

## Summaries

### **1.1. Geostrategic rivalries in Eastern Asia: The square of power China – Japan – Russia – USA (Hans J. Gießmann)**

In no other region in the world are the shadows of the East-West conflict as visible and the acute problems of international security as obvious as in Eastern Asia. Nowhere else do rival political and economic interests lie so close together, nowhere else are the compulsions for co-operative action and global responsibility so manifest. North Korea's atomic programme and the tension between China and Taiwan do not only pose a threat to peace and stability in North Eastern Asia alone. Competition over the exploitation of raw materials and disputed border questions are increasing the potential for conflict. The region is becoming a test case for the development of a constructive security partnership between the world powers in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Should this partnership be successful, it would provide positive global impulses. Should it fail, the consequences would also be of global consequence.

### **1.2. The UN following the world summit in September 2005: Standstill as progress? (Lothar Brock/Tanja Brühl)**

UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan linked his proposals for reform with the diagnosis that the world organisation was faced with the alternative of fundamental reform or failure. There was strong resistance from several sides to a complete overhaul of the UN. But nevertheless, the UN is by no means at an end. Not only did it prove possible to defend the UN successfully, e.g. through the continued validity of basic norms of the UN Charter, but even to expand certain central areas – the international protection of human rights, peace consolidation, the functioning of the Security Council. For the time being, these are only small steps. Whether they will add up to progress on the way to a global security community depends on how the member states deal with the reforms which have just begun and how firmly they insist on their continuation.

### **1.3. The OSCE between a crisis of adjustment and a debate on reform (Wolfgang Zellner)**

The OSCE is currently experiencing a double crisis of adjustment. On the one hand, there has been a drop in the number of violent conflicts in Europe whereas transnational threats and risks are becoming more significant. On the other hand, the enlargement of the EU and continuing Russian and CIS criticism, particularly of OSCE activities in the human dimension, have altered the political framework conditions. The OSCE's current discussion on reform is centred on how to deal with this situation. A "Panel of Eminent Persons", specially set up for this purpose, has drawn up workable solutions. However, there are hardly any signs of the participating states moving closer together. Should the reform fail, the OSCE will face political marginalisation. Should joint reform efforts succeed, the OSCE will be able to continue to help to tackle old and new security risks.

#### **1.4. The great promise: “Extended security” (Corinna Hauswedell)**

Concepts of “extended security” are characteristic of today’s debate on mastering international crises and catastrophes. They confirm the high status of human rights vis-à-vis state sovereignty, but they have also led to an increased readiness to launch military interventions. The ambivalence of such concepts calls for more restraint. The two lines of action could prove incompatible should it not be possible to reconcile national interests to form a new collective protective responsibility under the auspices of the UN. A critical appraisal must therefore stress the extremely varied risks, dangers and threats to human security, heighten the aspect of prevention and re-establish the normative priority of civil peace strategies over ambitions which are determined by military policy.

#### **1.5. “Benevolent hegemony” and the *pax americana*: The role and rationale of a super power (Franz Nuscheler)**

All common power indicators – political influence, economic strength, military capacity with the capability to conduct operations world-wide – assign the United States the position of a super power, the only remaining super power following the end of the bipolar structure of the international system. The United States has not only been able to maintain this special position but also to expand it. However, US policies only rarely meet the ideal of a “benevolent hegemony” under the hegemonic stability theory. The United States has declared that it will use its power to serve national interests, not the normative imperatives of an abstract global common good. Nevertheless, even extensive power is not unlimited. The United States will continue to rely on international partners if it intends to pursue goals which extend beyond those of securing its own rule and if it wants to shape international politics in the long term.

#### **2.1. Codes of conduct and fair trade (Volker Teichert/Stefan Wilhelmy)**

Globalisation is aggravating the unequal trade relations between industrial nations and third world countries. The poor countries of the South are finding it increasingly difficult to keep up in the competition between largely similar products on international markets. Social tensions are growing; the causes of conflicts and violence are on the increase. What solutions do the instruments of fair trade offer? First of all, the multinational companies would have to obey rules and standards which halt impoverishment and environmental destruction. Secondly, consumers would be able to exploit their market power by purchasing products which have been produced under humane and environmentally sound conditions. Fair trade would thus contribute to a reduction in conflicts over distribution and to the development of a viable world society in the future.

#### **2.2. A third of the way? The Millennium Development Goals as a joint basis for a policy of development and peace (Hans Diefenbacher)**

A third of the way into the period which the Millennium Summit allocated for the implementation of the Development Goals, the success and failure rates of the individual goals vary considerably from region to region. It will be impossible to realise most of the goals by 2015 without a massive expansion of the “partnership for development” and funding from the richer countries. It is therefore necessary to double the budgets for development co-operation, to cancel the debts of the poorest countries and to introduce new international funding instruments such as the Tobin tax. These demands are not new, but it is becoming all the more imperative to realise them if the international community of states wants to maintain its consensus on the aims which it has set itself.

### **2.3. European immigration policy: Limits to the promise of equality (Sabine Mannitz)**

The drama along the borders of the EU is visible. Drowned refugees have virtually become everyday news; the Straits of Gibraltar divide the continents almost like a moat. In the meantime, more rigorous action is being taken against undesired immigrants: They are being expelled from the North African enclaves and sent to the Sahel region; only recently they were fired at by the *Guardia Civil*. At the same time, the EU, as a democratic peace zone, does not have a good record for the treatment of its own immigrants at home. France was astonished by the uprisings in its suburbs last year. But it should come as no surprise that social exclusion is not compatible with the postulate of equality. These conflicts cannot be defused without improved chances for the future and a pro-active European immigration policy. The EU's recent package of measures is intended as a step in this direction.

### **2.4. Crisis prevention and promoting peace in German development policy (Tobias Debiel/Angelika Spelten)**

The violent conflicts of the 1990s, which - in Africa especially - eradicated the success of decades of work, forced the SPD-Green Government to adjust its course in the field of development co-operation. Securing peace and survival became a political postulate alongside the classical goals of fighting poverty. Whereas the changes in course during the Government's first legislative period involved programmatic concepts to prevent crises and consolidate peace, its second period in office was characterised by the institutional establishment of new key topics and their practical implementation in initial pilot projects. However, development policy must avoid being monopolised by the idea of "extended security", which gives priority to averting a threat to one's own security over safeguarding the existence of people in conflict regions.

### **3.1 Iraq caught between a permanent crisis, civil war and stabilisation (Jochen Hippler)**

Three trends are determining the development of Iraq following the fall of Saddam Hussein as a result of violent external intervention. The security situation is steadily deteriorating and gradually evoking the real danger of a civil war. Ethnic and religious differences between Arabs and Kurds and between Sunnis and Shiites are becoming deeper and at the same time more political. The reconstruction of the state is uniting democratic elements through mechanisms of balanced inter-ethnic representation in a way whose chances of success for ensuring social integration and political stability have yet to be proved. Added to this is the continued catastrophic economic situation of the Iraqi people. None of these problems can be solved in isolation, but only in the context of the others. The situation at the moment, however, is that they are mutually obstructing each other.

### **3.2. Peace by diktat? The long departure from a negotiated solution to the Palestinian conflict (Margret Johannsen)**

By clearing the Gaza Strip, Israel divested itself of its responsibility for the security and wellbeing of more than a third of the Palestinian population. In many places, the withdrawal was interpreted as an opportunity for the resumption of negotiations in accordance with the terms of the Road Map. However, this rendering proved to be wishful thinking. Negotiations are more remote than ever since the *Hamas* movement assumed government responsibility in the Palestinian regions whilst still reserving the option of continuing the armed struggle for liberation. As *Hamas* attempts to implement its programme of domestic reform and expects financial assistance from the Arab-Islamic world, Israel is heading towards defining its borders with the Palestinians unilaterally and thereby annexing strategically essential areas.

### **3.3. Internal development and international commitment in Afghanistan – An interim balance following the fall of the Taliban (Rainer Glassner)**

Without a functioning state apparatus with real control over the whole country, Afghanistan will be unable to overcome its instability and lack of security or succeed in rebuilding its economy. Admittedly, since the fall of the Taliban, the imported political system has gained legitimacy - thanks to democratic presidential and parliamentary elections - but state structures remain fragile and weak in the provinces, which are characterised by their different ethnic groups. Local warlords and profiteers from the drug trade are frustrating the development efforts of Afghanistan's central government and foreign non-governmental organisations. The obsession of external stakeholders with the military fight against terrorism is contributing towards making it more difficult to reduce political tension and is further aggravating the security situation.

### **3.4. Status, standards, security? Kosovo's uncertain future (Igor D. Grebenschikov)**

The future of Kosovo has been in the hands of the UN Security Council since the 1999 war. Initial steps have been taken towards democratisation under the protectorate of UNMIK and KFOR, but the realisation of the set standards varies and the security situation is precarious against the background of political radicalisation and Mafia-type violence. The conflict entered a new phase with the start of negotiations in February 2006. So far the international community's strategy of a *realpolitik* aimed at achieving conditional independence for Kosovo is failing due to the irreconcilable objectives of the conflicting parties with regard to status. The EU will have to act as a guiding force in this balancing act, employing a mixture of incentives and pressure which will form a precedent for other ethnic-national conflicts. It will have to accept responsibility for the peace process indefinitely.

### **3.5. Waiting for the thaw – frozen conflicts in the Black Sea region (Aron Buzogány)**

Even after a decade and a half, the "frozen conflicts" over Nagorno Karabach, South Ossetia, Abchasia and Trans-Dniester resulting from the post-Soviet wars of succession remain in an apparent stalemate situation. Although the failure of attempted solutions would suggest otherwise, the original causes of the conflicts have developed dynamically and have led to the relative stabilisation of these quasi-states, which are wholly viable even though they are not recognised internationally. Lately, the regional involvement of new stakeholders, in particular the EU, and the "colourful revolutions" in Georgia and Ukraine seem to have set in motion the delicate balance resulting from the complex interplay of local conflict economies, weak statehood and cleverly instrumentalised policies of identity.

### **3.6. Reconciliation: Balancing between truth and justice (Susanne Buckley-Zistel/Bernhard Moltmann)**

Peace consolidation in post-civil war societies requires the mutual recognition of groups and individuals that were once enemies. Since 1974, attempts have been made to uncover misdeeds and ensure justice for the purpose of reconciliation in more than 40 cases, particularly in South America and Africa. Truth commissions serve this aim. However, often the results do not meet expectations - if the desire for national unity interferes with the process of resolution and the time frame is too short. In many cases, there is a lack of both the willingness and the means to rehabilitate victims. Only those efforts are successful which guarantee a maximum of transparency and participation, combined with proven conflict settlement mechanisms. External help is all the more effective the more credibly the helpers illuminate the dark areas of their own past.

### **3.7. Democratisation from outside – Impossible? (Bruno Schoch)**

Since democracies do not conduct wars against one another, one could assume that the right peace strategy is to accelerate processes of democratisation. The number of democracies has increased significantly over the last two decades; and in the meantime the promotion of democracy has become a global practice. It often meets with the objection that authoritarian societies cannot be democratised from the outside, and certainly not by coercion. This objection ignores the fact that war and violence have often triggered processes of democratisation in the past. Admittedly, an active process of democratisation is faced with a number of dilemmas and the success rate of processes of democratisation which are conducted under compulsion is low – but the same applies to aid towards democracy by peaceful means. It would appear that the West still has to find the right strategy for promoting democracy by external means.

### **4.1. A never ending story? Iran and North Korea's nuclear programmes (Annette Schaper/Hans-Joachim Schmidt)**

The nuclear non-proliferation regime is experiencing a deep crisis. The NPT review conference has failed. The ambitions of North Korea and Iran are worrying the community of states. Iran is refusing to give up enrichment technology. Access to the bomb would then only be a matter of time. North Korea has quit the NPT and appears to already possess nuclear warheads. Both regimes are not democratic; they often express themselves in an extremely aggressive tone and are persisting in their plans. The United States is demonstrating strength, is playing down the importance of international treaties and is adopting different approaches towards Teheran and Pyongyang. What are needed are regional security concepts which involve both the key and neighbouring states as well as the United States. The direct talks planned to take place between the United States and Iran could promote such concepts.

#### **4.2. On the defensive – Europe’s policy on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (Oliver Meier/Götz Neuneck)**

Since the approval of the European Security Strategy and the Non-Proliferation Strategy in December 2003, European non-proliferation policy has gained in coherence, but hardly in effectiveness. Europe is neglecting efforts to strengthen multilateral non-proliferation regimes and support disarmament in cases where the United States refuses to co-operate. The EU is concentrating more and more on mechanisms that are independent of treaties and where common transatlantic interests are particularly strong. The Near and Middle East are a test case for Europe’s policy of non-proliferation but, with the exception of Iran, the EU has not shown itself to be particularly hungry for action. Europe should demonstrate its own multilateral approach more confidently and should try to encourage rulings which strengthen security wherever possible, even without American support.

#### **4.3. The new American nuclear strategy: A dangerous mistake (Harald Müller/Stephanie Sohnies)**

The draft of the United States’ new nuclear doctrine includes nuclear weapons as part of the country’s preventive military strategy and describes a whole range of scenarios for deployment. Nuclear weapons are not only to be used to deter attacks with weapons of mass destruction, but also to avert an unfavourable course of war and to help a multinational intervention to succeed. The new nuclear doctrine “conventionalises” thinking on nuclear weapons and is breaking the decades-old “nuclear taboo”. So far, only the US Congress is opposing this development, which violates international law and is harmful to world security. Germany’s interests are also affected since the doctrine treats the United States’ world-wide nuclear arsenal as a single unit. As a NATO partner, Germany acts as a base for tactical nuclear weapons and takes part in multi-national operations.

#### **4.4. The future of biological arms control – Transatlantic discord (Jan van Aken/Iris Hunger)**

Until now, the threat of the use of biological weapons has been regarded as moderate. But technical and political developments are making the use of such weapons more probable. Different ideas on the two sides of the Atlantic as to how to deal with this danger have led to a complete standstill in the field of biological arms control. Whereas the United States is adopting a combination of non-proliferation policy, military sabre-rattling and technical protection measures, the EU is emphasising the importance of an “efficient multilateralism”. The future of biological arms control will depend on how these differences can be bridged. The EU must act resolutely to prevent the erosion of the comprehensive ban on biological weapons and invest in the further development of the multilateral control regime and, if necessary, do so unilaterally.

#### **4.5. Small arms control: Has nothing been learnt? (Christine Beeck/Julie Brethfeld)**

A stop to the illegal trade in small arms and light weapons has been on the international arms control agenda for about ten years now. First steps were taken towards developing standards for small arms control with the UN Programme of Action in 2001 and the Firearms Protocol in 2005. However, the practical implementation of these programmes is still only just beginning. What is lacking is the political will of many big arms-exporting countries. Business interests often take precedence over human rights considerations. In addition, the Programme of Action ignores important aspects, such as the civilian use of small arms and thus the social causes of demand. The Federal Government should assume a pioneering role within the EU to stem these failures and should make this topic a priority for the UN Follow-up Conference in summer 2006.

#### **5.1 After Madrid and London – The EU and the fight against terrorism (Martin Kahl)**

The attacks in Madrid and London have significantly increased the pressure on the EU and its member states to develop effective strategies and instruments for fighting Islamic terrorism. The options being considered even go as far as military operations outside the territory of the EU. With regard to the EU's policy towards third states, the question then arises of the compatibility of measures to eliminate the causes of terrorism in the long-term with short-term defence strategies. The introduction of new information systems and the intensification of exchanges of data are increasing the tensions between "freedom" and "security" within the EU. The effectiveness of a large number of measures which the EU has introduced or plans to introduce must be regarded as problematical, particularly in view of the current profile of the terrorist players.

#### **5.2. Sanctions as an instrument of European Foreign and Security Policy (Michael Brzoska)**

Like the United Nations, the European Union places sanctions somewhere between diplomatic and military means as an instrument of foreign policy. The EU has pursued an active sanctions agenda for over twenty years without this having led to a coherent policy either internally or externally. Sanctions are a potentially important instrument for many fields of crisis prevention, crisis management and post-conflict action. However, to be effective they must be embedded in the overall concept of a European policy towards states and groups whose behaviour is to be altered. A clearly defined, selectively employed sanctions policy could enhance the effectiveness of sanctions. This requires a continuous analysis of their effects. Otherwise, there is a risk that sanctions may aggravate crises.

#### **5.3. The militarisation of Europe or the Europeanisation of the military? (Matthias Dembinski/Wolfgang Wagner)**

The problems of democratic control and the danger of deepening the trenches between the EU and its neighbours are arguments against expanding the EU's Security and Defence Policy, especially as EU treaties do not set any clear limits on future operations. If one takes a closer look, however, it becomes clear that the efforts towards integration also represent a Europeanisation of the military, which in turn provides a significant contribution towards peace by helping to overcome national rivalries. From the point of view of peace policy, rather than making overhasty sweeping criticisms of the "militarisation of Europe", it would be more important to concentrate on civilian instruments and the strengthening of democratic mechanisms that are capable of preventing the possible misuse of armed force for the purposes of an aggressive policy of influence and interests.

#### **5.4. In the alliance trap – Is a shift taking place in the military-civilian balance of German foreign policy? (Reinhard Mutz)**

At a first glance, the seven years of SPD-Green government do not confirm the claims of a shift in the military-civilian balance of German foreign policy. On the contrary, the Federal Republic's involvement in the three spectacular wars – Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq – decreased over time. At the same time, the transatlantic controversy over the invasion of Iraq was the catalyst for adapting security policy thinking and planning in Europe to meet new strategic situations. Citing alliance obligations, German policy too yielded to pressure to adapt. It abolished the *Bundeswehr's* defence mission as defined in the Basic Law and ordered the *Bundeswehr* to transform itself into an army that is also capable of conducting offensive warfare with an appropriate structure, weaponry, equipment and training. The priority of civilian over military forms of conflict settlement is being eroded.

#### **5.5. The internationalisation and militarisation of the German security industry (Marc von Boemcken)**

Following the example set by US-American and British firms, private security companies based in Germany are also active in international theatres of war. For example, German citizens are taking part in armed combat in Iraq, side-by-side with US soldiers. From the point of view of peace policy, current legal provisions in the Federal Republic are not able to effectively control, and if necessary prevent, the involvement of German firms in violent foreign conflicts. Possible regulative instruments could be licensing systems for work in the military sector and integration in the EU's Code of Conduct on Arms Exports. A discussion launched in the German Parliament in September 2004 has not yet produced any results. Nor has the Coalition Government commented on this important issue.