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“We have entered the third millennium through a gate of fire. If today, after the horror of 11 September, we see better, and we see further – we will realize that humanity is indivisible.” These words were spoken by the United Nations General Secretary, Kofi Annan, in Oslo on December 10, 2001, after he had received the Nobel Peace Prize on behalf of the UN. The indivisibility of humanity is simultaneously realism and utopia: on the one hand, the bitter insight that even the heart of the USA can be attacked using the simplest of weapons and that the division of the world into a zone of peace and a zone of turbulence is obsolete; on the other hand, the hope that it may be possible to make “one world” a reality. The UN is held in high regard all over the world, and remains our best hope that the rule of law can be established in international politics. But is the organization’s practical political significance growing as well, or is it increasingly powerless to meet the new kinds of challenge with which we are confronted? Will the UN be crushed between the privatization of violence practised by organizations like al-Qaida, the enormous power of the USA, which only trusts its own strength, and the binding duties of a world organization which the USA created but is now suspicious of and seeks to do without?

The dual challenge

On September 11 international terrorism took on a new dimension. A group operating as a worldwide network struck from the heart of western society. The fact that the suicide hijackers deliberately carried out a mass murder before the eyes of the world has given rise to profound insecurity and has also posed the frightening question of whether terrorists could get hold of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons of mass destruction. The USA’s main response has been military, as we can see from the rhetoric about the “axis of evil” and the Bush administration’s vast rearmament programme.

In the words of the preamble to the UN Charter, the organization seeks “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war”. In the present situation, the UN is trapped between a rock and a hard place. On the one hand, inhibitions against violence are weakening and the spatial separation between friend and enemy is becoming blurred. Both of these developments characterize the new international terrorism and the growing number of civil wars. On the other hand, we are witnessing the beginning of a change of policy: the use of military force is no longer taboo, and is to be restored to the arsenal of customary instruments of foreign policy. The core of the UN’s conception of global order and its greatest achievement, the prohibition of the use of force by states, will be undermined if the strongest state adopts a policy of removing dangerous regimes by force of arms.

Can one combat international terrorism by military means? What are the alternatives?
Armed Force and War as Anti-terrorist Strategy?

History has seen many instances of terrorism, but it is a changing phenomenon which always takes a historically concrete form. This requires us to look at the societal context of terrorism, though this should in no sense be understood as a legitimisation of it. Terrorism is the symptom, and the disease is the historical-societal context from which it emerges. This complicates both the analysis of the causes of international terrorism and the discussion of counter-strategies.

The coalition against terrorism

The most spectacular reaction to September 11 was the formation of a world-wide coalition against terror. The common platform is provided by UN Security Council Resolution 1373, dated 28 September 2001. This resolution goes beyond verbal condemnation of the attacks and calls upon the community of states to take active steps to prevent terrorism. The catalogue of measures proposed ranges from the immediate exchange of operational information to steps to ensure that the financial sources of terrorism are completely cut off.

American policy is both more pragmatic and more selective. Although the USA is in principle interested in seeing as many states as possible lining up alongside it, the substance of its policy rests on bilateral arrangements between the USA and whatever partners are needed to support particular unilateral measures. The most important arrangements relate to military and logistical assistance and to rights to overfly individual states and station troops there. In this sense, Washington’s profession of adhesion to multilateralism has proved to be a flash in the pan.

The coalition against terror forged by the US administration since September 11 serves as a way of providing political backing for a primarily military response. This pushes into the background conceptual and material tools that could be used for a more far-reaching, civil approach to combating terrorism. Moreover, the return of war as a policy option entails the risk that a dangerous dynamic of retaliation could be unleashed, which in turn threatens to erode the UN’s prohibition of war.

Afghanistan: a mixed balance

Doubts have been raised both about the justification in international law of the war in Afghanistan and about the appropriateness of the methods used. In addition, there are serious questions to be answered about the price that was paid for the largely military strategy employed. If one attempts to draw up a balance sheet, the positive outcome was the fact that a safe haven for the recruitment of international terrorism was destroyed and the radical Islamist dictatorship of the
Taliban defeated. These achievements were and are the precondition of the opportunity Afghanistan now has, after 22 years of war and civil war, to become once again a well-ordered polity and gradually to reestablish the state monopoly of violence.

On the other side of the balance sheet, however, are some substantial negative entries. The al-Qaida network was not destroyed, and Bin Laden not captured; the two main war aims were therefore not accomplished. We have no definite information about the military operations, their targets, or their results, nor about the civilian victims and the destruction caused to the country. Continued military operations are obstructing the urgent work of international organizations providing assistance. If one goes on to compare the effort and money expended on the war with the far too small international protection force, ISAF, stationed in Kabul and with the resources made available for the reconstruction of Afghanistan, it is impossible not to be struck by the huge discrepancy between the military campaign and the peace mission. Furthermore, this discrepancy draws attention to a dubious division of labour between the USA and Europe, which also has disturbing implications for the future.

There are different opinions as to whether the costs or the benefits of the military intervention in Afghanistan were greater, and there are also different views within the community of peace and conflict researchers. It is too early to draw up a final balance sheet. However, we would like to issue a warning against any future expressions of unconditional solidarity with the Bush administration, because they make it difficult to think about alternatives and are not in the interests of Europe. The German government must, within the framework of the EU, actively pursue the elaboration of non-military ways of combating terrorism and stabilizing crisis regions.

The return of the logic of war?

Perhaps one of the most significant of the negative consequences of the war, and one which extends beyond Afghanistan itself, is the danger that the logic of war may be universalized. In crisis regions such as Kashmir, Chechnya, and Palestine, the US-led “war on terror” strengthens the hand of the more powerful parties to the conflict and reduces any incentive they may have to seek political solutions. The war is seen to legitimize escalation and is interpreted as a licence to commit breaches of human rights: by Russia in Chechnya, by Israel in the autonomous Palestinian areas, and by China in Tibet. Peace negotiations in Colombia have been broken off because the state now calculates that it can rely to a greater extent on US military assistance against the rebels.
From self-defence to an offensive strategy?

On 29 January 2002, President Bush delivered his address to Congress on the state of the union and, with a flourish, changed the direction of the debate on strategy. Two particular announcements formed the core of what one can, on the basis also of numerous declarations by other leading figures in the administration, term the Bush Doctrine. The first of these was the statement that the USA would act just as decisively against regimes seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction as it had against terrorist networks. Secondly, Bush said that preemptive strikes would be among the methods considered. He explicitly mentioned North Korea, Iran, and – most emphatically of all – Iraq. Since then these countries, labelled “rogue states”, have been known as the “axis of evil”. The president’s martial rhetoric has been backed up by a massive increase in the military budget, an acceleration in the development of anti-missile defences, and planning for new kinds of mini-nuclear weapons for use in special battle conditions.

The present US administration is attempting to reinterpret the right to self-protection and self-defence as an offensive strategy. Shifting the theatre of military operations from Afghanistan to Iraq would also be a policy shift to a different issue, from preventive defence against terrorism to combating possible possessors of weapons of mass destruction. The use of force is permissible as a measure of defence against violent aggression, but the present situation does not resemble the summer of 1990: Iraq has not committed any military aggression. Because Iraq has not complied with UN Resolution 687, the sanctions imposed in 1991 have not been lifted. But a military intervention would be an arbitrary act. Any government that was involved, by providing military assistance, material help, or political support, would have to share the responsibility for the consequences and for those killed and injured. If the USA is determined to act in this way, Europe would hardly be able to stop it; but Europe is under no obligation to join in.

Even the exceptional treatment of Iraq decided upon in 1991 by the UN Security Council was part of a comprehensive concept of arms control policy. The objective was to take a first step towards the transformation of the Middle East into a nuclear weapons free zone. Nothing has been done to bring this goal any closer. The Europeans should use the opportunity presented by the ongoing reform of the sanctions policy to revive this almost forgotten plan, which was designed to bring about regional stability by non-military means.

Non-military counter-strategies

There can be no guarantee of security against terrorist attacks on civilian targets. The strongest military power on earth had to confront the terrifying realization that it could not defend itself against professionally organized terror attacks. Against the background of the risk of
further attacks and in view of the shortcomings in existing precautions and defence against terrorist violence, a fundamental rethinking of security policy is necessary. In this connection, there is a need to distinguish between short-term measures and those that aim to address the context and causes of terrorism.

Measures of civil prevention must take precedence in any anti-terror strategy. However, we must warn against the search for patent recipes which can only strengthen the illusory belief that absolute security is possible. The most that can be achieved is the reduction of risks. All security measures must be justifiable in material, financial, and democratic terms; in other words, they must perform the difficult balancing act between the requirements of security and the greatest possible protection of civil liberties.

Active precautionary measures must seek to promote a democratic culture of non-violence, in order to remove the fertile soil in which sympathy and support for and tolerance of terrorism can grow. This must include civil conflict regulation, the fostering of intercultural dialogue, and political crisis prevention. Disarmament and a strict control of arms transfers, particularly via the observance of national and global legal restrictions, must be employed in order to clamp down effectively on the proliferation and illegal acquisition of arms. Appropriate political, economic, legal, and police instruments must be used to the best possible effect and must be coordinated more efficiently than has been the case up to now. If terrorist networks operating across borders are to be detected and combated at the earliest possible moment, there must be an intensification of international cooperation between the security services and criminal justice authorities.

In December 2001, the EU drew up a list of what it considered to be terrorist organizations; there are now 23 groups on this list. Their bank accounts are frozen and their right of assembly is withdrawn. These measures are necessary, but not sufficient. Some of the organizations on the list – the Palestinian group Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Kurdish Workers’ Party, and groups operating in Latin America – receive a steady stream of new recruits because of long-lasting and unresolved conflicts. In cases like these, a strategy for the active prevention of terrorism must, in addition to restrictive measures, also employ diplomatic pressure and insist that creative steps are taken to deal with the root causes of the violence.

**In the long term, the causes of terrorism must be eliminated**

Combating international terrorism must, therefore, also involve drawing attention to its structural causes and developing strategies for dealing with these factors. This also applies to structural global problems such as the unequal distribution of power in the world economy and the phenomena which are associated with it: polarization and
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marginalization, structures of rule which hinder development, and intercultural inarticulacy. Neither the attempt to capture Bin Laden nor the division of the world into good and evil states can replace a long-term policy designed to address the conditions in which international terrorism can come into being and spread. Such an approach must address both the sources of political violence within societies and the structural global problems of international politics; both of these provide motives for terrorism.

The German government’s concept of “Development policy as structural global policy” is a step in the right direction. What is now needed is the implementation of this policy. It is becoming increasingly important for there to be broader participation in decision-making within international regulatory bodies such as the WTO, IMF, and World Bank, and non-state actors should be involved here as well. The predominance of the OECD states in international negotiation systems should be reduced. European contributions designed to strengthen development potential and pacify regional conflicts must be better coordinated internationally. This requires additional financial resources for structural global policy, and also institutional adjustments and innovations at the level of national governments and of the European Union. Above all, though, it requires political determination and a good deal of patience. Even though structural global policy is unlikely to have immediate short-term effects, it is equally certain that the structural causes of international terrorism can only be eliminated over a long period of time.

In most cases, the experience of a profound economic, political, and spiritual crisis lies at the root of terrorist violence. If the conditions of material life are threatened and the possibilities of articulation and participation brutally repressed, as is the case in almost all Arab states, there is a corresponding increase in the preparedness of oppositionists to draw attention to their cause by using violence. Religious fundamentalism contributes by strengthening political motivations, sometimes pushing individuals as far as the desire for a martyr’s death.

There is a direct connection between local living conditions and international power structures in the case of heavily symbolic regional conflicts. These conflicts nurture international terrorism and, most importantly, increase the attention and sympathy enjoyed by terrorism. This is not only due to the fact that parties involved in these regional conflicts are in most cases only able to draw international attention to themselves when they employ violence on a large scale; it also happens because the international power structures in which the regional conflict parties are embedded are held to be partly responsible for the conflicts.
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We need democratization strategies

A long-term strategy must turn its attention to the societal contradictions of the modernization process and to the absence of democratization in the Arab states. There is a connection between authoritarianism and terrorism. The West must therefore, in its own interests, do more than it has done so far to encourage liberalization and democratization in the Arab world. To be sure, this is easier said than done. Democratization is imperative, but as history has shown it is frequently accompanied by violence. Tangible economic interests are also involved: since the Arab countries have substantial reserves of oil, the West’s voracious appetite for cheap energy dictates a preference for stability rather than democratization. This is not only true of the USA, and not only true of governments. The West applauds enthusiastically when the feared Islamists are ruthlessly repressed, even though this only widens the vast gulf between authoritarian regimes and populations and provides new recruits for political Islamism. We therefore need strategies that will help to give moderate Islamists the possibility of articulation and the chance to participate, and will make it possible even for hardliners to contribute to democratization processes.

The New World Situation

The prospect that terrorists could get their hands on nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons is a nightmare. Up until recently, experts had argued that terrorist strategies did not involve attacks that would cause large numbers of victims and so terrorists were not interested in weapons of mass destruction. We now know that this was wrong. It has been proven that al-Qaida did try to get hold of such weapons, and we cannot entirely exclude the possibility that they succeeded in doing so.

The alternative: international cooperation and arms control treaties

There is only one sensible strategy that can be employed against the spectre of weapons of mass destruction in the hands of political desperados: closer international cooperation in the field of non-proliferation and arms control. This has also been demanded by peace researchers for many years.

In the world as a whole there are approximately 250 tons of weapons-grade plutonium and approximately 1700 tons of highly enriched uranium. Many storage sites are insufficiently secured or at present even unknown. The network of safeguards designed to counteract the smuggling of weapons-grade materials and to increase the transparency of existing stocks must be drawn tighter. The prosperous nations should surely recognize that it is worth spending more money...
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on this. The argument also applies to help with raising the security standards of Russian nuclear installations.

In 1993, the nuclear weapon states rejected a suggestion put forward by the German Foreign Minister that all nuclear weapons should be placed on a register administered by the UN. This proposal should be revived.

Where biological weapons are concerned it is particularly difficult, because of the dual use nature of these weapons, to verify whether international control agreements are being respected. There is a need for comprehensive arms control measures, but the USA is especially mistrustful of the level of transparency necessary for the effective verification of international agreements. The Review Conference on the Biological Weapons Convention had to be adjourned for this reason. It is therefore up to the Europeans to see to it that the international regime designed to ensure the observance of the Biological Weapons Convention is consolidated.

The greatest boost to security would come from a decision to invest in measures to assist disarmament and verification rather than in the development of exotic new weapons of war.

Nonproliferation is needed more urgently than ever

Other instruments are required to deal with weapons of mass destruction in the hands of governments. Thanks to the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the fear that 20 or 30 nuclear powers could come into being by the end of the 20th century has turned out to be unfounded. As of today 187 countries, almost the entire world of states, have signed the NPT. This success is hardly diminished by the fact that three “rogues” have not acceded to the treaty regime and have established themselves as unofficial nuclear-armed states: India, Pakistan, and Israel.

The goal of nonproliferation, which seemed to be within reach in 1995, is now under pressure from a number of different directions. How can states which do not possess nuclear weapons be convinced that they do not need them when NATO, for example, claims that it requires such weapons for its own security and even reserves for itself the right to use them first? The US administration does not conceal its determination to achieve political goals by using force if necessary. It has announced the development of new weapons, including nuclear weapons, and published a list of those states it would consider using them against. How can one deny the governments of these states the right to think about the most effective ways of meeting this danger and to consider the same kind of weapons as a response?

There are tried and tested systems of regulation available for all three types of weapons of mass destruction – nuclear, biological, and chemical. These systems place both nuclear and non-nuclear weapon
states under legally binding obligations. These regulatory systems should be used to their maximum effect and, where necessary, reinforced. As a general rule, the principle of nonproliferation (the controlled renunciation of nuclear weapons on the basis of a treaty) should be preferred to counterproliferation (the prevention of proliferation by means of coercion); nonproliferation takes effect at an earlier stage and can be brought about at lower cost.

We advise the German government to continue to adhere to its restrictive arms export policy. Weapons of war should not be delivered to crisis regions or to states which are likely to use those weapons for purposes other than legitimate defence. This was the reason why the government did not deliver tanks to Turkey, a member of NATO, in 1999. The “war on terror” must not be used as an excuse to undermine these principles. Arms exports to Israel should not be approved as long as the Israeli army occupies the autonomous Palestinian areas and increases tensions in the region.

A new form of transatlantic cooperation is needed

There are a number of questions on which the views of Americans and Europeans are diverging to an increasing extent: what is to be done about refractory members of the international system, what goals can justify the use of armed force, and to what ends solidarity can justifiably be demanded. These differences will grow, which will mean that many controversial political questions will have to be discussed within the Atlantic community of values. That community will have to put up with these strains.

The military asymmetry within NATO became particularly noticeable in Kosovo and in Afghanistan. There is a huge gap between the USA’s technical capacities and those of the Europeans. Some have drawn the conclusion that the Europeans must, if they wish to continue to exert an influence, acquire a military capability comparable to that of the USA. This is an erroneous demand. It is true that the Atlantic alliance remains important as a forum for consultation on and coordination of security policy in the Euro-Atlantic area, but the USA is at present emancipating itself from NATO in the sense that it plans to operate in future on a global basis by forming ad hoc coalitions.

The EU must therefore define its own interests and its own threat assessments, and must invest its resources in the capabilities most suitable for dealing with the causes of conflicts which affect Europe most directly. We should not forget that the military budgets of the European NATO countries make up approximately 27 per cent of all global military spending. Europe, which has up until now been primarily preoccupied with its own internal integration, must act autonomously to determine its own role in international conflict regulation in order to open up perspectives that will make it possible to overcome violence.
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Working from within the tradition of comprehensive multilateralism, Europe should consolidate its own civil and military capacities for conflict prevention, and should do this neither in competition with the USA nor as a dependent. The EU’s crisis management in the Balkans since the drawing up of the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe is a model that could serve as a guide to future policy. Those who advise the EU to invest in an arms buildup that would place Europe on an equal footing with the USA have a poor grasp of the problem. On the contrary: if military budgets are cut, the European governments will be forced to cooperate with each other and to orientate their arms procurement policies to the actual requirements of future defence and security policy.

The Bundeswehr is too big and too expensive

The Federal Republic of Germany continues to maintain armed forces that are too big and too expensive. It is self-evident that something is wrong in organizational terms if an army of 320,000 servicemen and women experiences problems when 10,000 of them are stationed abroad. The United Kingdom, a NATO ally with a much more ambitious programme of deployments abroad, makes do with an army of 190,000. The reform of the Bundeswehr is proceeding too slowly, and unrealistic planning goals are being adhered to. No plausible crisis scenario in Europe justifies an army that can expand to a strength of half a million.

With the end of the Cold War, compulsory military service has had its day. Most states have drawn the obvious conclusion and abolished or suspended this antiquated form of recruitment, but in Germany there is still a narrow majority in favour of it. The final argument of those who take this view is that this is the only way in which the Bundeswehr can attract young people with the right qualifications. One suspects that other branches of the civil service and the private economy would be only too glad to be able to use this argument. No conclusive case for compulsory military service follows from it. We would like to repeat our plea for a much smaller Bundeswehr made up of volunteers serving on short or long-term contracts, a case for which we have presented detailed arguments in the past. The pay and benefits offered to the armed services have not in the past been advantageous; they should be readjusted so that they are equivalent to those available to the police.

An army that is worth the money spent on it needs equipment appropriate to the tasks it is asked to carry out. If it takes weeks to transport soldiers and blankets to Afghanistan, something is wrong in this area. But does this mean the Bundeswehr needs to spend 9 billion euros on a huge fleet of 73 transport aircraft?
The change in NATO’s functions

Since September 11, representatives of the US administration have been repeatedly saying to their allies that “The mission determines the coalition, not the coalition the mission”. This motto could mean the beginning of the end of NATO, at least in its present form. To the annoyance of the alliance’s leading power, the European NATO states agreed to participate in the Kosovo intervention and at the same time expected a right to have a say on and join in decision-making on the joint conduct of the war. In the Afghanistan campaign, they were allowed to help out by providing seven AWACS aircraft for the surveillance of American airspace. There was no request for any additional help. Three weeks after the terrorist attacks NATO invoked its mutual defence clause, but this turned out to be nothing more than an anachronistic, albeit grand, gesture.

One of the first items on the agenda of the NATO summit to be held in November 2002 will be the second round of enlargement. There are seven candidates with a reasonable chance of being accepted: Slovenia, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, and the three Baltic states. At present there is no discussion of the criteria of acceptability, no political debate, and not even any protest from Moscow.

What role can NATO play in future? There is clearly no need for a classical defensive alliance with 26 members and well over 4 million men under arms. There is no consensus among the existing members on the idea set out in the 1999 strategy document, of an interventionist alliance with a radius of action extending beyond Europe and prepared to mandate itself to undertake military action. The only development that would seem to open up a positive perspective would be a new relationship between Russia and NATO. All options are open, ranging from Russia as an equal participant in discussions in Brussels to full membership for Moscow. This suggests that the alliance will be transformed from a military alliance into a political security organization for the whole of Europe. However, there were certainly less ponderous ways of reaching this goal. Moreover, the capabilities it requires of NATO are rather different from those it presently possesses.

Russia’s new policy of cooperation

On 24 September 2001, Vladimir Putin announced that Russia would support the USA unconditionally in its war on terror. Thus began what was perhaps the most significant realignment since 1947. Symbolically speaking, Russia declared that it was joining a struggle against terrorism that it considered itself to have been engaged in for the past five years, a struggle that had involved many victims of indiscriminate attacks in Russian cities and two wars in Chechnya. In material terms, Russia allowed the USA into the Russian sanctuary of the CIS in three Central Asian states. Even a few months before this would
have seemed quite unthinkable; one only has to remember the controversy over NATO enlargement.

Moscow’s abrupt decision to end its zig-zag course between cooperation and antiwestern great power rhetoric fits in well with Putin’s domestic policy of authoritarian modernization. His regime forces public opinion into line, while at the same time trying to allow the economic pluralism of the market to blossom. These two things can be combined with one another if internal modernization takes priority and if partners can be found who want and are prepared to make a tangible contribution to the project.

The Europeans can and must improve their relations with Russia

Before September 11 the situation was characterized by mutual mistrust. The new Russia wanted to be accepted as an equal in the circle of the remaining world powers, and in making this claim it assumed that the military power of the past could be unproblematically projected into a present that had been fundamentally transformed. This made it possible for Russia to function as a perpetual irritant, but it could not have any serious impact on US policy. Russia’s position on the scale of Washington’s priorities corresponded more closely to a state with an economic potential equivalent to that of Belgium, rather than to what might have been appropriate to the nuclear capability it still possessed. The Bush administration believed that there was no need to pay any particular attention to Russia either politically or, as had been the case under Clinton, in material terms. After September 11 the whole situation changed. Russia has now, at a stroke, turned itself into an indispensable coalition partner for the USA. The new treaty cutting the number of strategic nuclear missiles by two thirds is evidence of this. And NATO is now thinking seriously for the first time about how Russia could be incorporated into a cooperative European security structure. The new NATO-Russia Council (“Council of Twenty”) could, if it becomes an efficiently functioning body and not just a symbolic entity like its predecessors, lead to an extremely interesting realignment of the boundaries between collective defence and collective security.

This development is very much in the interests of the Europeans. There are good reasons why they should welcome the opportunity to place the historically difficult relationship with Russia on a new basis, to strengthen cooperation at all levels and to the benefit of both sides, and – as repeatedly stressed in Germany since 1989 – to overcome the division of Europe. However, this perspective means that more sustained attention must be paid to the western agenda for democratization. It can no longer be used as excuse and as a way of keeping Russia at a distance, in order to set the conditions under which partial cooperation with Russia takes place and at the same time to keep Russia at
arm’s length. There is now a need to increase the economic aid offered to Russia and the assistance made available for the country’s democratization, and at the same time to insist that human rights be respected in Chechnya and elsewhere.

The conflict over Palestine cannot be reduced to the struggle against terrorism

The dramatic developments in the Middle East demonstrate that a fixation on the terrorism syndrome contributes to the escalation of violence. After September 11, the Israeli government felt that it was in a stronger position to carry out its plan to inflict a military defeat on the intifada. The Israeli government’s contribution to the “war on terror” has recklessly destroyed the civil infrastructure in the autonomous Palestinian areas. This has also buried any hopes of economic development as the basis for a lasting peace agreement. On the other side, the militant intifada activists increasingly came to treat the scale of the casualties they could inflict on Israel as the measure of their success. Finally, secular forces too adopted the tactic of suicide bombings against civilian targets on Israeli territory. In this way they destroyed the faith of many Israelis in the possibility of cooperative relations with a future Palestinian state.

The essential elements of a solution to the conflict have been known since Taba in 2001: an end to the Israeli occupation; the setting up of a Palestinian state consisting of the Gaza Strip and most of the West Bank; territorial compensation for the suburbs of Jerusalem where the majority of the Jewish settlers live and which should be annexed to Israel; the political division of Jerusalem on demographic lines and the establishment of the capital city of Palestine in East Jerusalem, the part of the city where the Arabs live; the abandonment of Jewish settlements on the territory of the Palestinian state; recognition of the right of refugees to return to the future Palestinian state, together with generous international help for their resettlement.

The conflict over Palestine must be internationalized

The problem is that the leaders of the parties to the conflict seem to be incapable of reaching a negotiated solution on these lines. Some of the recommendations we made in the 2001 edition of our *Friedensgutachten* - economic pressure on Israel and a restructuring of the financial assistance made available to the Palestinians - have been overtaken by events on the ground. After a year of ineffectual appeals to the two sides, the price that would have to be paid to put an end to their strategies of violence has risen sharply.

Today, it is absolutely vital that an international initiative be launched that can force the parties to the conflict to end the violence and to draw up a binding timetable for solutions to the main contested
issues. However, concerted action by outside parties that can solve the conflict will be impossible as long as the parties are influenced by the rules of the campaign against terrorism.

**A division of labour between the USA and the EU**

Only the USA has the resources needed to persuade Israel, the more powerful of the parties to the conflict, to change course. The UN and EU, therefore, in their efforts to bring about a settlement based on the existence of two states, must build on the support to be had from those American Middle East policymakers who are prepared to recognize that the Palestinians too have a right to security and self-determination. The new “quartet” consisting of the UN, USA, EU, and Russia, which brings together the only legitimate authority with the actor enjoying real power, could be put to the test in a Middle East conference.

The EU should continue to contribute to this process by using its own strengths: the medium to long-term strategy of employing instruments in the spheres of the economy and civil society in order to encourage a political solution to the conflict. There is an urgent need for such measures in the autonomous Palestinian areas. The donor states have already agreed to make 1.2 billion dollars available for reconstruction. This means not only that they have taken on a financial burden, but also that they share responsibility for the political future of the Palestinian polity. If a political process begins and holds out the prospect of an early end to the occupation, the donors must demand that the autonomous authority take measures to reduce the level of violence in the areas under its control to the point where the Israelis must no longer fear for their existence. Only then will a majority in Israel be prepared to reject the strategy of violence pursued by the present government.

At the same time the EU should support those forces in Palestinian society which can function as the upholders of democratic reforms. The Palestinian bodies elected in 1996 will have to re-legitimize themselves by means of new elections. However, a leadership that was more orientated towards ensuring acceptance on the part of the population for the treaties it has concluded and less interested in its own privileges would be a more difficult negotiating partner for the Israelis. It could not, as it has done in the past, silence criticism of disappointing results with a combination of carrot and stick, by distributing material privileges to a swollen bureaucracy and combining this with censorship and intimidation. Another possibility that cannot be ruled out is that democratization will lead to Islamist organizations being elected to Palestinian representative bodies. The western bodies financing reconstruction would make a mistake if they were to make their assistance conditional upon the exclusion of these forces from the new Palestinian polity. If there are pragmatic groups or individuals among them
who are prepared to accept a two-state solution, it would be better to include than to exclude them.

The violence must be stopped before attention can be turned to the construction of a democratic Palestine. The population of Israel, just like that of the autonomous areas, has the right not to be exposed to the illegitimate and excessive use of force. In the short term this can only be achieved with the help of an international presence in the autonomous areas to replace the Israeli army. No patent remedies are available, but there are some isolated examples of successful intervention. In return for the release of Yasser Arafat from his house arrest in Ramallah, American and British warders are now guarding imprisoned Palestinian terrorists in Jericho.

The EU was successful in its efforts to mediate in the conflict over the siege of the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem. There are a number of further measures the community of states can take to help ensure that the political process is not repeatedly undermined by new outbreaks of violence: documenting breaches of any ceasefire that is agreed, uncovering the production and smuggling of weapons, and making sure that Palestinian prisons function as they are intended to.

The Institutionalization of International Cooperation

Since September 11 it has been more important than ever to develop concepts for more intensive international cooperation, to explore a broader conception of internal and external security, and to find ways of giving a new momentum to the juridification of international relations. The problems arising from globalization, which have been growing in urgency for years, compel both state and non-state actors to look beyond their traditional political concerns and adopt a longer-term perspective.

The International Criminal Court starts its work

In April 2002 the sixtieth state ratified the statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), thus enabling the court to begin its work. This statute rests on the conviction that war crimes and crime against humanity are not the internal affairs of individual states. The community of states has a shared responsibility and obligation to punish such crimes and to call to account those individuals who commit them. We see the ICC as an important step towards the juridification of international politics.

However, the refusal of Russia and the USA to participate in the work of the court is a serious problem. Washington had signed the statute, but has now withdrawn its signature. This means that the ICC can begin to operate, but the scope of its powers is restricted. The decisive question now is whether the states that have signed will be
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prepared to put this pathbreaking instrument of international justice into practice even without the participation of the USA, and thereby to create new legal precedents that will make it easier for the UN to travel farther along this road.

The prospects for a revival of the role of the UN

Individual leading world powers are preventing the UN from making use of all the possibilities open to it. In relation to the combating of international terrorism, for example, a number of unambiguous resolutions had been passed since 1998 which only began to have any effect after September 11: bank accounts were frozen, the financial flows supporting the terrorist networks interrupted, and terrorist cells broken up through cooperation between different states. Only after September 11 was there a positive response to another demand made repeatedly by the Security Council since 1998, that Kabul should cease its support for international terrorism and extradite Bin Laden.

Today, the USA is emphasizing the importance of the UN’s role. In the immediate aftermath of September 11, the USA demonstratively paid a large part of its debt to the UN. Some may be tempted to dismiss George W. Bush’s speech to the General Assembly on 11 November 2001 as mere rhetoric, but the fact that the USA considered after September 11 that the right course of action was to get Security Council legitimation for its action in Afghanistan shows that the UN still has a certain standing. On the other hand, it should not be accepted as routine for the Security Council, with reference to the right to self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter, to give an individual state carte blanche to act and so to relinquish any control over the military response of that state.

Confronted with the American preference for unilateral action, the Europeans must do all they can to make cooperative action at the UN level possible. They will find partners in this enterprise throughout the world, not excluding parts of the US political elite and administration.

A collective security organization needs to have its own instruments of power at its disposal. The demand that the General Secretary should have his own military instruments remains correct, and the appearance of a new international actor, the “quartet” made up of the UN, the EU, the USA, and Russia, could provide an opportunity to move in this direction. If the UN is given a decisive role within this quartet, a new cooperation between NATO and the UN could be in the offing which will give the UN teeth. To be sure, this judgement assumes that NATO will be content to play this part.

The OSCE must be used more effectively

The OSCE remains the indispensable organizational bracket around zones of varying stability and prosperity in Europe. The organization
is active in all fields of civil policy that are relevant to a broader conception of security. Approximately twenty field missions are working in critical regions, where they make specific contributions to the battle against organized crime, the construction of institutions responsible for the administration of justice, and the training of multiethnic police forces. The OSCE’s lean bureaucracy makes it one of the most cost-efficient security organizations, but its comprehensive political mandate is used much less frequently than it could and should be.

To an increasing extent, governments of countries about to become members of the EU or NATO are able to get rid of OSCE missions that are working successfully. A way should be found of putting a stop to this trend. If this is not done, states which have some way to go in attaining acceptable standards of democracy and the rule of law will have a pretext for withdrawing from OSCE observation.

The OSCE’s role in providing a forum for dialogue with moderate Islamist forces is still in its early stages. The organization’s experience in Tajikistan has been encouraging, and it is to be hoped that this experience can be drawn upon for similar work in other Central Asian countries.

Successful crisis management by the EU and NATO

In 2001, the international community was able to demonstrate that it had learnt its lesson from the disasters in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. In April 2001 the EU concluded a Stabilization and Association Agreement with Macedonia. Javier Solana, the EU’s High Representative for CFSP, doggedly pursued the goal of putting an end to the violence. His robust style of negotiation was demonstratively supported by NATO. This made it possible for Solana to persuade the Macedonian government and the representatives of the Albanian minority to agree to a joint framework agreement. The Ohrid Agreement of 13 August 2001 provides for changes to the constitution and the comprehensive protection of minority rights, and the EU is supervising its implementation. NATO took over the task of disarming the Albanian irregular fighters, and Skopje in turn guaranteed them an amnesty. Under NATO’s protection, most of the refugees returned to their homes. Currently, mixed police patrols set up with the help of the EU can be seen on the streets of mountain villages that were formerly the sites of armed clashes.

NATO did not, unlike in the spring of 1999, give itself a mandate to act in Macedonia. Operation Essential Harvest rested on agreement between the parties to the conflict – an understanding between the ethnic groups, an agreed cease fire, and the UCK’s commitment to give up their weapons. Although Macedonia is not yet entirely peaceful and there are still tensions in relations between the majority and minority
groups, this coordinated action by the EU and NATO has succeeded in halting the escalation of violence.

38,000 of the 58,000 foreign troops serving in the Balkans and securing a still fragile peace are European. We have in the past emphasized that we consider the presence of SFOR and KFOR to be useful contributions to peace in the region. This also applies to the deployment in Macedonia.

The EU has placed its economic and political weight behind the stabilization of the Balkans, and has also intervened forcefully in the dispute over the independence of Montenegro. The agreement reached in Belgrade in March 2002 on the formation of a new Confederation of Serbia and Montenegro also bears Solana’s signature. A referendum on Montenegro’s independence has been postponed for three years, and Podgorica has been granted a high degree of self-government. In case of disputes, the EU is to act as arbitrator. This means the EU’s responsibility is clearly laid down. In Kosovo, an interim government was only formed as a result of international pressure. In Bosnia, the EU will take over responsibility for the international police mission at the end of 2002.

German foreign policy played the central role when the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe was established in 1999, and it must develop the pact further and see to it that the EU’s interest in and assistance for the pacification of the Balkans do not flag. If this effort is successful, the Stability Pact could also become a model for other crisis regions.

Europe must cooperatively shape world politics

The EU’s capacity as a foreign policy actor must not, however, be restricted to Europe. And this role cannot consist of securing US strategic interests and searching for an “axis of evil”.

The root causes of international terrorism cannot be combated without convincing efforts to bring about justice and democratization. Instead of simply complaining about American unilateralism, Europe must commit itself to building a new and solid transatlantic relationship. On this basis it can launch initiatives to foster a multilateral culture of cooperation involving all regions of the world. The goal will continue to be the further juridification of international politics in all fields, including that of peace and security policy. One small step in this direction could be made with the introduction of an obligation to provide grounds for the exercise of the veto in the UN Security Council, and another might be making military forces available to the UN General Secretary. The European Union has considerable experience of interstate cooperation and integration, and seems to us to be particularly well suited to helping the UN acquire the weight it is entitled to as the body with responsibility for securing world peace.
The public political sphere that is coming into being in the European Union should be more mindful of the vision of the Union as a peace project which provided the impulse for its foundation. Exclusionary nationalism, racism, and fundamentalism have not been overcome for all time; increasing right-wing populism is a challenge in Europe. Peace also has an internal dimension.

We welcome the fact that the German government has begun to strengthen the instruments needed for civil conflict regulation and to try them out in practice, especially in the framework of development cooperation. We consider, for example, the support given in the Horn of Africa to programmes to control small arms and to help with the demobilization and reintegration of soldiers to be much more sensible than German warships patrolling off Djibouti. German policy must be committed to persuading the EU of the need to work together with regional state and non-state actors in order to elaborate coherent concepts of civil conflict regulation for individual countries and regions, and also of the need to create the necessary instruments. Especially after September 11, the EU is needed more than ever as a power able to shape world politics in a cooperative manner. Germany’s experience since 1945 means that there is a fundamental consensus in the country about the idea of Europe as a civil power, which serves as a model pointing the way to the future. Both in the EU and in relation to the task of strengthening the UN, Berlin should make the most of this.

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