The Reform of Guinea-Bissau’s Security Sector
Between demand and practice

Christoph Kohl
Summary

The present report addresses the issue of security sector reform in the small West African state of Guinea-Bissau. Since gaining independence in the 1970s, Guinea-Bissau has been characterized by political instability, coups d’etat, overthrow attempts and the interference of military factions within politics.

Following a brief civil war in 1998-99, the International Community placed the blame for political instability, lawlessness and lacking social and economic development on the Bissau-Guinean security sector. Furthermore, the country turned into an international problem case at the start of the new century due to its role as both a hub for drug trafficking and a transit and sending country for irregular migrants destined for Europe. International donor nations have held the hope that security sector reforms would contribute to stabilizing the country nationally and sub-regionally along with fostering the rule of law and peaceful socio-economic development.

Numerous attempts at implementing security sector reform since 2005 have either failed or not achieved their desired results. Some measures have even had the effect of aggravating the troubled political situation in the country further. A coup carried out in April 2012 ultimately led to the suspension of a large portion of on-going projects run by the International Community – only to be lifted after a new, democratically legitimized government was sworn in July 2014.

In the following, I argue that the concept of security sector reform in its present application is untenable. Disparate perceptions exist on the donor and recipient side concerning reforms and the expectations arising from them while local interests and concerns have thus far only partially been understood and taken into consideration. The possibilities for participation by the local government, members of the security sector, civil society and the general populace remain limited. Local perspectives have tended to only gain consideration selectively rather than continually, resulting in the absence of an essential precondition for successful reforms. The primary factors attributed to failure so far include: 1.) vastly differing understandings and expectations on the donor and on the Bissau-Guinean side, 2.) lacking coordination, integration, flexibility and continuity among the various reform strategies, 3.) structural procedural constraints on the donor side that yield rigid and short-term project approaches, 4.) inadequate financial resources, 5.) insufficient incorporation of societal actors and representatives from the Bissau-Guinean security sector within the reform process, and 6.) poor communication. One tangible expression of this failure has been the discrepancy that exists between the demands and the practical implementation of the reforms.

Alternative approaches must begin with broad public dialog and better incorporate varying local perspectives in order to create flexible strategies for the reform process. Additionally, the involved staff from within the security sector must be made aware of tangible benefits. In order to rid the concerned parties of any anxiety in regards to unknown processes and change, the sources of fear and resistance among politics and the security forces should be openly spoken about while plans should be elucidated and pursued in a gradual manner.
There are, however, several obstacles standing in the way of improving the execution of security sector reforms that cannot immediately be surmounted. One serious factor is the fact that previous reform attempts have contributed to exasperating and destabilizing the political situation in Guinea-Bissau. Former measures and failures have further intensified mistrust and critical attitudes towards any reform attempts among certain segments of politics, the police and the military. Though opposition can never completely be overcome, clear majority support has to exist for the sake of reform. Procedural constraints on the donor side are also a contributing factor, meaning that it is unlikely for rapid transformations in the approaches to security sector reform to be expected within large organizations such as the UN and the EU. Groundwork carried out behind the scenes characterized by long-term orientations could provide promise for improving the prospects for success, possibly in combination with conventional strategies for security sector reform.
1. Introduction

Security sector reforms are commonly considered to be a precondition for establishing effective and democratic legal, police and military structures, facilitating political stability, and ensuring economic and social development in post-conflict states.\(^1\) Reforms in the security sector entail a political and highly ambitious – on account of their holistic character – concept that, in reality, often lags far behind expectations. This has likewise been the case in Guinea-Bissau, a country which has, for decades, not only been characterized by economic deficiencies and social imbalances but also political instability – both of which stand in connection with problems in the security sector. Reforming the security sector has therefore seemed to offer an escape from the persistent national crisis. However, hitherto reforms have failed to fulfill the awaited expectations – on the contrary. Within expert circles, Guinea-Bissau is considered to be a prime example for the failure of security sector reforms. As such, this small West African nation provides a suitable case for investigating the causes of these failures by analyzing the discrepancies existent between officially proclaimed demands for holistic security sector reforms on the one hand, and the manifold difficulties and challenges present in their practical implementation on the other.

The problems facing Guinea Bissau are, indeed, immense. The country has primarily garnered attention over the last years through negative headlines. The main reasons for this have included repeated interventions by the military into politics, numerous coups (most recently in April 2012), and the country’s transformation into an international hub for drug trafficking. These developments have imbued this small African nation with the designation of “failed” (Failed State Index 2013). Despite what one may think of such classifications (for critiques, see Bethge 2012; Luckham/Kirk 2013: 13, 15), Guinea-Bissau’s poor results in the current Human Development Index (Malik 2014) do, in fact, allude to the existence of fundamental problems.


\(^1\) I would like to extend my thanks to Claudia Baumgart-Ochse, Peter Kreuzer, Sabine Mannitz, Eva Ottendörfer and the participants of the PRIF academic colloquium for their feedback and support in regards to this text.
Ever since the civil war in 1998-99, the International Community has placed the blame for political instability, lawlessness and lacking social and economic development on the Bissau-Guinean security sector. There were hopes that reforming the security sector would stabilize the country and facilitate its peaceful development. Proponents of this concept held on to the conviction that a security sector reform would ensure the establishment of a capable constitutional state as well as effective security forces that are accountable to the government. Creating democratic structures in the security sector would create a positive climate for investment, allowing private investment to rise and corruption to decrease, which would, in turn, create jobs, economic growth and social development. Such reforms would also supposedly satisfy the interest of donors by reducing drug trafficking, politically stabilizing the region and limiting illegal migrations via Guinea-Bissau to Europe (see OECD 2007). In order to achieve this, various international and supranational actors attempted to implement a reform of the security sector starting in 2005. Though these actors worked together with Bissau-Guinean representatives from the government as well as the security sector, they have been met with limited success up to now. Blame for these failures has primarily been placed on opposition to reform attempts within the military and politics, insufficient capacities held by Bissau-Guinean authorities, and lacking coordination among the various donors. The fact that this mission has been unsuccessful has not only resulted in frustration and disappointment among those who had attempted to implement the related projects, but has likewise reinforced Guinea-Bissau’s overall negative image. Considering this background, questions arise as to the causes of these failures in past reform attempts. In the following, I argue that the concept of security sector reform in its present application is untenable. Disparate perceptions exist on the donor and recipient side concerning reforms and expectations arising from them, compounded by the fact that local interests and concerns are also only understood and considered in part. Opportunities for participation by the local government, members of the security sector, civil society and the general populace continue to remain limited. Furthermore, local perspectives have tended to only gain selective rather than continual consideration, making one of the essential preconditions for successful reforms absent. The primary factors attributed to failure thus far include: 1.) vastly differing understandings and expectations on the side of the donors and the Bissau-Guineans, 2.) lacking coordination, integration, flexibility and continuity among the various reform strategies, 3.) structural procedural constraints on the donor side that promote rigid and short-term project approaches, 4.) insufficient financial resources, 5.) lacking incorporation of societal actors and representatives from the Bissau-Guinean security sector within the reform process, and 6.) poor communication.

One manifestation of the broadly diagnosed failure has been the discrepancy between the demands and the practical implementation of the reforms. The contrast existent between official success reports and documents made to be attractive, euphemistic and filled with empty phrases, on the one hand, and the impressions held by civil society and representatives from the government and security sector, on the other, is often stark. As I set out to demonstrate in the following, demands for considering local requests, long-term and holistic approaches, and improved coordination of reform efforts are, to a degree, regularly reinforced (see United Nations General Assembly-Security Council 2013; United Nations Security Council 2014) and international actors are committed to the norm of local
ownership in Guinea-Bissau as well. Upon closer inspection, however, significant differences surface between the demands and the actual practice of security sector reform. Such assurances often represent nothing more than lip service. As I will demonstrate, this discrepancy is partially the result of biographical differences among many international experts, often tending to be technical professionals rather than development experts. They are frequently prisoners of the given structures such as short project durations, long application terms, limited financial means, changing contact persons and responsibilities, etc. Despite these existing conditions, rapid and measurable success is still required of them. Insufficient knowledge about the country and language skills act as additional obstacles to these experts’ abilities to conceptualize complex local problems and conflict situations as well as local perceptions and interpretations. Additionally, the relevant actors among the Bissau-Guinean authorities are either allegedly or indeed not sufficiently trained in comprehending, planning or implementing complex reform efforts. Other factors that hinder the process of reform include: unreasonable expectations from donors, a fixation on external sources of financing and, last but not least, “grey eminences” within the government, security forces and public administration that feel threatened by the reforms.

In the following two chapters, I will start by presenting a brief historical overview of the security sector in Guinea-Bissau that spans the period from independence up to the end of the civil war in 1999. Connected to this, the third chapter gives an overview of the previous and current reform efforts within the security sector in Guinea-Bissau. With this, I intend to uncover the lines of development as well as their resultant problems and hitherto strategies for resolution in the sectors of the police, military and judiciary. To begin with, I first address the existing conditions for security sector reforms followed by a summary of the primary actors and their projects and reform strategies up to the present. This includes a critical analysis of the concept of security sector reform as well as its application. Finally, I present the political and structural causes that have led to the failure of central reform efforts in the fourth chapter. Here, I take a more detailed look into the shortcomings of the attempted reforms by investigating the discrepancies existent between official expectations and the practical implementation of the concept of local ownership, an idea that assumes a central position in discourse involving security sector reforms. This is done by contrasting various perspectives about the reform efforts, such as those held by international experts, members of the security sector and civil society actors.

This report draws on primary and secondary sources, on grey literature, and, most importantly, on findings from an eight-week field research stay in Guinea-Bissau in February and March 2013. Ethnographic data presented here is based on interviews, unofficial talks and observations that have been made anonymous to protect the dialog partner.
2. Guinea-Bissau’s Security Sector: an Overview

Guinea Bissau gained its independence from Portugal after a bloody war for liberation from 1973 to 1974 (see Rudebeck 1974; Dhada 1993). The independence struggle was dominated by the left-wing oriented African Party for the Independence of Guinea [Bissau] and Cape Verde (Portuguese acronym: PAIGC), which, starting in 1974, enforced an authoritarian one-party state until the introduction of a multi-party system in the 1990s. The country’s armed forces have their roots back to the People’s Revolutionary Armed Forces that were assembled as a rebel army in 1964. The combatants often only received brief military training and had, in many cases, not completed any formal schooling. Following the war, many of them were offered positions outside of the military within the civil service, primarily on the police force.

Members of the ethnic group Balanta, one of the largest in the country, have been overrepresented within the military since its founding. This can be traced back to geographic causes, as the war was concentrated in areas that are primarily populated by the Balanta. In accordance with their own self-perception, the Balanta are also considered to be socially and economically disadvantaged as the majority of them live in remote areas, a fact that may have facilitated their participation in the war for independence (see Handem 2008: 153-154; Semedo 2011: 109-110; and Temudo 2008). By the middle of the 1980s, their overrepresentation in the security forces had become a point of political contention.

Shortly following independence, purges and executions, with the clear involvement of members of the security forces, targeting chieftains, former soldiers of the colonial army and opponents to the ruling regime were carried out. Political and military structures were amalgamated from the very beginning, a fact that is also evident considering that many former military commanders later went on to assume political positions. One of the most prominent commanders in the war for independence, João Bernardo “Nino” Vieira, was (co-)responsible for carrying out the first successful coup in 1980. He ascended to the role of Guinea-Bissau’s authoritarian head of state and would rule the country until 1999. Vieira and his supporters therewith established a precedent for subsequent overthrows and coups in which military representatives would often collaborate with politicians. Ever since, supposed or actual enemies have been forcibly eliminated time and again in addition to repeated serious human rights abuses and a disregard for national laws (see Handem 2008: 151).

While central structures, processes and terminology relevant to the security sector were borrowed from the former colonial power (such as the judicial police common to Portugal), following independence, many police and military officers were sent for training to various friendly socialist countries (the Soviet Union/Russia, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, North Korea, East Germany, etc.). In the mid-1990s, France assisted Guinea-Bissau in establishing a quick response police unit; bilateral cooperation with Angola, Brazil and Portugal was added starting in the new millennium. In a historical perspective, this points to differing training levels and contents. Within the legal sector, the Portuguese were involved in establishing a law faculty in Bissau in the early 1990s. French and Portuguese engagement at this time must be considered in light of opposing
geopolitical interests of the two former colonial powers in Guinea-Bissau. Bissau-Guinean authorities executed at least two retirement cycles in the 1980s and early 1990s to force redundant and under-qualified veterans from the war of independence into retirement.

Although political liberalization in 1994 led to multi-party elections, the civil war that broke out soon after marked the start of a phase of political instability that has persisted to this day. The civil war that was commonly termed a “military conflict” began in June 1998 and lasted until May 1999. A military junta opposed president Vieira, which, along with a majority of the population, accused him of corruption, smuggling light weapons and making deals with the neighboring countries of Senegal and Guinea. The junta managed to attract many veterans from the war for independence along with young fighters. The civil war set the foundations for increasing political instability that climaxed in the governmental overthrow in April 2012 (International Crisis Group 2012; Kohl 2013). This coup resulted in the implementation of the Security Sector Reform Programme supported by the EU, CPLP (Community of Portuguese Language Countries), the USA, Brazil and UN Peace-Building Funds that is still in progress today.

In summary, it is evident that heterogeneity of the educational and training programs along with the generally low level of professionalization has become a common thread within Guinea-Bissau’s security sector since 1974. Additionally, the country’s development has since been fundamentally impacted by a security sector marked by violence and authoritarianism that has repeatedly led to violent conflict since independence.

3. Security Sector Reform in Guinea-Bissau

3.1 The context

In the wake of the civil war, many untrained personnel poured into Guinea Bissau’s security forces, further diminishing this institution’s overall capacities. Upon the war’s commencement, the strength of the military spiraled out of control: due to arbitrary recruiting measures, the number of soldiers doubled from 5,000 in 1997 to 11,000 (Herbert 2003: 22; Handem 2008: 153-154). A recently conducted military census confirms that the number of officers is disproportional to the number of rank and file soldiers. Observers conjecture that primarily uneducated young soldiers who are socially disadvantaged – including a great number of Balanta – strive for acceptance, power and access to money from illegal channels through their military service. Overthrows, a lack of discipline and private vendettas characterize the inner life of the armed forces, while a number of leading officers and their entourages (Reitano/Shaw 2013; 3) have presumably been involved in drug and weapon trafficking since 2005, and, more recently, in illicit logging and timber trafficking. Furthermore, officers have had control of the Bissauan port authority since the end of the military conflict, allowing them to bypass the customs authorities when importing goods. Concurrently, soldiers continue to be poorly paid, life in the barracks along with living conditions are still precarious, and education remains inadequate (Handem 2008: 153). Similar conditions exist within the police squads – often
an assembly of former soldiers – that are marred by under-financing, low pay (Handem 2008: 154), and many unqualified police officers. Bribery along with overlapping or unclear competences among the numerous police units are additional problems. Access to the legal system continues to be difficult or altogether lacking: courts in the interior of the country are either slow or do not operate at all, there are hardly any attorneys or other sorts of legal assistance and consulting, and processing fees pose a great burden to the population which is generally poor. Intimidation by judges and attorneys, favoritism, a lack of judges and state attorneys, and a nearly complete collapse of legal infrastructure in rural areas all create grave problems (see Liga Guineense dos Direitos Humanos 2013). In the eyes of many citizens, the legal system is seen to be corrupt and inefficient, which is partially true. Appealing to “traditional” or religious leaders and elders to resolve conflicts is therefore frequently a preferred alternative. As victims of crimes are often interested in resolving matters quickly, the police regularly assumes the role of “jurisdiction on site”, thereby overstepping the limits of their legal mandate.

3.2 Too many cooks ...

A “reform carousel” (see the policy-oriented overview in the Security Council Report 2013: 17-22) began to turn immediately following the military conflict in 1999. Until that point, efforts within the security sector did not operate under the title of “security sector reform”. Moreover, key concepts such as “peace building”, and “demobilization, disarmament and reintegration” (DDR) first appeared in Guinea-Bissau starting in 1999.

Since its inception in the 1990s, the concept of security sector reform became a popular catchphrase within the donor community. Influential normative definitions of this terminus technicus were presented by the UN and the OECD (OECD 2007: 5; United Nations General Assembly Security Council 2008: 5-6). According to this definition, security sector reform does not only target structures, institutions and personnel within the armed forces and police, but likewise the legal system, customs, prisons, border protection, the secret service as well as official supervisory committees, relevant ministries and the legislative branch. Furthermore, such reforms can also encompass non-state actors such as guerilla groups, private security contractors, civil society groups and “traditional” legal systems. This is evidence to the complex nature of these reforms – though the focus of reforms in Guinea-Bissau was, for a long time, placed on the police and the military. The legal sector has only begun to assume a more central role in the past several years. Security sector reform is not only supposed to lead to good governance, sustainable security, the rule of law and local leadership responsibility but to socio-economic development as well (OECD 2005: 20; 2007: 21). Indeed, this concept has turned into a “playground” for members of the armed forces from the global North in recent years. As military personnel from Europe independently confirmed during my interviews, ever since budgets for military spending began shrinking in recent years, there has been pressure to find alternative sources of income and areas of activity. As one high-ranking officer involved in security sector reform explained, there has been “growing demand for [qualified] personnel.” Training and education courses are one way to serve the market. On the other hand, there has also been a trend to “market”
anything possible as a form of “security sector reform” (Sedra 2010: 113-114) in order to tap into new sources of financing. Conversely, some projects and programs within security sector reform are not formally labeled as such being that they draw from different budgets (e.g. cooperation within the legal system) or because they are not considered to be part of security sector reform in a strict sense (e.g. DDR programs or purely police and military armament programs).

Such a convoluted reform carousel influenced by various interests and many parallel and consecutive projects can also be found in Guinea-Bissau. One DDR program commissioned by the World Bank following the end of the military conflict ended in failure when the erratically governing prime minister at the time, Kumba Yalá (2000-2003), misappropriated the injected funds (Herbert 2003: 22). After three failed DDR attempts, the explicitly titled commencement of security sector reforms in Guinea-Bissau can be dated to 2005 (Hutton 2010: 195). At the time, the scope of the security sector reforms was initially limited as it exclusively addressed the areas of the military and the police (Hutton 2010: 196). An international donor conference that took place in Geneva in 2006 passed a national strategy for reforming the armed forces in Guinea-Bissau (Republic of Guinea Bissau 2006) which ultimately resulted in the “Security Sector Reform Plan of Action for the Restructuring and Modernization of the Security and Defence Sector” (Peacebuilding Commission 2008: 3). However, according to critics, “security sector reform” was merely a guise meant to ensure international support, obeying a bureaucratic rather than a political logic and largely omitting a broadly based needs assessment (Hutton 2010: 198). Moreover, some donors, like China and Nigeria, have limited their support for the security sector to visible but hardly sustainable actions such as the donation of vehicles, equipment, uniforms and a military hospital.

From this point forward, many different actors proceeded to involve themselves in the plan, thereby looking to establish various focus areas – often in rapid succession. These activities have occasionally proven highly confusing: Overlap has regularly resulted, and relations among the donors have been characterized by competition or even mutual aversion, which has made exchange difficult or outright impossible. Problems and failures have been hidden behind the formal, bureaucratic (see Hutton 2010: 198) and smoothed-over language of official reports. An overview of the central actors shall be presented in the section that follows (a relatively good, though not comprehensive, overview can also be found at: ISSAT n.d.: 10-12).

United Nations

As in other places, the UN does not comprise a homogenous actor for security sector reforms in Guinea-Bissau. Rather, the organization’s presence is characterized by numerous programs, agencies and offices that concurrently work alongside one another within the SSR area. The most important organizations will be outlined here.

Assuming a leading role in the area of security sector reform is UNIOGBIS, the “United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau”, which was established in 1999 as the “United Nations Peace-Building Support Office in Guinea-Bissau” (UNOGBIS) (for current areas of engagement, see United Nations Security Council 2013). UNIOGBIS
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currently carries out short-term training courses in the area of security sector reform and has contributed to reworking legislation along with the EU and UNDP (United Nations Development Programme). UNIOGBIS has especially been involved in the area of police reform (Mainzinger 2011: 74-76; see Kohl in print).

UNDP implemented a new program in June 2009 titled the “Rule of Law and Security Programme” (Portuguese acronym: FORTES). This project supports a decentralization of the judiciary as well as the improvement of legal access, and likewise promotes the education of legal professionals along with a mentoring program (UNDP 2011). Since 2011, the program has also been involved in establishing legal aid clinics, so-called “Access to Justice Centers” (Portuguese acronym: CAJ), in various parts of the country. At these CAJs, trained legal professionals who have a mastery of the local language offer consultative support to residents on legal matters. Concurrently, CAJ staff members raise awareness among women, seniors and so-called “traditional” authorities on the issues of laws and human rights (PNUD 2011). Another UNDP measure was the founding of a ”National Access to Justice Center” (CENFOJ). UNDP also executed an inventory and codification of common laws existent among various ethnic groups as well as investigations into access to the legal system (PNUD 2011, UNDP 2011: 3-4).

UNODC, the “United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime”, supported local authorities in Guinea-Bissau in establishing a transnational crime unit along with financing a new Interpol office in Bissau. Under the auspices of the UNODC, Brazil designed and managed a police training center – though its activities were suspended after the coup in 2012. Brazil and Portugal provide training to legal officials in the area of criminality in their respective countries (de Barros/Godinho Gomes/Correia 2013: 148). UNODC also trains prison guards and supports the construction of penal institutions.

European Union

In July 2008, the EU mission in support of security sector reform in Guinea-Bissau (EU-SSR) was initiated under the EU Common Security and Defence Policy, based on previous work done by the UN. Great Britain dispatched the Security Sector Development Advisory Team in 2005 on initiative of this organization. The team carried out a demands assessment that led to the creation of the National Security Strategy of 2006. During this probe, members of the police and the military were supposedly asked about existing structures and working conditions as well as their expectations for the future. The resultant strategy document was presented to potential donors at a conference in Geneva in November 2006 (along with strategies for fighting poverty and investment). The EU conducted its own survey in Guinea-Bissau in May and October 2007. These preparations resulted in the initiation of the Security Sector Reform Program – according to the official reading – by the Bissau-Guinean government in January 2008 (Fiott 2008; Observatoire de l’Afrique 2008; Peacebuilding Commission 2008; Bahnson 2013: 261; Girão de Sousa 2013: 43, 50, 53, 89, 92), and a contract was signed by Guinea-Bissau and the EU in June 2008 (European Union 2008). The mission, which portrayed itself as being highly ambitious, concentrated on reforms within the armed forces and the police. Its main aims were to overhaul the legal framework, to plan the reorganization and restructuring of the police and security forces, to
train the armed forces, and to renew as well as supply armaments and infrastructure (Fiott 2008; Observatoire de l’Afrique 2008; Peacebuilding Commission 2008; Girão de Sousa 2013). The legal sector was by far the smallest component of the EU-SSR; original plans refer to the intended revision and reformulation of relevant laws and the rehabilitation of the legal infrastructure. One reason for this was that the EU had been implementing a separate legal program called PAOSED (Portuguese acronym for “Support Program for the Sovereignty and State Law Associations/Organizations in Guinea-Bissau”), the staff of which explicitly did not want to consider the project as belonging to security sector reform. Cooperation between EU Council instruments (reforming the armed forces in active service) and the EU Commission (the remaining elements) proceeded without any friction (Bahnson 2013: 267).

The EU-SSR was prematurely terminated in September 2010. The main trigger for this was the internal overthrow of the supreme commander of Guinea-Bissau’s armed forces, who had been a supporter of the reforms; the position was filled by António Indjai, who had initiated the overthrow and was critical of reforms. The current commander has been accused of fickleness, manipulability and maintaining close connections to the drug trade.

Well-informed circles report that the UN deemed EU-SSR to stand in competition to its own efforts, which would go on to sour relations between the two parties in Guinea-Bissau in the long term. Furthermore, UNIOGBIS and the EU were not in agreement as to the (re)structuring of the police. The conflict erupted following the establishment of a national guard (see Girão de Sousa 2013: 78). Insiders have reported that the mission was rashly agreed upon on initiative from Portugal, Spain and France. By way of security sector reforms, the EU had hoped to bolster the country against drug trafficking and illegal migration (Gya/Fiott/Vainio 2008), which primarily affected South European countries.

MISSANG

In August 2010, once EU-SSR was terminated, ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) concluded the “Guinea-Bissau Security Sector Reform Road Map”. Angola assumed the main financial load and campaigned for security sector reforms both bilaterally and along with the CPLP (Omoregie 2010: 2-3; Sousa Galito 2011: 4-5). Within the framework of an initial cooperation project between ECOWAS and CPLP, Angola, as a CPLP member, dispatched the “Angolan Military Mission in Guinea Bissau” in spring 2011 (Portuguese acronym: MISSANG). Together with many structural rehabilitation and new construction measures within the police and the military, Angola provided training for Bissau-Guinean police officers in Luanda, some of whom would later go on to assume the role of trainers in Bissau. This situation begs the question as to Angola’s capacity – as a country that is solvent yet accused of human rights violations and autocratic structures – to carry out security sector reforms. Though the Angolan MISSANG representatives were broadly popular among residents, doubt propagated among political opposition and the Bissau-Guinean military as to the true motives of the Angolan mission. Portions of the opposition, who maintained close contacts with high-ranking military officials, accused MISSANG of aiming to take possession of Guinea-Bissau’s natural resources in the name of Angola. A more serious accusation was that Angola was supporting MISSANG to ensure
that the democratically elected, pro-Angolan government would hold onto to power by all means necessary, thereby breaching the democratic rules of the game. Oppositional criticism towards Angola intensified in 2011-2012 as ECOWAS distanced itself from MISSANG – an act that again highlighted the political nature of security sector reform. The background for this was the challenge perceived among ECOWAS member states posed by Angola’s alleged economic (oil, bauxite, wood) and geopolitical ambitions in the region (as a balancing power against Senegal and Nigeria). Following threats from Guinea-Bissau’s military command, the mission was shelved prior to the coup in 2012, and MISSANG was withdrawn by June 2012 and replaced by ECOWAS troops (see Kohl 2013). As with the EU-SSR, many projects were never completed due to hasty termination.

**ECOWAS**

In mid-2012, ECOWAS dispatched ECOMIB (“ECOWAS Mission in Guinea Bissau”) – titled a peace mission – which conducted a new needs analysis for reforming the Bissau-Guinean military through the end of 2012. This was carried out in the context of the “Defence and Security Sector Reform Programme” (ECOWAS 2013). According to official statements, this program intends to revive and provide the corresponding financing for pension funds, which had been years in planning, for soldiers forced from service. The establishment of a pension fund had failed in previous years due to disagreement within the International Community as to financing matters. However, no actions were taken following these announcements, which can be traced back to the tense financial situation facing ECOWAS and its members. Most residents of the capital raise an eyebrow to the fact that though ECOMIB officially exists in order to stabilize the country and that it is stationed in Bissau, it has not yet been present during any of the incidents involving politicians or the military. As Bissau-Guineans have repeatedly emphasized during my interviews with them, from the perspective of large portions of the population, the Bissau-Guinean armed forces and the politicians that cooperate with them are, in fact, the security problem, and less so the populace itself. Overall, since ECOWAS is perceived to be a supporter, even an initiator, of the coup in April 2012, the ECOMIB mission is met with little acceptance among many Bissau-Guineans. Similar to Angola, ECOWAS continues to remain silent about concrete steps for security sector reform. As in the case of Angola, publicity and willingness to share information has been limited.

**Main security sector reform actor and their areas of activity**

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3.3 ... spoil the broth: an analysis

As this brief overview makes apparent, various actors attempted to execute differing security sector reforms within the context of complex political conflict. National as well as international actors have differing policies and priorities (Omoregie 2010: 6-7), pursue openly and at times opposing interests, and have hidden agendas that span from geopolitical interests, envy and competitive mentalities up to simple ambitions for power.

Mistrust between ECOWAS and other donors runs deep: Staff from international organizations working in Bissau doubt ECOWAS’ capacity to carry out security sector reforms. According to them, ECOWAS representatives are hardly even familiar with the concept of security sector reform. Indeed, by late 2014, ECOWAS has done little to nothing in terms of security sector reform in Guinea-Bissau. On the other hand, ECOWAS criticizes hitherto efforts made by the UN and the EU as being “imposed”. All of this again demonstrates the polarization that exists within the security sector reform complex as well as the trenches that developed immediately after the coup between ECOWAS and the transitional government on one side and the UN, African Union (AU), EU and CPLP on the other. This conflict between both camps stems from the conviction held by the International Community and parts of the populace that ECOWAS supported the coup in April 2012, which led to the resultant and not democratically legitimized “transitional government” – the government was not recognized by the UN, AU, EU or CPLP. Within this context, the then head of UNIOGBIS – the former president of East Timor who was named to this position at the beginning of 2013 –, José Ramos-Horta, was accused by observers of pursuing a pro-ECOWAS course, which could be due to the advisors he appointed, many of whom hail from ECOWAS countries. It was only in the run-up to free and fair general elections held in April and May 2014 that a rapprochement took place between UN, AU, EU, and CPLP, on the one hand, and ECOWAS, on the other.

Mutual blame for the failure of diverse reform attempts can be heard everywhere in the “den of serpents” in Bissau. Every party involved in the reforms harbors its own “theory” and “recipe” about how better to do things. Though only very few of those involved, for obvious reasons, officially admit that these sorts of difficulties exist, such problems are dealt with in depth behind closed doors. Representatives from international organizations, for example, officially deny coordination problems by referring to existing inter-institutional coordination committees within security sector reforms (see Fiott 2008: 2; Omorogi 2010: 2). In confidential talks, representatives from the Bissau-Guinean side, on the other hand, complain of prolonged processes and the fact that donors leave them in the dark about future proceedings. This is evidence of coordination problems and participation deficits. At present, coordination of reform efforts seems to be lacking between the two camps (ECOWAS vs. the UN, AU, EU, CPLP) – relations have been tense in the wake of the coup. However, coordination among donors – nominally controlled by a steering committee – was also insufficient during EU-SSR times, as those involved came to realize early on (Gomes 2009: 27-28; Girão de Sousa 2013: 101-105). This may have been further complicated on account of competing, complex institutions within the EU (see Helly 2006; Sherriff 2008) and within UN systems. Indeed, the security sector reform milieu within the
UN is marked by increasing differentiation: regularly new committees and organizational units engage in security sector reform or are created from anew, further obscuring the overview. A Security Sector Reform Task Force established in 2007 is tasked with coordinating the work of a total of 14 agencies (United Nations General Assembly Security Council 2013: 3, 16-17, 22-23). Time will tell if this attempt by the UN to bundle the interests and efforts of units working on security sector reform will prove tenable.

Improved coordination and cooperation is not only encumbered from a synchronic perspective but also from a diachronic one owing to the fact that actors and programs in Guinea-Bissau have continuously been changed over time. The lack of an overall approach is evident on the practical level: As an example, police officers sent to Angola are trained according to the local curriculum there, whereas those trained in Bissau receive a Brazilian curriculum. Even back in the 1980s and 1990s, Bissau-Guinean police officers were trained in the Soviet Union and East and West Germany while France trained officers for rapid response units. Consequently, since police work is generally not standardized (Mainzinger 2011: 68), police officers trained according to differing curricula possess disparate knowledge.

In the following chapter, I examine the differences that exist between official reform demands within the security sector in Guinea-Bissau and its practical implementation from a Bissau-Guinean perspective.

4. The Problem of Local Ownership

4.1 The cleft between demands and practice

One of the central demands in executing security sector reforms is local ownership ("apropriação local" in Portuguese). Despite the fact that a definition of this technical term, which implies "more than mere participation" (OECD 2007: 64), is overdue, most authors agree (Nathan 2007: 4) that security sector reform should be conducted by local actors (as according to the “Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness”, 2005 and the “Accra Agenda for Action”, 2008, as well; both in OECD, n.d.). They agree that a people-centered approach can contribute to improving the grounding and acceptance of such reforms (Oosterveld/Garland 2012: 197).

How has local ownership been implemented in Guinea-Bissau in the framework of security sector reforms? External observers were early to emphasize the (surely exaggerated) criticism that the EU-SSR represented an imposed military intervention from abroad (Telatin 2009), which practically transformed Guinea-Bissau into a UN protectorate (Marischka 2008). One of the decisive factors identified as contributing to the failure of the EU-SSR (see Bloching 2010) was a complete lack of local ownership (Hutton 2010: 198). The Eurocentric outlook assumed that its definition of reform was congruent with that of the Bissau-Guineans (Gya/Thomsen 2009: 3). As such, the EU-SSR, as well as other peace-building initiatives in the country found themselves "under the ownership" of the International Community (Roque 2009: 2; Girão de Sousa 2013:
Critical points of view refer to Guinea-Bissau’s strategy document, which itself purportedly accords to the demands, principles and approaches of the International Community. The complexity of security sector reforms was, according to this line of argument, underestimated. Furthermore, international actors were not familiar enough with local realities; they did not seem to have anticipated the degree of resistance from groups within the security forces and politics. The latter groups rightly feared that the reforms would distance them from power and privilege (Gomes 2009: 28-29).

What has the EU’s stance been to this criticism? When asked about considering the principle of local ownership in the wake of the EU-SSR, one EU interview partner reacted with irritation. He explained that local ownership was, of course, applied according to set guidelines and referred to the strategy document from 2006 and the plan for security sector reform passed by the Bissau-Guinean parliament in 2008. However, as the EU-SSR progressed further, the EU no longer paid heed to local ownership as the reforms proceeded only with reference to the strategy that had been agreed upon, as my interview partner argued. Once the national security strategy was drafted in 2006 and the EU mission commenced in 2008, members of the military and police seem to have had little to no involvement in the reform process and were likewise not kept abreast about concrete steps being taken. This was perhaps not only the fault of the EU but likewise of Bissau-Guinean leadership; it does, however, point to poor communication and exchange of information (see Girão de Sousa 2013: 99-100). During our interviews, many Bissau-Guineans who work for the police or the military expressed their incomprehension in being left in the dark about the approaches and steps taken by the EU-SSR. Former EU-SSR staff confirmed that many Bissau-Guineans who were formally involved in the security sector reforms were completely uninformed about the scope of the project. Correspondingly, most government and security sector representatives were clearly unaware of the consequences that signing the strategy document would have, assuming they had any knowledge of the document at all (see Bahnson 2013: 265; Girão de Sousa 2013: 74-75). When the new Minister of Defense, apparently under pressure from the military, unilaterally changed the structure of the reform committee in 2009, outrage ensued on the side of the EU. According to EU representatives, this entailed a breach of the strategy document, in which the structure of the committee had bindingly been established. Shortly thereafter, the minister declared changes in the newly planned target strength of the armed forces and called for a revision of the new bipartite police structure (Girão de Sousa 2013: 77-78). Though this could be interpreted as a breach of contract, as the EU had, other interpretations are also possible. It is feasible to assume that as time progressed, those possessing formal authority in Bissau recognized the meaning behind and potential dangers inherent in the envisioned reforms and attempted to redirect them. After they were excluded from effective participation in planning the reforms and were kept unaware of their scope, the inflexibility of the strategy set by the EU blocked further involvement. Considering these differences between the “is” and the “should be” in terms of local involvement, it is no wonder that the strategy document from 2006 – to which my interview partner from EU ranks in early 2013 repeatedly referred – was, over the years, never realized or adapted to given conditions or requirements in cooperation with
authorities and civil society. Instead, my interview partner insisted on maintaining strict adherence to the agreed-upon goals in from the 2006 strategy.

While the security sector reform and the management of local participation channels by actors from the North, such as the UN and the EU, have been relatively well documented, there has been a lack of transparency among other donors. This makes judging the inclusion of local perspectives and needs within reform planning and execution difficult. Though Angola’s engagement, for instance, was welcomed by residents and many police officers and soldiers, its local inclusion strategies remain largely shrouded, which is also the case for concrete measures. It seems as though Angola intended to offset an alleged lack of local participation by way of one-sided, pro-Angolan reporting on television. ECOWAS representatives likewise indicated commitment to local ownership in the interviews, though details about concrete steps were also unclear here. One of the few visible measures included inspections of army barracks conducted by the ECOWAS military in 2012-2013 for carrying out a needs assessment.

Indeed, few people in Guinea Bissau are even familiar with the idea of local ownership, be it among civil society or the security sector. This knowledge is limited to experts actively working in the area of security sector reform in international organizations, NGOs or authorities that deal with the issue.

This situation is also reflected in the fact that Bissau-Guinean knew very little about the security sector reforms. Even members of the police and military first associated them with the forced retirement of older and redundant colleagues. This comes as no surprise as “reforma” can mean both “reform” and “retirement” in Portuguese and Guinea-Bissau’s lingua franca Kriol (see Gya/Thomsen 2009: 3). Ideas related to “security” remain vague and heterogeneous: Many Bissau-Guineans, especially supporters of the government deposed in 2012, were convinced that the overall security situation worsened after the coup. Other interview partners identified positive outcomes that they frequently associated with the deposed government. Many were also of the opinion that, all in all, little had changed. Numerous segments of the populace tended to be unsure as to how the security situation had developed and how it could improve, whereas corruption and perceived insecurity remain central issues. The interviews made clear that security sector reform is not a crucial issue in itself. Nonetheless, security, criminality and corruption are regularly debated. Citizens speak little (if at all) about the possibilities and contents of a security sector reform. In general, few worry about the current, or possible, implementation of such a reform, pointing to insufficient awareness-raising and medialization. However, agreement exists among Bissau-Guineans that a way out of the political and security-related impasse can only be found with help from the international community: only foreign countries can help in restoring order. As such, portions of the populace therewith implicitly concede opportunities for involvement. This particularly occurs when they appeal to broadly disseminated self-victimization discourses directed at the state (see Kohl/Schroven 2014) that deprive Bissau-Guinean of the capacity to create change themselves.

The newly formed national guard – an outcome of the security sector reform – has been overtly welcomed, at least in the capital of Bissau. A number of civilian respondents
explicitly liked the martial appearance of the national guard, whereas interviewees from the UN blamed the institution for human rights violations. The former deemed this a positive sign compared to recently dispatched youth gangs (“scomae”) that drew from examples in Brazilian and Mexican telenovelas broadcast locally. These gangs had become involved in theft, robbery and, allegedly, drug trafficking in recent times and were likewise hired as “party armies” for certain political parties. One constant problem identified by many Bissau-Guineans was corruption within the police and legal system – most visibly embodied in the traffic police taking bribes along the roadsides. The military also has a very negative, though, at the same time, ambivalent, image. Efforts to renew barracks – carried out, in part, by Angola – and improve living standards were praised, yet the military’s reputation still suffers greatly as a result of the coup, drug trafficking conducted by certain individuals and repeated human rights abuses. Their image was also tarnished by the supreme commander of the armed forces, António Indjai, who was dismissed by the new democratic government in September 2014; he was seen as being a “strong man” acting behind the scenes and had a bad reputation among the populace. Concurrently, however, the military receives historical recognition as the liberator of the nation. The legal system is stricken with insufficient resources and likewise has a poor reputation among the populace due to corrupt practices and protracted and delayed legal proceedings. The interior of the country is largely devoid of a legal system; here, jurisdiction is realized by non-state mediators, elders, chiefs, religious leaders, etc. or assumed by the police. Many Bissau-Guineans have already heard of the Access to Justice Centers (CAJ) founded by UNDP; those who have made use of them positively rate their consulting and support services.

For years, there has been talk in Guinea Bissau of initiating a “national dialog”; UNDP organized a forum and regional conference with locals in 2011 with this goal in mind. In contrast to other large security sector reform projects, UNDP attempted to place civil society at the center of the process. Corresponding conferences were said to have been organized in all of Guinea-Bissau’s sectors (similar to counties) with the help of “peace brigades”. These brigades comprised mainly of young people who were engaged in community-based organizations – and explicitly not NGOs distant from the localities – at the village level, aiming to raise awareness for security sector reform among residents and motivate them to submit ideas and suggestions for the reforms. A national conference was to be organized as a concluding event for this process, though this was never realized on account of the death of the prime minister and the coup in early 2012. Even though this ambitious program did succeed in making a vital statement for involving civil society into the reform process, it ultimately seems to have borne little fruit: No results have been reported nor did Bissau-Guineans take notice of the conferences. UNDP staff kept largely silent about the conferences. This is surprising considering that UNDP has, in fact, submitted well-founded reports in the context of related projects in Guinea-Bissau. This includes a study on access to the legal system that essentially draws from local field research (Guerreiro 2011: 3-4). A similar situation exists with UNDP’s legal sector reform program: In October 2010, UNDP organized working groups and a concluding forum in Bissau in order to achieve a “participative consensus” among the judiciary, civil society and International Community in reference to priorities for the legal sector (Ministério de
Justiça 2011a: 5-6) – the results of the needs analysis were compiled by an external consultant. The outcome of this process included a “strategic plan” and a “national strategy” (2010-2015) for the legal sector that was approved by the government in January 2011 (Ministério de Justiça 2011a, 2011b). Individuals that I interviewed – who have held mid-level positions in the judiciary for years – admitted that they had no knowledge of this forum.

The UNDP staff members with whom I had contact showed themselves to generally be very dedicated to the local ownership principle, claiming to put effort into implementing projects in a participative way as possible. They did, however, admit that processes were at times too slow and that, for the sake of acceleration, they had to turn up the pressure, and this included the contracting of consultants.

Nevertheless, despite efforts by UNDP, the impression remained intact that – as with the EU – local ownership is conceived as a selective input at the very beginning of a project and not as a continuous process. The group of people involved in, or rather informed about, such processes termed “participative” remained limited – supposedly due to insufficient media and communication strategies. Yet, apart from financial and time-related obstacles, what reasons are there for not more broadly considering local options for involvement in the area of security sector reform? One international expert whom I interviewed said that NGOs, which follow a decidedly foundational-work strategy in their projects with members of the security forces, were at risk of being manipulated by them. Statements made by one UN staff member who had worked on security sector reforms in Bissau accorded to this. During a confidential interview, he even explicitly warned me about too much local participation, and referred to the model police station that UNIOGBIS had been built in an unsettled neighborhood in Bissau (see Mainzinger 2011: 77). During the project’s first attempt, money was embezzled by local institutions, forcing construction to commence during a renewed attempt. At the time of our interview, the station had supposedly still not been connected to the power grid, which was the blame of local officials. Another high-ranking staff member from an international organization struck a similar tone, naming East Timor as an example for Guinea Bissau. The UN had, on occasion, assumed authority over the police in East Timor; a similar situation would be feasible for Guinea Bissau, meaning that the UN should take over control of the administration for a period of time.

Time and again, the basic stance of my idealistic and hands-on interview partners from international organizations exhibited frustration with not being able to achieve their goals of creating functioning police and military structures – in a European sense – in Guinea-Bissau due to local “intransigence”, blockades, neglect, disinterest, insufficient capacity and lacking support. From this perspective, local ownership is more of a hindrance than an opportunity. Co-determination can here be interpreted as negative for planning and implementation of security sector reforms when the expertise and independence of experts is doubted and the doors are opened for manipulation at every turn. The problem of insufficient local capacities also cannot be totally dismissed. However, time-intensive dialog processes (ones that actually deserve the title) and foundational work should be carried out in the stead of largely prefabricated reform
processes. Foreign expertise in the security sector should go hand in hand with the social, cultural and pedagogic accompaniment of reform programs. One decisive aspect for local ownership and capacity development is the degree to which local perspectives and expectations for security sector reform strategies are taken into consideration.

4.2 A lack of embedding of projects and international experts

The rash progress and short duration of security sector reform programs has resulted in a lack of personnel and technical continuity – and not only in Guinea-Bissau. International experts are usually employed for limited contracts, meaning that they have little time to become intimately familiar with the reforms and the associated procedures, approaches and problems. Furthermore, contact to locals is often superficial and limited to domestic helpers and employees of international organizations, NGOs and local authorities; contact with “normal” police officers, soldiers and judicial staff remains narrow. It is thus no wonder that UN staff knew little about the internals of coups and overthrow attempts in Guinea-Bissau. Lacking local roots, they had to repeatedly inquire about the underlying causes from grassroots NGOs in order to be able to provide headquarters in New York with a competent report. Since international experts have few local acquaintances and are only superficially familiar with the political situation, they have been forced to rely on local intermediaries. The latter share commonalities with development agents, and they use strategic contacts in an attempt to steer external financing in local social arenas (Olivier de Sardan/Bierschenk 1993). International experts have become dependent on such intermediaries who may be prone to pursuing their own interests. In the context of security sector reform in Guinea Bissau, sub-par familiarity with local social constellations as well as cultural understandings, meanings and patterns of action among international experts also plays a role. When such “cultural impregnation” (Olivier de Sardan 1995) only exists to a limited degree while stubborn and stereotyped technical knowledge gains the upper hand (see Donais 2009: 8; Wilén/Chapaux 2011: 545), false estimations can arise and impair projects (see Girão de Sousa 2013: 90). The case of former Prime Minister Carlos Domingos Gomes Júnior illustrates this: As one of the main supporters of reforming the security sector, he served in Portugal’s colonial army prior to Guinea-Bissau’s independence. He first joined the long-governing PAIGC party, which had emerged from liberation movement, after independence. Among a number of military personnel, who equated the legitimacy of the military with its victorious battle against colonialism, the idea that Gomes now intended to reform them stirred indignation. A similar lack of sensitivity can be found in statements made by a UN representative who recommended that military personnel not qualified for service be employed as street sweepers. One can only conjecture as to the loss of honor and prestige this would have entailed and the amount of opposition it would have created. Within military circles, security sector reform was interpreted from a historical colonial reference point. A demotion to street sweeper would not only have confirmed this image but also strengthened it.
The socio-economic needs of security forces were clearly also underestimated. One example of this pertains to the pension funds for former armed forces personnel: The International Community had debated the modalities and financing of a pension fund for military personnel and veterans forced into retirement for years. Many members of the security sector would indeed prefer to enter retirement; however, they are currently unable to do so since the government effectively has not accumulated any savings for pensions. A drawn-out process related to the fund has angered and frustrated many of those affected and further undermined the credibility of the donors, who underestimated the degree of dissatisfaction among countless military personnel who wanted to retire from service. When the civil war began in 1998, many barely trained or capable veterans also entered the battle against long-ruling Prime Minister Vieira. They had been placed in retirement since the 1980s without receiving a pension, forcing them, from their perspective, to take on degrading side work. They saw the war to be an opportunity for revenge. Besides these former veterans who have returned to the police and army, new “lateral entrants” in these two branches who are not ideologically or ethnically bound pose another problem. Well-trained police officers complain of their under-qualification and have reported how they are forced to curb their opposition. They trace this back to fear among less-qualified coworkers, of losing their status and income in the course of the security sector reform.

The short project and financing cycles mentioned above also create an issue of involvement (Nathan 2007: 3; Oosterveld/Garland 2012: 201). This was made especially clear as I spoke to a leading employee of the Access to Justice Center (CENFOJ) financed by UNDP: By the end of our talk, he explained that UNDP would successively withdraw from the project as planned. The plan envisioned that CENFOJ would have to seek other financing sources. It was known that the government could not cover the costs; he therefore asked me if PRIF could help support the training facility. The CAJ faces a similar case of insecure financing.

Being that the training level is as low as it is and that the projects are rushed on account of time pressures, Bissau-Guinean officials are quick to feel overwhelmed and sequester themselves. Exclusive and selective involvement measures may contribute to demotivating officials and causing them to withdraw. Yet even those better-qualified are not well acquainted with their work responsibilities as a result of wide-spread repetitive, cognitive instruction methods in a starved education sector. Low and overdue wages in the civil service likewise generate few incentives. Additionally, paternalistic relations on the side of high-ranking officials and ministers also play a role. They tend to demonstrate their putative superiority as so-called “big men”, in the face of foreign experts as well, and operate as patrons of clientelistic relations. This leads to administrative processes assuming a different logic than in the global North. Well familiar with the urgency and importance of requests made, officials sometimes attempt to relegate customers and lower-ranking colleagues to the role of clients and petitioners, thereby further complicating and delaying processes.

On the one hand, competent members of the military have expressed dissatisfaction over cooperation with the International Community due to insufficient information policies,
long waiting times and a domineering presence. Conversely, international experts also complain that cooperation is generally difficult: Politicians and administrative staff are often very slow, hesitant and incapable, causing frustration and disillusionment among donors. Western consultants have often had to fill these holes, such as in drafting laws since many parliamentarians are illiterate or poorly educated. Perceived inadequacies in the government and administration could partially have to do with lacking understanding about local dependencies, interests, and power and patronage structures among experts who are frequently idealistic.

In summary, these facts signify that the insufficient embedding of projects and limited knowledge of local culture among international experts can impair the execution of security sector reforms, as the case of Guinea-Bissau illustrates. Existing structures and socio-cultural conditions in the security sector and bureaucracy do, also, greatly contribute to complicating reforms in the affected countries.

### 4.3 One-way “transfer” of ideas and concepts

Another factor in the donor-recipient relationship is intimately related to the worldviews and guiding principles held by international staff in the area of security sector reforms. Despite affirmations of local ownership, representatives from international organizations often explicitly or implicitly assume an approach based in modernization theory and cognitivism. What does this mean? Modernization theory assumes that a country’s development proceeds linearly, with the global North serving as an ideal to be emulated (see Gardner/Lewis 1996: 19). Cognitivism states that knowledge is simply transported from a “sender” to a “recipient”, and thus overlooks the complexities of learning and the advantages of individual processing.

Representatives I spoke with were convinced that Guinea-Bissau needs “modern” structures that the global North can deliver by way of an example to be copied. This attitude has already been made clear in the earlier vignette about the model police station. Another interviewee from an international organization argued that international experts with experience in state and government building – similar to the case of East Timor – were capable of creating “modern” and “efficient” structures. As such, structures in the global North are seen to be a template. This conviction has concretely been manifested in legislation: Representatives from the International Community openly confessed that Portuguese legal experts simply copied parts of Portuguese police and military sector law and applied them to the Bissau-Guinean legal framework. I was further told that an alleged lack of skills on the Bissau-Guinean side made it necessary for European lawyers to carry out this task.

Educational and training courses are deemed a proven means for affecting capacity building and behavioral change among Guinea-Bissau’s security personnel. Experts are initially convinced that as soon as course participants have learned the basics of professional police and military work as well as democracy and human rights principles, they will apply the newly acquired philosophy and cease any corrupt and bad practices. Many of these courses only last a few days (e.g. UNIOGBIS) or weeks (e.g. UNODC and
Brazil’s police training center), whereas others, such as in Angola and Brazil, are longer term. Practitioners are accordingly frustrated when their expectations are not met. One telling example is of a Brazilian federal police officer who showed disappointment when Bissau-Guinean police did not apply the course contents to the field. He related a story of passing through traffic control near Bissau attended by twenty officers; all or part of the officers at the checkpoint had previously participated in theoretical and practical training at the Brazilian-supported police training center. The Brazilian police officer said that the Bissau-Guineans had “forgotten everything” that they tried to teach them at the training program. He criticized the approach taken, pointing to a lack of continuity and isolated nature of the courses (for a critique of traditional “train and equip” strategies, see Mainzinger 2011: 81). Considering this, it is questionable whether longer-term courses would change the behavior of the police. Even if police officers were to internalized the acquired knowledge according to expectations, fundamental structural deficits persist both in the police service (such as overdue wages, coworkers who maintain undesired practices, etc.) and in Guinea-Bissau’s public administration in general. In conclusion, the Brazilian federal officer mentioned the fact that many police officers – especially younger ones, as I observed – are noticeably attracted by material symbols such as fancy cars, trendy sunglasses and flashy pants. Such desired self-images might be decisively influenced by corresponding “Western”, Nigerian or Far Eastern security force clichés seen on television and in online media that police officers may be attempting to “relive” locally.

One effective model transfer was the restructuring of various police units initiated by the EU on the basis of the National Security Strategy. Interview partners explained that the creation of the national guard drew from Southern European – Portuguese (Monteiro/Morgado 2009: 4) and Spanish – experts, being that these countries have traditionally possessed such proto-military forces exercising police tasks. Yet old and new structures appear to share an awkward coexistence. The EU and the government ambitiously set out to reorganize the entire police sector and attempted to integrate numerous units (e.g. the border guard, fiscal police, forest protection, etc.) – which had formerly existed in parallel, were subordinate to various ministries, and seldom possessed clearly defined competences – into the new, expressly militaristic, black uniform-wearing national guard. As with the security police – responsible for public order – the national guard reports to the Ministry of the Interior; however, the national guard continues, at least de jure, to likewise report to the respective, formerly responsible line ministry (a double structure). Criticism emerged early on about the national guard potentially upsetting the fragile domestic power structures. The national guard “import model” did, in fact, politicize the environment: Portions of the military viewed the national guard as an oppositional power threatening the military’s existing privileges and roles. They placed responsibility for this on Prime Minister Gomes, calling him a “protectee” of the International Community who wanted to use Western assistance to limit the influence of the military. Following the coup, the national guard, as well as the rest of the police, was de facto placed under the control of the military and the supreme military commander.

Angola, as a representative of the global South, did no better with its own approach to security sector reform: It also politicized the process and posed a challenge to the military.
This happened insofar as MISSANG used its protégé and supporter, Prime Minister Gomes, in an attempt to curb the influence of the military and strengthen Angola’s political and economic position in Guinea-Bissau. Criticism here should not, however, be placed on the intention to curb the influence of the armed forces, which is indeed the main cause for instability in Guinea-Bissau; MISSANG’s imprudent approach was objectionable, leaving the impression that it was imposing its own norms and priorities. MISSANG failed to suitably account for the great deal opposition within the armed forces and politics or try to settling it in advance.

The politicizing effect of Angolan engagement was also evident in the fact that police officers were initially placed under general suspicion by the new military commanders in Bissau upon returning from the Angolan police trainer center. They were apparently suspected of being “contaminated” by what they learned in Angola and of being allies of deposed Prime Minister Gomes and opponents of the military. As relatively well-trained police officers, the returnees were therefore initially freed from service in 2012 and only integrated into the police forces by early 2014. This alleged “disloyalty” based on the curriculum they learned corresponded with the aforementioned fact that the older, less-qualified counterparts felt threatened by the returnees.

In a similar vain, the misunderstanding related to Portuguese term “reforma” (reform vs. retirement) highlights the various environments, perceptions and interests of the International Community on one side and that of the security sector on the other, proving that hardly any dialog was pursued. Many Bissau-Guineans, mainly veterans and elderly members of the security forces, primarily associated “reforma” in the security sector with material improvements in the form of pensions, whereas those in active service hoped for new vehicles, IT equipment, etc. This was therefore a material matter related to bettering one’s own social status. This illustrates the phenomenon of a desire to flaunt and increase one’s social position through conspicuous status symbols that is existent in societies marked by serious and rapid social ascent and descent; a demonstration of social differentiation from as well as the wish for participation in the lifestyle of the global North. In contrast, it was structural aspects that were deemed crucial for the International Community, namely the restructuring and professionalization of the security forces, the reworking of existing laws, the drafting of new ones, etc. – all based on models borrowed from the North. This discrepancy between Bissau-Guinean perceptions and expectations and the actual intentions inherent in the reforms can be explained by a dearth of communication, both within Guinea-Bissau’s state structures as well as between Bissau-Guinean actors and the International Community.

The “reforma” misunderstanding also posed a problem for security sector reforms in another perspective. One insider reminded me of how former State President Vieira had gathered the commanders of the armed forces outside of Bissau in 2006 or 2007 to inform them that the International Community intended to execute a “reforma”. Many of those present, particularly ex-veterans who had reenlisted after 1998-9, felt fatally reminded of the “wild” forced retirements during which soldiers were simply sent home without any pension benefits. Vieira now stood before some of them again and announced a “reforma”, reawakening negative associations among those in attendance; many were...
completely indignant. This misunderstanding related to the term “reforma” clearly reinforced the rejection of and opposition to the reform, even though the supreme commander of the armed forces finally announced support for the reform.

These examples suggest that many experts are prisoners of modernization theory logic even though the academic development discourse turned away from this approach decades ago (see Gardner/Lewis 1996: 19). How can such a “delay” be explained? Looking at the biographies of those practically working on security sector reform, it is evident that many, due to the nature of the subject, have an exclusively legal, police or military background. This means that they are unfamiliar with development theories as they are received and discussed within development cooperation and academia. As such, many security sector experts lag behind in applied development cooperation, an area in which practitioners seem familiar with recent approaches to development theory, even if they may not actually apply them. Were experts in security sector reform to possess a higher degree of knowledge about development theories paired with analytically thought-through realizations based on related former projects, the reforms would surely be better planned and implemented. This would include consideration for self-determined local ownership principles, enhanced communication and coordination, and improved cultural embedding of projects and international experts. Nevertheless, many international practitioners within security sector reform remain largely unreflexive, deeming themselves – from a modernization theory perspective – to be emissaries acting in the name of freedom, development and civilization. They believe that their noble intentions are neither valued nor understood by state authorities in the affected nations of the global South. This was illustrated by the official parting words made by the head of the EU-SSR in mid-2010. He explained that the people of Guinea-Bissau knew how to traverse the path to peace, security, wealth and justice, and that the EU-SSR had contributed to preparing the way. Taking this path would help free the Bissau-Guineans, an “agonized people”, from the past and the stagnation in which they have sunk for decades. He indirectly added that the EU-SSR had represented the inherited and “sacred” values of the EU in Guinea-Bissau, namely freedom, dignity and human rights (Juan Esteban Verástegui in: European Union Mission for the Security Sector Reform in Guinea-Bissau 2010: 1).

But to what degree and how rapidly do new ideas penetrate police and military institutions in the first place? Interviews in the countryside showed that members of the police and military there were even further removed from security sector reform efforts than their counterparts in the capital. The observable urban-rural gap in Guinea-Bissau and other countries was thus further reinforced in the wake of reform efforts.

Despite contrasting official rhetoric, many security sector reform projects and their staff remain trapped in the one-sided logic of North-South norm and idea transfers; such an approach can only be met with limited success. Reforms that are meagerly adapted to local needs and demands are bound not to succeed.

Overall, this chapter has shown how co-determination principles were only selectively adapted into security sector reform in Guinea-Bissau for the sake of satisfying formal demands for local ownership. Donors blamed the actual lack of inclusion of local government, administrative and civil society representatives into the process on insufficient
capacities, susceptibility for corruption and limiting timeframes. The EU-SSR proved to be very inflexible and did not allow any room for adjustment or subsequent changes to the agreed-upon strategy. This meant that the content and approaches of implemented projects were often oriented towards guiding principles from the global North. Disparate perceptions, interpretations and expectations on both the side of the Bissau-Guineans and the International Community were dictated by deficient coordination and a lack of communication. In the field itself, donors have abided by the logic of modernization theory, leaving little room for locally negotiated reform approaches.

5. Prospects

The considerations presented here have highlighted the manifold difficulties and deficiencies inherent in previous security sector reform projects in Guinea-Bissau. One of the grave pitfalls in this context has been both the size and diversity – diachronic and synchronic – of the involved actors along with communication and coordination within and among the involved institutions that have exhibited little efficiency. Short project cycles, a desire to achieve too much in too little time, a lack of flexibility, holism and multi-disciplinarity, and timid financing commitments also had negative impacts. Although participation was repeatedly called for, the demand was not sufficiently satisfied: civil society and members of the security sector were seldom included. The overall impression remains that instead of guaranteeing self-determination, only a minimum degree of local co-determination in the form of selective consultations was granted. For this reason, differing perceptions and expectations in Guinea-Bissau and among the International Community could neither be resolved nor fulfilled.

The idea of local ownership has, indeed, also been criticized in other national contexts (see Reich 2006; Nathan 2007; Donais 2009; Mobekk 2010; Wilén/Chapaux 2011; Keane/Downes 2012; Oosterveld/Garland 2012; Richmond 2012): The term is often used as mere lip service – it is frequently unclear who the “locals” even are; they do not comprise a homogenous mass in possession of a single opinion. Recently, the idea of “national” or “governmental” ownership has gained in prominence. Basic as well as technical competences related to involvement in reforms are often denied governmental representatives by experts, dictated by the logic that donors know best how to plan and implement reforms. At international development cooperation training events on security sector reforms, local ownership is stressed, yet, in the same breath, the feasibility of implementation is said to be limited and subordinated to donor conditionality. Indeed, the notion of local ownership seems to serve to cover up asymmetrical power relations between the global North and countries of the South. Ultimately, this term frequently replaces the idea of “self-determination” since governments in the South hardly have a choice in what they can claim “ownership” of. In other words, local ownership can be seen as a code for behavioral conditioning serving to guarantee abidance by countries in the global South (Richmond 2012: 358-360, 372).
Last but not least, politicization, misunderstandings, limitations stemming from occupational biographies and deficient “cultural impregnation” of international actors have likewise contributed to the wanting results of security sector reforms. As such, “security sector reform with dignity” (Omoregie 2010) – as spoken by the former commander-in-chief of Guinea-Bissau’s armed forces – was not achieved. On the contrary, when considering the complexity and diversity of security sector reforms, the draining of funds, a perception of being excluded from and overrun by processes, a fear of change and unknown outcomes, and paternalistic mindsets operating within associated patronage networks, lacking capacities and excessive demands on the Bissau-Guinean side were also detrimental to previous reform attempts (see Mainzinger 2011: 69, 78).

Alternative approaches could start by facilitating broad public discussions and improving inclusion of differing local perspectives in order to create flexible reform strategies – with involvement by experts with various qualifications. Additionally, concrete utility must be presented to the affected staff within the security sector; rather than receiving mere theoretical information in courses, stakeholders must experience innovation in the field, termed “knowledge in practice” (Hills 2012: 742, 754). The causes of fear and opposition from politics and among the ranks of the security sector should be consistently addressed and plans should be explained and executed bit by bit in order for participants to overcome anxieties related to unknown processes and changes (see Vermaak 2012: 237, 243).

There are, however, obstacles that cannot be overcome in the short term. One serious situation relates to the fact that former reform attempts contributed to unsettling and destabilizing the political environment in Guinea-Bissau. Previous measures and failures have tended to aggravate mistrust and critical stances to any reform attempts among some segments of government, the police and the military. This is problematic since majority support is essential for reforms. Furthermore, how can coordination be enhanced when central international actors are found to pursue contrasting (geo-strategic) interests? Structural constraints on the donor side comprise a crucial factor that leaves little hope for a change in approaches to security sector reform among large organizations such as the UN and the EU. It seems unlikely that changes will occur in relation to short project cycles, stubborn project planning and limited finances that must repeatedly be renegotiated.

A more fundamental question arises as to whether an adaptation to current local demands and perspectives, in regards to local co- and self-determination, would actually have achieved more. People have to “fight to get by” in many areas of life in Guinea-Bissau (termed “dubri” in the local lingua franca). This includes norms set by the state which are often negotiable to a certain degree in local social practice. It is therefore no wonder that the members of the police and military I surveyed prioritized material structural factors over organizational ones. Reform projects must therefore much more essentially consider socio-economic fears and demands in order to win over those affected. Additionally, increasing the standard of education and training is fundamental for ensuring that adequate prerequisites for executing reforms exist into the long term; even high-ranking officers only possess rudimentary school education, if any at all. Many
representatives in the security sector are thus only marginally capable – at times even completely incapable – of effectively engaging in reforms. This does not, however, mean that their perceptive capacities should be denied, nor does it justify underestimating, ignoring or excluding them. They are, however, easier to manipulate than one would expect of those with more education. In contrast to the ways things are currently progressing, a reform of the security sector in a politically unstable country with a low level of education like Guinea-Bissau – whose actors in the security sector strongly pursue their own interests – must essentially be carried out with greater flexibility and a long-term outlook. Local perspectives and interests must be considered to a far greater degree, fear of change must be overcome with empathy, and tangible utility must be made apparent to those impacted.

Finally, a question emerges as to how suitable the Bissau-Guinean government and administration would be in serving as corrective instruments for undesirable developments, granted that the country is allowed to develop a reform strategy on its own. Regardless of capacity problems and the paternalistic predispositions of political representatives towards donors and civil society, research findings from developmental sociology and ethnology cast doubt on this prospect. Relevant literature from decades past has already described and analyzed the fixation of strategic groups (such as ministerial bureaucracies) on relatively easily accessible revenue that stems from development cooperation (see Evers/Schiel 1988: 228). Reform rhetoric directed at donors should attract projects and financing sources (see Hills 2012: 743); in this context, the role of economic considerations should not be underestimated. Particularly in a country like Guinea-Bissau that has been fixated and dependent on funds from development and financial cooperation since gaining independence, the issue of “extraversion” assumes crucial significance. Extraversion refers to a strategy by African societies to turn dependence into a resource: By targeting the mobilization of foreign resources, a steady flow of funds is ensured, along with continued dependence (Bayart 2012).

One possibility for enhancing the prospects for success within security sector reform lies in actually facilitating self-determination, or rather reinforcing co-determination by local governmental institutions and civil society, along with strengthening the basic orientation of cooperation. Strengthening this basic orientation should be done through the involvement of lower and mid-level local security sector actors as well as focus groups from the populace. Bottom-up project approaches (in contrast to top-down approaches planned without incorporating local views from security actors and the local populace) have to precede any dominant, “holistic” macro-approaches in order to set the foundations for primarily structural security sector reforms in the first place (see Mannitz 2014). Finally, improved coordination and communication is an indispensable prerequisite for optimizing reforms in the security sector.
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**Table of Abbreviations**

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAJ</td>
<td>Access to Justice Center; Portuguese: Centro de Acesso à Justiça</td>
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<td>CENFOJ</td>
<td>National Access to Justice Center; Portuguese: Centro Nacional de Formação Judiciária</td>
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<td>CPLP</td>
<td>Community of Portuguese Language Countries; Portuguese: Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa</td>
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<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration</td>
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<td>ECOMIB</td>
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<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<td>EU</td>
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<td>EU-SSR</td>
<td>EU mission in support of the Security Sector Reform in Guinea-Bissau</td>
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<td>FORTES</td>
<td>Rule of Law and Security Programme; Portuguese: Programa de Fortalecimento do Estado de Direito e Segurança</td>
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<td>ISSAT</td>
<td>The International Security Sector Advisory Team</td>
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<td>MISSANG</td>
<td>Angolan Military Mission in Guinea-Bissau; Portuguese: Missão Militar de Angola na Guiné-Bissau</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organization</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAIGC</td>
<td>The African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde; Portuguese: Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde</td>
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<td>PAOSED</td>
<td>Support Program for the Sovereignty and State Law Associations/Organizations in Guinea-Bissau; Portuguese: Programa de Apoio aos Órgãos de Soberania e Estado de Direito da Guiné-Bissau</td>
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<td>UN</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
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<td>UNOGBIS</td>
<td>United Nations Peace-Building Support Office in Guinea-Bissau</td>
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<td>UNI OGBIS</td>
<td>United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau</td>
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<td>UNODC</td>
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