug (24 %).

Defense of national territory and Constitution provokes between women and men, officers and NCOs and warriors and technicians a support that oscillates between 95% and 100 %. Protection of Human Rights and to help in case of catastrophe outside and inside of Spain is enough or very important, according to cases, for the 87% -100 %, but, in both variables, it has only any importance for 50 % of women. To take part in operations of peace and in UN, NATO, UEO missions receives a majority support of all, oscillating between 82% and 100 %, according to cases; the support to the participation in missions of peace descends a little between NCOs (71 %) and the participation in NATO, UN and UEO missions becomes smaller to 67 % between NCOs and to 75 % between technicians. The vigilance (possible) of frontiers is supported by 50% - 55% of men and women; it has unimportance for 53% of officers and 56% of warriors; but 83% of NCOs and 88% of technicians gives it a lot of importance. 78% of men, 100% of women, 72% of officers and 80% of warriors do not concede any importance or give unimportance to the protection of the private property. However, 50% of NCOs and technicians give it quite a lot of importance.
In relation to the attributes that a good soldier should have, they have the maximum importance: respect for the subordinate, companionship and loyalty (100%), spirit of sacrifice (97%), abilities for commanding, discipline and technical training (94% in the three cases), affection for the Fatherland and capacity of organization (89%); and it is enough important the human resource management (80 %), and, last of all, braveness (77 %). In minor measure, and without quantifying, they point also to: integrity, humility, morality, exemplarity, respect to Law and Right and service to the others.

Relating to these attributes, there is a consensus of opinion about his great importance, existing small oscillations according to be women or men, officers or NCOs and warriors or technicians those who hold an opinion. The human resource management only has any importance for 50 % of NCOs and the third part of technicians. What the way of being (ethos) of military defines is an ample set of attributes, but is not possible to establish a priority between them in the accomplished interview. Marked values and attitudes can be classified in three different levels: Those that are connected with society, those that belong to the intraprofesional relation and those related with each one of individuals.

The moral values of social connection would be:

Patriotism (over political opinions), defense of constitutional values, respect and loyalty to established order, feeling of national identity, protection and defense of national territory, service capacity to the others and the respect to Human Rights and morality.

The values connected with the professional environment are:

The respect to superiors and subordinates, discipline, preparation (technique and physics), teamwork, enthusiasm of overcoming, capacity of organization, ability for commanding, collaboration, sense of duty, observance of obligations, loyalty, comradeship and exemplarity (professional and taking into consideration all society) that would belong to this and to the previous group.

The personal moral values are:

Capacity of sacrifice, courage, abnegation, equanimity, common sense, responsibility, initiative, integrity (over the self interest), love to the justice, emotional equilibrium, the capacity of commitment, prudence, motivation, illusion and a certain spirit of adventure.

About the characteristics that define a good style of command, they indicated the following, in order of importance: With enough or much importance: being an example for the subordinates and stimulating teamwork (100 %), promoting the subordinates' initiative (94%); from this point, although it continues being very important, a fall of 20 points is produced: making easy the participation in decision making (71 %) and having capacity of persuasion (69 %). With very little importance: enforcing discipline (54 %). They are mentioned also the loyalty to command and to the subordinates and the need of pondering the orders, although we can not establish the specific weight of this two.
Being an example in order to the other ones and stimulating teamwork they have a generalized consensus between women, men, officers, NCOs, warriors and technicians, with percentages that they get close to the 100 %. The participation in decision making is more important for men (for 74 % it is enough or very important ) than for women (only 50 % in favour); and also there are some difference between warriors and technicians, because although, in both cases, they give it enough or a lot of importance, those ones are in favour 61 % and these ones 83 %.

To foment the subordinates' initiative is, in point of its great importance, of common consensus in the studied segments, with variations between 90 % and 100 %. Capacity of persuasion is important, but more for women (100 %) than for men (76 %), more for officers (71 %) than for NCOs (57 %). Warriors and technicians, however, maintain a similar favourable opinion about its importance, around 70% -75 %. With regard to impose discipline, 58 % of men affirm that it do not have or have little importance, while 75 % of women indicate that it have enough or a lot of importance. One half of officers and NCOs do not give or they give little importance; but, while 56 % of warriors give it enough importance, 67 % of technicians affirm that it have little importance.

Therefore, we can say that Spanish military manifest as ideals the precepts included in the Constitution: "Armed Forces ... they have like mission ... to defend territorial integrity and the constitutional ordering." (Art. 8,1.) and, "The rules related with the fundamental rights and with freedoms ... they will be interpreted in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ... (Art. 10,2). They also express to agree with operations of cooperation with other countries.

Otherwise, there are missions or activities that are not considered proper of army, and, therefore, they do not provoke adhesion, such as the fight against drugs or the defense of private property. Vigilance of frontiers is perceived like something that can be necessary in determined circumstances; but, even so, 45 % do not agree with it, because it is perceived as a mission of interior security and, consequently, belongs to the police's mission.

Although, here, we talked about ideal concepts, in weberian sense, the group of moral values that have been named "social connection" establish a loudly link with the society to which this institution serves. The consensus in connection with the constitutional values is almost absolute and, at this point, the fact that a separation of the values socially accepted can exist is not perceived. The above does not impede that military in Spain have a very loud corporate culture, where in addition to the inter-group values, they promote other personal values that, in so far as they come true, at least partially, they give a military man's severe image. However, armed forces have been the institution best evaluated by the Spanish in 2008[^2].

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[^2]: The Center of Sociological Researches (CIS), in its yearly opinion poll, asked to 2,400 citizens, on the confidence merited by a dozen of institutions. The most appreciated were: Armed Forces (5.96), Police (5.85) and Monarchy (5.54). The least appreciated the Congress, Senate and, last of all, Tribunals of Justice (3.75)
With independence of the high consensus what there is on values, such as the teamwork and to promote the initiative of subordinates, or the scarce importance given to the imposition of discipline, we can indicate that women and officers seem more followers of doing a greater effort of persuasion. But, women and warriors come from more followers of the application of discipline, if need be. If these data are confirmed, it would mean that a bigger percentage of Spanish military women are able to negotiate more time, in order to reduce the uncertainty of a decision, through persuasion. Nevertheless, they would be less inclined to the participation in decision making and more inflexible at the time of applying these decisions, including disciplinary means if need be.

These answers and these percentages are congruent with the perception that military have of their ideals and how these ideals should be reflected in the exercise of command (Previous Paragraph 1, 2.)

3. Spanish citizens, relation with armed forces and perception of military

3.1. There is public debate?

A 64% indicates that there is no open forum on how the ideal Spanish soldier should be and a 28% indicates that certainly they perceive a debate. And about if changes that have taken place in civic perception relating to the new tasks that Armed Forces in Spain have to fulfill, 69% says yes and 25% denies it. Both times, percentages for men, women, officers, NCOs, warriors and technicians keep similar.

Never, public debate on the model of Armed Forces has taken place in Spain. No with the pass to democracy, neither after. Only, punctual news on certain events has appeared in the media. In universities, there are no departmental sections or academicians’ groups that have dedicated to the study of the military or to generate opinion on military themes; although yes on more general ambits of international relations and defense. Certainly there is a favourable opinion to the military among the Spanish citizens; the new tasks in international missions have contributed to improve the Armed Forces’ image. Therefore, the above is congruent with military do not perceive a social debate over Armed Forces; but definitely they have become aware of the upturn of the civic opinion.

3.2. The relationship between citizens and Armed Forces

As to if citizens can have prejudice or stereotypes about Armed Forces, 81% affirms that there is them and 9% denies it. This perception is more intense among women (100% affirms that there are prejudices) and technicians (92%).
Those that indicated that definitely there are prejudices are convinced that: Citizens are convinced of the deficiency of formation or lack of culture of the military men; That they do not work much or they are loafers; That they are conservative, reactionary or of fascist thought; That they have an authoritative or despotic behaviour, they are intransigent, rigid or of exaggerated rectitude; That they are beneficiaries of privileges, that have a violent character, that they lack utility for the State that maintains them and they are kindred with pre-constitutional ideas; That they are sexist, drunkards, squanderers; And they, even, think about them as mercenaries. The interviewees indicated also that citizens do not know actually their military. There is not a study that allows quantifying what percentage of Spaniard supports some of the prejudices about military, indicated in the previous paragraph. In the accomplished work, the interviewees were not asked about population's percentage that they believed hold those prejudices.

If we consider the moral values that, it is alleged, should be presents in the military action, so much in its profession like facing society, some of these stereotypes would have some justification. Because we can affirmed that, definitely, in military are a certain tendency to conservatism, (which, as we have seen, does not mean defense to utmost degree of the private property), to the authoritative behavior, exaggerated rectitude or some kind of intransigence. Spanish Armed Forces have not carried out any efforts to be a organization more permeable to the society; Government has not created organs – neither endowed of resources– that they allow studying the armies from an external space to them (workgroups or research centers).

As a result, society does not have deep knowledge, nor even medium, on the military organization. Political parties do not have, either, specialized people in military themes; and these deficiencies of knowledge are more evident, when they form government (the consequences in organizing missions in the exterior are detailed in another paragraph).

4. Tension between military functional needs and democratic standards, relative to rights and freedoms

4. 1. The resolution of conflicts

As to the way of solution of internal conflicts, the interviewees indicated that conflicts can get solved by means of:

a: The rules in use, which would be manifested through:

Application of rules, of Disciplinary Regimen and the imposition of discipline (by coercive means, being respectful with the subordinates, their rights and obligations) or being flexible in the application of such rules; the presentation of complaints via statutory
conduit, the utilization or submittal of proposals to Personal's Advisory Board; proceeding through request or appeal to commander, the information to the hierarchic superior, the report in writing; the presentation of demands through the contentious-administrative jurisdiction.

b: Actions of personal character; it would be the case of:

The dialog or encounter between the contending parts, the comprehension in human relations, the assessorship, the information and communication to avoid unfounded rumours, the participation as far as possible in non-operational decision making, the acceptance of the limitations imposed by law or the use of the administrative possibilities; (for example, changing the post if a conflictive situation in the current appointment comes into question).

c: Only, in a case it was affirmed that a manner of resolution of conflicts doesn’t exist.

Relating to if they are in accordance with the present way of resolution of conflicts, 38 % manifested than no, 31 % yes and 31 % does not know or does not answer. These percentages are kept with light differences for officers, NCOs, warriors and technicians and they vary for men and women. Among men, 26 % say yes and 39 % do not agree to the present-day mode, the percentages among the women are: 25 % yes and 0 % not; 75 % of women do not know or do not answer. And about if individual rights and freedoms are protected in the Army, 53 % indicated that no, 32 % said yes and a 15 % did not know or did not wanted to answer. Women, men, the warriors and technicians maintain similar proportion, but there is difference between officers and NCOs; they declare that their rights and freedoms are not protected in a 46 % and 80 %, respectively. For age groups, a significant contrast between young people and veterans is perceived, the young people manifest in a 60 % that their rights definitely are protected in the Spanish Armed Forces; among veterans, 63 % affirm that their rights are not protected; and 33 % does not know or does not answer.

With reference to the sentence: «A soldier has to serve his nation and should not care about politics», 59 % was in disagreement, 32 % was in agreement and 6 % was indifferent. This disagreement is a little bit bigger in NCOs (67 %) and more intense among women (100 %) and technicians (80 %). Only warriors agree with this sentence (53 %). Disagreement oscillates between 50% and 69% in age groups. Most of people that disagreed they explained that the sentence should be interpreted as «military should care about politics, but without participating in it».

The Constitution recognizes the right of association to all the Spanish (Art.22); except freedom of syndication because «... it will be able to be limited or to be excepted ... to Armed Forces or Armed Institutions or to the rest of the organisms that are subjected to military discipline ...» (Art. 28,1.). Even, right of petition is limited for the military; because «Members of Armed Forces, Armed Institutions or those that are subjected to military discipline, they only will be able to exercise these rights individually and in accordance with what's disposed in its specific legislation. » (Art. 29,2.).

3 This Board does not exist still in the Armies, but it exist already in «Guardia Civil». 
But, as to the way of resolution of conflicts and protection of rights and freedoms, the fact of the matter is that there is not an established system. Military Syndicates are prohibited; but, from the Ministry of Defence, (whichever it was the political orientation of the governments, from the disappearance of dictatorship), to create Associations, that may channel off the requests of social character or professional of military, has been obstructed. Besides, this situation has been kept internally in an informative limbo. That's why, it is not strange that, in front of demands or conflicts that there can be, some interviewees propose the application of the existent rules (included disciplinary measures), the simple acceptance of the existent limitations or the displacement from where one works, if there are confrontations.

The opinion is divided in third parts between those who affirm, they deny or they do not know what to say if they are according to the way of resolution of conflicts. With the years of experience, military takes conscience about this problem; but, they do not formulate it openly or they think that it has no solution; perhaps for that reason, 67% of veterans does not answer when they are asked about if they are according to the conflicts resolution way. In addition, 53% do not feel his rights and freedoms protected. This percentage is increased to 63% between the ones belonging during more years in the profession and to 80% in the case of NCOs. In short, in this ambit there is a real possibility of conflict that, in case of being confirmed percentages before indicated, for posterior studies, it will be raised up first by NCOs and for veterans. NCOs have been the first sanctioned in the year 2008, to make manifestations in public as representatives of non-authorized associations. The aggregate of the answers to the question about if the soldier should get worried for politics we have to interpret her to the effect that military definitely should worry about what happens in the politic world, but they should not take part in policy. Besides, the legislation in vigour forbids the participation of the military in politics (if they want to make it they should request the pass to the reserve).

4. 2. The formation of military in Social Sciences

Referring to the role of formation in Social Sciences in Armed Forces, 89% did not agree with the affirmation that such Sciences are not necessary to military; 64% indicated that such formation have a character complementary to the military formation. But 81% indicated that formation in Social Sciences has to be well-balanced with technical formation and with the strict military training. 29% stated that Social Sciences are very important and it should take priority, with which 66% disagree.

In the studied sectors, there is general agreement as to its necessity; but, the pace of the years gives a different profile to these affirmations. That way, to the 10 years of service a 100% affirms its necessity and this proportion goes getting down to the 67% for those ones that have more than 30 years of service. NCOs are convinced that this formation only has complementary trait (86%). The opinion on the complementary
character of Social Sciences presents a contrary sequence to the previous paragraph; until the 10 years of service, 60 % agree and with over 30 years, a 100 %.

The equilibrium between military training, technical formation and education in Social Sciences provokes 100 % of agreement among the youngest; Halfway through the military career, it get to go down to the 75 %, in order to get on the 100 % between those they have more than 30 years of service. As to that Social Sciences should take priority, 20 % of who have less than 10 years of service they agree; This percentage duplicates (42 %) for the ones that have between 11 and 20 years of service, it falls in the ten following years to 25 % and it increases something for those with more than 30 years of career (33 %).

To the question about if the formation received by Armies in civic education it was adequate, 54 % said no, 23 % affirmed that certainly it was adequate and they marked that knowledge received and applied in their military life and considered important for them were: Spanish and Universal History, Geography, Strategy, International Relations, Social Psychology, Sociology, Cultural Dynamics and Conduct of Groups.

It would be precise to establish the correlation between these opinions on formation in Social Sciences, and the type and number of military that have accomplished out-of-area missions in the two last decades. We would be able to affirm that age groups that have had to go out in missions to exterior, they coincide with those who call for a bigger formation in Social Sciences. The veterans would also be in favour of a bigger level of this type of formation, due to what's been said previously and because their proximity to the pass to the reserve, and the necessity of developing another type of activity, it can make them conscious of a bigger formation in this ambit. Those that prove to be more favourable to this type of formation are the ones that are halfway through the military career; (the ones that they have between 11 and 20 years of service), which in a 42 % give priority to this formation.

Although the above-mentioned data require a deeper investigation, what's certain is that the military career's new profile (reorganized by the Law 39/2007, of November 19, about military career), the organizational necessities and the outgoings to the exterior have made manifest that it is precise to redefine the role of the formation in Social Sciences in the military career.

The existent circumstances in the military organization, the requests that are directed to this for the accomplishment of its missions out of the country, the activities that are carried out inside Spain -there is a Military Unit of Emergencies that develops civil missions -, the need, above-mentioned, to give a dignified opportunity to military that, with the pace of years, they look to accomplish other activities as an alternative are elements that suggest the necessity of a restatement of the formation in Social Sciences.

4 To facilitate the way out of a third part of the professionals that, after 20 years of military career, they try to develop other activities, it makes more light, besides, the overload of personnel in the superiors levels of ranks among officers and, also, among NCOs.
5. The national and international policy, politicians, out-of-area missions and their relation with armed forces as institution

5.1. The relation between politicians, policy and out-of-area missions

On the political decisions and the missions of Armed Forces and those who should be the persons in charge of taking decisions in this space, 58% indicated that it is better than Defense's Minister be a civilian; this percentage raise to 75% in the case of women, meanwhile 71% of NCOs think the opposite. When we asked, more in detail, on if they agree with than of defense policy and the military policy (both) take them a politician, a 69% object, with percentages, according to segments, that they oscillate between the 67% and the 100%.

In general terms, 53% does not agree with that Minister of Defense be military; this percentage rises to 68% among officers and to 65% among warriors. Women and NCOs manifest just the opposite, they look in favour of Defense's Minister be military, in a 67% and 57% respectively. As to a possible division of competences, 53% holds an opinion than policy of defense should take it a civilian and military policy a military man; this percentage grow twenty points for women, technicians and officers; but, 67% of NCOs declare against it. Separated, and without possibility of establishing priorities or quantifying, they indicated that the Minister of Defense should know the military previously; that he can be (he does not must to be) civilian or military man, that he should be, most of all, a good manager and that the senior posts of the Ministry should not be conditioned by the political vicissitude and they have to safeguard their subordinates' rights. On if politicians are at the height of their responsibilities, 81% said not. This opinion is more radical in women (100%) and it is moderated for NCOs (57%).

75% say that, on many occasions, politicians are not aware of what they do when they send troops abroad. Asked if, certainly, foreign missions respond to the reason for what, in theory, the Spanish troops are over there, 28% indicates yes and 61% say no. These last say that, in foreign missions, it is necessary have in account the following criteria:

- We should assist to those that they need it and, of course, to our allies.
- Missions should be defined clearly.
- It is precise studying in advance:
  a) If they want us there, if there is an authentic necessity in going and whom is benefitted really with our presence abroad

That way, we would be able to avoid the fact of having a significant percentage of military veterans in jobs not in agreement with their formation; Men that, besides, are fountain of demoralization and, potentially, of internal tensions.
b) The problems of security of troops and soldier’s welfare

c) How the mission affects to national economy or if it is of utility for it.

- Some missions should be considered war missions (although the last objective was peace enforcement or peace keeping) and, therefore, the casualties of those missions are war casualties.

- It should be had in account that these actions are an external projection of the Spanish image (and acting in consequence).

- Better material capacities are required to achieve the mission.

- Armed Forces should go to military missions (Army is not a NGO).

Considering these data, it can be indicated that, in general, the presence of a civilian in charge of Armed Forces is perceived like positive. But, the opinion changes when the management of the military subjects is mentioned. The lack of knowledge of civilians about the specifics military subjects becomes manifest; And the majority looks clearly against than technical military subjects be managed by a civilian (at least for a civilian without previous knowledge on the subject). The organizational problem is that a separation between the direction and the management of the policy of defense and the military policy cannot be established; As the Administration and Management of the State cannot be separated from Government of the State.

There is a rooted corporativism in the military professionals (and in the State's other ambits) that it increases more in the case of women and NCOs; but, here it is added that, on the one hand, military are refractory to provide information on their organization. On the other hand, the successive governments – already it was indicated previously – have not created civil centers or research groups to study Armed Forces, to educate civil staff and to create public opinion. The result supposes the access of politicians to the responsibility of heading an Armed Force that they are ignorant of, beyond defence's general issues.

In addition, Spanish military are not opposed to take part in missions abroad, among other things, because they are aware that it is an element of legitimation in front of the public opinion. But, they affirm, that the decision of sending Spanish troops to foreign places is taken by considerations of political character. The interviewees' answers point to that implementation of such decisions brings added problems, due to the not much study or preparation of the decision.

Partially at least, it is given a certain conceptual and practical confusion. A mission can be of "peace", but is at a zone in conflict and, sometimes, in a war environment. Therefore, the operational courses of action should be of “war”, although the final purpose of the mission could be the contrary. Through the obtained answers, it does not look like this point of view is obvious for who take the political decisions. The qualitative answers also seem to indicate that, in some missions accomplished in the past, Spanish troops were not endowed with the necessary means, neither with clear criteria of action.
5. 2. The participation in out-of-area missions

44 % of the interviewees have not taken part in foreign missions and a 56 % yes. This participation is similar for sexes (50% - 56 %); bigger of officers than of NCOs (58% and 43 %, respectively) and warriors duplicate the percentage of technicians (63% and 33 %, in each case). Those that had taken part in missions were asked about what kind of instruction they received before their departure to the exterior. They indicated that they received instruction about characteristics of zone and local population's behaviour; about techniques, tactics and lines of action of the possible enemy, some instruction on International Laws and English language and on mines protection and material handling. But, in the first missions that the Spanish troops did, no instruction was given or it was very brief.

Comparing Spanish Armed Forces and the ones belonging to other nations, in this kind of actions out-of-area, the ones that have taken part in these missions perceive like:

- Strengths: the training, the work capacity of and the ability to learn from the errors, the “way the Spaniard is” (more adaptable to situation changes, with capacity of improvisation, initiative, a bigger empathy with the community of the zone and more spirit of sacrifice) and the human quality of Spanish soldier.

- Weaknesses: A “disastrous” personnel policy; variable guidelines (which supposes continuous reorganizations), the not much implication of high commands in subordinates’ problems; deficiencies of organizing and logistics; a minor support of the “political factor” and a minor preparation in Civic Education.

- Disadvantages: Less means, worse life quality and minor social support that Armies from other countries.

Considering the above, it can be indicated that the participants in out-of-area missions hold that they receive a satisfactory formation but improvable, although the percentage of whose do not know or do not answer seems to indicate that many of them do not have made a reflection about what areas it would be convenient to modify in this type of formation.

The comparison with other armed forces seem to show that, in the zones they have acted in, Spanish military have a less ethnocentric behaviour and a bigger adaptability and capacity of empathy in the population. This would suppose, if confirmed, that the interaction with the zone population would be, a priori, less problematical (apart of the tensional level), due to this Spanish “cultural factor”. In addition, it would play against this the minor endowment of material means and the variable directives which would make difficult the development of activities in those areas.

5. 3. The assessment of the exterior compromise

In relation to the evaluation of the Spanish commitment with the foreign missions, the interviewees were very in agreement with the Spanish Armed Forces participation in these out-of-area missions (97%). They were in agreement with the following ideas:
NATO or UEO should create Permanent Units for maintaining the peace (91%); European Defense should be organized in order to depend less of USA (76%); we have to go further and integrate Spanish Armed Forces into an European Army (54%). In addition, 71% disagree with the participation in these missions like a way of professional promotion for Spanish soldiers.

The above-mentioned percentages are remained for all cases (officers, NCOs, women, men, warriors and technicians) with any shading or exception. That way, to depend less of USA, in the case of the technicians, it rise to the 92 %; And 83 % of NCOs and 50 % of warriors disagree with integrating Spanish Armed Forces in an European Army. In addition, and without that we can specify quantities, interviewees affirm that these missions contribute to improvement, organization, preparation and instruction of Spanish Army.

About if the Spanish Armed Forces should get engaged or no in these missions, 47 % of the interviewees do not seem to have a clear opinion in regard to this matter, because they did not answer; 33 % manifested we have to do more and 19 % that it is necessary to acquire a minor compromise. But, perception is different, according to the years of service. That way, 0 % of those they have less than 10 years hold that we have to do more; 23 %, between 11 and 20 years, 50 % from 21 to 30 and 67 % the ones that carry more than 30 years of service; And in the opposite direction and with similar percentages those who hold that we have to get involved less.

In the other hand, 64% affirms that cooperation in out-of-area missions creates problems to the Spanish Armed Forces. In the same way than in the previous case, perception differs with age; 80 % of the more young affirm that missions abroad generate different problems; and it descends step by step to 33 %, between more veterans.

As a consequence of the participation in out-of-area missions, interviewees perceive negative various impacts; basically of category:

1. Organizational
The need of personnel reorganization; personnel's insufficiency in units of origin and for missions in national territory; the temporality in post assignment and the use of material in environments for which it not was considered.

2. Economical
Attrition and, even, lack of material, need of new acquisitions and shortness of budget.

3. Personnel
Excessive time outside, tiredness of commands and troops, a worse life quality, familiar and personal problems and lack of motivation.
About the role of Spanish Armed Forces abroad, compared with the Armies of other countries, they indicated that they are at same level as other countries and a very professional and effective role is accomplished, proportionate to our reality and volume of participation; in humanitarian missions, Spanish demonstrate a high level, but Spanish Army do not seem to be willing to implicate itself, as much as other ones, due to the policy of “zero casualties”.

Some of interviewees take the view that they carried out a correct role, but improvable; scarce or balanced for a fall; or that Spanish military seem to be more a NGO than an army.

That is, there is agreement between all the segments of military studied as to the participation in these missions and to the good role that Spanish Armed Forces play in comparison to other countries, considering the available means.

To organize NATO or UEO units it seems to be perceived as a means of diminishing the organizational, budgetary and personal problems, generated by out-of-area missions. A great majority (approximately four of every five) manifests agreeing upon the creation of those units; also as a means for dropping off the tutelage that USA exercises on Europe. One half of the military proposes, even, the creation of a European army; although this is not a very popular idea between NCOs, because four fifth parts oppose.

There is an inverse correlation, between those favourable to increase the participation in the missions abroad (if more veteran, more in favour of the participation) and those who affirm that these actions generate problems inside Armed Forces (if more young, bigger perception of problems).

6. The training to take part in missions outside of country

6.1. The received instruction

Asked if they took part, voluntarily, in the course, 85% said yes and 15% said no. Ten of them that responded affirmatively, said that they took part in the course because, that way, the possibility of be posted abroad expanded; they would be able to do their work better; knowledge, capacities and personal training were increased; the level of English language and the capacity of communication was improved.

People who was receiving instruction to participate in out-of-area missions responded these block of questions; but only a maximum of 14 and a minimum of 5 among the 36 interviewees. For that reason, although significant, the answers are not enough to accomplish generalizations and the few percentages that we marked, they should be taken only to indicative level.
For 11 of the 14 interviewees (79%), the course covered up its expectations and 7 of them indicated as expectancies and experiences of the course that: It was a good, useful and efficient teaching; that they became fit for abroad missions with other foreign armies; that they acquired new expertises and knowledge and that, perhaps, the level of English language should have been bigger. Any one did not have a formed criterion and did not hold an opinion. Referring to what had had more importance in the course, 5 interviewees responded that the adaptation of their mentality to the missions they had to develop, the high level of the course, its subject matters, and personal preparation of the teaching staff. Thirteen responded that they believed that all course contents were applicable in abroad missions and indicated that useful contents of the course were: the knowledge of the display place and the training to adapt themselves to this environment, the instructions on work procedures; English language improvement and, also, the improvement of cooperation, communication and relation capacity.

Therefore, to the training courses, an ample majority of personnel attend voluntarily, which considers it useful and applicable and it keeps his expectations. This type of instruction is seen like a mode of professional perfecting and to obtain, afterwards, more interesting posts. If we compared these answers, with what asked in the Paragraph 4, relating to the received instruction and its benefit, we can observe similitude in the answers of who already has experience in abroad missions (72 % considered it useful). Besides, the scarce formation given in the first abroad missions, at beginning of the ninety, has been increased and improved. Nevertheless, the division of opinions produced in the question number 30, about if "some areas of instruction would have been preferred because be more important" (44 % in favour and 39 % against), it can be indicating the need of accomplish a performance appraisal in order to improve the training, at least in certain sectors.

7. Other issues of interest concerning

The opinions expressed in this paragraph have to do mainly with personnel policy and how this affects them in their departures abroad. Only 7 of the 36 responded to this paragraph. For this reason, the variables detected could be significant, but they cannot be absolutely generalized. The interviewees indicated aspects:

1. Organizational, such as:

Politicians have to define, right now, what kind the model of Armed Forces, Spain should have. There is personnel scarcity in a lot of units. The way out abroad of military with key specialties causes problems in the units. It causes an excessive load of work for the personnel that remain in. In occasions, there are semi-abandoned facilities and the material means are wrongly distributed. They have to dedicate a special attention to the management of human resources.
2. About information or communication internal and with society, just like:

Communication policy is not properly working (there is secrecy in normal issues). They are lying to the society about the actual nature of some out-of-area missions.

3. On rights and freedoms:

In some cases, it is affirmed that individual rights are violated and, in another one, that the State does not take care of soldiers interests.

4. Personal perceptions or petitions:

There is sensation of abandonment and demotivation. More equality between officers and NCOs in the promotions policy is solicited.

The organizational and those that affect to personnel stand out among the variables without quantifying related in this block. They indicate aspects of political character and responsibility, like the deficiency of definition of soldier's model, of Armed Forces’ model and the deficiency of criteria to organize the departures to the exterior of Spanish military. If this is true, to hide the truth of the nature of the out-of-area missions to the society would be a logical consequence.

In addition, they indicate problems of personnel management and of operation of the units, which seems to be aggravated by personnel's way out to the missions abroad. There are military men that consider their rights were violated; the tutelage of such rights (by a State that does not allow associations of professional military character) is not developed as it should be made and as it is regulated.

8. As a brief conclusion

All what is been said make us think that the Spanish case, relating to the ambit of investigation, remains, generally speaking, in the same line than the theoretical scenarios constructed about the democratic ways to shape Armed Forces: from subordination to civil power and the acceptance without fissures of a democratically voted constitution, to the definition by Law of the Defense Policy objectives and the military missions, according with National Defense Law, published in November, 2005:

*Article 2.- Purpose of Defense Policy: The defense policy is aimed at protecting the whole of Spanish society, its Constitution, the superior moral values, principles and institutions that are consecrated in it, the social and democratic State of Right, the full exercise of the rights and freedoms and the security, the independence and territorial integrity of Spain. In like manner, it has as objective to contribute to the preservation of*
international peace and security, within the framework of the commitments undertaken by the Kingdom of Spain.

Article 15. - Missions of Armed Forces: 1. Armed Forces, in accordance with the article 8,1 of Constitution, have attributed the mission to guarantee sovereignty and independence of Spain, and to defend its territorial integrity and the constitutional ordering. 2. Armed Forces will contribute, militarily, to security and defence of Spain and its allies; in the framework of international organizations of which Spain is member, as well as to the maintenance of peace, stability and humanitarian assistance. 3. Armed Forces, along with the State Institutions and Public Administrations, should preserve security and welfare of citizens in cases of grave risk, catastrophe, calamity or other public necessities, in accordance with what is established in the legislation in use. 4. Armed Forces can also accomplish missions of evacuation of Spanish residents abroad, when circumstances of instability in a country put their lives or their interests in serious risk.

All of this, in addition to another type of actions, like the re-definition of size, organization and structure of military, the reform of Military Teaching, etc., facilitated the construction, in Spain, of democratic Armed Forces.

However, thirty years after the implantation of a democratic Constitution, we can observe that some deficiencies are still unsolved. One of them, the one that seems to be considered very important, it is the definition of an ideal of soldier. But we believe that it does not have so much importance. We thought that an ideal of that type does not exist. Rather, the characteristics and concrete values of soldiers are much related to the historic moment, to the perception of the threat and to the missions that are defined for the Armies; all of this, beyond the generic values of any democratic soldier in a democratic society.

Other deficiencies (and these indeed are important) have to do with the limitation of the rights of military, with the legal definition of their rights and duties. (Government has promised the publication of a law of rights and duties of the military during the current legislature that substitutes and brings up to day ancient and obsolete legislations). Also, they have to do with the procedures to solve internal conflicts in a just and fast way, and not subjected, absolutely, to the concept of discipline and with the creation of institutions that could support military men's demands such as a Personal's Advisory Board or the Ombudsman's figure.

Beside this, although the answers in the fieldwork interviews have not been many, definitely, they can give us a first approximation to the theme. In addition, it allows us to say that, really, the soldier that we can discover in them, is the soldier we wait exist, after the measures of reform taken by democracy and, of course, for what is foreseen in the military teaching reform that, although late, it seems to bearing fruit. And beside a democratic, loyal and arranged for service soldier, it presents to us a trained soldier, in a certain way, proud of the missions that he accomplishes. A soldier worried by the effectiveness of the armed forces and with a certain critique capacity, although distrusted still with the civil society and his vision about Armed forces.
### TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS of FIELDWORKS

<table>
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<tr>
<th>CONCEPT</th>
<th>QUANTITY</th>
<th>COMMENTARIES</th>
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<td>Number of valid interviews</td>
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<td>Number of invalided interviews</td>
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<td>20 questions have, at least, 3 variables</td>
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<td>Sex</td>
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<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>88,9%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Women</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rank</td>
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<tr>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>77,4%</td>
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<td>NCOs</td>
<td>22,6%</td>
<td>From Sergeant to Warrant Officer</td>
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<td>From 29 to 62 (3 cases more than 50)</td>
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<td>Navy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Defence Common Corps</td>
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<td>From 4 to 35 years of</td>
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<tr>
<td>Corps</td>
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<td>Nationality</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Engineers of Armies</td>
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<tr>
<td>Defence Common Corps</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;Technicians&quot;</td>
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**GENERAL OBSERVATIONS:**

Statistically, this work should be considered like a pilot study.

A *stratified random sampling* has not been accomplished, which would have been more convenient.

The proportion among men and women and the belonging to Army get close to what exist.

Air Force and officers are over-represented.
CONCEPTUAL STRUCTURE OF INTERVIEWS OF FIELDWORK

The interview has been structured in six blocks, according to the received design. We try to obtain, in each of the blocks, different information, whose conceptual diagram is indicated next. The blocks of information, that is, the general themes, as well as the concrete variable questions, were previously defined by the research coordinators. However, the explicative categories of every concrete variable, and the interviewees’ data, that allow delimiting the information, and the crossing of variables in tables of contingency were determined by the Spanish team (following received indications).

Not all the explicative categories were crossed with the interviewees’ data. Among these data, they were taken into consideration:

1. Sex.
2. Officers / NCOs.
3. Years of military experience, subdivided in:
   - To 10 years.
   - From 11 to 20 years.
   - From 21 to 30 years.
   - More than 31 years.
4. Branches of Armed Forces, subdivided in:
   - Army.
   - Navy.
   - Air Force.
   - Defence’s Common Corps.
5. General Corps / Other Corps, subdivided in:
   - General Corps (Infantry, Artillery, Parachutists, pilots, seamen, etc.) and Marine Corps (called by us «warriors»)
   - Corp of Intendance
   - Corp of Engineering
   - Defence’s Common Corps (Medical, Juridical and Auditor) and others (called by us «technicians»).

The concatenate conceptual structure (theme - general variable - concrete variables - explanatory categories), is indicated from now on.
BLOCK 1

Theme:

What motivated Spanish military to choose this career? How they understand their professional model and which ones are their ideals? Do these vary from the democratic ideals?

General variable 1:

1,1. Motivation (in order to the choice and permanence in the military career).

Concrete variables:

1,1,1. Reasons (that encouraged them to keep on the military career)

Explanatory categories:

1.1.1.1. Life ordered and disciplined
1.1.1.2. An stable work.
1.1.1.3. Social prestige.
1.1.1.4. Service or abnegation to the other ones.
1.1.1.5. Familiar tradition.
1.1.1.6. A life more dynamic.
1.1.1.7. Other ones

Concrete variables:

1,1,2. Change of the reasons.

General variable 2:

1,2. Self-image.

Concrete variables:

1,2,1. Social need (of the military career).
1,2,2. Military protector of certain ideals.
1,2,3. Military within a tradition.
1,2,4. Perception of the self-same ideals and exercise of command.

Explanatory categories:

1.2.4.1. Stimulating and organizing teamwork.
1.2.4.2. Discipline.
1.2.4.3. Capacity of persuasion.
1.2.4.4. Participation (as much as possible) in decision making.

1.2.4.5. Exemplarity.

1.2.4.6. Promoting the subordinates' initiative.

1.2.4.7. Technical-professional preparation.

1.2.4.8. Other ones.

**General variable 3:**

1.3. Ideals.

**Concrete variable:**

1.3.1. Concrete expression of ideals (of which one considers himself protective).

**Explanatory categories:**

1.3.1.1. Protection and defense of the national territory.

1.3.1.2. Protection of the private property.

1.3.1.3. Defense of the Constitution.

1.3.1.4. Helping in the vigilance of frontiers.

1.3.1.5. Taking part in peacekeeping operations.

1.3.1.6. Helping in case of catastrophes (inside and out of Spain).

1.3.1.7. Protection of Human Rights.

1.3.1.8. Participating in the fight against drug.

1.3.1.9. Taking part in UN, NATO or UEO missions.

1.3.1.9. Other ones

**Concrete variable:**

1.3.2. A good soldier's attributes.

**Explanatory categories:**

1.3.2.1. Technical training.

1.3.2.2. Spirit of sacrifice.

1.3.2.3. Capacity of organization.

1.3.2.4. Respect to the subordinate.

1.3.2.5. Human resource management.

1.3.2.6. Physical preparation.

1.3.2.7. Companionship.
1.3.2.8. Love to the fatherland.
1.3.2.9. Bravery.
1.3.2.10. Discipline.
1.3.2.11. Loyalty.
1.3.2.12. Talent for leadership.
1.3.2.13. Other ones

Concrete variable:
1.3.3. *Ethos* of the military.

Concrete variable:
1.3.4. Characteristics of a good style of command.

Explanatory categories:
1.3.4.1. Being an example for the subordinates.
1.3.4.2. Imposing discipline.
1.3.4.3. Stimulating teamwork.
1.3.4.4. Making easy the participation in decision making
1.3.4.5. Having capacity of persuasion
1.3.4.6. Promoting the subordinates' initiative.
1.3.4.7. Other ones

**BLOCK 2**

**Theme:**
The Spanish citizens, their relation with and their Armed Forces's perception.

**General variable 1:**
2,1. Open forum (about Spanish Armed Forces)

**Concrete variable:**
2,1,1. The ideal military man.

**Concrete variable:**
2,1,2. The new tasks.
**General variable 2:**
2.2. Relation citizens - Spanish Armed Forces

**Concrete variable:**
2.2.1. Existence (of prejudices).

**Concrete variable:**
2.2.2. Definition (of prejudices).

---

**BLOCK 3**

**Theme:**
Tension between the military functional needs and the democratic State's rules, relative to rights and freedoms.

**General variable 1:**
3.1. Resolution of conflicts.

**Concrete variable:**
3.1.1. Mode ( of resolution ).

**Concrete variable:**
3.1.2. Agreement ( on the mode of resolution ).

**Concrete variable:**
3.1.3. Protection of rights and freedoms.

**Concrete variable:**
3.1.4. “Worry for the policy” (among military).

---

**General variable 2:**

**Concrete variable:**
3.2.1. Necessity.

**Explanatory categories:**
3.2.1.1. They are not necessary.
3.2.1.2. Complementary character.
3.2.1.3. Equilibrium (with the technical and military formation).
3.2.1.4. Priority.
3.2.1.5. Other ones

Concrete variable:
3,2,2. Adequacy.
Concrete variable:
3,2,3. Utility.

BLOCK 4
Theme:
The national and international politics, politicians, foreign missions and its relation with the military as institution,

General variable 1:
4,1. Relation (between politicians, policy and out-of-area missions).
Concrete variable:
4,1,1. Relation between political decisions and responsibility.
Explanatory categories:
4.1.1.1. A responsible civilian (as Minister of Defence).
4.1.1.2. A responsible military (as Minister of Defence).
4.1.1.4. Policy of defense and military policy should be carried by a politician.
4.1.1.5. Other ones.
Concrete variable:
4,1,2. Mutual compatibility between missions and actions.
Concrete variable:
4,1,3. Criteria of compatibility.
Concrete variable:
4,1,4. Responsibility (of the politicians).
Concrete variable:
4,1,5. Capacity of evaluation by politicians (of the consequences).

General variable 2:
4,2. Participation (of the military in missions abroad).
Concrete variable:
4,2,1. Participation.

**Concrete variable:**

4,2,2. Instruction.

**Concrete variable:**

4,2,3. Utility (of instruction).

**Concrete variable:**

4,2,4. Proposals (to improve instruction).

**General variable 3:**

4,3. Valuation of the exterior compromise.

**Concrete variable:**

4,3,1. Strengths Weaknesses

**Concrete variable:**

4,3,2. Comparison (with other foreign armies).

**Concrete variable:**

4,3,3. Valuation of the compromise.

**Explanatory categories:**

4,3,3.1. Responsibility to participate.

4,3,3.2. Participation as promotional means (professional).

4,3,3.3. Creation of specific units (in NATO or UEO).

4,3,3.4. Integration (of Spanish Armed Forces an European Army).


4,3,3.6. Other ones.

**Concrete variable:**

4,3,4. Level of compromise.

**Concrete variable:**

4,3,5. Organizational problems.

**Concrete variable:**

4,3,6. Impacts (of cooperation).
BLOCK 5

Theme:
The training to take part in missions out of the country (only for assistants to courses).

General variable 1:
5,1. Received instruction

Concrete variable:
5,1,1. Voluntariness.

Concrete variable:
5,1,2. Expectations.

Concrete variable:
5,1,3. Accomplishment (of expectations).

Concrete variable:
5,1,4. Acquired experience.

Concrete variable:
5,1,5. Relevancy.

Concrete variable:
5,1,6. Utility.

Concrete variable:
5,1,7. Contents.

BLOCK 6

Theme:
Expression of other issues that interviewees consider of concern and on which they have not been asked.