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# **The European Union Peacebuilding Approach: Governance and Practices of the Instrument for Stability**

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## Summary

Liberal peace represents a dominant paradigm of contemporary peacebuilding based on the principles of democratization and marketization. This approach is sustained by the assumption that states with strong political democratic institutions, which ensure political representation and a market economy, guarantee sustainable economic growth and provide basic public goods, are necessary conditions for establishing durable peace. Within this dominant approach, scholars have distinguished several gradations that place their emphasis on specific aspects. Therefore, several models can be distinguished within the liberal peace paradigm, in particular, the *conservative*, the *orthodox* and the *emancipatory* models, which prioritize, respectively, institutions of government and rule of law, democratic liberal governance, and welfare and social justice.

Within this paradigm the EU stance on peacebuilding and conflict management policy is difficult to categorize. The current EU peacebuilding approach is the result of evolving policy practices and not of a preconceived general policy. As a reaction to the international debates on peacebuilding, the EU adopted a mosaic of diverse documents on specific priorities that later were progressively incorporated into EU activities. At the same time, there is rather limited discussion of the very principles and objectives of the EU peacebuilding approach. Therefore, in order to discuss these questions and to assess EU peacebuilding policy, this report focuses on EU practices for dealing with conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Specifically, the report assesses, in the light of liberal peace modalities, the main patterns of EU peacebuilding practices pursued in the framework of the Instrument for Stability (IfS). This instrument was conceived as the Commission's response to the demands of the greater EU's involvement in conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities. With a budget of € 2 billion for the 2007-2013 period, the IfS permits the EU's engagement in crisis and conflict response as well as in tackling structural sources of security risk and threats throughout the world.

After four years of implementation, the IfS provides a very comprehensive view of the broad range of EU practices in the field of peacebuilding and crisis response. The framing of the IfS measures as well as the particular measures analyzed in this report reflect the EU consensus on conservative and orthodox models of liberal peace, emphasizing fundamental security challenges in post-conflict situations and the building of law and order institutions as well as political and economic problems and democratic governance institutions. There are very few measures of an emancipatory version of liberal peace characterized by transcendence of identity and sovereignty problems through contextual legitimacy and respect for local cultures. However, in view of the frequent failure of more traditional approaches to peacebuilding efforts and the planned renegotiation of the Instrument for Stability for the period 2014 to 2020, the report concludes that some proposals deriving from this variant of liberal peace should be seriously considered as a valid alternative or at least a supplement to existing EU approaches.

The report begins by introducing the central debates about liberal peacebuilding consensus and setting out the analytical criteria framing the assessment of current IfS peacebuilding practices. The third section of the report describes the main functional

characteristics of the Instrument for Stability, indicating the apparent consensus concerning a broad and comprehensive approach to peacebuilding. The fourth section analyses the governance practices observed during implementation of the IfS. The fifth section assesses qualitatively the use of the different tools offered by the Instrument for Stability, pointing out the main patterns of EU peacebuilding practices in light of various models of liberal peace practices. The sixth section presents the particular challenge of ensuring the appropriate institutional structures for the IfS within the European External Action Service. And finally, the last section concludes and sketches out various scenarios of the role of the IfS in the EU's peacebuilding and conflict prevention policy.

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## 1. Introduction<sup>1</sup>

The European Union has traditionally presented itself as a successful peace project that ensured the reconciliation and peaceful development of Western Europe during the Cold War and subsequent reintegration of divided Europe, bringing about stability and prosperity. The Treaty on European Union emphasized that one of the objectives of the Common Foreign and Security Policy was preserving peace and strengthening international security, while the Treaty establishing the European Community included the objectives of promoting democracy and the rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms as well as fostering the sustainable economic and social development of developing countries, their integration into the world economy and the campaign against poverty.

In view of this particular self-conception and legal mandate, in the last decade the EU has become very active in multiple crises and conflicts around the globe with the aim of conflict prevention and peacebuilding. A crucial contribution to the development of the EU's peacebuilding policy was the development of civilian and military crisis management capabilities and the deployment of an increasing number of missions under the umbrella of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The EU also developed a whole series of policy documents conceptualizing the principles, objectives and methods of addressing peacebuilding demands, and developed many policy tools employed under different conditions of conflict prevention and peacebuilding. This growth of EU conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities was exceptionally dynamic after the adoption of the Communication on Conflict Prevention (European Commission 2001) and the EU Programme on the Prevention of Violent Conflicts or so-called "Gothenburg Programme" (Council of the European Union 2001). In both cases scant attention was paid to outlining a general approach to peacebuilding and conflict prevention. The main concern was technocratic reflections and plans on institutional cooperation enhancing coherence and efficiency. Despite this neglect, it seems that the EU embraced a multidimensional and comprehensive approach to peacebuilding, with an emphasis on long-term and integrated prevention activities addressing root causes of conflict. In addition to these general policy guidelines, the EU also adopted a whole series of specific policy documents guiding its policies relevant to peacebuilding: electoral assistance and observation; governance and state institutions; governance of natural resources; children and gender issues in the context of conflicts; Small Arms and Light Weapons; Security Sector Reform; Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration; state fragility; security-development nexus; and mediation.

However, the multiplicity of policy documents adopted in the 2000s did not add to the momentum of constructing a comprehensive EU doctrine of peacebuilding. The evolution of the EU's understanding of peacebuilding took place in reaction to the

1 The author is grateful to the European External Action Service and European Commission officials as well as Members of the European Parliament that kindly agreed to be interviewed for the writing of this report and to several researchers of PRIF for their helpful comments and suggestions.

enlargement of the agenda of peacebuilding in the debates of the international community, especially at the United Nations. This absorption of external input was also geared by the experiences of the EU practices and by challenges faced on the ground. As a result, the EU approach to peacebuilding evolved into a myriad of practices and concepts that included such diverse types of activities as dialog and mediation (including preventive diplomacy), law enforcement and reform of the justice sector, tackling trans-regional and cross-border threats such as terrorism, illegal immigration, trafficking of drugs and arms and human trafficking, piracy, democratization, elections and electoral reform, human rights, security aspects of climate change, and governance of natural resources in conflict (Council of the European Union 2010a).

The increasing complexity and diversity of the EU's peacebuilding and conflict prevention activities as well as the changing international context led the EU to reflect on the progress in the implementation of the EU programme for prevention of violent conflicts. The aim was to prepare a "new, forward-looking document" assessing the implementation of the Gothenburg Programme and adapting EU conflict prevention policy to the establishment of the European External Action Service (Council of the European Union 2010b: 4). Similarly, some policy recommendations also called for preparation of a general EU peacebuilding strategy that would overcome conceptual diversity and institutional fragmentation (Major and Mölling 2010). However, in June 2011, the Council confirmed that the Gothenburg Programme "remains a valid policy basis for further European Union action in the field of conflict prevention". Due to the lack of political agreement on the future development of the EU peacebuilding and conflict prevention policy, the Council provided only modest recommendations emphasizing the continuation of existing policy (Council of the European Union 2011).

In view of this lack of a comprehensive and updated EU peacebuilding strategy and the dominant emphasis of institutional and technical aspects of EU peacebuilding activities, it is no wonder that there has been rather limited discussion of the very principles and objectives of the EU peacebuilding approach. What kind of peace-builder is the EU? What kind of peacebuilding approach does it promote? Is there a particular, distinctive EU approach to peacebuilding? How should the EU peacebuilding approach be placed in the context of debates about peacebuilding in the world? In order to discuss these questions and to assess EU peacebuilding policy, this report focuses on EU practices for dealing with conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Specifically, the report assesses the main patterns of EU peacebuilding practices pursued in the framework of the Instrument for Stability (IfS) in light of debates over the strengths and shortcomings of the so-called liberal peace consensus.

The Instrument for Stability was established in 2006 as a continuation of the Rapid Reaction Mechanism (created in 2001) and formed part of a package of new instruments of EU external action to be implemented during the Financial Perspectives 2007-2013.<sup>2</sup>

2 The regulation establishing the Instrument for Stability was approved unanimously by the Council of the European Union on 7 November 2006, and entered into force on 1 January 2007. Unless otherwise stated, article numbers in this report refer to the "Regulation (EC) No 1717/2006 of the European Parliament and



Despite its employment since the beginning of 2007, the IfS is still hardly mentioned in public debates as a relevant instrument of EU foreign policy. Similarly, with a few notable exceptions (Gänzle 2009; Hoffmeister 2008) academic literature has devoted rather scant attention to analysis of this instrument. This neglect is unfortunate for two basic reasons. First, the IfS is one of the few instruments dealing exclusively with crisis prevention and management and peacebuilding during different phases of conflict and, therefore, it provides a complete view of EU practices in this field. Second, the resources available in the framework of the IfS are considerable, e.g. its budget of € 2.068 billion is comparable with the EU's budget for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) (€ 1.980 billion).

The research for this report is based on in-depth analysis of primary source documents from three EU institutions: Council, Parliament and Commission. This desk phase of the study was accompanied by a series of anonymous interviews with EU officials and representatives involved in the implementation of IfS.

The next section of the report introduces the main debates about the liberal peacebuilding consensus and sets out the analytic criteria framing the assessment of EU peacebuilding practices. The third section of the report describes the main functional characteristics of the Instrument for Stability, drawing attention to the apparent consensus concerning a broad and comprehensive approach to peacebuilding. The fourth section analyzes the governance practices observed during the implementation of the IfS which confirm the overall consensus on the way the IfS has to be implemented. The fifth section assesses qualitatively the use of the different tools offered by the Instrument for Stability, pointing out the main patterns of EU peacebuilding practices in light of the different models of liberal peace practices. The sixth section presents the particular challenge of ensuring the appropriate institutional structures for the IfS within the European External Action Service. The final section of the study concludes and sketches out various scenarios in the debate about the IfS as a particularly important instrument of EU peacebuilding and conflict prevention policy.

## **2. The liberal peacebuilding approach: debates and models**

After the end of the Cold War, the international community intensified peacebuilding activities, understood generally as “external interventions that are intended to reduce the risk that a state will erupt into or return to war” (Barnett et al. 2006: 37). On the basis of this essential understanding of peacebuilding, there is broad scholarly agreement that the so-called liberal peacebuilding consensus based on the principles of democratization and marketization dominates contemporary thinking about the mode of ensuring peace in war-torn societies. The liberal approach to peacebuilding assumes that, in order to guarantee peace, a broad range of issues concerning social, economic and institutional

the Council of 15 November 2006 establishing an Instrument for Stability” (Official Journal of the European Union 2006).

needs should be addressed in building stable states. This approach is based on the straightforward assumption that states with strong political democratic institutions which ensure political representation and a market economy guarantee sustainable economic growth and provide basic public goods, are necessary conditions for establishing durable peace. Therefore, post-Cold War peacebuilding included a broad range of tasks and activities combining challenges of security, economic development, humanitarian assistance, and governance and rule of law (Newman et al. 2009: 8-9).

In addition to practical debates on the efficiency and effectiveness of peacebuilding around the world (Page Fortna and Morjé Howard 2008) there is normative awareness of the positive and negative consequences of liberal peacebuilding efforts. However, scholarly consensus on the liberal peace approach is observed in a widely shared assessment that its record and experiences are positive overall, with negligible criticism. Critical positions on liberal peace doctrine tend to emphasize the need for actions that would avoid shortcomings, disappointments and mistakes, rather than promote fully fledged alternative theories and approaches. It is argued that liberal peace simply did considerably more good than harm, saving millions of people from lawlessness, predation, disease and fear, while “hyper-critical” positions claiming that liberal peacebuilding is fundamentally destructive and illegitimate are simply exaggerated and unjustified (Paris 2010). Notwithstanding, critiques of liberal peace practices emphasized that liberal peacebuilding recurrently reveals three shortcomings: 1) failure to take into account domestic local conditions and appropriately engage local stakeholders in externally steered peacebuilding efforts; 2) tensions and contradictions between different objectives and instruments of peacebuilding as well as different practices of different international donors and agents present on the ground; and 3) a tendency to premature withdrawal from missions due to both insufficient commitment of resources and unclear criteria for assessing successes and failures of peacebuilding (Paris 2010: 347).

Bearing in mind these critical voices, the underlying tension in the liberal peace approach is between arguably universal liberal peace principles and the need to respect local communities’ cultures and values. Critical voices argue that universalistic assumptions of liberal peace doctrine – premised on standardized and technocratic templates of promoting liberal democracy, liberal human rights, market economy values, integration into globalization processes – frequently clash with the values and cultures of local stakeholders. This confrontation creates the perception of external imposition of alien models that do not respect local communities, diminishing the legitimacy of liberal peacebuilding efforts and provoking destabilization and return to conflict. However, the widely held belief is that these adverse and unintended consequences of liberal peacebuilding can be avoided when peacebuilding is context-aware and more sophisticated in critically assessing local needs. Consequently, this dichotomy between the universal and local is crucial when designing suitable strategies of engagement with third actors in the peacebuilding process.

This dispute focuses on the differences between “external” and “top-down” imposition of peacebuilding solutions and engagement with elites and state institutions of third states, and “bottom-up” engagement in local community-driven peacebuilding activities,

with the latter remaining sensitive to local stakeholders and their everyday practices and experiences (Richmond 2009, 2010a). It is argued that the choice between top-down and bottom-up engagements may be crucial for the effectiveness and sustainability of peacebuilding efforts as well as for normative questions of legitimacy and appropriateness of peacebuilding endeavours from the perspective of locally held notions of justice. However, a tendency to synthesize both perspectives stresses the need for complementarity between top-down and grass-roots bottom-up initiatives in peacebuilding (Gawerc 2006; Mac Ginty 2008).

Richmond (2006) identified within liberal peace several models or generations of peacebuilding (Richmond 2010b, 2008). Each model of liberal peace emphasizes specific objectives, approaches and means of peacebuilding. A *conservative* model of liberal peace focuses on top-down approaches aimed at guaranteeing security and sovereignty as a basis for statebuilding where peace tends to be imposed by military forces and sustained by coercive conditionality and dependency measures. It concentrates on delivering security, considered a precondition for peace. In the *orthodox* model of liberal peace, although it is also dominated by top-down and state-centric attempts at building the institutions for a market-oriented and democratic state, there is, however, some understanding of local ownership and culture, visible in some bottom-up practices. In this model of peacebuilding elite-level negotiation predominates, but there is greater sensitivity to the inclusion of citizens in the peace process and more direct emphasis on local ownership and engagement with civil society. In this model, security and institutions guaranteeing order are considered to be necessary factors in bringing about lasting peace, but there is also awareness of the political and economic functions of state institutions. Finally, the *emancipatory* model of liberal peace aims at emancipation, transcendence of identity and sovereignty problems through contextual legitimacy with respect to local cultures, extending to the questions of social justice, human security and welfare. This approach is critical of universalistic liberal peace ambitions, as it is especially concerned with local ownership and critical of top-down coercive, conditionality and dependency strategies. It prioritizes a bottom-up approach focusing on the needs as well as rights of local communities, with the main concern being delivery of social welfare and justice. In this case, the peacebuilding process is shaped by private and social movements supported by external donors, but does not emphasize state structures (Richmond 2006: 300-301; Richmond 2009: 560-561). These different models of liberal peace might be combined in different contexts and might be present to different degrees depending upon the priorities and approaches of both external and domestic actors. The presence of each of the models may also depend on the specific phase of the conflict cycle. Table 1 presents a simplified overview of the differences between the three models of liberal peacebuilding, presenting the main elements that will serve as the guidelines for the analysis which follows.

**Table 1: Gradation of the liberal peace approach to peacebuilding**

	<b>Conservative</b>	<b>Orthodox</b>	<b>Emancipatory</b>
<b>Nature of peace</b>	Institutional peace	Constitutional peace	Civil peace
<b>Objective</b>	Liberal market-oriented states	Peace and liberal states	Just and durable peace
<b>In focus</b>	Order: institutions of government, rule of law, anti-terrorism	Democratic liberal governance: human rights, constitutionalism, private property	Justice: welfare and social justice, identity, rights and needs of civil society
<b>Approach and means</b>	Exclusive, top-down activities; coercive, conditionality, dependence; international transitional administration	Exclusive and inclusive; Mix of top-down (dominant) and bottom up activities; cooperative custodianship with consent and local ownership; consensual negotiations at the elite level	Inclusive, bottom-up participation; local participation and integration
<b>Rights and needs in focus</b>	Security	Political and material	Socio-cultural
<b>Sources of insecurity in focus</b>	Armed violence	Political and economic violence	Social violence
<b>Beneficiaries in focus</b>	State elites	State elites and some organized civil society	Civil society and local groups; society in general

*Sources: Prepared by author on the basis of Richmond et al. (2011), Richmond (2006), Heathershaw (2008).*

Within this framework, reflecting the liberal peace consensus, there are pronounced differences in particular approaches to peacebuilding in the practices of international donors and agencies (Barnett et al. 2006). Therefore, bearing in mind this diversity, it is of the utmost importance to scrutinize critically EU peacebuilding efforts in the light of the above-mentioned debates. In general terms, EU peacebuilding practices resemble the general principles of liberal peacebuilding. As argued by Richmond et al. (2011), the EU

peacebuilding framework places itself between the orthodox liberal peacebuilding and emancipatory frameworks. There is tension in EU peacebuilding practices between the global peacebuilding approach that focuses on statebuilding practices, and the approach that emphasizes a contextual and a locally sensitive form of peacebuilding. On the one hand, the EU emphasizes the objectives of promoting classic liberal priorities providing security, democratic values and market principles through the institution of the Westphalian sovereign state. On the other hand, multiple EU actors are aware of the need to take into account the complexity of contexts requiring respect for identities, cultures, customs, rights and needs tailored to localized understanding of them and sustaining the values of just peace.

This report approaches the analysis of IfS practices taking into account the three models of liberal peacebuilding: conservative, orthodox and emancipatory. The analysis of this instrument of EU external actions is undertaken on the basis of questions and criteria that determine which of the models is pursued by the EU in practice. The analysis of IfS practices will focus on the following benchmarks:

1. What are the main concerns addressed? (institutions of government and the security sector; democratic governance and market institutions; social justice and social welfare)
2. How are the practices of statebuilding of democratic and market institutions connected and planned (exclusive top-down, blended exclusive-inclusive top-down and bottom-up, inclusive bottom-up practices)?
3. What needs and rights are addressed in the first place (security, political and economic, socio-cultural)?
4. What sources of insecurity are tackled in the first place (armed violence, political violence, economic conditions, and social violence)?
5. What social groups are the main beneficiaries/stakeholders of the measures funded by the IfS (state elites and institutions, state elites and organized civil society, large societal groups)?

### **3. The Instrument for Stability: An all-inclusive liberal peace mandate?**

There are different categories that can be used in order to describe the phase of the crisis/conflict or the preventive action and strategies and tools used. Basically, conflict prevention measures can be divided into structural measures and operational measures; *structural* measures address root causes of a given conflict before and after the eruption of conflict; *operational* measures are undertaken in cases when violence seems imminent or has already broken out (Dahl Thruelsen 2008). The IfS regulations attempt to tackle challenges in different phases of the crisis/conflict cycle as well as issues related to broad security challenges throughout the world. However, this seemingly broad scope of the IfS regulation is limited by its supplementary and subsidiary character vis-à-vis other

external action instruments the EU uses in long-term efforts to tackle the root causes of conflicts. In the first place, it is underlined that the aim of IfS crisis response measures is to guarantee the conditions for implementation of EU development and cooperation policies (Article 1.2(a)). Additionally, all measures adopted within the IfS can be employed only when other geographic and thematic instruments of external assistance cannot be provided, and they have to be consistent with the strategic framework of assistance for partner countries and the objectives of other assistance instruments (Article 2.1 and 2.2). In the second place, the regulation establishes that the measures should be “complementary to, and shall be consistent with, and without prejudice to, measures adopted under Title V and Title VI of the EU Treaty” (Article 1.3), hence CFSP and Justice, Freedom and Security areas. This emphasis and the negotiation of the regulation reveal that the EU peacebuilding and crisis response strategy also places great emphasis on long-term assistance addressing possible root causes of conflict (social or economic imbalances, lack of democratic legitimacy, etc.) and the Instrument for Stability does not reflect the approach of EU peacebuilding in all its dimensions and phases. Within this restricted framework, the IfS is not considered to be a unique instrument for dealing with peacebuilding and crisis response, but rather an exception to be used in extraordinary cases. However, the IfS can be considered an expression of intentions concerning how the EU understands the scope of its contribution to peacebuilding efforts worldwide with reference to specific crisis response situations as well as structural challenges to security.

In order to tackle these issues, the IfS establishes two separate components: 1) short-term measures in response to situations of crisis or emerging crisis; and 2) long-term measures in the context of stable conditions for cooperation. Each component includes a broad mandate allowing different activities that might be undertaken within the IfS. It can be argued that the scope of IfS regulation reflects mainly conservative and orthodox models of liberal peace, emphasizing a top-down approach to security problems to be tackled by state institutions. The inclusion of some discourse on civil society and local ownership takes place within a broad consensus on conservative/orthodox models of liberal peace existing in the IfS.

The short-term component of the IfS is designed to respond to crises or emerging crises beyond EU borders. However, due to the diverse and unpredictable nature of the crisis situations and topics to be addressed, the EU defined them broadly and quite flexibly, reflecting awareness of both third states’ stability and security as well as the well-being of their citizens. According to the IfS Regulations, the characteristics of situations in response to which short-term assistance might be provided are: 1) a situation of urgency, crisis or emerging crisis; 2) a situation posing a threat to democracy, law and order, the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, or the security and safety of individuals; 3) a situation threatening to escalate into armed conflict or to severely destabilize the third country or countries concerned; and 4) a situation where the Community has invoked the essential clauses of international Agreements in order to suspend, partially or totally, cooperation with a third country (Article 3.1). However, sixteen specific thematic areas of IfS intervention restrict this flexibility, since the focus is on state security and state institutions, while issues concerning democratic governance or bottom-up empowerment of civil society are comparatively less pronounced (Table 2).

**Table 2: Priorities of short-term measures – Article 3**

<b>Conservative</b>	<b>Orthodox</b>	<b>Emancipatory</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Interim administration</li> <li>- Law and order institutions, especially control of security system</li> <li>- Illicit use of firearms</li> <li>- Anti-personal landmines, unexploded ordnance or explosive remnants of war</li> <li>- Demobilization and reintegration of former combatants (child soldiers and female combatants)</li> <li>- Restructuring of the armed forces</li> <li>- Response to natural and man-made disasters and threats to public health</li> <li>- Rehabilitation and reconstruction of key infrastructure</li> <li>- Access and management of natural resources</li> <li>- Sudden population movements</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Democratic and pluralistic state institutions, independent judiciary, and good governance</li> <li>- Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, democracy and the rule of law</li> <li>- Transitional justice</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Promotion of confidence-building, mediation, dialogue and reconciliation</li> <li>- Development and organization of civil society (including role of women and independent media)</li> <li>- Specific needs of women and children (including gender-based violence)</li> <li>- Rehabilitation and reintegration of victims of armed conflict</li> </ul>

*Source: Prepared by author.*

While the short-term measures prioritized security and state institutions issues in response to crisis, the aim of the long-term component was to “help build capacity both to address specific global and trans-regional threats having a destabilising effect and to ensure preparedness to address pre- and post-crisis situations” (Art. 1.2(b)). Similarly, the conservative liberal peace approach dominates in this capacity-building component, strongly emphasizing security challenges and the need to build states’ capacities in order to contend with such challenges. Especially, the priorities of threats to law and order, the security and safety of individuals, threats to critical infrastructure and to public health as well as risk mitigation and preparedness relating to chemical, biological, radiological and

nuclear (CBRN) materials or agents concentrate on the aspects that directly touch questions of building institutional capabilities. But even the third so-called Partnership for Peace component including issues concerning, among others, confidence-building, mediation and reconciliation components focuses on building capacity of international organizations, states and non-state actors, thus framing this question in terms of a top-down approach characteristic of the orthodox model of liberal peace (Table 3).

**Table 3: Priorities of long-term measures – Article 4**

<b>Name</b>	<b>Beneficiaries</b>	<b>Topics addressed</b>
Trans-national security threats (Article 4.1)	Law enforcement, judicial and civil authorities	Terrorism, organized crime, illicit trafficking of people, drugs, firearms and explosive materials and other illegal trade and transit issues, threats to international transport and energy critical infrastructure, major threats to public health.
Proliferation of CBRN (Article 4.2)	Institutions and infrastructure sensitive for CBRN; civilian control and crisis response authorities	Civilian research, safety practices in civilian facilities, establishment of civil infrastructure and civilian studies, control of illicit trafficking of CBRN, export controls on dual-use goods and civilian disaster-preparedness, emergency-planning, crisis response, and capabilities for clean-up measures
Pre- and post-crisis capacity building (Peacebuilding Partnership) (Article. 4.3)	International regional and sub-regional organizations, state and non-state actors	Capacity building in the areas of early-warning, confidence-building, mediation and reconciliation, and post-conflict and post-disaster recovery

*Source: Prepared by author*

As can be observed, the IfS encompasses a broad range of diverse issues considered as sources of insecurity and instability that reflects a rather conservative/orthodox approach. Notwithstanding, this element of the Regulation was the most difficult to agree upon precisely due to controversies concerning how to incorporate the security-sensitive questions and delimit the type of topics relevant to peacebuilding during the phases of crisis response. Paradoxically, however, EU member states resisted successfully the Commission's proposal to include military and hard security related issues that would further reinforce a conservative model of liberal peace. Likewise, despite some member



states' opposition, some particular issues that reflect more bottom-up and non-state approaches were also included in the IfS.

For example, the Commission's ambition was to concentrate different security-related instruments into one IfS Regulation. In the Commission's proposal of the IfS Regulation, Article 308 TEC and Article 203 of the Euratom Treaty were a legal treaty basis of the regulation.<sup>3</sup> This proposal was driven by two purposes. In the first place, the Commission tried to ensure financing of peace-keeping activities which was as extensive as possible, going beyond the civilian aspects of crisis response. In the second place, the Commission included the references to the Euratom Treaty in order to be able to deal with issues concerning nuclear safety as well. However, this proposal was opposed by EU member states due to their sensitivity to the transfer of hard-security questions to a non-intergovernmental field. As a result, both Council and Parliament agreed on the changes to the legal basis of the regulation proposal setting them in Articles 179 (development cooperation) and 181A TEC (economic, financial and technical cooperation with third countries) and eliminating any references to nuclear safety,<sup>4</sup> placing the IfS in the broader context of EU external action.

The question of support for peace-keeping measures and the inclusion of measures related to SALW constituted two main divergences in the design of the short-term component of the IfS. In both cases, the Commission's ambitions were blocked by the EU member states. With reference to the peace-keeping aspect, the Commission proposed the possibility of supporting military monitoring and peace-keeping or peace-support operations of regional and sub-regional organizations and coalitions of states operating with United Nations endorsement (European Commission 2004: 17). Several member states opposed this proposal since they perceived that this would infringe existing relations between the Community pillar and the CFSP pillar (Council of the European Union 2004: 4). On the other hand, however, several member states (in particular France, United Kingdom and Spain) opposed, this time without success, the inclusion of any mention of support "for the efforts undertaken by international and regional organizations, state and non-state actors in promoting confidence-building, mediation, dialogue and reconciliation" since they argued that the very concepts of "reconciliation" or "mediation" were beyond the scope of the Community's competences (Council of the European Union 2006a: 9).

In the case of SALW, the parties agreed on a very carefully drafted text that replaced the concept of SALW with "firearms" and restricted the scope of the IfS by excluding explicitly "support for measures to combat the proliferation of arms". However, the

3 When the Treaty has not provided the necessary power elsewhere Article 308 of the Treaty entitles the Community to "take the appropriate measures" when it is necessary to attain one of the Treaty's objectives in the course of the operation of the common market. This clause allows questions that are deemed necessary by the EU institutions to be addressed in a flexible way.

4 Article 308 would mean that the role of the European Parliament would be consultative power with little possibility of influencing effectively the content of the regulation, while Articles 179 and 181A implied that the regulations should be approved in the co-decision procedure.

Council and the Commission agreed that until the judgement of the European Court of Justice in the case of ECOWAS, the Commission would not adopt measures in this area and would revise the regulation in the light of the forthcoming judgment expected to divide competencies in this field between the European Commission and the Council (Council of the European Union 2006b). Finally, the ECJ judged that the measures against the proliferation of SALW could be implemented by the Community under its development policy and, therefore, the Commission proposed in 2009 to mention explicitly the issue of SALW in the Regulation (European Commission 2009a).

During negotiation on the long-term component of the IfS regulation two particular issues were especially controversial, reflecting the tension between the opposition of some member states to including, on the one hand, all security-related issues that enhance a conservative approach and, on the other hand, to considering non-state actors as fully-fledged partners in EU peacebuilding policy that would give emphasis to a less state-centred approach. In the first place, it was the question of non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament and the relation of the IfS to the EU's Weapons of Mass Destruction Strategy. While the topic of nuclear safety was excluded from consideration at an early stage, issues relating to weapons of mass destruction, and in particular the inclusion of CBRN in the IfS, constituted the most controversial topic until the very end of negotiations, when the Council finally decided to include some of the above mentioned elements. In the second place, important divergence emerged in relation to the inclusion of notions concerning support for civilian peacebuilding capacities promoted by the different NGOs. This aim was strongly supported by the European Parliament, but some member states (France, Spain, Greece and the United Kingdom) were very reluctant to contemplate this question in general and especially the support for international and non-state actors in the areas of early warning, confidence-building, mediation, and reconciliation. Notwithstanding this reluctance and the ambiguous result of the negotiations, the Commission declared that the Peacebuilding Partnership would, in practice, be implemented taking into account the view of NGOs lobbying in favour of these measures.

Alongside the framing of the IfS where the conservative/orthodox approach to peacebuilding dominates, regulations concerning beneficiaries and modalities of support create opportunities for less state-concentrated activities. The EU usually acts as a source of material resources for the activities of other actors, since it requires some intermediaries that implement the activities on the ground on its behalf. In this respect, the IfS allows funding for public bodies, private entities, non-state actors and natural persons from EU member states and third countries as well as international organizations, including UN bodies (Article 10.3). All these actors may propose, design, benefit from and implement a very broad range of measures, including technical assistance projects, grants and budget support. In practice, IfS funds can be employed in order to cover the costs of external experts coming from non-EU or EU Member States' entities providing services (e.g. advice, technical assistance) or transferring the resources to the treasuries of beneficiary countries in order to supply the required materials in kind.

The budget of IfS, set at the level of € 2.062 billion, is divided between different priorities. For the short term priority of crisis response, the budget appropriation is 73% of this general budget (€ 1.505 billion). For the three remaining long term priorities the budget has been established as follows: about € 144 million (7% of the budget) for the priority concerning threats to law and order; € 309 million (15% of the budget) for risk mitigation and preparedness related to CBRN materials or agents; and € 144 (5% of the budget) million for pre- and post-crisis capacity building. However, the overall budget of the IfS suffered a considerable setback, since in 2008 it was decided to reduce it by € 240 million in order to finance the Food Facility, a new EU external action instrument aimed at alleviating the consequences of soaring food prices in developing countries.

## **4. Decision-making and accountability**

EU external assistance projects are implemented traditionally on the basis of long-term, mid-term and short-term programming documents. However, in the case of IfS, the standard system of programming is adapted to its inherent characteristics of an instrument of rapid reaction to crisis or emerging crisis. Until the creation of the EEAS, there were two processes of inter-institutional decision-making and political accountability: 1) a special system put in place for short term measures in response to situations of crisis or emerging crisis (Article 3) implemented through Exceptional Assistance Measures; and 2) the normal system of the long-term component, implemented under Article 4 of the IfS Regulation in the context of stable conditions for cooperation. The functioning of both systems reflects, in practice, an overall consensus of different EU actors on implementation of IfS measures.<sup>5</sup> In other words, the conservative/orthodox liberal peace approach that emerged during negotiation of the IfS Regulation described in the previous section is sustained by a broad institutional consensus during its implementation.

### **4.1 Short-term component**

In the case of short-term measures, the EU adopted a flexible approach in the process of identification and approval of crisis response measures, which according to the Commission, allows for “rapid decision-making, which is absolutely necessary in the field of crisis management” (European Commission 2009b: 29). Therefore, criteria used in project identification are very general: 1) the eligibility of the measures, meaning the actual existence of a crisis, complementary character of the measures, and synergies with other EU crisis response interventions; 2) the feasibility of the measures assessed on the basis of sufficient time available for sound preparation of the action and availability of a solid implementing partner; and 3) the political appropriateness of the action (European Commission 2010a: 3). The Commission clarified that the short-term component might

<sup>5</sup> Challenges related to the setting up of the EEAS are presented in the sixth section of the report.

be mobilized in the case of “a major new political crisis or natural disaster, or a window of opportunity to pre-empt a crisis or an opportunity to advance conflict resolution, or the need to secure the conditions for the delivery of EC assistance”, but emphasized also that on the basis of these criteria there is no automaticity in mobilizing IfS funds and that judgment is made case by case (European Commission 2008a: 4-5). Additionally, an inclusive process characterizes the phase of project identification since: “*ideas for new IfS programmes are often developed, in a flexible manner, through discussions with a series of actors within the EU (...), or within the wider international community (beneficiary country authorities, UN system agencies, bilateral), or with civil society actors*” (European Commission 2008b: 5, emphasis original). Therefore, the project proposals might have been planned by staff in the Commission or its Delegations in third countries or received from NGOs and international organizations. After the assessment of proposals and formal approval of the Commission’s decision, Delegations responsible for the day-to-day management (e.g. negotiation of contracts with local partners and monitoring of project implementation) are decisive in the implementation. For example, they implemented in situ 19 out of 20 decisions on Exceptional Assistance Measures adopted in 2009.

However, the broad autonomy of the Commission was constrained by the obligation of cooperation with other institutions. The EU Member States and the European Parliament decided to establish an exceptionally strict system of control guaranteeing continued access to information on the activities developed in the IfS framework, allowing for permanent political guidance and general accountability by other institutions. Before adopting or renewing Exceptional Assistance Measures or introducing “substantial changes” to these measures, the Commission had to inform the Council regularly about the planning of assistance in general and especially as refers the nature, objectives and financial amount. In practice, the Commission briefed on a monthly basis the Political and Security Committee on the planned short-term measures of the IfS and the progress of the activities. As was recognized in 2009, “this arrangement has worked well and to the satisfaction of both the Council and the Commission” (European Commission 2009b: 33).

In addition to this continuous control of the Council, after the adoption of Exceptional Assistance Measures the Commission had to report in the Parliament. Due to the insistence of the European Parliament, the Commission decided to provide the Parliament with the same information as the Council. On the basis of monthly notes, the Parliament comments on the measures. Precisely, the opinions of the Parliament reflect the most important critique of the IfS measures, but instead of its specific content the Parliament has concentrated on procedural and coherence aspects. Initially, a flexible approach to project selection raised criticism. As stated by the *rapporteur* of the Parliament, it is not always clear what the selection criteria for IfS projects are, whether there were policy or donor coordination concerns at the time of adopting a decision and what actors and on what basis they were chosen for the implementation of the measures (European Parliament 2009: 11). As a result, secondly, the Parliament has raised questions of the suitability of the IfS as a source of funding for specific measures, suggesting that in some cases the proposed measures should be funded in the framework of other geographical instruments or humanitarian aid (especially, in the case of disaster recovery)

and has been concerned about the continuity of IfS measures under other geographical instruments.<sup>6</sup>

## **4.2 Long-term component**

The long-term measures of the IfS are implemented on the basis of a conventional programming cycle: Strategy Papers with attached Multi-annual Indicative Programmes and Annual Action Programmes adopted for each issue area. The long-term component is programmed and implemented by the Commission with the involvement of the EU member states, which are consulted before the formal adoption of a decision by the Commission on the content of all programming documents in the framework of so-called management comitology procedure, usually applied in the implementation of programmes with substantial budgetary implications.<sup>7</sup>

The practice of the IfS Committee also reflects overall consensus on the approach to the implementation of these measures. Therefore, the main problems with the implementation of the IfS had to do with procedural controversies and delays. On the one hand, due to a disagreement on the languages to be used in the comitology procedures, the Committee did not adopt the rules of procedure and, as a result, some member states (Spain and Italy) refused to participate in the voting unless the Rules of Procedure were approved, making voting impossible during meetings because of the lack of a quorum. This lack of a quorum was also related to the permanent absence of many Member States representatives. However, a common practice was that, after the meetings, the Commission launched a written procedure of voting, usually concluding with a favourable opinion by unanimous agreement of Member States.<sup>8</sup> Even in the case of quorum during the meetings of the Committee, but in view of the continuous abstention of Spain and Italy, the Commission preferred written procedure “so as to ensure an unanimous adoption of decision” (European Commission 2009c: 1).<sup>9</sup>

This generally unproblematic approval of measures by the Member States reflects general agreement on the actions proposed by the Commission as a result of a considerable convergence of views. The most important debates and deliberations took place in 2007 when the Commission presented the first Thematic Strategy Paper for the period 2007-2011 and the Indicative Programme 2007-2008 and the Member States

6 There are no official replies from the Commission, which usually keeps silent on the comments of the Parliament.

7 Comitology procedure is applied in order to preserve Council’s oversight of the implementation of rules by the Commission.

8 The exception was the voting on the Interim Response Program in the International Civilian Office in Kosovo in March 2009 in which two member states (Spain and Greece) abstained due to their position on the independence of Kosovo.

9 The IfS did not adopt the rules of procedure, but the usual silent procedure has been introduced. It means that the Commission sends to the committee members the proposed measures on which their opinion is sought. Tacit agreement to the proposal is considered to exist when a member state does not express its opposition or abstention before the deadline.

demanded substantive amendments to these documents. Any further debates on IfS programming documents resulted in minor amendments to the draft document prepared by the Commission, with previous substantial input from the Member States. Similarly, the Annual Action Programmes for each of the three long term priorities were adopted without any substantial problems since they already reflected the recommendations of Member States' experts (European Commission 2009d)<sup>10</sup> and in very few cases the Commission had to redraft the projects considerably in view of the opinion of Member States.<sup>11</sup> For example, even after the ECJ judgment, the question of the Commission's competencies in the field of SALW continued to be very sensitive for some EU member states, but they did not obstruct the implementation of these projects. As a result of this overall intra-EU agreement, the only project that was cancelled was the EU contribution to the nuclear fuel bank under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) due to the delay in establishing formally this initiative.

According to the comitology procedure, the European Parliament has scrutiny powers and the Commission should inform the Parliament on committee proceedings on a regular basis, including information, consultation and dialogue on Strategy Papers. In this procedure, the Commission presents proposals of programming documents to the European Parliament and the Council at the same time. This practice enables the Parliament to express its views before the Committee has adopted a position. Furthermore, after the Committee adopts a position on proposed measures, the Parliament has 30 days to object to the decision on a draft. Hypothetically, the Parliament can object through a resolution when it considers that a planned decision is not fully in line with the legal basis. However, the adoption of the resolution is a cumbersome procedure and would have in fact limited impact on the measures, and thus the Parliament never uses this possibility. As a result, the European Parliament, only raised three issues in 2007 when commenting on the draft Strategy Paper: It praised the reduction of funding for the International Science and Technology Centre in Moscow and the Science Centre in Kiev; expressed its concern about the implications of EU funding for the African Union's African Centre for Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT), based in Algiers; and it asked about insufficient funding of SALW-related activities in the transitory phase of mainstreaming this priority in the geographic instruments. In addition to this particular opinion, support provided in order to enhance capacities in the field of terrorism is noted continuously with criticism by the European Parliament, worried that the EU's support might be counterproductive in countries with poor human rights records.

10 More than 50 national experts visited more than 20 potential partner countries in the framework of the so-called Expert Support Facility in order to "assess the scope, needs and conditions for cooperation and assistance under the IfS" (European Commission 2009a: 28). This national expertise assured a smooth process of drafting and agreeing on the Multi-annual Indicative Programme.

11 The most far-reaching modifications to the projects' content took place in September 2010 when the Commission had to revise four of five projects in the area of risk mitigation and preparedness relating to CBRN materials or agents (European Commission 2010b: 3-4).

## **5. The liberal peace consensus in the practices of EU peacebuilding: projects and initiatives**

### **5.1 Implementation of the short-term component**

As was explained in section 3 of the report, measures under Article 3 referring to crisis or emerging crisis were planned as operational measures aimed at providing rapid and technical response in the context of increasing tension. The Commission, during the period 2007-2010, supported in total 116 individual actions worth € 480 million in more than 50 countries all over the world.<sup>12</sup> According to the annual reports, by the end of 2010, the Commission had adopted 69 large-scale Exceptional Assistance Measures in 37 countries (including Kosovo and Occupied Palestinian territories) and one measure supporting capacity building for crisis response in the African Union.<sup>13</sup> In addition, the Commission adopted so-called IfS Facilities in order to provide support to small-scale and short-notice actions in the following areas: 1) Facilities for urgent actions involving Policy Advice, Technical Assistance, Mediation and Reconciliation for the benefit of third countries in crisis situations; 2) a Conflict Resources Facility, including support for the Kimberly Process; and 3) a Facility for urgent actions involving support for Tribunals of International Character and Transitional Justice Initiatives. In the framework of these special facilities, the EU adopted 47 small-scale measures contributing assistance for security sector reform, assessment missions before large-scale support, electoral missions, mediation and transitional justice initiatives.

As a general rule, the Commission commits all budget appropriations every year and, according to the Commission's data presented in annual reports, these budget commitments are transferred very quickly to the implementing actors and beneficiaries. The ratio of commitments/contracts and contracted commitments/disbursement, which illustrates the status of the implementation of the activities, was very high (especially, in comparison to other geographic and thematic external assistance instruments). Most of these projects acquired the status of completed, and in many cases the EU has been able to implement activities at a lower cost than had been initially planned. Financial flows also suggest a fast process of decision-making during the adoption and implementation of these measures. The average period between the initial needs assessment and the financing of the first actions on the ground was usually two to three months, while in the case of traditional geographical assistance instruments this period is about 24 months. In some case, however, this period has been excessively long (e.g. 12 months in Nepal, 10 months in Kyrgyzstan, 9 months in Peru), but, on the other hand, in several cases, the Commission recognized that formal decisions on launching the projects had been adopted after the actual beginning of activities on the ground. On the other hand,

12 For more details see European Commission (2010d, 2011a).

13 Additionally, as a follow up to previous Exceptional Assistance Measures, the EU adopted two Interim Response Programmes in Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

however, the Commission recognized that due to different problems on the ground several measures had to be prolonged beyond the initially planned period.

Most of these projects have been implemented through United Nations programmes and agencies (37% of funds), international and national NGOs (28% of funds), International Organizations (17% of funds), private operators (4.5% of funds), EU member states' agencies (10.5% of funds) and governments of beneficiary countries (3% of funds) (European Commission, 2011b: 8). In most cases, the role of the EU institutions and officials in the EU Delegations is limited to the supervision of their implementation by these actors. The EU has to involve either UN agencies due to their actual presence in the field and existing structures able to deliver response, or NGOs due to their expertise in conflict prevention and peacebuilding (European Commission, 2010c: 4). Finally, as recognized by some EU officials, implementation through other international organizations reduces risks associated with project failure and, consequently, the political and personal responsibility of European Commission officials. As a result, however, EU provision of funds to other international organizations, frequently presented as a case of implementation of its commitment to "effective multilateralism", is rather a need that has been made a virtue and a suitable policy option involving delegation of the implementation of EU policy in view of the organization's own limitations.

Thematically, the measures supported by the EU addressed very diverse problems related to tensions and crises affecting countries in different geographical areas. Drawing from the analysis of Exceptional Assistance Measures that directly addressed situations of crisis or conflict, the EU usually engaged in cases of protracted crisis and conflicts characterized by continued tension and sporadic use of violence. There are in fact only two conflicts that emerged in the same year as the decision to adopt IfS measures: conflicts between the government and the opposition in Moldova and Peru. On the other hand, the EU usually acted in countries affected by several crises and conflicts at different stages, but frequently avoided engaging in situations of severe crisis characterized by repeated use of violence in an organized way, or war.<sup>14</sup> Indeed, the countries with the most complex situation were Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Myanmar, Lebanon, Indonesia, DR Congo, Colombia and Chad, but even in these cases the EU engaged in the stage of stabilization or, as in case of Sri Lanka, focused on providing humanitarian aid to civilians affected by the war. As a result, there are numerous projects in countries affected by different tensions or crises, which thematically do not always directly tackle their causes or effects, but focus on some aspects of their context or simply other, less problematic tensions on the ground. Projects in Afghanistan supporting the reform of the justice sector, two measures in Bosnia-Herzegovina dealing with explosive remnants of war, two measures in the DR of Congo that supported the establishment of security bodies, or a measure in Yemen aimed at empowering the government and civil society in order to address migration flows are examples of activities that focused on problems different from the actual crises or conflicts in which the beneficiary countries are involved or


14 The definition of severe crisis is from the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (2010: 88).



affected. In some cases, the IfS measures provided accompanying support for ESDP missions deployed in those countries (DR of Congo, Afghanistan, Kosovo) or adjacent areas (Somalia and Kenya). The EU funded eight measures addressing the consequences of natural disasters (in Bangladesh, Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, Pakistan and Peru) and even offered expert support for an HIV-AIDS strategy in Libya. While it cannot be denied that these measures may have positive indirect effects on these conflicts, their rationale is not always clear and straightforward.

Notwithstanding this thematic diversity of projects, they can be assessed in terms of criteria characterizing different models of liberal peacebuilding presented in Table 1. The description of these projects included in the annual report of the European Commission makes it possible to associate their characteristics with these different ideal models of liberal peace. Measures' descriptions show that IfS practices frequently combine modes of action of different ideal models within the liberal peace paradigm. The analysis of 69 projects addressing some type of crisis situation (including disaster recovery) reveals that the IfS practice of providing assistance in crisis response merge conservative and orthodox models of liberal peace: the approach of 18 measures can be characterized as conservative; 23 orthodox (including all disaster recovery measures); 24 measures usually reflect traits of both conservative and orthodox models; and only 4 measures can be defined as emancipatory (Figure 1).

**Figure 1. Liberal peace models: short-term measures**




*Source: Prepared by author*

The analysis of five criteria (concerns, approach, sources of insecurity, rights and needs addressed, main beneficiaries) employed to assess the measures from the point of view of a liberal peace paradigm offers a nuanced and comprehensive summary of EU practices in response to crisis and emerging tensions. Indeed, the distribution of different patterns shows that the combination of different conservative/orthodox practices of liberal peace dominates in all dimensions. As can be observed in Figure 2, the dominant concerns that were addressed in the framework of these projects fall within the scope of the conservative

type of liberal peace. In the measures frequently addressing several topics, the issues concerning problems with institutions of government and the security sector appeared in 36 and 17 cases respectively, while democratic governance and transitional justice characterizing orthodox liberal peace were included in 15 and 7 cases respectively. The remaining concerns addressed in the projects cannot be associated directly with any particular liberal peace model without further analysis of other criteria. In effect, in contrast to some expectations of securitization of EU external migration policy, four projects addressing migration challenges were based on activities and approaches that most resemble emancipatory model of liberal peace. In other cases, however, the IfS measures supported security forces in managing migration as well as problems arising from displaced persons as a result of conflicts.

**Figure 2: Short-term measures: dominant concerns addressed**




*Source: Prepared by author*


Taking into account other criteria, there is also a proportional distribution of the patterns characterising conservative and orthodox models of liberal peace, leading in practice to a general merging of both models. In the first place, almost half of projects adopted a top-down approach to intervention where the origin of intervention is situated at the level of state administration. The projects mixing top-down and bottom-up activities, or focused only on bottom-up actions appear to be in only 35% and 16% of IfS short-term measures respectively. However, this conservative approach to delivering assistance was frequently shared with concerns about sources of insecurity corresponding to orthodox models of liberal peace. Although armed violence appeared in 32 measures as a source of insecurity addressed, almost the same role was played by political and economic sources of insecurity (34 and 23 projects respectively). Additionally, in many cases, armed violence and political or economic concerns appeared in conjunction with each other.

By contrast, more measures attempted to address political and economic rights and needs associated with an orthodox type of liberal peace than security concerns characterizing the conservative option: political and economic rights and needs were addressed in 39 and 34 IfS measures respectively, while there were 25 measures addressing security rights and needs. This supremacy of orthodox liberal peace needs and rights is balanced by a much stronger emphasis on beneficiaries typical of the conservative model. State elite and institutions could be identified as direct beneficiaries in 50 projects, while organized civil society was considered only in 17 measures. Surprisingly, broad social collectives (e.g. refugees, people affected by natural disasters or families of combatants) were included as the main beneficiaries of projects in 27 cases. However, this focus on large social groups does not imply inclusion of the emancipatory type of liberal peace models in IfS short-term crisis response measures, but a tendency to channel support and aid to society through state institutions and top-down approaches.


**Figure 3: Short-term measures: projects' approaches**




**Figure 4: Short-term measures: Sources of insecurity addressed**



**Figure 5: Short-term measures: rights and needs addressed**



**Figure 6: Short-term measures: direct beneficiaries**



Source: Prepared by author

## 5.2 Implementation of the long-term component<sup>15</sup>

The long term component of the IfS is aimed at tackling and counteracting diverse structural thematic security risks and threats worldwide. The framing of this long-term component of the IfS stresses a rather conservative approach to liberal peace, since it focuses especially on capacity building of state institutions in dealing with security questions. In line with this approach, this long term component, specified in the Thematic Strategy Paper for the period 2007-2011, emphasized as the strategic and policy framework the European Security Strategy and three further priorities: implementation of the EU Strategy against proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction; counteracting global and trans-regional threats; and building capacity for effective crisis response (European Commission 2007).

**Table 4: Themes of long-term IfS measures specified in Indicative Programmes**

Priority	Thematic domains of projects
Reduction of illicit trans-regional flows	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Fighting against crime on drug trafficking routes</li> <li>- Fight against the proliferation of SALW</li> <li>- Maritime security and safety along critical maritime routes</li> <li>- Capacity building in regions affected by terrorism</li> </ul>
Risk mitigation and preparedness relating to CBRN materials and agents	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Capacity-building activities and learning activities referring to illicit trafficking of CBNR and border monitoring</li> <li>- Bio-safety and bio-security, export controls on dual-use goods</li> <li>- Redirecting of former weapons of mass destruction scientists.</li> </ul>

*Source: Author's elaboration*

In line with the conservative model of liberal peace present in the IfS Regulation, all projects addressing structural transnational security challenges focused on strengthening the institutional capacity of governments, especially law and order institutions and security bodies worldwide, including several international organizations. These IfS projects aim fundamentally at improving the capacities of beneficiary national administrations and international organizations in facing security challenges, mainly

<sup>15</sup> This part of the report is based on the analysis of Annual Action Programmes as well as semi-structured anonymous interviews.

through providing equipment and training. For example, the reduction of illicit trans-regional flows focuses on capacity-building and provision of equipment for laboratories and law enforcement bodies as well as resources such as information, know-how, best practices and training of personnel.

In the context of the conservative approach to dealing with transnational challenges through state institutions of law and order, some EU officials consider that the most innovative approach to capacity building in beneficiary countries is sensitivity to the demands and needs expressed by beneficiaries themselves. Therefore, instead of traditional top-down assumptions about the needs of third actors, the EU adopted in some cases a bottom-up approach in order to detect beneficiaries' needs and engage them in sustainable cooperation. For example, in order to guarantee greater involvement of target countries and sustainability of measures, the EU is attempting to apply a bottom-up approach in its flagship project CBRN Centre of Excellence for Risk Mitigation. This project was conceived as a decentralized network of regional initiatives (South East Asia, Southern Caucasus/Ukraine, Central Asia, Middle East, Gulf and Mediterranean region, Africa), clustering individual countries with the aim of helping them to build institutional capacity and implement strategies of CBRN risk mitigation. These regional initiatives from the bottom-up perspective aim at identifying specific needs and providing tailor made assistance in such areas as export control issues, illicit trafficking, bio-safety and bio-security, as well as engagement of the scientific community.

Other measures considered as innovative approaches attempt to design projects at inter-regional level, e.g. linking activities of state law and order institutions in West Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean in connection with the fight against organized crime on the cocaine route as well as supporting the fight against the illicit accumulation and trafficking of firearms in Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean. Additionally, support for the availability of a database developed by Interpol for reporting lost and stolen firearms to 188 Interpol member countries is envisaged within the framework of the project concerning firearms and explosive materials.

As a result, the often-referred to post-national EU is trying to reinforce state institutions in order to deal with questions considered to be transnational security challenges originating from non-state actors and entities separated from concrete territories and states. This tension between the nature of issues to be tackled and the means that are mobilized can be explained by the way the projects are identified, programmed and implemented. In all these phases, EU Member States occupy the dominant position and shape the content of long-term projects. Similarly, consultations with beneficiaries, which might be considered examples of a bottom-up approach, focus on third state institutions of law and order.

During each phase of the project cycle there is direct involvement of different actors from the EU, including Member States and institutions, international organizations and beneficiary countries. According to the Commission's officials, the engagement of different stakeholders is crucial in order to identify and appropriately implement the projects for several reasons: sensitivity of EU member states in dealing with security-related issues; considerable competition of private and public actors in providing security-

related products; and the very limited pool of specialized experts ready to provide their input to the projects. In this context, the so-called Expert Support Facility, which mobilizes experts from EU Member States that assist the Commission in identifying programmes and projects, has also been welcomed by EU officials. Experts for member states carry out studies and fact-finding missions in potential beneficiary countries in order to assess the suitability of proposed measures. As has been stressed by Commission officials, EU activities aimed at enhancing the capacities of beneficiary countries fall within a very sensitive domain and, therefore, might sometimes be perceived as too intrusive if not subjected to consultation well in advance with beneficiary countries by their peers from EU member states.<sup>16</sup>

This involvement of national experts and consultation with stakeholders influenced the definition of approaches and thematic priorities of action. Experts from member states contributed to shaping projects concerning illicit trafficking and border monitoring, critical maritime routes, the fight against organized crime on cocaine routes as well as projects addressing bio-safety and bio-security. Participation of national experts also reflected the political interest of several member states in approaching particular problems from the EU level. For example, the projects in the field of export controls of dual use goods reflect the interest of Germany in ensuring a follow up of earlier projects through a common approach to this politically and commercially sensitive issue area, and Spain, for example, was especially supportive regarding projects related to the trafficking of cocaine.

The implementation of these projects exposed a critical limitation faced by EU institutions: too few staff engaged in the project management cycle and a shortage of human resources and expertise in demanding and resource-intensive areas requiring advanced equipment and technology as well as high-level expert skills. The dominant view is that the services in the Commission (and now in the EEAS as well) dealing with these projects are understaffed and that project management within the requirements of financial regulation imposes a considerable bureaucratic workload on them. For example, the implementation of the Peacebuilding Partnership in support of non-state actors emphasized the permanent shortage of available staff in the DG RELEX to manage the very demanding and time-consuming process of project selection (Bayne and Trolliet 2009). As a result, the Commission changed its approach to the method of funding non-state actors, decentralizing the management of grants to the level of EU Delegations.

Due to these expertise constraints, many IfS projects constituted initially a follow-up of activities developed previously in the framework of geographic assistance instruments (TACIS and MEDA in particular). For example, the EU supported a follow up of such activities as the International Science and Technology Centre in Moscow and the Science and Technology Centre in Ukraine aimed at redirecting former weapons scientists from

16 Despite this dominance of national experts, some projects and ideas benefited considerably from intra-Commission expertise drawn from the Joint Research Centre that provided scientific expertise, the inter-Commission processes of drafting and agreeing on particular projects and the geographical desks of DG RELEX.

the former Soviet Union to civilian and peaceful activities developed since the mid-1990s; a project in support of activities aimed at combating illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials in selected former Soviet Union countries; export control of dual-use goods in the Russian Federation; and a network for the control of health and security threats and other bio-security risks in the Mediterranean region and South-East Europe.

As a result of problems concerning EU expertise and staff, numerous projects have been implemented by the specialized agencies and bodies of the United Nations and other international organizations, EU Member States' agencies as well as ministries and agencies of beneficiary countries. There are almost no EU staff engaged in project implementation at the expert level, and the EU officials concentrate basically on the supervision of implementation of the contracted projects. Therefore, the EU is perceived more as an intermediate agency providing resources and supervising project implementation than an actor on its own. Consequently, from this point of view the EU does not favour any specific approach to the implementation of security sensitive projects, but makes use of already existing opportunities provided by other actors.

In view of these structural limitations, the implementation of the component covering crisis response and preparedness under the umbrella of Peacebuilding Partnership has been considered a structural complement to the crisis response activities with the aim of building and strengthening the capacity of non-state actors, international organizations as well as relevant Member States' agencies, in the areas of conflict prevention and peacebuilding. The constitution of this component of the IfS was regarded as a way of overcoming the limitations of state-centred measures of EU peacebuilding practices and possibly enhancing alternatives to conservative approaches to liberal peace. Therefore, the approach adopted in the implementation of this priority was actor-driven, focusing on the needs of specific groups of actors in view of their potential role in peacebuilding activities worldwide. The Commission executed activities directed at civil society actors with the aim of stimulating their capacity-building projects in the field of peacebuilding and conflict prevention. Moreover, the Commission promoted the establishment of a stable platform of interactions with civil society organizations active in the field through the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO) – a network of organizations (NGOs and think tanks) promoting peacebuilding policies among decision-makers in the EU.

However, the bulk of Peacebuilding Partnership was also directed at state actors. For example, the IfS funded activities of EU Member States' agencies supporting training for police participating in civilian stabilization missions, including police officers from EU Member States, non-EU countries contributing to CSDP missions and African countries, as well as civilian experts for crisis management and stabilization missions. However, as recognized by some EU officials, these efforts have been of little relevance to date since it was observed that, for example, very few of the 1800 trainees in the field of civilian crisis management participated in the EU missions. Additionally, UN bodies and international organizations (regional and sub-regional) themselves benefited from the capacity building support provided by the IfS. For example, the EU provided special grants to international organizations (especially the UN) with the aim of enhancing their capacities in the area of early warning and early recovery, especially concerning actions aimed at elaborating

methodologies for post conflict and post disaster needs assessment as well as addressing the issue of natural resources management and conflict. This phenomenon of turning the EU into an international financial agency providing funds for capacity-building of other international organizations became a source of concern of several actors following the implementation of the IfS. As put by one of the EU officials, “it makes no sense to fund UN mediation capabilities at the moment when the EU has no capacity in this field at all and needs it desperately” (Interview, Brussels, 4 May 2011).

## **6. European External Action Service: towards a conservative liberal peace paradigm?**

The established ways of implementing IfS actions, exemplifying the EU’s implicit orthodox and conservative approaches in the liberal peacebuilding doctrine, may be modified significantly after the launch of the European External Action Service (EEAS) in January 2011. According to many opinions, the establishment of this novel body challenges the continuity of the accumulated practical knowledge for dealing with crisis situations and security problems. There are fears that the possible outcome of the establishment of the EEAS might limit the liberal peace paradigm of EU peacebuilding to its most conservative version, based on CSDP missions establishing law and order institutions. Therefore, the issue at stake in the establishment of EEAS is who will be in charge of the peacebuilding policy and, in consequence, what rationale and institutional culture will dominate IfS practices in the future.

Among many controversial questions during the establishment of the EEAS, one of the most important was the transfer of officials and functions from the General Secretariat of the Council and the Commission to the EEAS and, especially, the position of the external assistance instruments in this new structure. The compromise achieved was that almost all staff in the departments and functions from the Directorate General for External Relations, External Service (Delegations) and several functional units of the Directorate General Development would be transferred to the EEAS, with the exception of the staff responsible for the financial management of external assistance instruments. It was agreed in the EEAS Decision that “the management of the Union’s external cooperation programmes is under the responsibility of the Commission”, but “without the prejudice to the respective roles of the Commission and of the EEAS in programming” (Official Journal of the European Union 2010, Article 9.1). Additionally, the High Representative shall ensure overall political coordination, unity, consistency and effectiveness of the Union’s external action, “in particular” through external assistance instruments. The division of tasks in a new programming cycle is as follows: the EEAS, responsible for the early stage of programming, will contribute to and prepare the Commission’s strategic decisions, e.g. Strategy Papers and Multiannual Indicative Programmes. Furthermore, both the High Representative and the EEAS should work with the members and service of the Commission throughout the whole cycle of programming, planning and implementation of the instruments. On the other hand, however, all proposals for decisions should be prepared following the Commission’s



procedures, and it is the Commission that formally adopts the decisions once they are submitted by the EEAS and will be responsible for later stages of programming and implementation on the ground.

Some aspects of the implementation of the IfS in this new institutional setting have been regulated specifically. The Council's decision confirmed the existence of two separate procedures for implementation of the IfS. As a result, the long-term component of the Instrument follows the procedure described above for cooperation between the EEAS and the Commission during programming, and the Commission's services responsible for the implementation of the IfS are located in the DG EuropeAid Development and Cooperation (DG DEVCO). However, the short-term rapid crisis response component of the Instrument was placed under the direct responsibility of the High Representative and the EEAS, albeit with two caveats. First, financial implementation is the responsibility of the Commission "under the authority of the High Representative in his/her capacity as Vice-President of the Commission" and, second, the department of the Commission in charge of the implementation of this component "shall be co-located with the EEAS" (Ibid, Article 9.6).

Following this decision, the Commission created a so-called Foreign Policy Instrument Service (FPIS) in charge of the implementation of the IfS short-term component and Peacebuilding Partnership.<sup>17</sup> The creation of the FPIS staffed, among others, with crisis response planners with regional or thematic expertise and financial administrators resulted, however, in the relocation of four former DG RELEX units outside the EEAS structures (European Commission 2010d: 17).<sup>18</sup> This decision reflected the political sensitivity and specificity of the IfS since, in the view of some, the FPIS "will look after Commission money that cannot be transferred to the EEAS and should not be conventionally swept into" the DG DEVCO (European Voice 2010). However, the decision affecting the IfS also reflected broader controversies concerning EU peacebuilding activities after the creation of the EEAS: the question of appropriate expertise and the organizational position of civilian crisis management and peacebuilding in the new Service.

The transfer of the former DG RELEX staff responsible for implementation of the IfS short term component to the FPIS as well as its unclear attachment to the new Service has been criticized by the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs). They argued that this is a case of non-fulfilment of the commitments of the High Representative/Vice-President as regards the creation of "an appropriate structure" in the field of crisis management and peace building (High Representative/Vice-President of the European Commission 2010). According to the MEPs, one of the elements in fulfilling this commitment should be the incorporation into the EEAS of the staff previously engaged in

17 This service is also responsible for the implementation of actions under the CFSP Budget, the Instrument for Cooperation with Industrialised Countries, communication and public diplomacy actions, and election observation missions.

18 In the organization chart of the EEAS, the FPIS has been distinguished as a separate European Commission service reporting directly to HRVP.

the planning and programming of the crisis response measures of the IfS (Brantner et al. 2011). In order to pressure the Commission, the European Parliament introduced a budget reserve of € 1.37 million that “shall be released once the Commission will present a proposal for the transfer of Commission staff in DG RELEX to the EEAS unit dealing with Peacebuilding and Crisis Response, in line with previous commitments and statements by High Representative/Vice President” (Official Journal of the European Union 2011a: II/79). This negative stance on peacebuilding staffing in the EEAS has also been shared by the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office. For example, in February 2011 it argued that it would be very problematic for “a skeletal team of just three staff members” within the Directorate for Conflict Prevention and Security Policy of the EEAS to programme the IfS “strategically, effectively and consistently”, monitor the funding, contribute expertise to the programming of other instruments, provide analysis, cooperate with external actors, and build knowledge about conflict prevention (EPLO 2011: 1-2).

This question would be of little relevance in terms of creating EEAS, with more than 3600 staff already employed in the headquarters and delegations, but those following this dispute argue that this case illustrates a broader problem of the EEAS role in the area of conflict prevention and management since there is a serious concern that due to the lack of peace building expertise in the service, its specificity will be neglected in EU foreign policy (Smith, 2010a, 2010b). It was observed that units coming from the Council Secretariat and dealing with conflict management and operations (EU Military Staff, Crisis Management and Planning Directorate, and Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability) are separated in the EEAS structure from the peacebuilding and conflict prevention units coming from the Commission. Therefore, both MEPs and NGOs argued that this structure is not appropriate and that further integration of the EEAS units active in conflict prevention, crisis management and peacebuilding into a unified structure was critical (Brantner et al. 2011; ELPO 2011: 2-3). In consequence, some are alarmed that former European Community instruments such as IfS may be dominated by an intergovernmental approach of conflict management units and their military experience and expertise. In other words, some participants in this institutional conflict were afraid that the conservative approach to peacebuilding would become the dominant way of dealing with crisis situations due to continuity of practices based on a military approach, in view of the lack of alternative ideas emerging from the EEAS itself. Additionally, they are worried that the Community budget will in fact be managed following the needs of intergovernmental and underfinanced CSDP operations, leading in fact to the nationalization of previously communitarized components of EU foreign policy.<sup>19</sup> The Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Parliament expressed its opposition to this possibility, claiming that “under no circumstances is formal or informal control by CSDP structures of Stability Instrument Article 3 and 4 measures acceptable and in line with the

19 The British government has already recognized that its aim is “to ensure that EEAS staff who are responsible for setting strategic priorities for the short-term IfS component adopt a comprehensive approach to stabilization integrating both the military and civilian dimensions” (House of Commons 2011: 93).

Treaties” (European Parliament 2010a: 3). As a result, at stake in this apparently irrelevant bureaucratic disagreement is the possibility of substantial redefinition of EU practices in the crisis response and peacebuilding fields in the direction of conservative models, and the disappearance of alternative approaches from the EU menu of choices in dealing with crisis response.

## **7. Conclusion**

Liberal peace represents the dominant paradigm of contemporary peacebuilding, which prioritizes statebuilding through law and order institutions as well as democratic governance and market economy. In this report, the EU practices of peacebuilding have been analysed in the light of different models of the liberal peacebuilding paradigm. In view of the lack of any comprehensive and complete EU doctrine on peacebuilding, the focus on practices pursued through the Instrument for Stability enabled reconstruction of the EU’s approach to peacebuilding and conflict management.

Overall, analysis of the IfS practices with regard to peacebuilding exposes the EU’s consensus concerning conservative and orthodox models of liberal peace, which emphasize security concerns and state institutions as well as political and economic problems and institutions of democratic governance. This consensus when approaching conflict response and peacebuilding is reified by the smooth and uncomplicated process of decision-making in particular cases, since there are very few instances of conflicts between the Commission, Council and Parliament with reference to IfS projects. Similarly, the overview of specific measures implemented in the framework of the IfS provides corroboration that the conservative/orthodox mandate provided by the IfS Regulation is also being implemented in practice. Additionally, the institutional debates and controversies affecting the IfS and concerning the role of peacebuilding activities in the EEAS suggest that this approach of mixing conservative and orthodox elements of liberal peace building is not confronted with any alternative proposals.

These observations require, however, an additional caveat: the IfS is designed as an instrument that is supplementary to other geographical instruments of external action aimed at addressing root causes of crises and conflicts. The analysis of these instruments was beyond the scope of this report, but the EU’s dominant focus on statebuilding and building of democratic governance and market economic institutions during the critical phase of post-conflict suggests that, even if other concerns are present in later stages of peacebuilding processes, the EU conceives peacebuilding as a process of settling conflicts within the logic of modern liberal states. Furthermore, the analysis of current practices points also to the fact that, in view of the lack of political debates on the EU peacebuilding doctrine that would strategically and politically inform the use of instruments and tools of peacebuilding, the dominant mood among EU officials and decision-makers is risk-aversion. This leads to a permanent tendency for technical considerations of particular measures to lose their strategic perspective. Paradoxically, this is not so much due to the lack of strategic documents, but to the wide array of them and consequent difficulties in setting clear policy priorities.

The current EU approach to peacebuilding is the result of evolving policy practices and the evolution of international debates on peacebuilding and not a preconceived general policy responding to intra-EU debates on peacebuilding doctrine. From the internal perspective, the Instrument for Stability was conceived rather as the Commission's practical response to the general demands of the greater EU's involvement in conflict prevention and peace-building activities. It was aimed at contributing to the enhancement and diversification of EU crisis response capacities beyond CSDP civilian and military missions by addressing issues regarded as immediate causes and results of crises and conflicts through activities which lay beyond the conservative logic of third party intervention in order to stop conflicts and mediate between parties. The more flexible character of the IfS also differs from CFSP instruments and CSDP missions, where ad hoc policy considerations, domestic policy constraints, scarce resources and cumbersome procedures prevail at the moment of adopting crisis response measures.

The practices of EU peacebuilding, including the IfS measures, were also strongly influenced by the international debates and especially emerging agreements in the framework of the United Nations. Therefore, in reaction to these international developments, the EU adopted a mosaic of diverse documents on specific priorities that were later progressively incorporated into the EU activities. As a result, in the last decade the EU has adopted dozens of policy documents concerning conflict prevention and security, but there is general concern that the EU is failing to deliver results in its ambitious policies in this area. This situation is leading to a deadlock among competing principles. The variety of policy documents frequently provokes paralyzing concerns about the possible errors and political controversies that a more innovative use of the IfS might trigger, thus stimulating self-imposed limitations at the moment of deciding about the measures to be applied in very sensitive and demanding areas of security and conflict/crisis response. This self-restraint is further stirred by insufficient human resources and expertise in the very concrete fields of conflict prevention, peace-building and security challenges, due to the characteristics of this policy field, which requires advanced policy and technical expertise. At the same time, the lack of resources has further reinforced strong reliance on the expertise of other international organizations and, especially the United Nations, in the implementation of projects and activities, reducing EU visibility worldwide and limiting the possibility of conceiving any specific EU approach to peacebuilding. Therefore, in stark contrast with the myths of "Brussels bureaucracy", the report has emphasized that, in reality, an instrument amounting to € 2 billion is implemented by a very few overloaded officials of the EU.

As a result, policy ambitions are constrained by path-dependent approaches, viewing the EU as an international donor instead of a self-confident and autonomous actor providing its own clearly visible and creative solutions to crises and conflicts. The EU did not deliver its own specific approach to peacebuilding which, consistent with the liberal international consensus, could also provide some solutions reflecting to a greater extent the very nature of the EU collective polity. As we have seen, even within the dominant liberal peacebuilding paradigm there are several models that can provide intellectual templates in order to build up an EU peacebuilding doctrine in a reflexive manner, and tailor the IfS in a way that enables it to go beyond support for third-party intervention in

conflict-torn societies. The predominance of conservative and orthodox practices of peacebuilding in the CSDP framework and in the approaches of other international donors leaves ample room for actors more reliant on emancipatory models.

The IfS is due to be reshaped during the forthcoming negotiations on the EU's financial framework 2014-2020. Improvement of the EU's capacities for crisis prevention and resolution as well as improved coordination of its tools in peace-building processes are among the six strategic objectives identified by the European Commission (European Commission 2011d: 191-192). However, due to the lack of a comprehensive debate on the EU peacebuilding doctrine, negotiations will most probably turn into a technical exercise of drawing a new regulation meeting some administrative expectations addressing problems of institutional coherence and efficiency. In fact, the Commission already considers that under the current Regulation the IfS worked reasonably well, and there is no need for comprehensive revision. Some particular questions were raised in order to enhance the policy-driven character of the instrument, strengthen crisis response capacities, improve synergies with other EU external action instruments as well as enhance measures aimed at tackling global security threats and risks. Similarly, the European Parliament underlined in general the relevance of the instruments for crisis prevention and management, including the IfS, but stressed the need to focus on long-term, preventive actions, including peacebuilding and conflict prevention via geographic programmes (European Parliament 2011).

In the light of this report assessment, the IfS might evolve in three directions, implying a different role of the IfS in the future architecture of the instruments of the EU external action. A first possible scenario is that the IfS evolves into a kind of flanking measure for CSDP missions, especially in view of the increasing number of civilian missions. In this way, the IfS would transform itself from a former Community instrument with a comprehensive approach, to a more selective instrument for the support activities of the former intergovernmental pillar. In this sense, the IfS would end up focusing uniquely on crises and conflicts where the EU is already engaged. Hence, this tendency would limit considerably the thematic scope and geographical reach of the IfS measures. Therefore, this scenario would lead to reducing considerably the EU's ambitions in peacebuilding and conflict prevention and probably to the establishment of a conservative liberal peace model as the only point of reference in designing EU peacebuilding actions.

The second possible scenario is that the new institutional structures of the EU external action and the debates about policy instruments will be hostage to conflicts about the scarce financial resources available to the EU in the 2014-2020 period. Therefore, instead of building upon the lessons learned from the IfS implementation in order to improve the EU conflict response instruments, other considerations will reduce the scope of the debates. This unfortunate tendency would obstruct the ability of the EU for self-reflexive building of its resources and instruments in areas of crisis response and peace-building. In this scenario we might expect a simple follow-up of the current IfS practices, including its existing shortcomings and contradictions. In other words, the IfS would fall short of meeting political criteria in the process of decision-making and, in turn, technical and bureaucratic considerations would continue overshadowing the policy content of the

EU's approach in the field of peacebuilding. Therefore, this scenario would result in the continuation of the existing implicit conservative/orthodox consensus.

The third scenario assumes an enhanced linkage between strategic-policy planning and the use of available or redesigned instruments and tools balancing different principles. Establishing clear and strategic policy benchmarks would be an outcome of sound debate on the EU peacebuilding doctrine and careful assessment of its capabilities. Additionally, clear strategic guidance would facilitate assessment of the effectiveness of policies and measures and their future improvement, on the basis of a reflexive and planned process of institutional learning, something which is much needed in view of the new rules provided by the Treaty of Lisbon. The new IfS Regulation would benefit from assessing successes and failures of the conservative/orthodox approach in the light of existing alternatives provided by emancipatory approaches. Even if the EU will not revise in depth the current liberal peace model as implicit policy guidance, the inclusion of alternative approaches proposed in view of frequent failures of conservative and orthodox approaches would better equip EU's peacebuilding practices. Therefore, the inclusion of an emancipatory approach to the EU peacebuilding menu of choice could contribute further solutions and tools, especially in those protracted and long-standing crisis situations where existing approaches have failed to provide solutions.

The creation of the EEAS allows imagining that in the future, more focused and coordinated efforts in policy planning could be accompanied by more careful assessment of the available and/or necessary resources and instruments. This would require temporal synchronization, sequencing policy planning and in-depth critical periodical reviews of policy documents in the field of EU foreign policy. Therefore, in order that this third scenario could materialize, it would be essential that the newly created EEAS undertook a revision of existing strategies and policy programmes in order to adapt their content and reach to the outcomes of the forthcoming negotiations of the 2014-2020 financial framework, taking into account, however, the experiences of successful alternative measures and approaches implemented in view of the failure of the existing standard approaches of conservative and orthodox versions of the liberal peace paradigm.

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## **Acronyms and special terms**

CBRN – Chemical, Biological, Radioactive and Nuclear

Comitology – the European Commission’s system for implementing EU legislation overseen by committees consisting of Member State representatives.

CSDP – Common Security and Defence Policy

CFSP – Common Foreign and Security Policy

DCI – Instrument for Development Cooperation

DG AIDOC – Directorate General EuropeAid Co-Operation Office

DG DEVCO – Development and Cooperation – EuropeAid

DG RELEX – Directorate General of External Relations

ECOWAS – Economic Community of West African States

EEAS – European External Action Service

ENPI – European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument

ESDP – European Security and Defence Policy

EU – European Union

FPIS – Foreign Policy Instrument Service

IAEA – International Atomic Energy Agency

IfS – Instrument for Stability

INSC – Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation

IPA – Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance

MEPs – Members of the European Parliament

UN – United Nations

SALW – Small Arms and Light Weapons

TEC – Treaty establishing the European Community

TEU – Treaty on the European Union

TFUE – Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union