Towards Effective Security Governance in Africa

African and European actors in peacekeeping and peacebuilding: partners or competitors?

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Summary

Although prospects for peacekeeping and peacebuilding in Africa have significantly improved since the end of the East-West conflict, creating the conditions for lasting peace nevertheless remains a challenge. On the positive side, we note in particular the changed constellation of paradigms and actors. The present constellation is characterized by a shared ideological frame, often referred to as liberal peace, which has the potential to guide interventions by a wide range of external actors in local conflicts. Most striking has been the emergence of strong regional security organisations (RSOs) as providers of security. Their unique authority, their propensity for rule-based behaviour and their linkages to the UN and with each other raise hopes for the creation of an effective system of security governance. On the less positive side, we note that effectiveness remains a hope, rather than a given, because it depends on a genuinely shared interpretation of global norms by an increasing number of international actors and compliance in implementation, as well as on the adequacy of the global scripts for addressing local conflicts.

This report contributes to the debate on the effectiveness of peacekeeping/peacebuilding on the African continent by analysing the policies and activities of the African Union (AU) and the European Union (EU) as well as some of its member states regarding two global norms: a) Protection of Civilians (POC) as one task of peacekeeping operations and b) Security Sector Reform (SSR). The peacekeeping missions in Darfur and Chad and the SSR efforts in Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe serve as examples of the organisations’ involvement. Based on the analyses, the report finds that the similar interpretation of UN, EU and AU doctrines on peacekeeping and peacebuilding is promising and can be considered an indicator that a layered system of global security governance based on strong and connected RSOs could be both effective and legitimate. However, this alignment of doctrines remains fragile and does not always translate into increased effectiveness at the local level.

The report identifies three classes of frictions that hamper the translation of global scripts into effective local solutions: (a) global norms suggesting policy responses, which do not match local challenges and needs, (b) global norms being translated into practice by international actors but not compatible with the traditions and interests of local actors and thus not penetrating deeply enough to the local level to affect the behaviour of respective actors, and (c) regional actors adopting global norms in formal terms but implementing them in ways that compromise the intent of the norm. The observed discrepancy between growing harmony among UN, AU and EU peacebuilding at the level of doctrines and persistent discord over its implementation, as well as the partial misalignment between global policy responses and local needs and interests, should thus serve as a warning that alignment of doctrines should not be confused with more effective security governance in practice.
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1. Introduction

During the past two decades, international actors have considerably increased their efforts to prevent violent conflicts in Africa and creating the conditions for lasting peace. This engagement is reflected, inter alia, in the number of peacekeeping operations, which rose from four in the period from 1945 to 1990 to over 30 between 1991 and 2012, of which 25 have been UN-led operations. In qualitative terms, the manner in which keeping and building peace has also changed dramatically. Present-day involvement of the international community in local conflicts differs in three important ways from the pre-1990 period. First, the number of external actors has increased. During the Cold War, only a limited number of external actors – a feeble UN and strong superpowers (including allies like Cuba) as well as former colonial powers – influenced security dynamics in Africa. In contrast, today’s international peacebuilding community includes a very active UN, various regional as well as extra-regional states and, most notably, an array of regional and extra-regional security organisations (RSOs) such as the EU, the African Union (AU) and African sub-regional organisations (Diehl 2007; Diehl/Lepgold 2003). Located between the global and the state level, RSOs supply or withhold crucial legitimacy for interventions (Bellamy/Williams 2011), develop regional codes of conduct for peacebuilding, and provide military or civilian power for the management of conflicts (Williams/Haacke 2011; Kirchner/Dominguez 2011).

Second, the depth of international actors’ involvement in local conflicts has changed. During the Cold War, their engagement did not challenge the internal political make-up of states in Africa. While traditional peacekeeping was basically confined to the observation of fragile truces, the engagement of the superpowers and former colonial powers aimed not at reforming, but at propping up or undermining existing local regimes. In contrast, today’s broader understanding of peacekeeping/building legitimizes more intrusive interventions by outside actors. While peacekeeping has become more robust, including inter alia the protection of civilians, peacebuilding even entails the transformation of those political, economic and social conditions which have led to violent conflicts in the first place. In this respect, several commentators have observed the emergence of a liberal peace doctrine whose constituent parts include democratization, human rights, civil society, rule of law, and economic liberalization (Richmond/Franks 2009: 3; Paris, 2010). In brief, liberal peacebuilding assumes that lasting and just peace can be generated through controlled social and political change along predefined lines.

Third, and most importantly, the constellation of intervening parties has changed. While the former pattern of antagonistic interventions by superpowers has exacerbated and perpetuated many local conflicts, today’s universal acceptance – at least in principle – of a UN-sponsored script providing directions for peacekeeping and peacebuilding interventions has improved the potential for international actors to work hand-in-hand as parts of a layered peace architecture with the UN at the top (Bellamy/Williams 2005).

These quantitative and qualitative changes have significantly improved the prospects for effective peacekeeping and peacebuilding on the African continent. Yet, effective policy responses to instability and violent crisis remain a promise rather than a given, as
effectiveness depends (a) on a genuinely shared interpretation of global norms by an increasing number of international actors as well as compliance in implementation, and (b) on the adequacy of the global scripts to address local conflicts.

Even the first requirement is not as easily fulfilled as may seem at first glance. Although the emergence of a global normative frame has improved the chances for coordinated policy responses, it still has to be ascertained to what extent relevant international actors interpret and implement global norms and concepts in similar ways. In fact, such a common understanding is rather unlikely, given the inherent contradictions of the liberal peacebuilding programme (Paris/Sisk 2009; Paris 2010: 343; Richmond 2005) as well as contradictions between global norms and pre-existing regional security traditions, perceptions, norms and practices (Acharya 2009).

Secondly, even if international actors interpret emerging global norms in the same way, their implementation might not necessarily lead to adequate policy responses. Frictions might emerge either because the global script does not provide adequate remedies for local conflicts or because global scripts are not in step with or attuned to local traditions, expectations and interests and international actors, when implementing policies, prove incapable of reconciling global norms with local conditions.

This report contributes to the debate on effective peacekeeping/peacebuilding on the African continent by analysing the policies and activities of the African Union (AU) and the European Union (EU) as well as some of its member states with regard to two global norms: (a) Protection of Civilians (POC) as one task of peacekeeping operations, and (b) Security Sector Reform (SSR). The focus on the AU and the EU is due to the significantly increased role of both organisations in peacebuilding on the African continent. Both organisations have established a close working relationship with the UN and both undertake to act according to global norms. Moreover, they depend on each other. While the AU depends heavily on the material support of the EU (Gänzle/Grimm 2010), the EU, claiming to facilitate ‘African solutions to African problems’, depends on the provision of legitimacy by the AU.

The paper will proceed as follows: we will a) reconstruct the respective global norms and their interpretation by the EU and AU, and b) discuss to what extent and with what consequences these norms have been applied by African and European actors in situations of crisis. The paper will focus on AU and EU peacekeeping missions in the wider Darfur conflict (AMIS and EUFOR Chad/CAR) and SSR peacebuilding efforts by European actors in Sierra Leone and by African actors in Zimbabwe.

A comparative analysis of the emerging POC and SSR norms promises to produce interesting results because the norms vary with regard to their intrusiveness. The protection of civilians has two dimensions – the prevention of human-rights abuses by peacekeeping troops and the protection of civilians from violence committed by armed non-state actors as well as armed formations under the control of the government. This constitutes a challenging task for peacekeepers. Yet, the implementation of the POC norm leads to political conflicts between international actors responsible for peacekeeping and local holders of power if forces of the latter engage in violent acts against civilians and...
perpetrators are effectively confronted. SSR is aimed both at the civilian control of forces and the re-organisation of the military under democratic auspices. In many cases, the latter aspect of SSR will prove especially controversial as it interferes directly with existing political structures and hierarchies.

We will analyse the implementation of POC doctrines by using the example of the AMIS and EUFOR Chad/CAR missions because both aimed at the protection of civilians and took place in the same conflict setting. With regard to the implementation of SSR doctrines by European and African actors, we decided to look at a significant European engagement in Sierra Leone as well as the most important case of African SSR, the involvement of the South African Development Community (SADC) in Zimbabwe after the conclusion of the Global Political Agreement in September 2008. In analysing engagement by African actors, we are confronted with the dilemma of the AU having developed (though not yet officially adopted) a SSR doctrine yet so far not having been involved in assisting reform programmes in any African country. SADC, on the other hand, has been assigned, together with the AU, to supervise the political transformation in Zimbabwe including reform of the security forces, but has so far not developed a SSR doctrine. As a first step, SADC Parliamentary Form (SADC PF) has at least urged the sub-regional organisation to adopt the AU Policy Framework on SSR as soon as it has been adopted by the AU itself (OSISA 2012). We therefore decided to look at SADC’s SSR policy in Zimbabwe as it is the only case which can shed some light on future African SSR practices. With regard to European actors, we chose the case of security sector reform in Sierra Leone, where the United Kingdom took the lead. The British efforts preceded and influenced European standards. They are an early example of European SSR efforts in Africa and guided later attempts by the EU and by other European states. Our aim was not to carry out a structured comparison of these cases. Instead, our approach is more modest and aims at empirically exploring rifts that might emerge whenever international actors implement global scripts.

2. Protection of Civilians in Peacekeeping: Convergence of Doctrines and Practices

The recent emergence of doctrines on protection of civilians (POC) as a major objective of peacekeeping operations reinforces a trend in international peacekeeping extending beyond state security and stressing the importance of multidimensional peacebuilding, including human security and human rights as critical components for sustainable peace. This development has important ramifications for the planning and legitimacy of peacekeeping missions. While the UN has been at the forefront of this development, both the AU and EU are emulating this trend by developing POC concepts of their own. On the

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1 The document has been agreed politically. At the point of writing, the AU secretariat was in the process of harmonizing the different translations of the text (see ASSN Newsletter, April 2012).
following pages, we will briefly recapitulate the emergence of POC concepts at the UN level and their adoption at the regional level.

Since the Cold War, UN peacekeeping practice has changed significantly, with the emphasis on the protection of civilians being one of the recent developments. Originally designed to secure fragile peace agreements between conflicting parties, before 1990 peacekeeping constituted a rather passive undertaking. Three core principles stipulated that (a) a precondition to the deployment of UN peacekeeping troops was the consent of the main parties to the conflict, that (b) any peacekeeping mission needed to adhere to impartiality, which at the time was interpreted as entailing the equal treatment of the parties, and that (c) the use of force by the peacekeeping troops was not allowed unless for the purpose of self-defence. Although the norms codified in the UN Charter, humanitarian law and human rights conventions, as well as the principles of consent, impartiality and non-use of force still guide peacekeeping today, their interpretation has changed. The failures of missions in Somalia and former Yugoslavia as well as the policy of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in Rwanda called for a redefinition of the purposes and methods of peacekeeping. The Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, better known as the Brahimi Report after the panel’s chairman Lakhdar Brahimi, constitutes the major work commissioned to work out such a redefinition. Confronted with the problem of ineffectiveness both concerning the execution of the mandates as well as the fulfilment of the superior aim of the mission, namely to secure lasting peace and provide security for the people, the panel arrived at two main conclusions (UNSC 2000: paras. 48–64): Firstly, peacekeeping should attain a more robust character in order to fulfil the purpose of the missions. Secondly, robustness need not contradict the guiding principles but merely calls for their reinterpretation. Thus, once the UN intervention has been consented to, parties to the conflict must not undermine the execution of the mandate by manipulating the mission. Impartiality, in turn, does not necessarily entail the equal treatment of the parties but, rather, stipulates unconditional adherence to the mandate, which might, depending on the conduct of the parties, lead to varying treatment. Furthermore, in addition to its use in self-defence, force may also be deployed for the purpose of defending the mandate.

In humanitarian discourses, awareness of the protection of civilians (POC) as a complex and highly political task had already developed in the 1990s and was provided with a rights-based definition by the ICRC in 1996, according to which POC encompasses ‘all activities aimed at ensuring full respect for the rights of the individual in accordance with the letter and spirit of the relevant bodies of law (human rights law, international humanitarian law and refugee law)’ (ICRC 1999: 21). In the realm of peacekeeping, POC is an emerging norm and its interpretation is still being debated. There is also no consensus on the operationalization of POC in armed conflicts among UN bodies, with OHCHR on the one hand demanding a legal protection approach that focuses on the conduct of UN troops as well as the monitoring and reporting of human rights violations, and DPKO on the other hand conceiving of protection primarily as the provision of physical security (Stensland/Sending 2011: 36). In 2010, DPKO published a POC concept going beyond the humanitarian definition by including the political process and physical protection as essential elements (UN DPKO/DFS 2010). Similarly, OCHA regularly briefs the UNSC on
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POC and, in its latest *Aide Memoire* (2011), underlined the constructive role peacekeeping troops can play in POC if clear strategies are developed, coordination with civil bodies strengthened, troops appropriately trained and sufficient resources provided. Although still a young norm, implementation of POC in UN peacekeeping is proceeding fast: While the UN mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL 1999–2005) was the first peacekeeping mission with an explicit protection mandate, fourteen missions are operating under protection mandates today (AU 2011: 5).

The *Capstone Doctrine* (UN DPKO/DFS 2008: 2.3) considers POC a “core business” of peacekeeping and the *New Horizon*, the latest non-paper on peacekeeping issued by DPKO and the Department of Field Support (DFS), reiterates the importance of robust peacekeeping and the inclusion of POC in the peacekeepers’ tasks, yet emphasizes the need for more clarity in operational guidelines as well as for more political will for these to be implemented successfully (UN DPKO 2009: 21). However, the shift to robust peacekeeping and the deployment of missions to crises where peace is fragile and the political situation highly complex also necessitates increasing resources. As the UN does not possess the requisite capacities, the *New Horizon* emphasizes the importance of partnerships with other relevant stakeholders in peacekeeping activities, among which the EU and the AU are considered key partners (ibid., vi). The demand for more cooperation is not new but had already been articulated by Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his 1992 *Agenda for Peace* (A/47/277, VII). However, due to the current overstretch of UN peacekeeping capacities the need for carrying out peacekeeping under Chapter VIII has become more urgent (UN DPKO/DFS 2009: 4). To ensure effectiveness despite the proliferation of actors, coordination of the organisations’ activities and coherence in their strategic approaches and objectives are needed. To this end, the UN has developed common declarations and plans regarding peacekeeping activities with both the AU and the EU, yet emerging norms such as the shift to robust peacekeeping and wider interpretation of the POC norm remain issues where the organisations nevertheless diverge in their practices.

2.1 EU Doctrine on POC

Although the EU has so far not developed a peacekeeping doctrine, it has incorporated guidelines on POC into its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). While European states contributed to debates at the UN, the EU Council, taking into account developments at the UN, adopted preliminary guidelines on POC in EU-led crisis management operations in 2003 and revised these guidelines in 2010. This EU-UN dialogue is in fact part of a larger pattern of co-evolution, which, together with initiatives by smaller EU states (Jakobsen 2009) and EU institutions, influenced the character of

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2 Other examples of UN norms having been mainstreamed into CFSP are the guidelines on Children in Armed Conflict, the conclusion on promoting gender equality and gender mainstreaming in crisis management, and the document on ‘Mainstreaming human rights across CFSP and other EU policies’. www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/hr/news66.pdf (1.11.2012).
CSDP significantly. To understand the significance of this convergence, one has to take the different points of departure into account. While the doctrine, and less so the practice, of UN peacekeeping has become more robust, compared with its rather timid origins, EU peacekeeping, which was originally envisaged and practiced as robust military interventions, has turned into less robust and more impartial stabilization missions. Initially, European defence had been devised by Britain and France with the lessons of the wars in the former Yugoslavia in mind, according to which humanitarian interventions should be based on a political/military approach that takes sides, evolves rapidly, uses forces in a robust manner, and is sustained in order to rebuild viable political structures. Yet, the initial focus on the generation of large, heavily equipped fighting forces for robust interventions was soon replaced with a more holistic approach to crisis management. Central CSDP doctrines such as the comprehensive concept (Johannsen 2011; Ginsberg/Penksa 2012) and ‘Civil-Military Co-Ordination’ (CMCO) stress the nexus between peace and development and call for an approach which does not focus on peacekeeping as a military endeavour, but combines short-term mediation efforts and civil-military stabilization missions with structural peacebuilding activities (Council of the EU 2005a: 4). In sum, the emerging ‘EU approach to peacekeeping’ reflects a broad approximation of UN practices.

The EU doctrine on POC fits this pattern of convergence. Although the 2003 guidelines did not offer a definition of POC, they nevertheless mirrored the legalistic approach of the UN at the time. POC aimed on the one hand at ensuring the proper behaviour of EU troops vis-à-vis local civilians and on the other hand strove to protect civilians from violent acts committed by local parties. Concerning the first dimension, the 2003 guidelines called for the development of standards, which reflect at minimum the provisions of the UN’s ‘Ten Rules: Code of Personal Conduct for Blue Helmets’. Additionally, the EU developed generic standards of behaviour for ESDP operations (Council of the EU 2005b), which oblige EU personnel to fully observe international humanitarian law, including, when applicable, the laws of armed conflict, and the laws of the host state (Council of the EU 2005c; Arloth/Seidensticker 2007: 19). Concerning the protection of civilians from violence committed by third parties, the 2003 guidelines stipulated that appropriate steps are to be taken to create a secure environment for endangered civilians and that EU forces are to provide special protection and assistance for particularly endangered groups such as internally displaced persons, women and children (Council of the EU 2003: 2f). However, in this respect, the document remained vague and did not contain specific recommendations on ways to ensure physical protection.

In contrast, the 2010 guidelines placed greater emphasis on protection against violence committed by third parties. Following the definition proposed by the ICRC and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee, they define POC as ‘encompassing all activities aimed at obtaining full respect for the rights of the individual in accordance with international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law’ (Council of the EU 2010: 4). While some observers note that the EU is leaning towards a more robust approach than the UN (Kjeksrud et al. 2011), more detailed examination reveals that the EU approach is in accordance with UN doctrines and even less robust than the DPKO approach. Concerning external measures, the paper envisages political dialogue with third parties to further international norm development and compliance (Council of the EU 2010: 6). With regard
to internal measures it calls for mainstreaming POC into the planning and conduct of ESDP missions. Most of the measures mentioned in the report are of a political nature such as facilitating the political (peace) process, working with local and other international actors, monitoring the human rights situation and reporting violations. The most robust measure mentioned in the paper concerns activities such as patrolling and ‘signaling to potential aggressors or perpetrators of human rights violations that they will be held accountable’ (Council of the EU 2010: 12).

2.2 AU Doctrine on POC

The AU is currently developing an operational concept on the protection of civilians in its peace support operations (PSO). Its transition from the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to the AU in 2002 meant a significant increase in the legal-political and institutional abilities held by the continental body, especially regarding matters of peace and security. Deliberately setting itself apart from its defunct predecessor, the African Union was provided with two main features to accomplish the envisaged shift from non-interference to non-indifference: the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and the right to intervene in a member state in case of war crimes, genocide or crimes against humanity (AU Constitutive Act 2002: Art. 4(h)).

The conceptualization of POC for the newly established APSA was undertaken in close cooperation with the UN (particularly OCHA and DPKO) and received financial support from various European and other overseas sources (AU 2011; AU PSC 2011: 3; AU 2010a). It was assigned to an Inter-Departmental Working Group of the AU Commission in acknowledgment of the multifaceted character of the norm covering humanitarian, refugee, political and defence issues (AU 2011: 7). The group adopted a rights-based definition of POC close to the one set forth by the ICRC in 1996 and plans to mainstream POC into the entire APSA (ibid. 7, 12). So far, however, the Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) has essentially been leading the process of adoption of POC in AU policy and subsequently been shaping the reception of the POC norm (AU 2011: 17). In 2010, draft guidelines were developed on POC in peace support operations, including both peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions which are notably close to those issued by DPKO. While the latter proposed a three-tiered approach that encompasses protection through the political process, physical protection and support for a protective environment, the AU guidelines add rights-based protection as a fourth tier (Kjekrud et al. 2011: 13; AU 2010a: 5). The focus on POC in the realm of PSO stems not only from the PSOD’s prominent role in the process but also from the conviction that it is in PSO where the AU can give most meaning to POC (AU 2011: 13).

While Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act has never been explicitly invoked, the AU has deployed peacekeeping troops tasked with the protection of civilians. To date the AU has conducted four peacekeeping operations: the mission to Burundi (AMIB 2003-2004), to Sudan (AMIS 2004-2006), to Somalia (AMISOM 2007-present) as well as several missions to the Comoros (2007-present). All but the missions to the Comoros involved
protection of civilians to varying degrees, although only the AU Mission to Darfur (AMIS) was provided with a protection mandate (Kjekrud et al. 2011: 38-39). Deployment scenarios of the future African Standby Force (ASF) emphasize that PSOs can be explicitly tasked with the protection of civilians (AU 2005a: 3.21, 78). In the latest progress report on the operationalization of the ASF, AU leaders on defence and security expressed the “need for strong political leadership that demonstrates an appetite for POC as a core function of peacekeeping operations” (AU 2010b: 11).

The ASF draft doctrine, which is based on the British Defence Doctrine, sets forth a broad interpretation of the core peacekeeping principles of consent, impartiality and non-use of force. The consent of the parties to the conflict is not regarded in absolute but in relative terms, it is defined as the “degree of cooperation and willingness” (AU 2005a: 3.35, our emphasis). Furthermore, the consent does not only relate to the deployment of the mission but also to the terms of the peace agreement and the fulfilment of the PSO mandate (ibid. 3.35). Therefore, consent may oftentimes only be partial, yet must continuously be strengthened, as it is the core requisite for self-sustaining peace (ibid. 3.35, 3.36). Insights of the Brahimi Report clearly resonate in this conception of consent, just as they do concerning the interpretation of the principle of impartiality. The ASF doctrine explicitly stresses that impartiality does not stand for neutrality, but for an even-handed execution of the mandate (ibid. 3.43). In its conception of the use of force, the doctrine applies an even broader interpretation. Unlike the UN peacekeeping principle of non-use of force that is mitigated only by exceptions of use of force for the purpose of self-defence and defence of the mandate, the ASF doctrine speaks of the principle of minimum necessary use of force (ibid. 3.48). The doctrine sets out that the use of force is allowed for self-defence and defence of the purpose of the mission (ibid. 3.49), thus parallel to the UN principle, however, it also states that “in a situation of chaos or, where the parties are uncoordinated and independent, more force can generally be used” (ibid. 3.48). For the effective execution of POC in PSO, furthermore, the use of force may be sanctioned, especially if applied in peace enforcement missions and when POC is at the core of the mission (AU 2011: 13, 15; AU 2010a: 6).

Summarizing this section, we find an astonishing degree of conformance on the doctrinal level. Both the AU and the EU have adopted new peacekeeping norms that had emerged on the global level. While the EU follows closely the DPKO approach, the AU’s conceptual work on POC goes even one step further by declaring the aim to actively provide protection in PSOs, including through the proportionate use of force. In the next chapter we will ask whether and to what extent both organisations actually adhere to these doctrines when conducting peace operations. Additionally, we will explore whether the implementation of global doctrines in local contexts leads to more effective outcomes or to frictions and unintended consequences.
2.3 European Union in Chad/CAR

So far, the EU mission to Chad and the Central African Republic (EUFOR Chad/CAR) has been the largest and logistically most demanding CSDP mission in Africa. Starting in January 2008, it involved the deployment of as many as 3,700 troops for exactly one year to secure approximately 200,000 km² of one of the most remote, least hospitable and least governed parts of the world, inhabited by approximately 700,000 refugees and internally displaced persons. The mission’s mandate was equally extensive. UNSC Resolution 1778 (2007) authorized EUFOR Chad/CAR under chapter VII ‘to take all necessary measures’ to ‘(i) contribute to protecting civilians in danger, particularly refugees and displaced persons; (ii) facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid […]’; (iii) to contribute to protecting UN personnel […]’. It was also the most dangerous mission putting European troops in the hotspot of multi-faceted conflicts involving rebels, bandits and a proxy war between Chad and Sudan. Moreover, the mission was politically contested. EUFOR Chad/CAR was heavily influenced by and dependent on France. In the view of the French political elite, the mission was closely connected to the atrocities in Darfur. Yet, being aware of the intimate relationship between France and Chadian President Idriss Déby, some of France’s partners such as Germany and the UK saw the mission as “another pet project in support of Francafrique” (Dijkstra 2010: 396). The seeming partiality of the mission was underlined by the fact that EUFOR would draw on the French national mission Epervier, which has been stationed in Chad since 1986 to shield the government against external and internal enemies (Charbonneau 2009: 556). Hence, most EU member-states refused to commit troops. In fact, it took five force generation conferences to obtain the already reduced level of force and the troop-contributing states insisted on provisos, most notably a firm 12 months limit. EUFOR Chad/CAR was to be conducted as a military bridging operation and in close cooperation with a parallel UN mission to the region (MINURCAT). While the unarmed MINURCAT mission was tasked with training a new Chadian police unit that would assume responsibility for security in the refugee camps, EUFOR would provide the protective element.

Was EUFOR Chad/CAR conducted in accordance with the emerging EU peacekeeping doctrine and its focus on the protection of civilians? Or did it resemble traditional French interventions with a focus on regime protection? Some observers do indeed claim that EUFOR was essentially a classical French intervention in multilateral disguise (Berg 2009: 67). According to this view, its effect, if not its intention, has been protection of the authoritarian Déby regime, not of endangered civilians (Charbonneau 2009; Haine 2011: 595). However, closer inspection shows that EUFOR Chad/CAR does not fit this pattern. Exactly because European leaders were aware that EUFOR might be perceived as serving classical French interests, they repeatedly emphasized the ‘neutral, impartial and independent manner’ in which EUFOR would operate (Haine 2011: 594; Seibert 2010: 14). These assurances were mirrored by practice on the ground. Soon after its arrival, EUFOR made a concerted effort to communicate to local communities its neutrality and the limitations of its mandate (Kühne 2009: 26). In fact, EUFOR acted impartially, as is testified by President Déby’s repeated annoyance with EUFOR for allowing anti-government rebels free passage (Dijkstra 2010: 406; Kühne 2009: 27). Impartiality, neutrality and
independence were even stressed to the point that the protection of civilians was pushed to the background. In other words, the convergence between EU and UN peacekeeping doctrines was mirrored by a convergence on the practical level. EUFOR acted to protect civilians and UN personnel, but only if and when threats occurred while EU troops happened to be around (Mattelaer 2008: 27). Not surprisingly, observers note that the protective effect was most heavily felt in the vicinity of the five forward bases (Seibert 2010: 37). In general, most observers note ‘that the European forces only had a marginal effect on the ground’ (Seibert 2010: 41) while some even argue that the humanitarian situation worsened during the deployment of EUFOR (Berg 2009: 65).

This underachievement was due to several factors. First, local actors were allowed to manipulate the mission. President Déby, in particular, insisted on a restricted mandate that did not allow for the deployment of EUFOR within the camps or at the border, as originally planned. He also hampered the deployment of MINURCAT Police trainers (Haine 2011: 596). As the greatest threat to civilians did not result from cross-border raids of Darfurian militias, but from banditry within the camps to which EU forces had no access, there was little EUFOR could do to protect endangered civilians (Seibert 2010: 25). Equally detrimental for the mission as such and for the protection of civilians in a broader context was the French failure to insist on political reforms.

Secondly, EUFOR was weakened by self-made restrictions. By emphasizing its impartiality, the mission undermined its deterrence effect vis-à-vis bandits and local armed groups. Moreover, the politically motivated insistence on a fixed time limit relieved the EU from defining a satisfactory end-state. Instead, mission planning was based on an end-date, irrespective of whether the situation on the ground had improved (Mattelaer 2008: 30). In theory, EUFOR’s protective functions were to be taken over by MINURCAT. In practice, the transition was poorly planned and fraught with difficulties (Dijkstra 2010: 396).

Thirdly, the lessons learned from EUFOR Chad/CAR point to a more systematic failure. As EU peacekeeping resembles UN practice more and more, it moves away from the original intention to make humanitarian interventions robust, sustainable and aimed at clear and achievable political objectives. It is noteworthy that as CSDP matured, EU missions became less robust. Just like EUFOR Chad/CAR, the first EU mission to Africa, Operation Artemis (2003) in the Ituri region in Eastern Congo, was mandated under Chapter VII to protect camps of internally displaced persons and the civilian population. During this mission, EU commanders did not shy away from using superior firepower to enforce the mandate and rebuff armed rebel groups (Ulriksen/Gourlay/Mace 2004). At a critical moment during the stabilization mission in the Congolese capital Kinshasa (EUFOR DR Congo) in 2006, EU troops resorted to a show of superior force in order to defend the mandate. In contrast, EUFOR Chad/CAR remained mostly passive. Given the vast gap between threats to civilians on the one hand and EUFOR’s passivity on the other, it appears that as EU peacekeeping converged with UN practices, it also lost its ability to provide effective solutions.
2.4 African Union in Darfur

The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) was initially deployed as a ceasefire monitoring group. In Sudan, already conflict-ridden for decades, a humanitarian catastrophe had developed due to fighting between armed rebel forces demanding greater autonomy for the neglected Darfur region and forces supported by the government aiming to oppress secessionist ambitions (Middleton/O’Keefe 2006: 547). As the Sudanese military was for the largest part occupied with the conflict centred in the South, the government made use of paramilitary forces and Arab militia, called Janjaweed, to counteract the rebels’ attacks on the state (Ekengard 2006: 12f). While tasked with counterinsurgency, the Janjaweed’s strategy was not confined to action targeting the rebels but instead was aimed at civilians supposedly supporting them and resulted in countless human rights violations (Ekengard 2006: 13; United Nations 2005: 54). In 2005, the United Nations estimated that 1.65 million Darfuri had been internally displaced and that 200,000 had fled to Chad (United Nations 2005, 3).

Initiated by Chadian President Déby, a Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement was brokered in April 2004 with the assistance of the AU between the Sudanese government (GoS) and the then two major rebel factions, the Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Sudan Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). Although the parties consented to an AU ceasefire-monitoring group, AMIS, initially consisting of 60 military observers, found itself confronted with ongoing and massive acts of violence (Bergholm 2009: 113). The number of troops was quickly raised and a year later the mission’s mandate was amended to incorporate, among others, an explicit protection mandate. Nevertheless, displacement and violence against civilians continued unabated and AMIS’ minor achievements, e.g. through sporadic firewood patrols (Ekengard 2006: 31-34), were confined to the local level, while AMIS stood out as a major failure regarding the overall picture (Williams 2009: 633).

This failure was firstly due to the priority assigned to the consent of the conflicting parties in general and the government of Sudan (GoS) in particular. Khartoum, using the dependency of the AU and the wider peace process on its support and its seat in the AU Peace and Security Council when the AMIS mandate was amended, insisted on a severely restricted mandate, which limited the troops’ abilities to protect civilians to situations “under imminent threat and in the immediate vicinity, within resources and capability, it being understood that the protection of the civilian population is the responsibility of the GoS […]” (Bergholm 2010: 22; AU PSC 2004: 6). The GoS had consented to the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement to avoid a peacekeeping mission with more powers and later accepted a hybrid UN-AU peacekeeping mission provided that it retained an ‘African character’ and that the force commander was appointed by the AU (Bergholm 2009: 108; de Waal/Flint 2008: 268). Confronted with this dilemma, the AU did not manage to strategically reconcile the peacekeeping principle of consent with its commitment to non-indifference and the protection of civilians, in effect leaving the missions at the mercy of the GoS.
Yet, bending to the Sudanese government’s preferences was not the only factor impeding the AU missions’ ability to effectively protect civilians. The AU mission lacked adequate capacities and, furthermore, was plagued by corruption (de Waal/Flint 2008: 194). Thirdly, and more importantly, the mission lacked operational and tactical guidelines on the implementation of the protection mandate (AU 2011: 8; O’Neill/Cassis 2005). The lack of common Rules of Engagement meant that interpretation of the protective mandate was left to the troop-providing states. While under the first Nigerian General, even before the protection mandate was in place, troops were in several instances able to protect civilians through bending the mandate (de Waal/Flint 2008: 176), they lost their combative attitude under successive commanders. This observation fits with the assessment of Appiah Mensah, former commander of AMIS, that failure to translate AU doctrines into binding guidelines will result in national practices and respective national Rules of Engagement filling this void (Appiah-Mensah 2005). Although provided with a protection mandate, the AU troops in consequence used too little (threat of) force to effectively implement it (pers. comm. with a representative of the AU, 3 April). The AU had responded to the situation in Darfur with ‘its heart, not its head’, as an advisor to the AU said (quoted in de Waal/Flint 2008: 175). Eager to let the world see deeds follow the declaratory commitments to an involved continental organisation, and hoping to gain legitimacy in the eyes of the international community, the AU engaged in a mission which was beyond its political, strategic and operational capacities (see CFR Interview with Obasanjo, Sep 2004; Bergholm 2009: 109f).

Likewise in Somalia, considerable discrepancy between doctrinal developments on the continental level and behaviour on the local level appears, in this case with different consequences. While adherence to international humanitarian law has been identified as an essential element of POC in Addis, the AMISOM troops have been repeatedly accused of using force indiscriminately and incurring a disproportionate number of civilian losses through their attacks on the militia (Human Rights Watch 2011; Amnesty International 2011). Again, the mission has failed to improve the amount of protection for civilians due to the missing translation of the doctrine into operational guidelines and adherence of troops to the latter. The AU has recently reacted to these shortcomings, arranged a three-day roundtable on enhancing AMISOM commitment to international humanitarian law, called on AMISOM to adhere to international humanitarian law and introduced an indirect fire policy (AU PSC 2011: 2; UNSC 2012). While applauded for the efforts, the results remain to be seen.

The above analyses of EU and AU peacekeeping missions show that even considerable convergence of AU and EU peacekeeping doctrines to global (UN) norms does not translate directly into more effective peacekeeping on the local level. As the AU mission to Darfur indicates, successful translation of doctrine into practice is not self-evident. In fact, the AU is faced with decisive challenges in the provision of POC in its operations and faces allegations both of failure to effectively protect the population in its missions and to even fulfill the minimum ‘do no harm’ doctrine. Against this, the EUFOR Chad/CAR mission indicates that doctrinal convergence does not necessarily lead to greater effectiveness in implementation.
3. Security Sector Reform: Convergence of Doctrines

The emergence of security sector reform as a necessary component of peacebuilding strategies can be traced back to a speech that UK Development Minister Clare Short gave in 1999 at King’s College in London on ‘Security Sector Reform and the Elimination of Poverty’. All main principles of SSR were already mentioned: oversight of the security sector by civilian and democratic authorities, the right-sizing of security forces and the idea of enhancing knowledge about human rights and humanitarian law among security forces (Short 1999). The UK Department for International Development (DFID) then pushed the SSR concept onto the international agenda. It was under the UK’s initiative and leadership that SSR was discussed at the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) whose Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation (CPDC), created in 1995, dealt with SSR-related issues even before its emergence (Bryden 2007: 65). CPDC’s conceptual work laid the groundwork for the development of the 2007 OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform (OECD DAC 2007). Under strong leadership from the UK CPDC Chair, a process was initiated in 2005 with the objective of distilling SSR good practices and lessons learned to provide practical guidance to donor support for SSR programmes (Bryden 2007: 68-69). The key policy and operational commitments emerging from the handbook were endorsed by DAC Ministers and Heads of Agency at the DAC High Level Meeting in April 2007. It is currently the state-of-the-art SSR handbook and the blueprint for most SSR programmes all over the world.

The OECD DAC handbook on SSR strongly influenced other international organisations’ take on SSR. The UN, EU, NATO, OSCE, ECOWAS, the Council of Europe, the World Bank and the IMF all developed their own sets of SSR principles – often following closely the OECD DAC Handbook. Even if these organisations differ in terms of geographical coverage, character and activity, they thus developed similar norm sets and concepts. Particularly important for the ‘universalization’ of the SSR concept has been its adoption by the UN. In July 2005, the Security Council Presidency recognized ‘that security sector reform is an essential element of any stabilisation process in post-conflict environments’ and highlighted the need for more coherent approaches by the UN and the international community (Scherrer 2007: 182). In the statement made by the President of the Security Council after the first Security Council open debate on SSR in February 2007 under the Slovak Presidency, it was underlined that the UN ‘has a crucial role to play in promoting comprehensive, coherent, and coordinated international support to nationally-owned security sector reform programmes’ (UNSC 2007). SSR is nowadays

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3 The first set of guidelines, issued in 1997, is the aforementioned paper Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation on the Threshold of the 21st Century. In 2001, the OECD DAC developed a supplement to these guidelines, The DAC Guidelines: Helping Prevent Violent Conflict (OECD DAC 2001) which further elaborates on the political nature of security issues, the need for democratic oversight and accountability of the security sector as well as the need for a comprehensive approach to SSR.

4 The Security and Development Nexus: Challenges for Aid (OECD DAC 2004); Security System Reform and Governance: Policy and Good Practice (OECD DAC 2005); Enhancing Security and Justice Service Delivery (OECD DAC 2007).
well established with an SSR Unit at the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in New York and is present in many UN missions as SSR units, for instance in East Timor, Burundi, DRC, etc. But even if there is no formal SSR unit, many other units are mandated to support SSR-related activity. National armies and police forces are often targeted and supported by policy, legal and technical advice by the UN: The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI), as well as the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), to name but a few, all had tasks within the realm of SSR.

Thus, through policy developments and international interventions, the word has been spread – ‘SSR is considered a key concept that has been accepted and implemented by almost all of the major international organisations that deal with security issues.

3.1 The EU’s SSR concepts

The evolution of the EU SSR concepts demonstrates that the EU is as much a recipient of global norms as it is a promoter of its own norms beyond Europe. While some EU member states have been leading the way in terms of SSR norm and policy development – notably the UK and the Netherlands within the UN – it took the EU some time to make progress in its own normative developments. This delay was due to the rivalries between the Council and the Commission which still hamper the concept’s efficient implementation today. SSR was included in four different agendas (conflict prevention, crisis management, good governance and enlargement). While the crisis management agenda under the command of the Council is geared more towards short-term actions and missions that deal with ‘hard’ security issues (for example, providing training and equipment for military personnel), the other agendas are managed by the Commission and based on long-term approaches. Facilitated mainly through the EU’s external assistance and development programmes, they are geared towards ‘soft’ SSR norms such as transparency, democratic oversight and human rights (for example, capacity building for members of parliamentary committees). Both actors developed their own SSR concepts (the Concept for European Security and Defense Policy Support to SSR, developed by the Council of the EU 2005, and the Commission’s Concept for European Community Support for SSR, Commission 2006) that were subsequently linked though not merged under the EU Policy Framework on SSR in June 2006. This has resulted in SSR cutting across different policy areas and subsequently lacking a clear policy framework that is implemented by institutions dedicated exclusively to SSR. The result is what some call the cross-pillar challenge, identified as the biggest challenge of the EU SSR approach (Sherriff 2007: 91).

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5 Also, SSR-related activities rarely are organised into SSR programmes and SSR is rarely mentioned as a programme’s objective.

6 To date, the only examples of a coordinated EU approach to SSR implementation include the EU action in Macedonia and the joint planning of EU SSR activities in Guinea-Bissau and the DRC.
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Even though both concepts differ, they resemble one another when it comes to the normative content of SSR. To begin with, the EU proposes a holistic approach to security in using the OECD’s definition of the security sector: in addition to the military as a core security actor, this also includes law enforcement institutions, security management and oversight bodies, justice institutions, non-state security forces and other non-state entities such as civil society organisations as well. In addition, the SSR principles and key norms resemble the ones already propagated by the OECD. First, local ownership is regarded as paramount for any success and is thus viewed as a core principle by the EU (Council of the EU 2005: 4; Council of the EU 2006c: 7). Second, the EU promotes the good governance of the security sector (Council of the EU 2005: 4, paragraph 1 and 2; Council of the EU 2006c: 7f) which entails democratic and civilian control, as well as the accountability and transparency of the security sector. Third, the EU demands compliance of security actors with internationally recognized values and standards (Council of the EU 2005: 4, paragraph 1, Council of the EU 2005: 9, paragraph 20). Fourth, the EU promotes the efficiency and effectiveness of the security sector (Council of the EU 2005: 4, paragraph 1; Council of the EU 2005: 10, paragraph 25; Council of the EU 2005: 16, paragraph 41; Council of the EU 2006: 3).

To sum up, EU norm development in the field of SSR is influenced from above (the OECD and to some degree the UN) just as much as it is from below (its member states, most notably the UK). In general, the EU portrays SSR as a holistic and long-term approach corresponding with its emphasis on conflict prevention, development and human rights. Since SSR is still a cross-cutting issue within the EU and no single EU institution is able to take the lead on SSR-related matters, member states often not only influence EU policies and implementation, but also manage to align EU programmes with their own SSR programmes in developing countries.7

3.2 AU’s SSR concept

The African Union’s response to the emerging SSR norms is influenced by two of its own principles. On the one hand, the AU Constitutive Act is based on a restricted interpretation of sovereignty and emphasizes peace and (human) security, together with democracy and good governance. On the other hand, it reflects the idea that Africa should be able to come up with African solutions to African problems (Selassie 1963: 285) and thus demonstrates African emancipation from Northern tutelage (Dembinski/Reinold 2011: 11). In keeping with this standpoint, many African critics of the SSR concept claim that it is a Western concept (Hutchful/Fayemi 2005) (which often served as a vehicle for foreign intervention), and demanded the development of a non-Western approach to SSR. One important step in this regard was the Cape Town UN SSR meeting in 2007. Recommendations adopted at the meeting stressed the importance of local ownership, capacity

7 For example, the UK managed to integrate EU support for Sierra Leone within its overall strategy for supporting SSR there.
building, and the role of sub-regional organisations. As a result of these recommendations, the AU Assembly decided to develop its own Policy Framework on SSR (AU Assembly Decision 177 (X) of February 2008). Subsequently, an AU SSR officer was appointed in early 2009 and a permanent office devoted to Africa’s security sector was established within the Defense and Security Division (Tadesse 2010: 18). The UN welcomed these steps and held a UN-AU consultation on SSR in Addis Ababa in March 2009, with the aim of supporting the development of the AU SSR concept (Tadesse 2010: 19). The draft AU Policy Framework on SSR was first presented at a meeting in Addis Ababa in May 2010 and has subsequently been debated in a number of consultative processes with government officials and civil society organisations. The resulting SSR concept is expected to be adopted by the AU Assembly soon.

The AU debates reflect all major global SSR norms and underlying principles. The Post-Conflict Reconstruction/Development Policy (PCRD) features a holistic approach to SSR, pointing at the effectiveness and efficiency of the security sector, respect for local ownership, democratic and civilian control of the security sector (including transparency and accountability), and respect for international values such as human rights and international humanitarian law, etc. (AU 2005b). Similarly, the AU Policy Framework on SSR has so far identified 12 basic SSR principles. These don’t seem to differ from the UN SSR concept and the consultants at the meeting in Addis Ababa had difficulties identifying specifically African principles (Mlambo 2010: 173).

Yet, despite the apparent resemblance, different interpretations appear. Many African scholars and practitioners pointed out the need for transformation, rather than reform, of the security sector (see especially the contributions by African scholars to Bryden/Olonisakin 2010). Transformation can be understood as meaning real change of behaviour and political structures (Bryden/Olonisakin 2010: 4). Proponents of Security Sector Transformation state that transformation adds to SSR the need to take African (colonial) history and peculiarities into consideration (Bryden/Olonisakin 2010: 9). Interestingly, the term transformation was used not only in the debate, but also in the Post-Conflict Reconstruction/Development Policy (PCRD) (paragraph 25c) and figures in the draft version of the AU Policy Framework on SSR as well. A more substantial difference concerns the meaning of local ownership. Donors, not wanting to be perceived as infringing upon national sovereignty, embrace this principle and portray themselves as technical facilitators, yet refer to global norms as guiding principles and often insist on control of expenditures (Hutton 2009: 7), while African states demand full control of externally driven or supported SSR efforts (in Burundi, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, etc.).

We thus find similar SSR concepts whose interpretation, however, differs in parts. While European actors promote especially those SSR norms that reflect their own traditions and interests, African actors tend to adopt an SSR concept that strongly resembles international blueprints, yet in some aspects carries differing meanings.

While the adoption of SSR norms and principles at the regional level provides guidance, it is at the national level that these principles are adopted, integrated into national legal frameworks and subsequently implemented. In the following, we examine reform processes in Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe, externally supported by European and African
actors respectively. In Sierra Leone, the UK applied for the first time its SSR policy frameworks which subsequently influenced the EU approach. In Zimbabwe, the South African Development Community’s efforts built on the emerging AU approach.

3.3 SSR in Sierra Leone

After the UK’s military intervention in 2000, Sierra Leone became something of a testing ground for European-driven efforts to reform the security sector in post-conflict countries. (Albrecht/Jackson 2010: 9). Due to the need for total reconstruction of state structures after the end of the civil war and to the UK’s massive financial engagement the external influence in SSR in Sierra Leone has been very strong. Great-Britain was not only very active in terms of military training through the UK-led International Military Assistance Training Team (IMATT), but even took on an executive role during the implementation of SSR. Some British advisors assumed posts within the Sierra Leonean security sector. The most visible example was the British (retired) police officer Keith Biddle who acted as the Inspector General of the Sierra Leonean Police (SLP) and was the driving force behind most parts of the police reform. Additionally, hundreds of British experts were deployed as mentors and advisors to their Sierra Leonean counterparts (Le Grys 2010: 42). Reform efforts concerned a) the level of policy and strategy papers, b) the legal framework, and c) regulatory instruments.

At the strategy and policy level, the National Security Policy and the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) as well as other documents dealing with security issues drafted since the involvement of the UK entail the concept of human security as well as the concept of democratic and civilian control of the security sector (Ebo 2004: 56; Le Grys 2010: 41). External support for the development of these papers was of utmost importance (Ashington-Pickett 2010: 24). The only exception to this was the Defense White Paper which has been mainly drafted by Sierra Leonean actors (even though input was given by IMATT), which, interestingly enough, was criticized by the British-run Sierra Leone Security Sector Programme (SILSEP) staff, because it called for a restructuring of the British-designed Command Structure of the Republic of Sierra Leone’s Armed Forces (RSLAF) according to local needs and culture.

The legal and institutional reforms aimed primarily at establishing new institutions and reforming existing ones. For example, a National Security Council was created, complemented by provincial and district security committees (PROSECs and DISECs). The Sierra Leonean intelligence service changed as well: the National Security and Central Intelligence Act 2002 led to the creation of the Central Intelligence and Security Unit (CISU) and installed a system of civilian and democratic oversight of the CISU. The same law founded the Office of National Security (ONS). The ONS serves as the secretary of the

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8 The linking of development with security also appears in the Sierra Leone Vision 2025 and the governance and corruption survey of 2002 (Osho Coker 2010: 111).
NSC and is the intellectual driving force behind the reform of the security sector. Intelligence reform was supported by British advisors, especially the intelligence and security advisor (ISA) whose task was to “shepherd the passing of the National Security and Central Intelligence Act” (Ashington-Pickett 2010: 21). This law was not so much influenced by British legislation directly, but by laws of other African (mainly Anglophone) countries (Ashington-Pickett 2010: 26), which often based their respective laws on the British models. As far as military reform is concerned, SILSEP was tasked with bringing the RSLAF under a system of democratic control, which is based on the UK model of dual civil/military command (Horn/Olonisakin 2006: 119). The most important law for the armed forces is the Sierra Leone Military Forces Bill of 1961, which has been changed many times since. The most important amendments after the beginning of the comprehensive SSR in Sierra Leone were adopted in 2003 with the establishment of a Board of Inquiry (the Board of Inquiry Rules 2003) and the reform of the court martial procedure (the Court Martial Procedure Rules 2003). Both reforms raised the standards of jurisdictional and internal control within the RSLAF to the level of international SSR standards, introducing, for example, observance of international human rights standards. The reform of the Sierra Leonean police sector, too, has been driven mainly by external actors according to international standards. Reforms changed the rank system, introduced an internal complaint and disciplinary mechanism, established oversight through the creation of the Executive Management Board, introduced the concept of community policing, and determined that the essential role of the police force consists in ensuring internal safety (Fakondo 2010: 162–165).

Even regulatory instruments and policies such as the 2006 Military Aid to Civilian Power (MACP) directive, which regulates the use of the armed forces within the country, were created on the basis of British models or British-based African models. What is more, British advisers heavily influenced the drafting of standard operating procedures as well as staff regulations for the military and the police forces (Ashington-Pickett 2010: 27).

We therefore conclude that the overall reform of the security sector followed international or in certain cases even British models. As Robert Ashington-Pickett, the British Intelligence and Security Advisor to the ONS and CISU from 2000 to 2003 stated: ‘organisations would grow in line with their ability to absorb growth and internalize guiding SSR principles’ (Ashington-Pickett 2010: 24). As a consequence, Sierra Leone now has a state-of-the-art SSR framework, which has been designed and in some cases even adopted by external actors. While laws needed to be adopted by parliament, policy papers and regulatory instruments were often issued by the ministries where external actors had more influence. Thus, it is no surprise that the major legal reforms took place at an early stage of the SSR where external involvement has been most keenly felt (Le Grys 2010: 55).

In other words, most global SSR norms were incorporated in Sierra Leone’s legal framework. That is to say, the material or substantive SSR norms were followed while

9 Nelson-Williams even stated that IMATT even had “the final say about the running of the RSLAF” (Nelson-Williams 2010: 127).
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another very important procedural norm – respecting national and local ownership – was not consistently observed. Respecting substantive and procedural SSR norms at the same time proved to be an extremely difficult balancing act – almost impossible for external actors to handle if they wanted to operate according to pre-established guidelines and benchmarks for their SSR projects. It is this lack of respect for national and local ownership that provokes many commentators to say that the Sierra Leonean SSR model is partly a replica of the UK model, doubting whether this model will prove appropriate in the long term (Horn/Olonisakin 2006: 121). In fact, the interpretation and implementation of SSR norms, laws, and regulations already deviate today from the external model. This is partly due to the fact that the external actors did not look beyond the formal adoption of SSR norms (which was often the benchmark for their own activities and project proposals).

Especially when it comes to the principle of civilian and democratic control of the security sector many observers fear that it did not take root and its observance is for now mainly due to the ongoing UK presence in the country (Horn/Olonisakin 2006: 120). Some of the oversight bodies instituted do not even convene while others do not act within the bounds of their intended area of responsibility. It was easier for the Sierra Leonean government to accept training and equipment for the security forces (thus providing stability) than to accept a system of checks and balances. It was also often difficult for local actors to absorb so many new procedures (Horn/Olonisakin 2006: 116). The reformed military law system provides a good example of this. While the only legal expert in the entire military law system was made ombudsman, proper functioning still hinges on the training of two Sierra Leonean officers to become military lawyers. Also, the (British) disciplinary and re-dress system as well as the court martial procedural rules foresee a strong and active part in all their procedures by the commanding officer (CO). Yet, almost no CO has any grasp of his/her obligations under these rules. Furthermore, experts state that a true change in the mentality of the security actors has not occurred yet (von Gienanth/Hansen 2006: 5; Ebo 2004: 61). There is a façade of a functioning security sector, but the imported sets of norms do not appear to be adequate for the realities on the ground (Horn/Olonisakin 2006: 110). While SSR policies, laws and regulations have successfully been aligned to global SSR standards, the introduction of these SSR norms does not necessarily accommodate local adaptation so that SSR is effective and sustainable. Even though the SSR framework resembles its counterpart abroad, such reforms have differing meanings, are not implemented, known, or accepted. The adoption of SSR norms on paper and resistance in practice thus results in an artificial exercise that often does not produce greater effectiveness in providing human security or building peace. External SSR norm entrepreneurs, due to their established methodologies and benchmarks, are fixated on convergence of regulations, while national elites pick the SSR norms that most closely match their interests (for example, professionalism that increases the effectiveness and effi-

10 This alignment has been achieved through processes of norm diffusion at three different levels: First, policy and strategy papers often introduce the broader SSR principles. Second, bilateral actors bring in their legal set-up from back home through detailed legal reforms. Third, the laws are operationalized through corresponding regulatory frameworks – an entry point used by external advisors in particular to institute their models because their implementation is easier.
cency of security forces). To put it differently, the British experts had to disrespect the procedural norm of national and local ownership in order to push the substantive SSR norms through while Sierra Leonean counterparts often asked for the respect of local ownership in order to dilute some of the substantial norms.

3.4 SSR in Zimbabwe

Calls for a reform of Zimbabwe’s security forces have been made ever since its independence. These calls have, however, become more vocal over the last ten years in which the democratic space has diminished ever further. Especially before and during election periods (the 2002 and 2008 presidential elections), it has become clear that Zimbabwean security forces (the Zimbabwean Defence Force (ZDF), the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) and the Central Intelligence Organization (CIO))\(^{11}\) cannot be considered neutral (Chitiyo 2009; Hendricks/Hutton 2009; Hendricks/Musavengana 2010). They tried to influence the election process on several occasions and have altered the outcome of the political struggle. The most well-known example is the statement reiterated by the Head of Staff of the ZDF arguing that the armed forces will never accept a president who has not fought in the independence struggle (thus pledging allegiance to President Robert Mugabe in his fight against Morgan Tsvangirai, the leader of the most important opposition party, Movement for Democratic Change (MDC)). There are many more examples of the security forces not remaining neutral despite such neutrality being enshrined in the Zimbabwean Constitution. This lack of neutrality is rooted in Zimbabwe’s colonial past and the heritage of the liberation struggle (Chitiyo 2009: 2).\(^{12}\) This history has had an effect on the way security forces interact with other state institutions and society at large. Most notably, it is the baggage from the liberation struggle, for example ZANU’s need to operate underground or abroad, that explains the lack of transparency and the security forces’ penchant for secrecy. This past is most visible in the veterans’ organisations that play a central role in today’s politics, especially in regard to land reform, as well as in the intricate relationships between those who fought in the liberation struggle and the highest echelons of today’s state structures.

In 2008, SSR was a prominent feature of the Global Political Agreement (GPA). This agreement was established after the last elections (2008) resulted in a political stalemate between Mugabe’s ZANU-PF and Morgan Tsvangirai’s MDC. The GPA installed Morgan Tsvangirai as Zimbabwe’s Prime Minister and described in broad terms a future process of political transformation, demanding, inter alia, that the Zimbabwean security forces act

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11 The gaps in terms of creating a democratic governance system for the security sector are considered greatest within the intelligence sector because of the lack of legislation and oversight measures (Chitiyo 2009: 8f).

12 Also problematic was the ZDF’s involvement in the civil war in the Democratic Republic of Congo and finally, the integration of war veterans who even today play an important role in Zimbabwe’s political process.
according to the highest standards of human rights and the rule of law. The South African Development Community, which had brokered the GPA, also took up the role of guaranteeing its implementation. SADC’s head of States nominated South Africa’s President Jacob Zuma as its facilitator (and mediator) for the political process in Zimbabwe, a post he held until the President of Tanzania Jakaya Kikwete was elected by SADC’s heads of states as the new facilitator for Zimbabwe in August 2012. Despite the provisions of the GPA, SSR has not really been embraced by Mugabe and his party, the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF). Instead, critics claim that ZANU–PFs leading role rests ultimately on the support of an unreformed, but directly controlled, security apparatus.

In spite of this obvious resistance to change, SADC adopted a low-key approach, assuming that any reform of the security sector must be based on the consent of the parties involved and thus preferring behind-the-scenes negotiations. Jacob Zuma, too, shied away from any statement that might alienate him from Mugabe.

It remains to be seen whether or not this approach will eventually bear fruit. While critics deplore the passive stance of SADC in the overall political process (Dzinesa/Zambara 2010) and the snail’s pace of the SSR process in particular, optimistic voices refer to first steps in the right direction. Most notable in this regard has been the adoption of the National Security Act (April 2009) which established a revised National Security Council (NSC) – a new civilian oversight institution that demilitarized the old NSC and provides for multiparty representation (Chitiyo 2009: 35).

The next step in the SSR process would be the adoption of a new constitution whose draft text has finally been developed (July 2012). The negotiations over the new constitution took so long precisely because of the disagreements between ZANU–PF and the opposition over the issue of security sector reform and the devolution of power. Section 11 of the draft Constitution demands that the police, the intelligence services, the army and the correctional services must act in a non-partisan manner and members of the security forces must be subordinate to the civilian authority of the country. Whether the constitution will ever be adopted by referendum and enacted remains to be seen – according to recent reports ZANU–PF wants to renegotiate the draft text.

At the time of writing, the main question in regard to SSR is whether reforms should take place before or after the next elections (scheduled for 2013). ZANU–PF and the security forces call for a postponement of SSR while Tsvangirai’s MDC made reforms a

precondition for any credible and peaceful election. At this crucial moment, SADC (and the AU as the other guarantor of the GPA) is still struggling to define its position. While Lindiwe Zulu, President Jacob Zuma’s foreign policy advisor and a member of South Africa’s facilitation team, argues that SSR has to be tackled before the next elections, Zuma seemed to be hesitating. As a result, SADC has not clearly stated whether SSR should take place before or after the elections.

To summarize, we find that neither the European nor the African SSR efforts have been particularly effective. In Sierra Leone, the British efforts have been rather successful on the surface of doctrines, strategy papers and legal acts, but did not trickle down and did not affect the behavior of national actors. In Zimbabwe, SADC’s and especially South Africa’s SSR efforts remain somehow inconclusive. The limited success in both cases is not surprising. SSR is controversial, would fundamentally change the target country’s political power balance, thus often lacks national ownership and is therefore bound to meet open or concealed resistance. As a reaction to open resistance or delaying tactics, European actors usually ask for deeper reforms (and are easily satisfied with legislative reforms on paper and superficial reforms – demanding the incorporation of substantive SSR norms while also disregarding the procedural norms of national and local ownership) while African external actors shy away from applying pressure and thus tend to postpone SSR reforms. While African and European approaches differ, both seem to be limited in their effectiveness in promoting and supporting sustainable SSR.

Conclusion

This report contributes to the debate on the effectiveness of international peacekeeping and peacebuilding by addressing two questions: Firstly, do relevant international actors such as the EU and the AU uphold global norms and do they share a common understanding of these norms? Secondly, does the adoption of global norms at the declaratory level guide the actual behavior of either organisation and do these global approaches contribute to effective policies at the local level?

Our findings suggest a rather mixed picture. Concerning the first question, we find that both organisations do indeed adopt global norms to a high degree. The alignment of African and European doctrines on peacekeeping and peacebuilding with UN norms and scripts is promising and can be considered an indicator that a layered system of global security governance based on strong and connected RSAs could be both effective and legitimate. Yet, we also notice that both the EU and the AU interpret certain aspects of global norms differently. On the one hand, the AU promotes a more ambitious understanding of POC and SSR norms. The African organisation assents to a robust use of force in the defence of a peacekeeping mandate and calls for security sector transformation, instead of mere reform. On the other hand, AU doctrines demand strong African influence over the implementation of international peacekeeping and SSR efforts.

Concerning the second question, we find that the adoption of global norms by the AU and the EU at the declaratory level does not necessarily result in increased effectiveness at the local level. Our cases suggest that taking global scripts applying them as effective local solutions might be hampered by three types of friction:

(1) Global norms may suggest policy responses which do not fit local challenges and needs. Adherence to global norms encourages a ‘one size fits all’ mentality. In other words, actors tend to interpret specific challenges according to pre-defined categories and respond by following established rules and procedures, irrespective of the specific circumstances on the ground. In our case, evidence for this tendency is discernible with regard to European peacekeeping. Here, we observe a striking resemblance of the European approach to peacekeeping with UN doctrines and practices. Convergence goes well beyond doctrines and affects practices at the level of missions and individual units. This process, however, is not driven by efficiency criteria. It not only erodes the initial rationale for a division of labour between both organisations, whereby the EU would enrich UN peacekeeping with particular qualities such as robustness. Given the uncompromising nature of wars in some parts of this world (Reno 2012), this close resemblance might also adversely affect the prospects of providing effective protection in peacekeeping.

(2) Global norms are translated into practice by international actors but do not mesh with the traditions and interests of local actors and thus do not penetrate deeply enough to the local level to affect the behavior of respective actors. We find evidence for this kind of friction in two of our cases: African peacekeeping in Sudan and Somalia and European SSR programmes in Sierra Leone.
Concerning peacekeeping on the part of the African Union, we find few indicators that the ambitious African POC doctrine affects AU peacekeeping missions and the conduct of peacekeeping troops on the ground. In Sudan, AU troops remained rather passive, even though the amended mandate authorized them to protect civilians. In Somalia, AU troops proceed with rigor, but are accused of not discriminating sufficiently between combatants and non-combatants. Our observations in the field of Security Sector Reform in Sierra Leone point in a similar direction. Western supported SSR programmes result in the incorporation of SSR norms at the level of national regulations but do not affect the behavior of relevant local actors and do not result in a thorough reorganisation of the security apparatus.

Regional actors adopt global norms in formal terms but implement them in a way that compromises the intention of the norm. We find some evidence for this kind of friction with regard to SSR in Zimbabwe. It is too early to provide an assessment of security sector reform in Zimbabwe and of SADC’s consensus-orientated approach. Nevertheless, one might well speculate that SADC’s attempt to find a solution by working with the Zimbabwean security forces might result in reforms which leave the existing power structures in place.

These preliminary observations may not suffice to draw definitive conclusions yet. The adoption of SSR and POC doctrines in the African context occurred only recently, and it is too early to decide with certainty whether and to what extent these doctrines will eventually trickle down and affect behavior at the local level. The observations should, however, serve as a warning sign that harmonizing doctrines should not be confused with achieving greater effectiveness in practice.
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List of abbreviations

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AMIS</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Sudan</td>
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<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Somalia</td>
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<tr>
<td>APSA</td>
<td>African Peace and Security Architecture</td>
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<td>ASF</td>
<td>African Standby Force</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIO</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CISU</td>
<td>Central Intelligence and Security Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMCO</td>
<td>Civil-Military Co-Ordination</td>
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<tr>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Commanding Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPDC</td>
<td>Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Common Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAC</td>
<td>(OECD’s) Development Assistance Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>(United Kingdom) Department for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFS</td>
<td>Department of Field Support</td>
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<tr>
<td>DISEC</td>
<td>District Security Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPKO</td>
<td>(The United Nations) Department of Peace Keeping Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community Of West African States</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EUFOR</td>
<td>European Union Force</td>
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<td>GoS</td>
<td>Sudanese Government</td>
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<td>GPA</td>
<td>Global Political Agreement</td>
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<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<td>IMATT</td>
<td>International Military Assistance Training Team</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISA</td>
<td>Intelligence and Security Advisor</td>
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<tr>
<td>JEM</td>
<td>(Sudan) Justice and Equality Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>MACP</td>
<td>Military Aid to Civilian Power</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDC</td>
<td>Movement for Democratic Change</td>
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<td>MINURCAT</td>
<td>The United Nations Mission in Central African Republic and Chad</td>
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<td>MINUSTAH</td>
<td>The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
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<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
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<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Displacement</td>
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<td>ONS</td>
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<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
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<td>PCRD</td>
<td>Post-Conflict Reconstruction/Development Policy</td>
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<td>Provincial Security Committee</td>
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<td>PRSP</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper</td>
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<td>Peace Support Operations</td>
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<td>South African Development Community</td>
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<td>SILSEP</td>
<td>Sierra Leone Security Sector Programme</td>
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<td>Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army</td>
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<td>Sierra Leone Police</td>
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<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
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<td>The United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZDF</td>
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