

**WARID:** Bosnia and Herzegovina (Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina)

**STARDATE:** 30 April 1992

**ENDDATE:** 21 November 1995

Related cases: Bosnia and Herzegovina (Croat Republic of Herceg-Bosna) 1993-1994,  
Yugoslavia (Croatia)/Croatia (Serbs) 1991-1993,  
Yugoslavia (Kosovo) 1998-1999

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### **Conflict overview**

Of all the armed conflicts in the course of Yugoslavia's dissolution, the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina was the longest and the bloodiest. Several conflict party dyads can be differentiated within this war. The most important dyad relates to the struggle between the internationally recognized government of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the proclaimed Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.<sup>1</sup>

In 1991, 44% of the inhabitants in Bosnia and Herzegovina were Muslim, 31% Serb and 17% Croat. Most Muslims – who later preferred the term Bosniacs and many Croats, in some periods, were loyal to the government of the newly independent state. Most Serbs, however, supported the proclaimed Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Most Bosniacs and Croats favored the secession of Bosnia and Herzegovina from Yugoslavia whereas most Serbs preferred remaining in Yugoslavia. Once Bosnia and Herzegovina became independent, the Serb forces aimed at splintering off as much territory as possible from the new state (Burg/Shoup 1999; Silber/Little 1997; Woodward 1995). The whole of Bosnia and Herzegovina was disputed territory.

The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (GFAP 1995) – better known as Dayton Agreement – ended the war in November 1995 [**WARENDUC=1; WARENDOS=1; WARDUR=43**]. Since then, Bosnia and Herzegovina has continued to exist in its internationally recognized borders but has been composed of two federal units, called 'Entities': the predominantly Bosniac-Croat Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (henceforth Federation) and Republika Srpska.

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1 In contrast to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) we do not see a separate armed conflict between the government and Serb irregular fighters. The irregular combatants can be seen as a part of the Serb rebels.

The UCDP estimates that about 24,000 people [**FATALUC=24000**] were killed in the armed struggle and through one-sided violence.<sup>2</sup> According to this data, 0.55% of the 4.4 million inhabitants in 1991<sup>3</sup> [**PREWARPO=4400000**] died on account of war [**INTENSUC=0.55**]. For all dyads in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the ‘Book of the Deaths’ compiled by the Research and Documentation Center in Sarajevo lists the names of 96,000 victims<sup>4</sup>; studies for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia counted 105,000 fatalities.<sup>5</sup> According to the UCDP, about 83% of the fatalities in all dyads related to the struggle between the government and the Serb Republic. Applying the same share to the overall number of 96,000 fatalities, about 80,000 people were killed in this war [**FATALOS=80000**]. Accordingly, the war killed 1.82% of the pre-war population [**INTENSOS=1.82**].

### **The military balance at the end of the war**

No warring party triumphed on the battlefield [**VICTORY=0**]. For most of the war, Serb forces, supported by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, controlled two-thirds of the territory. Nevertheless, they did not overcome the resistance by the government, which possessed more troops but less heavy weapons than the Serb forces (Calic 1996: 99-102; Nation 2003: 155-160, 164). In the last weeks of the war, Bosniac-dominated government troops and Croat forces, backed by NATO airstrikes, pushed the Serb forces back. By the end of the fighting, each side respectively controlled about one half of the territory [**REBTERR=1; MORETERR=0**].<sup>6</sup>

Cunningham et al. 2009 assess the Serb forces’ relative strength as ‘moderate’ [**REBFIGHT=0**]. As the Dayton Agreement (GFAP 1995: annex 1a.IV) drew a Line of Separation and prescribed the redeployment of troops from both warring parties, it is clear that both sides were able to continue fighting. Despite NATO airstrikes in August and September 1995, the Serb troops “still functioned as a coherent military force throughout its operational area”<sup>7</sup> [**CONFIGHT=0**]. Neither side eliminated or captured<sup>8</sup> its enemy’s top political leadership [**LEADER=0**].

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2 [http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdata/gpcountry.php?id=20&regionSelect=9-Eastern\\_Europe#](http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdata/gpcountry.php?id=20&regionSelect=9-Eastern_Europe#) (22 Nov 2013).

3 See the summary of census results at: <http://popis2013.net/index.php?docid=1042> (12 Aug 2014).

4 “Bosanska knjiga mrtvih” Mirsada Tokače, <http://www.otisak.ba/bih/15677-bosanska-knjiga-mervih-mirsada-tokae.html> (22 Nov 2013).

5 Hag: U BiH tokom rata stradalo više od 100 hiljada ljudi, *Nezavisne novine*, 29 March 2011, online edition.

6 Holbrooke 1998: 164-250; Owen 1996: 362-364.

7 CIA 2002: 395.

8 In May 1992, President Alija Izetbegović was captured by troops of the Yugoslav People’s Army (YPA) at the airport in Sarajevo but exchanged the next day for the most senior YPA commander, whose forces were besieged in the capital (Silber/Little 1997: 231-243).

In the last weeks of the war, NATO's intervention tipped the military balance to the disadvantage of the Serb forces. NATO's objective, however, was not to defeat them but to enforce a peace plan that resulted in the Dayton Agreement. Overall, military power was close to being balanced, as indicated by the average value of all variables mentioned in this section [**WARBAL=0.17**].

### **The post-war military balance**

The Dayton Agreement did not demand the unification of both sides' forces nor the dissolution of Serb troops. Both Entities were allowed to maintain forces led by defense ministries at the level of the Entities (GFAP 1995: annex 4.III); the federal level did not possess armed forces in the first post-war decade. The federal level took over defense policies only after a defense reform from 2003 to 2006 (Hadžović 2007a). Both former warring parties contributed to the newly established Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina [**STATEFOR 1996-2005=n.r., STATEFOR 2006-2012=0**].<sup>9</sup>

Each of the three infantry brigades of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina consists of a Bosniac battalion, a Serb battalion and a Croat battalion.<sup>10</sup> The Serb battalions evolved from Republika Srpska's military. Being that the brigades and the structures of command are multi-ethnic, the Serb side does not have a separate military force, at least on paper. It is, however, doubtful whether the Serb battalions would be loyal to the government in the case of a new war. Additionally, the Entities maintained police units that outnumber the soldiers of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Azinović et al. 2011: 31, 34, 41, 55-56).<sup>11</sup> In total, both former warring parties possess separate forces, although this fact has been less obvious since the defense reform [**SEPFORCE 1996-2012=0**].

Prior to the peace agreement, the government forces had 142,000 active troops<sup>12</sup> and the Serb forces about 85,000 combatants. During the post-war years, the advantage held by the Federation grew slightly.<sup>13</sup> In the merged forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbs constitute about

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9 The particular situation with armed forces at the Entity level between 1996 and 2005 does not perfectly fit within the coding options. Coding STATEFOR 1996–2005 with '0' (i.e. that both sides were parts of the state's military) would be misleading, as the federal level did not have any armed forces. The coding 'double exclusion' would ignore that both sides possessed troops.

10 See [http://www.mod.gov.ba/o\\_nama/Odbrambena\\_struktura/?id=21715](http://www.mod.gov.ba/o_nama/Odbrambena_struktura/?id=21715) (22 Nov 2013).

11 The cited author discusses whether private security companies with about 4,000 employees can also be perceived as reserves of the former warring parties.

12 This is the combined strength of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ARBiH) and the Croat Defense Council (HVO).

13 See the IISS yearbooks 1996-2012. For 2000, IISS presents a ratio of only 1.33:1 to the advantage of the Federation; it was 1.86:1 for 1999 and 1.71:1 for 2001. A reduction of Serb forces seems to have been considered delayed.

one-third of the troops (s. Table 2 in the annex).<sup>14</sup> In sum, no substantial change in the ratio has taken place [**TROOPS 1996-2012=0**].<sup>15</sup>

With respect to tanks, armored vehicles and artillery, the Serb forces outnumbered the government's troops at the end of the war by a ratio of more than 2.5:1 (IISS 1996: 81-82). The Dayton Agreement prescribed that the Federation should possess twice as many heavy weapons as Republika Srpska (GFAP 1995: annex 1B.IV.2-3). Indeed, in the following years, the ratio substantially changed to the benefit of the Federation [**ARMS 1996-2012= -1**].<sup>16</sup>

Republika Srpska is dominated by Serbs, the Federation by Bosniacs, and, within the Federation, several of the ten Cantons are predominantly Croat. In this sense, all warring parties control territory with state institutions and are able to recruit people and to extract resources there [**TERRCON 1996-2012=0**]. Amendments to the Entity constitutions in 2002 mitigated the respective dominance by reserving a share of positions to Serbs in the Federation and to Bosniacs and Croats in Republika Srpska (High Representative 2002a and 2002b).

The amounts of territory held by the Entities (Federation 51%, Republika Srpska 49%) largely reflect the situation on the battlefield at the end of the war. Following the Dayton Agreement, some areas have been exchanged. With regard to the extent of territory, no side made substantial gains. The Serb side, however, did have to transfer control over parts of Sarajevo to the Federation, winning the Federation important territory<sup>17</sup> [**TERRWIN 1996-2012= -1**].

Republika Srpska is more vulnerable than the Federation. According to the borders agreed upon in Dayton, only a small corridor around the city of Brčko connects Republika Srpska's Eastern half with the north-western half that includes the economic heartland and Republika Srpska's biggest city, Banja Luka.<sup>18</sup> The Dayton Agreement did not decide on which Entity Brčko should belong to (GFAP 1995: annex 2.V). After arbitration, the city became a neutral district (High Representative 2000). In the case of a new war, it is very likely that the Bosniac side would try to occupy the corridor in order to split Republika Srpska into two parts

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14 The Presidency saw nearly proportional representation: 45.9% Bosniacs, 33.6% Serbs and 19.8% Croats (BiH Ministry of Defense 2011: 15).

15 We combined ARBiH and HVO, as the Croat troops in the war from 1992 to 1995 mostly fought against Serb forces. If one doubts the loyalty of the HVO towards the government in case of a new war against the Serbs and compares only the ARBiH with the Serb forces (1995-2005) or the number of Bosniac soldiers and Serb troops (2006-2012), the coding would change to [**TROOPS 1996-2001=0, TROOPS 2002-2012= -1**].

16 See the respective yearbook 'The Military Balance' by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS 1996-2012). Although the yearbooks 1996-1999 only report data for the situation prior to the Dayton Agreement, Republika Srpska obviously lost ground even in these early years, as the Federation benefited from a US-led 'Train and Equip' Program (s. <http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/14799.htm> (21 Nov 2013)). When the forces of the Federation and Republika Srpska merged, the Serb units did not regain their former advantage.

17 Bildt 1998: 159; Holbrooke 1998: 448.

18 See the map at: [http://www.vijeceministara.gov.ba/osnovne\\_informacije\\_o\\_bih/default.aspx?id=95&langTag=bs-BA](http://www.vijeceministara.gov.ba/osnovne_informacije_o_bih/default.aspx?id=95&langTag=bs-BA) (25 Nov 2013).

**[VULNERAB 1996-2012= -1]**. Republika Srpska's territorial vulnerability is underlined by the threat to use Brčko as leverage in the case of the Entity's unilateral secession.<sup>19</sup>

Armed peacekeeping forces were present in the entire post-war period. The NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) kept the peace from December 1995 to December 1996. It was succeeded by the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in December 2004. Since then, the European Union Force Operation Althea has continued peacekeeping **[PEACKEEP 1996-2012=0]**.<sup>20</sup>

The USA, Russia, the United Kingdom and France substantially participated in efforts to make, keep and build peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. All of them committed themselves to guaranteeing peace, no matter which side violated the peace agreement. However, none of them clearly announced that they would be one conflict party's military ally in the case of a new war **[P5ALLY 1996-2012=n.r.]**.

In sum, the military balance in the post-war period shifted to the benefit of the government **[POSTBAL 1996-2005= -0.43, POSTBAL 2006-2012= -0.38]**.<sup>21</sup>

The scores for the military balance at the end of the war and for the post-war years result in a total score close to 0 **[BALANCE 1996-2005= -0.13, BALANCE 2006-2012= -0.1]**.<sup>22</sup>

## Economy

The war and its consequences upset Bosnia and Herzegovina's demographic structure. As the first post-war census only took place in 2013<sup>23</sup>, data for the population in the years 1996 to 2012 was only estimated. Thus, the numbers for the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita are therefore imprecise.

Table 1: GDP per capita in current USD<sup>24</sup>

<i>Year</i>	<i>Estimated population</i>	<i>GDP per capita</i>
1996	3485575	799
1997	3535998	1038
1998	3640821	1131
1999	3752004	1249
2000	3834364	1436
2001	3879353	1482
2002	3897579	1707
2003	3895779	2148
2004	3886723	2579

19 Dragan Jerinić: Ratni pijev novog bega, Nezavisne novine, 12 October 2010, online edition.

20 See Fortna 2008: 21 until 2004 and for the last years: [http://www.euforbih.org/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=15&Itemid=134](http://www.euforbih.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=15&Itemid=134) (22 Nov 2013).

21 If we code STATEFOR 1996-2005 as 'not relevant', POSTBAL 1996-2005 would be at -0.43.

22 If we code STATEFOR 1996-2005 as 'not relevant', BALANCE 1996-2005 would be at -0.13.

23 According to this census, the population is 3.79 million: Maja Rener-Smajović: U BiH popisane 3.791.622 osobe, Nezavisne novine, 5 November 2013, online edition.

24 See <http://api.worldbank.org/v2/en/country/bih?downloadformat=excel> (14 Nov 2013).

2005	3879828	2822
2006	3875157	3200
2007	3868665	3950
2008	3861201	4802
2009	3853446	4433
2010	3845929	4362
2011	3839322	4751
2012	3833916	4447

### **The scale of compromise after the war**

Since Dayton, Bosnia and Herzegovina has been a consociational democracy (Lijphart 1977: 25-47) in which the former warring parties share power [**GOVERN 1996-2012=0**]. According to the new constitution, part of the peace agreement, the tripartite presidency, consists of a Serb elected in Republika Srpska as well as a Bosniac and a Croat, both elected in the Federation. At least one third of all members of the Council of Ministers must come from Republika Srpska (GFAP 1995: annex 4.V).

Each member of the Presidency possesses a veto right (GFAP 1995: annex 4.V.2). In the Parliamentary Assembly, all decisions need a majority of votes which “includes at least one-third of the votes of Delegates or Members from the territory of each Entity” (GFAP 1995: annex 4.IV.3d). Another veto right is institutionalized in the House of Peoples, one of two chambers of the Parliamentary Assembly, which is comprised of five Bosniacs, five Serbs and five Croats. A decision which affects the vital interest of one people requires a respective majority in each of the three caucuses for approval (GFAP 1995: annex 4.IV.3e). Despite many debates about reforming the political system, veto rights remain in force [**VETO 1996-2012=0**].

In the post-war period, Bosniac parties supported Bosnia and Herzegovina as a state shared by Serb, Croats and themselves. At the same time, they favored of establishment of functional regions rather than preserving the ethnically defined Entities. Moreover, many Bosniac politicians called for constraining or abolishing the veto rights. As they are the largest people, Bosniacs perceive power-sharing and veto rights as a strait jacket. Most Serbs prefer an independent Republika Srpska over Bosnia and Herzegovina as constituted in Dayton. However, as a state shared with Bosniacs and Croats is a fact, they have to act within the constitutional institutions. Since Serbs have a smaller share of the total population, they perceive power-sharing and veto rights as a protection against a Bosniac domination. Because the Croats are the smallest constituent people, they support the Serbs in defending power-sharing and veto rights (Gromes 2012: 67-90). Croats and Bosniacs were part of the warring party that was in government at the beginning of the war. As the Bosniacs outnumber the Croats, their critical position on the veto rights is decisive [**VETOSAT 1996-2012=1**].

Political parties with Bosniac, Serb or Croat prefixes, parties from Republika Srpska or the Federation, as well as parties with multi-ethnic orientations have run in all post-war elections **[ELECT 1996-2012=0]**.<sup>25</sup>

The war was dominated by the question whether Bosnia-Herzegovina would continue to exist in its internationally recognized borders. Most Bosniacs supported the government's struggle for the state's territorial integrity, whereas the Serb camp tried to secede from Bosnia-Herzegovina. They wanted to establish an independent Republika Srpska that would be unified with the rest of Yugoslavia and Republika Srpska Krajina, proclaimed by Serb forces in Croatia. The Dayton Agreement prescribed the continuity of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the existent borders (GFAP 1995: annex 4.I.1). The government prevailed in this regard **[EXBORDER 1996-2012= -1]**. The question of the Inter-Entity Boundary Line only became relevant in the last phase of the war, when the warring parties accepted the state's territorial integrity as a basic principle of a comprehensive peace agreement. The border between the Entities resulted from a compromise. The government, for instance, abandoned ambitions to regain control over Srebrenica, where Serb forces had killed 8,000 Bosniac men and boys in an act of genocide in July 1995 (International Court of Justice 2007). In return, the Federation received control over the whole of Sarajevo and a corridor that connects the city of Goražde with other parts of the Federation. This aspect, however, is not relevant for the coding, as it is also considered with respect to power-sharing and the allocation of responsibilities between the federal level and the Entities **[INBORDER 1996-2012=n.r.]**.<sup>26</sup>

In the peace talks leading to the Dayton Agreement, Bosniac representatives demanded a strong central government while Serb representatives wanted to allot as many responsibilities to sub-state units as possible (Bildt 1998: 115-116, 138-139). The peace agreement's provisions were much closer to the Serb position. The 'Institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina' in Sarajevo were responsible for foreign policy, foreign trade policy, customs policy, monetary policy, finances of the federal institutions, immigration, refugee and asylum policy, international and inter-Entity criminal law enforcement, common and international communication facilities, the regulation of inter-Entity transportation, and air traffic control. All other responsibilities were reserved to the Entities (GFAP 1995: annex 4.III). Between the years 2000 and

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25 See all results in the local language at <http://www.izbori.ba/Default.aspx?CategoryID=48&Lang=3&Mod=0> (22 Nov 2013). The English version does not present all election results. For the period between 1996 and 2012, Freedom House rated the political rights always as '5' or better: <http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Country%20Ratings%20and%20Status%2C%201973-2014%20%28FINAL%29.xls> (26 Mar 2014).

26 If one codes INBORDER 1996-2012=0, COMPROM 1996-1997 slightly changes from 0.17 to 0.14, COMPROM 1998-2012 remains at 0.

2006, the Institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina obtained new responsibilities for the judiciary (Independent Judicial Commission 2004), border protection, the police (Ahić 2007a and 2007b), intelligence (Hadžović 2007b) and finance (Bliesemann de Guevara 2009: 150-158). As mentioned, the Entities lost their responsibility over defense policy. Nevertheless, even after these reforms, Bosniac parties still assessed the Entities as being too powerful **[COMPETEN 1996-2012=1]**.

Dissent over economic policy, special programs for particular groups and other issues were not driving forces of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina **[ECONOMY 1996-2012=n.r.; SPECPRO 1996-2012=n.r.; ISSUE 1996-2012=n.r.; ISSUE2 1996-2012=n.r.]**.

The Dayton Agreement authorized an internationally appointed High Representative to coordinate efforts to implement the provisions related to civilian matters (GFAP 1995: annex 10). In December 1997, the High Representative attained the power to remove elected politicians and other officials and to impose legislation (Peace Implementation Council 1997: para. XI). Up to December 2012, the High Representative had dismissed almost 200 politicians and other officials; in total, he made more than 900 decisions using his expanded powers.<sup>27</sup> As the High Representative imposed legislation that has strengthened the Institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the call for abolishing his sweeping powers received much more support from Serb than by Bosniac politicians **[NEWCON 1996-1997=n.r.; NEWCON 1998-2012= -1; NEWCON2 1996-2012=n.r.]**.<sup>28</sup>

On the one hand, the compromise on the internal border was closer to the Serb position than to the demands by the government. According to the census in 1990, less than one-third of the population was Serb. The 2013 census revealed that only 35% of the total population of Bosnia and Herzegovina lived in Republika Srpska.<sup>29</sup> Nevertheless, this Entity held 49% of the territory. On the other hand, the compromise on the internal border resulted in Republika Srpska's vulnerability **[BENEFIT 1996-2012=n.r.; BENEFIT2=n.r.]**.

In sum, post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina is characterized by a high degree of compromise **[COMPROM 1996-1997=0.17, COMPROM 1998-2012=0]**.

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27 See <http://www.ohr.int/decisions/archive.asp> (22 Nov 2013).

28 For recent examples see: Dejan Šajinović: Nezađovoljni Inckovim izvještajem, *Nezavisne novine*, 16 May 2013, online edition; BiH posljednja politička diktatura u Evropi, *Nezavisne novine*, 26 March 2013, online edition; Nije moguće raspakivanje Dejtonskog mirovnog sporazuma, *Nezavisne novine*, 12 February 2013, online edition.

29 Maja Rener-Smajović: U BiH popisane 3.791.622 osobe, *Nezavisne novine*, 5 November 2013, online edition.



## Stability of peace

Neither a new war nor an armed conflict below the threshold of war took place in Bosnia and Herzegovina [SAMEWAR 1996-2012=0; DATESAME=n.r.; ANYWAR 1996-2012=0; DATEANY=n.r.].<sup>30</sup> Peace lasted from the signing of the Dayton Agreement until the end of the period under investigation in December 2012 [PEACMON1=205; PEACMON2=205].

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## Annex

Table 2: Troops in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina (IISS 1995/96-2013)<sup>31</sup>

Year	Former government		Serb forces VRS <sup>32</sup>	Ratio	
	ARBiH	HVO			
1995	92000	50000	85000	1.67	1
1996	40000	16000	30000	1.87	1
1997	40000	16000	30000	1.87	1
1998	40000	16000	30000	1.87	1
1999	40000	16000	30000	1.87	1
2000	30000	10000	30000	1.33	1
2001	16800	7200	14000	1.71	1
2002 <sup>33</sup>	9200	4000	6600	2.00	1
2003	9200	4000	6600	2.00	1
2004	11992	4408	8200	2.00	1
2005	11992	4408	8200	2.00	1
		<i>AFBiH<sup>34</sup></i>			
2006		11865		1.97 <sup>35</sup>	1
2007		9047		1.97	1
2008		8543		1.97	1
2009		11099		1.97	1
2010		10577		1.97	1
2011		10577		1.97	1
2012		10550		1.97	1

31 The yearbooks 1995/96-1998/99 claim to only present data on the situation prior to the signing of the Dayton Agreement. Nevertheless, they report smaller numbers for 1997 and 1998 than for 1995. For 1996, IISS repeats the information for 1995. For 1996, we therefore use the data reported for 1997.

32 Army of Republika Srpska.

33 In contrast to other years, IISS excludes conscripts in its data for 2002 and 2003.

34 Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

35 The ratio for the years 2006-2012 assumes that 45.9% of the soldiers are Bosniac, 33.6% Serb and 19.8% Croat (cf. BiH Ministry of Defense 2011: 15).

Table 3: Arms in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina (IISS 1995/96-2013)

Year	Former government		Serb forces	Ratio	
	ARBiH	HVO	VRS		
1995	75 MBT <sup>36</sup>	100 MBT	500 MBT	1	2.86
	35 APC <sup>37</sup>	80 AIFV <sup>38</sup>	295 APC	1	2.57
	175+ total artillery	930 total artillery	2,921 total artillery	1	2.64
1996-1999	only data for the situation prior to the Dayton Agreement				
2000	170 MBT	80 MBT	250+ MBT	1	1
	150 APC	90 AIFV	350 APC	1	1.46
	1,500 total artillery	500 total artillery	750 total artillery	2.67	1
2001	205 MBT		137 MBT	1.50	1
	185 APC, AIFV		139 APC, AIFV	1.33	1
	919 total artillery		547 total artillery	1.68	1
2002	203 MBT		80 MBT	2.54	1
	105 APC, AIFV		170 APC, AIFV	1	1.62
	880 total artillery		581 total artillery	1.51	1
2003	192 MBT		80 MBT	2.40	1
	105 APC, AIFV		219 APC, AIFV	1	2.09
	900 total artillery		628 total artillery	1.43	1
2004	188 MBT		137 MBT	1.37	1
	105 APC, AIFV		148 APC, AIFV	1	1.41
	914 total artillery		628 total artillery	1.46	1
2005	188 MBT		137 MBT	1.37	1
	164 APC; AIFV		148 APC, AIFV	1.11	1
	946+ total artillery		500 total artillery	1.89	1
<i>AFBiH</i>					
2006	194 MBT				
	194 APC, AIFV				
	357+ total artillery				
2007	325 MBT				
	325 APC, AIFV				
	754+ total artillery				
2008	325 MBT				
	277 APC; AIFV				
	1,469 total artillery				
2009	325 MBT				
	276 APC, AIFV				
	1,757 total artillery				
2010	334 MBT				
	264 AIFV, APC				
	1,521 total artillery				
2011	334 MBT				
	264 AIFV, APC				
	1,521 total artillery				
2012	316 MBT				
	264 AIFV, APC				
	1,521 total artillery				

36 Main battle tank.

37 Armored personnel carrier.

38 Armored infantry fighting vehicle.