

## **Editors‘ Statement**

The world has fallen out over war and peace in a new way. A feeling of global insecurity is growing. Most Americans felt that the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 were a declaration of war. The sudden realisation of ordinary citizens that they were vulnerable to deadly attack was used by conservative ideologues to put into practice ideas they had been developing for a long time – ideas of a new kind of power politics and world order, based on military superiority. The Bush Doctrine adds to the established principles of containment and deterrence a unilateral claim to be entitled to wage preventive war against dictatorships armed with weapons of mass destruction and against terrorist networks. This destroys the central provision of international law as it has existed up until now, the prohibition of war as contained in Article 2 of the UN Charter.

This change of strategy amounts to throwing the main coordinates of international politics out of the window. During the unprecedented struggle over the legitimacy of the war on Iraq, it became clear that while the Cold War brought Europe and the USA together, the war against terrorism and the „axis of evil“ is now driving them apart. As this has happened, the transatlantic relationship has been strained and a division within Europe has opened up.

It seems as though, just over ten years after the end of the East-West conflict, the western world is out of joint. A situation in which military asymmetries are already heightened cannot cope with further militarisation. But how can we envisage a new world order that makes security, development, and democracy possible for all? What can we learn from recent interstate and intrastate conflicts that will help us develop a peace policy for the 21<sup>st</sup> century? If everything is in a state of flux, peace research too is unlikely to have ready answers to all these questions.

### **1. A New Order for the World?**

#### **The change in US policy**

Thomas P.M. Barnett, a Pentagon adviser, has summed up the new US policy stating that the Iraq war marked the moment at which Washington has actually taken a grip on global security in the age of globalisation. When President Bush senior announced the arrival of the „new world order“ in 1990-91, it was envisaged that the United Nations, international law, and international cooperation would be given more weight than they had during the

confrontation between the blocs. Even though the North-South conflict was by no means defused, there were promising signs of emerging global governance in the UN's world conferences and in the extension and intensification of cooperation in many international institutions – the WTO, ASEAN, NAFTA, the EU, and others. But even during the Clinton administration, neoconservative forces were developing their own conception of a new world order. When George W. Bush became president, the *Project for the New American Century* became part of the administration's policy. The goals of this project are that the US should free itself of any cooperative, multilateral obligations that conflict with short-term American interests, and adopt a confrontational strategy dominated by military instruments in order to deal with any global problems regarded as threats.

In the eyes of most Americans, the president's declaration of war on international terrorism after September 11 was justified. The war against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, which refused to hand over the main suspects, was legitimised by the UN Security Council. Soon afterwards, however, the Bush administration began to speak of the „axis of evil“, a selective projection of enemy images which involved targetting states charged with supporting international terrorism or seeking to acquire nuclear weapons. At no time was the administration able to prove that Iraq supported al-Qaida. This gap in the administration's case could not be covered up with references to the nightmare scenario that had loomed since September 11 – the possibility that international terrorists might get hold of weapons of mass destruction.

The USA's new National Security Strategy, which was officially published in September 2002, states that a strategy to ensure long-term American dominance is the guiding principle of this new foreign policy. And, without completely abandoning the doctrine of deterrence, it declares preventive action against „rogue states“ and terrorists to be an important pillar of the new security policy. The right of self-defence is reinterpreted as a right to take unilateral military action „on suspicion“, and the possible use of nuclear weapons is explicitly stated to be part of the strategy. Counterproliferation, the policy of preventive military action to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction, has always been a questionable instrument; now, though, it is being given the status of a principle.

In the course of this militarisation of its policy, the US has increased its share of worldwide military spending to almost 40 percent. The 2003 military budget stands at 380 billion dollars, which is 60 percent more than the military spending of all the other NATO countries together with Australia, Japan, and South Korea, and approximately 25 times greater than that of the so-called „rogue states“. US dominance of expenditure on military research

and development is even more marked; here, the US is responsible for two thirds of all global spending.

This new security policy strengthens the military at the expense of diplomacy, and runs counter to all international efforts to promote arms control, especially those designed to ensure adherence to the nonproliferation regime. The policy therefore presents an enormous challenge not only to international law, but also to all efforts to develop cooperative and civil conflict regulation, arms control, and disarmament.

### **The war against Iraq serves as a warning**

With the war on Iraq, this hypertrophied way of thinking about security turned into a flagrant breach of international law. America used its absolute power to snub the international community, refused to take the concerns of its NATO partners into consideration, and has profoundly annoyed much of the world. During the months of diplomatic to-ing and fro-ing that preceded the Iraq war, something like a world public opinion expressed itself before a war for the first time. For all its military superiority, a democracy like the USA cannot afford to take this lightly in the long term. One of the many critical voices heard in the USA itself was that of the senior Democratic Senator Robert C. Byrd, who uttered words of warning in Congress saying that this reckless, arrogant administration has initiated a policy that could have dangerous repercussions for many years to come.

Before the eyes of the world, disarmament was made to appear a ridiculous idea. Did the US in the end only attack Iraq because it did not have, or no longer had, any weapons of mass destruction? This suspicion is strengthened by the fact that Washington has up until now been at pains to use diplomacy in its dealings with North Korea, a state that is openly using its nuclear programme as a threat. The USA's interpretation of the UN resolution 1441 and its abandonment of the constructive ambiguities of this resolution, which were intended – in combination with a military buildup – to ensure that a disarmament and inspection regime could function effectively, served to demonstrate that the UN is incapable of acting when world peace has to be secured. *Quod erat demonstrandum.*

Power was given priority over the law. The Europeans, divided among themselves and facing an America determined to go to war, failed in a variety of ways: Germany and France were unable to prevent the war, and the UK and Spain were unsuccessful in their attempts to get a second resolution passed by the Security Council that would have legalised military action. Almost all scholars who have analysed the situation have concluded that the threat posed by Saddam Hussein did not justify the war. The government of the Federal Republic

also took this view. The reason for the opposition to the war in Germany was not just the fact that, as Chancellor Schröder put it, „we have problems with the military“ because of our history. To be sure, the US’s experience of war differs from the European experience; Europe destroyed itself in two world wars. But even within Europe, there are a variety of different views about the legitimacy of using military force. This is one reason why it is difficult to formulate a joint foreign and security policy. However, there is nothing to be said in favour of the idea of a division of labour, in which the US fights wars and the Europeans clear up the mess afterwards – especially if this is seen as tacit acceptance of the use of force. In the aftermath of the Iraq war, there is even less reason to support this idea.

### **Security must be defined politically**

In the case of Iraq, a war was stage-managed and waged on the basis of shifting justifications and without any legitimation in international law; we cannot allow this to happen again. What is needed is a fundamental and forthright debate about conceptions of world order. How do we assess the non-military and military threats that make up the dark side of globalisation? Which concepts and instruments are appropriate as ways of dealing with these threats? To pose these questions is not to be anti-American, and this is not an attempt to form a new axis; however, it is not advisable to take decisions with fear as our guide. If the leading western power has decided to abandon a historical achievement such as the outlawing of wars of aggression, European and other states have the right and the duty, in their own interests, to resist this policy and to continue to adhere to the principles which, for good reasons, were laid down by the American founding fathers of the UN.

The return of war as an everyday instrument of policy will create a new arms dynamic as others follow the bad example that has been set. Anyone who relies on a primarily military definition of power and security will make it more difficult, both intellectually and materially, to pursue civil conflict prevention and regulation. A militarisation of interstate relations and of conditions within societies endangers the credibility of democracy and the defence of human rights. If the leading western power declares military security to be its most effective public export (Barnett), then the OECD world, which is made strong and simultaneously vulnerable by its own openness and interdependence, will be the loser in the long run.

It is not only the Europeans who are now facing a new situation as a result of the change of US strategy. Many other countries are also profoundly shocked. There is enough evidence suggesting that the change will be a lasting one; on the other hand, making predictions is a risky business. Can we rule out the possibility that the US might return within

a few years to a more cooperative policy? Any form of dominance and hegemony produces its own forms of resistance. Attempts may be made by Russia or China, perhaps by India or by Latin American states, to redefine their position in world politics; unipolarity will not necessarily last for ever. In what follows, we restrict ourselves to political options available in the European context.

## **2. The Challenge for Europe**

### **The alternative: cooperation instead of confrontation**

Europe is still ill-prepared to play an autonomous global role; this applies equally to the national governments, to public opinion, and to think tanks. For many decades, the West Europeans got used to pressing ahead with their own integration in the shadow of the two great powers and of nuclear deterrence. There was hardly any need to develop an independent policy on world order or a peace order. Things have changed since 1989-90. There were already some transatlantic tensions during the 1990s, but now they have become unusually sharp. How will the Europeans react to the new situation? Are they prepared to develop their own policy, and are they capable of doing so? What will it look like? They could at least make a start by ceasing to ask what the Americans will do, and asking instead what actually needs to be done.

The foreign policy of the EU states relies on multilateralism, international treaties, international law, relinquishing sovereignty, and the effects of their own economic attractiveness. Europeans were forced to re-think their foreign policy fundamentally as a result of the destructive history of two world wars, defeats in their colonies, and finally the bloc confrontation. The EU prefers cooperation to confrontation, and „soft power“ is undoubtedly the Union's strength. However, this is not the result of cowardice (as American anti-Europeanism assumes); it has come about because the Europeans' experiences of constructing the EU, of detente, of the CSCE/OSCE and the Council of Europe, and of development cooperation with the African, Caribbean, and Pacific states have been positive. All the same, the EU has still not managed to develop its cooperation in the sphere of foreign policy to the point where it would become a coherent, common foreign policy as such. Foreign and security policy continue to be conducted by the individual member states. Attempts to reach agreement on a common political line in this area are a laborious and

prolonged business, and because of the states' national interests they are frequently unsuccessful.

The EU is a civil rather than a military power. Nevertheless, it would be an oversimplification to say that the EU is striving for a multilateral world order while the USA indulges in isolationist unilateralism. Both Europeans and Americans have benefited from the transatlantic model of order. The secret of the long, successful period of American hegemony after 1945 was the USA's capacity to pursue its own interests within the framework of an alliance and a multilateral network. Both sides found that cooperation and multilateralism were worth it. What is making the Europeans feel insecure in the present situation is the fact that the USA's new security strategy is placing in question this central aspect of transatlantic relations.

The EU is currently in the middle of a historic phase of expansion. The divisions that emerged during the period of diplomatic tug-of-war in the months leading up to the Iraq war were not really a matter of „old“ versus „new“ Europe. For the moment, a common foreign and security policy exists only on paper, and the Union as a security policy actor is no more than a pipe-dream. It may be that the differences of opinion over relations with the USA will become sharper, and one cannot rule out the possibility that the integration process may come to a halt. On the other hand, we saw during the Iraq crisis, for the first time in relation to a matter of life and death, the first signs of public opinion discussing an issue on a Europe-wide basis. For this reason, the crisis could also have enhanced an awareness of the need to formulate a genuinely European position.

### **The idea of challenging the power of the USA is an illusion**

Up until now there has been little sign of any determination to develop such a position. As we saw in the case of Iraq: as soon as Washington acts decisively on its own, thus challenging the European vision of international cooperation, the fragility of this vision is revealed. More is at stake here than a choice between unquestioning loyalty and self-assertion on the part of Europe. The idea that Europe could act as a military counterweight able to challenge the USA is an illusion; European foreign and security policy has no future as an anti-American project. Any attempt to keep the transatlantic partner in check, so to speak to shackle Gulliver, would be too much for Europe.

The alternative course of action would involve accepting the fact that a power imbalance exists, and using this as the starting-point of a realistic programme designed to strengthen European multilateralism. In many policy fields, this programme would still be a

transatlantic project. International law, which came into existence in Europe, rests on the mutual recognition of the sovereignty and equality of states. It is America's historically unprecedented power that has now undermined this principle. Europe can use its own example, the power of political persuasion, and its economic influence as a way of putting forward its own vision of law and global cooperation, but there is no point trying to challenge US military power.

### **Global cooperation for comprehensive human security**

Some of the most important decisions on the future direction of world politics are taken in the form of outcomes negotiated in the major international organisations – the UN, the IMF, the World Bank, the WTO, and others. European interests can only be effectively put forward and advanced in these fora if they are presented as joint EU positions. This can mean opposing the USA if Europe's interests differ. Drawing up international agreements and regulations has always been the right thing to do even if some states do not, for the time being at least, want to participate. Even though the search for global solutions is made more difficult if some parties do not wish to join in, the principles and institutions of international cooperation are still strengthened. The 1997 International Landmine Convention, which has now been signed by more than 130 states, is an encouraging example of this, and the International Criminal Court is another.

There can be no doubt that global problems like climate change, poverty, and infectious diseases can only be effectively dealt with if there is international cooperation. This is also true of the threat of transnational terrorism. The broad anti-terror alliance that came into existence after September 11, and which has – thanks to intensified cross-border cooperation between police forces and secret services – succeeded in arresting numerous terrorists and weakening their networks, confirms this. In recent years we have drawn attention to the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe as a good example of cooperation between donor states, UN bodies, and numerous NGOs. The same multilateral approach is being applied to Afghanistan, in the shape of reform of the security sector, the reconstruction of the police, justice, education, and healthcare systems, and other measures. Germany is playing a significant and widely appreciated role here, which must be extended and provided with stronger financial backing.

Like many other post-conflict situations, Afghanistan confirms the dilemma and the necessity of developing a more comprehensive understanding of human security: all risks that could impair life chances and prospects of development must be treated as of equal

importance. This includes protection against physical threats. However, continuing military operations in crisis regions frequently hinder or even work against civil reconstruction, and make it more difficult to address global problems successfully. The use of force is of limited utility as an instrument for dealing with most threats to human security, including transnational terrorism.

### **Respect for international law and an intelligent sanctions policy**

The basic norm of currently valid international law is the renunciation of war as an instrument of policy. Any party which fails to respect this prohibition on the use of force undermines the international legal order as a whole. This is why it is so important to state that the military action against Iraq was a breach of international law. All states should now do whatever is in their power to ensure that Article 2, Paragraph 4 of the UN Charter is once again complied with. The UN has regulations and procedures which make it possible to use force, legally and in a controlled manner, against breaches of the law and threats which necessitate such measures. However, we do not wish to deny that the difficulties associated with using force – where necessary – to enforce international law in cases of major infringements of human rights constitute one of the Achilles heels of the vision of non-violent global cooperation.

The discussion about the further development of the rules and institutions of international law has begun. Europe's experience has taught it that after centuries of warlike relations, it was possible for a peace order to come into being and for this then to be expanded through a persistent detente policy; this should remain a central element of any future transnational politics (*Weltinnenpolitik*). In regional terms, enhancing the status of the OSCE and the Council of Europe would be an appropriate way of strengthening civil conflict regulation and so of restricting the potential for violence.

At the global level, the EU could press for more effective use of the international jurisdiction provided for in Chapter XIV of the UN Charter. In addition, there are ways in which the status of individuals in international law could be strengthened by broadening the procedure on individual complaints in the framework of the international agreement on economic, social, and cultural rights (the social pact), by improving the standing of NGOs in international law, and by supporting initiatives for a UN convention designed to set standards for the political responsibility of companies.

The instruments of multilateral sanctions policy should also be developed further in order to place restraints on the resort to force. An intensified use of „smart sanctions“ must be

the priority here. Financial sanctions, because they can be targeted more effectively, are more likely to be successful than general trade embargos. As we argued repeatedly in the case of Iraq, general embargos have devastating effects on the population without affecting the rulers, and may even strengthen the position of the leadership. This is an area where Germany, which has among others things done important pioneering work in the shape of the Bonn-Berlin process, could use EU fora to press for the strengthening of the relevant UN bodies so that they have a greater capacity to provide analysis and guidance. In this way, better targeted and more effective sanctions could be imposed and it would be easier to monitor them.

### **Just defence and securing peace, or something more?**

The EU foreign ministries have taken the right decision in resolving to draw up a European security strategy. If this decision is to do anything more than distract attention from the current quarrels over Iraq, it will have to lead from a sober analysis of the factors that endanger Europe's security to considered answers to the question of how the various challenges can most effectively be met. The German President Johannes Rau recently stressed a point peace researchers have been making for years: a public debate about the role and tasks of the armed forces, with democratic legitimation as its goal, is overdue. The new German guidelines on defence policy should serve as the occasion for this debate. A realistic assessment of requirements and the clarification of goals and means are indispensable if a European security and defence policy, about which we hear so much, is to be provided with a solid foundation. At present neither of these things are being done. The drawing up of a common political project is being hindered by definitions of national interest. Not all European states share the view that the only purposes for which armed forces can justifiably be employed are territorial defence and securing peace on the basis of, and at the behest of, the international community of law. As a consequence, any future joint action by Europe will be limited to cases in which there is agreement on this minimum consensus.

Most of the projects initiated by the heads of government of four EU states at the end of April, 2003 are in accordance with these ideas and are steps in the right direction. Common NBC measures to protect the civilian population, the programme to provide immediate help within 24 hours in case of disasters, the air transport command, and the joint training centre of the crews of transport planes and helicopters; all of these initiatives, by concentrating resources, help to save money and fit well into the concept of an EU reaction force, which is now being set up. If the Union sticks to what it has said so far, the tasks of this force will involve crisis prevention and peace consolidation in areas close to Europe. It will not, unlike

the Response Force announced by NATO in November 2002, be responsible for worldwide offensive operations against hostile powers.

The favourite themes of neoconservative threat analysts – transnational terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and disintegrating states – have also arrived in the German security debate. But there can surely be no doubt that each of these risk factors can be more effectively combated with the help of instruments deployed by the police, intelligence services, arms control, or development policy than by means of armed intervention.

Neither the old nor the new arguments to the effect that the new threats mean EU states must dramatically increase their military capabilities are convincing. It is not true that the EU has too few armed forces, nor is its military spending too low. It is only by comparison with their transatlantic alliance partner that the EU states are a military dwarf. Measured against all the others they are, with the 160 billion euros they spend on defence and their 1.8 million soldiers, a giant. Limitations imposed on arms and equipment by financial restrictions have the advantage that they will force the EU states in future to think in a more European way and to concentrate their efforts where they are most needed.

In April 2003, the EU took over from NATO the stabilisation mission in Macedonia. In January, the European Union Police Mission had already replaced the UN's police contingent in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Both of these missions are being conducted on the basis of treaties and in agreement with the governments of the countries where they are stationed. It is now planned that the EU should take over responsibility for SFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina. These are examples of useful engagement to secure consolidation processes in countries that have been affected by civil wars. None of these missions requires new military capabilities, more offensive weaponry, or increases in defence budgets. With the same goals in mind, the idea of a mobile, rapidly mobilisable peace force under the control of the UN General Secretary should be taken up again in the medium term.

### **Nonproliferation must be taken seriously**

For the time being there is quite enough to be done securing peace in the important field of arms control and disarmament of weapons of mass destruction. The Federal Republic has already done more to further the cause of nonproliferation than some of its European neighbours. There is an urgent need to launch new initiatives in the run-up to the review conference on the Nonproliferation Treaty in 2005. Existing elements of the regime such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and export controls must be strengthened. The measures on the destruction of stockpiles adopted last year in Canada are inadequate, and

the German government can do more here as well. There is a particular need for new initiatives on restrictions and arms control in the area of biological weapons. This will be difficult, because the USA is blocking the adoption of verification „at equal eye level“, but compromise solutions must be found. For example, suspicion inspections could be given more weight in relation to routine inspections, and restrictions on the production and proliferation of know-how could be tightened.

### **3. Soft Power and Conflict Regulation: Peace Requires Justice**

#### **The export of European stability: the Balkans and Turkey**

The Stability Pact for Southeast Europe, help with the construction of a civilian administration in Kosovo, and robust diplomacy towards the Confederation of Serbia and Montenegro can be considered successes in the attempt to bring peace to the Balkans. One of the strengths of the EU's foreign policy lies in the fact that the Union can throw its economic and political attractiveness into the scales as a way of pacifying nationalism and nationality conflicts. This is why the enlargement of the EU as more East European countries join is rightly considered a good example of the sustained export of stability. Stability can be secured by strengthening economies and intensifying trade relations, but also through persistent efforts to consolidate states, for example by providing support for the reform of the security sector and the police, and by helping to promote democratic structures and mutual monitoring to ensure that human and minority rights are respected.

The same applies to the EU's political dialogue with Turkey. The strategy of conditional enlargement has demonstrably contributed to a reduction of tension in the Greek-Turkish regional conflict in the Aegean, and to progress towards a settlement with the Kurds. There is even reason to hope that the division of Cyprus, which has lasted since 1974, can be overcome in the foreseeable future. If Turkey were to join the EU a state of central geopolitical importance would be firmly anchored in the West, and Turkey's model status as an Islamic country with a democratic and laicistic state form would be strengthened. However, this example makes very clear the strains that appear whenever new members join the EU: enlargement increases the risk of institutional paralysis or even splits in the Union. The prospect of Turkish membership is frequently seen as a nightmare vision as leading conservative commentators perceive a threat to European identity. Suddenly religious borders are being drawn, cultural exclusionism is triumphant, and the Christian West is mobilised

against the Orient and Islam. But the EU has always demanded that candidates for membership should protect religious and cultural freedoms as universal human rights; if the Union felt it was unable to accept a predominantly Muslim country as a member it would discredit its own civilisational norms. And in any case, Muslims and Christians have lived side by side in Europe for years.

### **Crisis prevention in Africa**

If we turn our attention to the conflict regions in Africa, demands for a more coherently peace-oriented foreign policy are even more justified. Since the mid-1990s the EU has made Africa, especially the Great Lakes region, one of its main priorities in crisis prevention. Via its support for regional organizations such as SADC and ECOWAS, the EU is helping the African states to settle both their societal and their interstate conflicts, peacefully and with their own resources. It has also provided financial and diplomatic support for the peace process in the Congo, and in particular for the process of dialogue within the country. The EU states are an important partner for Africa in the field of development cooperation. German support for NEPAD, the African development initiative, must be extended. Political dialogue contributes to democratisation and improvements in the human rights situation. Sometimes such negotiations need to be conducted out of the public eye in order to be successful.

These partial successes show that the EU is able to use its soft power to act in this field, but the Union's influence remains limited. One reason for this is the fact that some former colonial powers, such as the UK and France, have preferred to conduct bilateral relations with African states rather than to pursue a concerted European policy in the CFSP framework. In addition, in the case of the wars in the Congo where neighbouring states were involved, the EU's sanctions policy towards actors not interested in a peaceful solution was contradictory, unpredictable, and thus not very credible. Europe's chances of exercising influence were therefore weakened, and this confusion diminished the prospects of success of the political dialogue and the diplomatic efforts of the special representative, Aldo Ajello. This makes it all the more important that the EU states should now actively support in the UN Security Council Kofi Annan's proposal to send UN peacekeepers to the northeast Congo in order to avert the danger of genocide.

In the Congo, and also in Angola and West Africa, war economies have become established which finance themselves from the illegal trade in raw materials, for example „blood diamonds“. The EU's support for the Kimberley process, by which the sources from

which diamonds originate are certified, is to be welcomed. This process is designed to disrupt the illegal trade and to dry up the flows keeping these civil war economies going. The UN recently publicly identified the trade routes and also the individuals and firms involved in the trade in minerals from the Congo, so the EU states are now in a better position to carry out intensive checks to identify foreign trade in such raw materials and so to stop the financial transfers that sustain the civil war economies. However, these measures must be accompanied by closer financial and technical cooperation, so that the Congo and other affected states can rebuild their national economies. The necessary measures should be coordinated by the EU, and the assistance offered to African countries should be made subject to conditions. This is needed to prevent new economic and trade structures serving no purpose beyond the enrichment of elites which treat the state and its resources as their private fiefdom. Up until now, average spending on foreign aid in Europe has been about three times higher than the USA's 0.1 percent of GNP. If the USA now wants to double the money it spends on development cooperation, the Europeans should treat this step as a confirmation of their position and an incentive to increase their own spending, which should be seen as an investment in the future.

### **Help with the creation of a Palestinian state**

Twelve years after the 1991 Madrid Middle East conference, it is time to draw the correct conclusions from the failure of that initial attempt to make peace in the region. If this is not done, the same thing is likely to happen with the „road map“, which the Middle East Quartet (UN, EU, USA, and Russia) want to use to make another attempt in the aftermath of the 2003 Iraq war.

Neither the USA nor the EU was able to persuade the parties to the conflict to abandon their incompatible objectives. The USA was not prepared to use the possibilities of influence open to it as military guarantor of Israel's security in order to exert genuine political pressure. The EU's plan, to appeal to the Palestinians to push ahead with the peace process on the basis of an improvement in their standard of living, came to nothing because of the continuing confrontation and the decline of the Palestinian economy.

The advantage of the road map is that it makes the goal of the process perfectly clear: an independent, democratic, and viable Palestinian state. Both sides will have to make their contribution to a step-by-step movement towards this goal. The Palestinian leadership has to establish an effective monopoly of force, and Israel has to stop building settlements and withdraw its armed forces from the cities of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The Quartet

wants to reach consensus on whether the conflict parties have done what is required of them. However, no sanctions mechanism is envisaged. The road map presupposes the goodwill of two parties, neither of which has any faith at all in the goodwill of the other side. This could be the fatal flaw in the plan; as in the earlier Oslo process, there is no authority able and determined to penalise the parties for failing to live up to the commitments they have taken on.

This new start requires the opposing sides to break out of the circle of violence in which they are trapped. If Israel is so afraid of a security vacuum in the Palestinian territories that it is prepared to continue its war against the armed resistance groups with the same harshness it has used up until now, then other forces must be prepared to fill this vacuum. One remedy could be international guarantees backed up by a multinational force on the ground. The same logic suggests that establishing a temporary international protectorate would be a good idea. Europe cannot do this on its own. But why should not the EU suggest that it could, along with other states belonging to the Quartet, replace the Israeli army in the occupied territories? Someone must eventually give the Palestinians a chance to set up a political entity that Israel can accept as a partner.

However, an international armed force should not allow itself to be instrumentalised to confer permanent legitimacy on a provisional arrangement giving the Palestinians 40 percent of the occupied territories (this amounts to 9 percent of Palestine under the British mandate). The EU recognises the 1967 Green Line, the ceasefire line up until the Six-Day War, as the basis of a border between Israel and a Palestinian state. It should stick to this position. Without the central idea of a just peace, security that has been imposed will always be threatened by renewed violence.

### **A new opportunity for demilitarisation in the Middle East?**

There are many reasons why the broader Middle East region poses a particular challenge in the context of the search for cooperative conflict solutions in this part of the world. European colonialism has left its mark on the region. Tradition and modernity, western and Arabic-Islamic understandings of culture and politics clash with one another here, and authoritarian regimes stand in the way of democracy and development. Threats of violence, its actual use, and blatant infringements of human rights are all part of everyday life. There is hardly any other region of the world which has imported so many weapons in recent years, including the know-how and the production facilities required to make weapons of mass destruction.

We have no way of knowing what effect the war against Iraq will have on the long-term search for ways of pacifying conflicts in the region. The postwar order in Iraq itself is not the only factor involved here. The new situation also presents us with an opportunity to think again about the whole complex of issues of security and demilitarisation in a comprehensive regional framework. One useful point of reference is UN Resolution 687 from 1991, which explicitly stated that the measures to be taken were seen as steps towards the goal of the creation of a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction and of all delivery vehicles for these weapons. In the context of the 1991 Madrid conference, these and other multilateral ideas designed to pave the way for confidence building and arms control were given a more concrete form and the Arab states, Palestinians, and Israelis were brought into the equation. However, after the failure of the Oslo process they were abandoned again. Germany should, in the EU framework, insist that this goal (which is not part of the „road map“ itself) should be given expression in concrete new policy initiatives. The German government should also use its good relations with Iran, one of the critical candidates for nuclear proliferation, to stress the need for the Iranian side to make public or discontinue all relevant activities and to cooperate fully with the IAEA.

We consider that these initiatives would serve to demonstrate the importance of a return to a cooperative understanding of security. The true path to arms control and disarmament is the path of dialogue, treaties, and the implementation of agreed regimes, not the path of selective military interventions.

### **The need for democratisation in the Arab world**

At the end of 2002, the UN Development Programme published the *Arab Human Development Report 2002*. This document analyses the modernisation crisis and the enormous development problems in the Arab states. Although it neglects the differences between individual countries, the overall picture painted by the report pulls no punches and contains some surprises. Contrary to widely-held beliefs about fabulous oil wealth, the GNP in 1999 of all 22 Arab states together was lower than that of Spain. Average income per capita has not risen since 1975. In 1981 China's economy was only half the size of the Arab countries', but today China's production is double that of the Arab states. Their levels of technology and education are below those of many developing countries; only 0.6 percent of the population have access to the internet.

The report identifies three decisive obstacles to development: the absence of individual freedoms, discrimination against women, and inadequate systems of education. Freedom and

political participation are not only values in their own right, but also fundamental prerequisites of modernisation and dynamic development. Authoritarian regimes throughout the region suppress all opposition and show no respect for human rights. The media and the universities are, if they are not under the control of religious leaders, steered by the state. For this reason, the existence in Qatar of the independent television station al-Jazeera, with its critical reporting and genuine political debates, is tantamount to a revolution.

The myth that Islam as such is incompatible with democracy is a piece of mistaken, outdated colonial arrogance. But even those who reject regime change *manu militari* must find better ways to press for human rights, freedom of opinion, and the rule of law, in the Arab world as well, than have been employed up until now. This applies both to the community of states and to many social actors. For much too long, we have supported stability at all costs in preference to human rights and freedom in the region with the world's largest oil reserves. Many people in Islamic countries are disappointed with the West, not because they are scornful of its values but because they no longer believe that we are sincere when we hold up these values in our dealings with them.

The threat posed by transnational terrorism has brought to light the connection between authoritarian regimes and radical Islamist movements which are prepared to use violence. This is what makes the demand for the opening up of the political process, participation, and the separation of powers (in other words, democratisation) so urgent. A public sphere, freedom of opinion, and legal rights guaranteed by the constitution are the fundamental preconditions of an emancipatory development in the Arab world, just as they are everywhere. We therefore wish to underline a point we made last year: there is a need for strategies which will enable moderate Islamists to express their views and to participate in politics, and which will ensure that hardliners too are able to speak out politically.

### **Iraq: the sanctions must be lifted and reconstruction should receive international support**

Precisely because we opposed the war against Iraq, we must now do what we can to restore the unity of political morality and humane principles. This implies a differentiated approach to the reconstruction of Iraq: immediate humanitarian assistance without any preconditions; help with the reconstruction of vital infrastructure (water, sanitation facilities, education, etc.) if there is a UN mandate for the coordination of external aid (World Bank, UNDP, etc.); more extensive support only for an internationally accepted transitional

government. Much will depend on the concrete contents of resolutions passed in the UN framework.

With the exception of the arms embargo, the sanctions should be lifted. The complete embargo on trade and financial ties was originally imposed to help drive the Iraqi army out of Kuwait, and it was then retained in order to force the Baghdad leadership to give up its weapons of mass destruction. The embargo should have been lifted in 1997 at the latest, when the UN inspectors reported that they had found no more serious infringements of the provisions on disarmament. We have in previous editions of this *Friedensgutachten* repeatedly said that hundreds of thousands of Iraqi children have died as a result of the economic embargo.

After decades of despotic rule, three wars, and twelve years of economic strangulation the population of Iraq must finally be given the right to dispose of its own natural resources. There is no other way the long-suffering country can be reconstructed. The invading states should not be allowed to use their present powerful position in order to reimburse themselves out of income derived from Iraqi oil for their war and occupation costs.

There can be no doubt that successful nation-building in Iraq will require greater efforts than have been needed in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. The USA cannot do this on its own. We must also warn against unrealistic expectations that the second-largest oil reserves in the world will make it easy to finance the reconstruction of the country. Iraq is deeply in debt, the production facilities are technologically outdated, and because of the country's population explosion future oil exports will provide a much lower per capita income than during the decades of the Iraqi boom.

In view of religious and ethnic differences within Iraq, there is no guarantee that the country will continue to exist in future. However, its disintegration would have fatal consequences for the stability of the whole region. The experience of the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe and of the Petersberg Afghanistan conference demonstrates that reconstruction requires large-scale international support. Peacemaking needs a broader coalition than war. This means that the UN is the right framework for this process.

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