

**WARID:** Chad (MPS/MDD) 1990-1993

**STARDATE:** 31 March 1990

**ENDDATE:** 28 February 1993

Related Cases: Chad (MDJT) 1999-2002

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### **Conflict overview**

Chad's post-colonial history has been marred by conflict. Since gaining independence from France in 1960, there has been a division between the Muslim North and the Animistic-Christian South of the country. This divide is reflected in the existence of numerous rebel groups that often procure their identity from the ethnicity they belong to (Basedau 2010: 41f.). Between 1982 and 1990, during the rule of Hissène Habré, Chadian territory was home to activities for many diverse armed groups. Moreover, the state suffered from many types of organized political, ethnic and religious violence (Berg 2008: 10; ICG 2008: 1).

Habré was overthrown in 1990 by Idriss Déby and his 'Mouvement Patriotique Pour Le Salut' (MPS). As his predecessor, Déby was from the North but from a different ethnic group, namely the Zaghawa (Basedau 2010: 42). The civil war that raged between 1990 and 1993 is characterized as an ethnic conflict and reflects the division between the Zaghawa, associated with the MPS, and the Gorane ethnic groups, linked to former president Habré, (Sany/Desai 2008: 27).

The MPS group was a fusion of three rebel groups: the Islamic Legion, later known as the Revolutionary Forces of 1 April, the 'Mouvement pour la salvation nationale tchadienne' (Mosanat) and the MPS, who had challenged Habré's authority since 1987. After a failed coup attempt in 1989, the rebel groups fled to Sudan, from where they launched a new attack on the Chadian Government in March 1990 with heavy support from Libya. Déby was able to seize power in N'Djamena on 2 December 1990 (Bangoura 2005: 344; Burr/Collins 2006: 262; Debos 2013: 88; Nolutshungu 1996: 243; Prunier 2007: 69ff.). Déby quickly concentrated power in his hands and gave most government positions to members of his own ethnic group (Berg 2008: 14). Habré and his supporters first fled to Cameroon and later regrouped in eastern Nigeria, from

where they prepared an attack on the new Chadian Government. The group around Habré, formerly known as the FANT (Forces Armées Nationales Tchadiennes), renamed themselves 'Mouvement pour Démocratie et Développement' (MDD) and coalesced with a minor rebel group called the 'Forces Armées Occidentales' (FAO). These two groups were determined to restore Habré's power and therefore launched an attack on Chad from Nigeria. Though the MDD achieved some degree of military success, they did not manage to control any important territory for a long period of time and suffered heavy casualties in battles against the Chadian army (Burr/Collins 2006: 262). The Chadian army was partially supported by the French army in its fight against the MDD (Clayton 1999: 162). At the end of the war, the remaining fighters from the MDD first fled to Nigeria, and were subsequently sent back to Chad. Most of the rebels feared retribution from the Chadian army and fled to Niger, planning to overthrow Déby from there (Burr/Collins 2006: 262; 273f.). According to the Uppsala Conflict Date Program (UCDP) Conflict Termination Dataset from 2010, the war ended in February 1993 due to its low intensity, being under the threshold of the conflict definition [**WARENDUC=5**].<sup>1</sup>

The MDD was not militarily defeated by the MPS. It remained active, operating at a low level of intensity. Andreas Mehler (1996: 209f.) states that the MDD split into many factions that were active after the end of war. Due to the high level of fragmentation within the group, it is difficult to pinpoint any main faction that would qualify as the legitimate representation for the whole group. Moreover, Mehler (1997: 210) refers to a peace agreement signed by one of the MDD factions led by Moussa Medella in Franceville (Gabon) on 12 January 1996. If the MDD had been of no significance, the Chadian Government would not have made a peace agreement with this faction. As such, the end of the war did not constitute a final victory over the MDD but rather 'ended' once it reached a low intensity [**WARENDOS=5**].

According to the International Crisis Group (ICG 2009), the MDD ceased operations in February 1992; Clayton (1999:162) does, however, describe a local rebellion led by the MDD in February 1993, confirming the information coded by in the UCDP dataset. In total, the war lasted for 35 months [**WARDUR=35**]. According to data provided by the UCDP, around 2,000 people were killed in battles related to the armed conflict and by one-sided violence against civilians [**FATALUC=2000**]. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) provides a slightly higher estimation, with around 3,000 fatalities [**FATALOS=3000**]. Considering the fact

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1 [http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp\\_conflict\\_termination\\_dataset/](http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp_conflict_termination_dataset/) (4 Feb 2015).

that the Republic of Chad had a total population of 5,765,000 [**PREWARPO=5800000**]<sup>2</sup>, the intensity of the war, illustrated by the share of fatalities as a portion of the pre-war population, varies between 0.03% and 0.05% [**INTENSUC=0.03; INTENSOS=0.05**].

### **The military balance at the end of the war**

When Idriss Déby overthrew Hissène Habré's government on 1 December 1990, the MPS seized power and deprived the MDD of most of its former resources. Major strategic reasons for the MPS' victory include the fast capture of Chad's capital N'Djamena, support from Sudan, Libya's hostility towards the Habré administration, and the neutrality of the French Épervier forces (Bangoura 2005: 339f.; ICG 2006: 2; SIPRI 1991: 368). Déby's kinsmen were undoubtedly the military victors, most strong evidenced by Hissène Habré's escape into exile in Senegal [**VICTORY=1**].<sup>3</sup>

In contrast to our approach, Cunningham et al. (2009) separate the conflict in two distinct patterns: Habré's rule being challenged by Déby's MPS (1990) and the MPS government being opposed by MDD rebels (1991-1993). In both constellations, there is no evidence of territorial control held by the rebelling side. Since we understand these two parts as constituting stages of one consistent framework, the switch from the Habré to the MPS government is proof of the MPS enforcing territorial control [**REBTERR=1**]. With their base in Darfur, the Déby-led MPS troops first seized control of Ouaddai, N'Djamena and other southern districts in Chad in 1990, before turning to the northern regions (Bangoura 2005: 340). Until the end of war, the MPS managed to enlarge its territorial control, leading to the complete withdrawal of MDD rebels from the disputed territory [**MORETERR=1**].<sup>4</sup>

In their divided conflict observations, Cunningham et al. (2009) describe the rebels' fighting capabilities as 'high' in 1990 and 'low' between 1991 and 1993, when MDD rebels challenged MPS rule. Even before the turnover of power in 1990, the MPS had between 2,500 and 5,000 men in arms (SIPRI 1991: 367). In 1992, after establishing control of the military and paramilitary apparatus, the new MPS government commanded a total of 50,000 troops (SIPRI 1993: 127). The International Institute for Security Studies (IISS) provides lower estimates, counting a total of 29,700. Nevertheless, both data exhibit a similar trend and the progressively

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2 <http://data.worldbank.org/country/chad> (2 May 2014).

3 Taje 2006: 48.

4 Burr/Collins 2006: 273f.

increasing strength of the MPS troop contingents [REBFIGHT=1]. There was a clear demobilization at the end of the conflict to the disadvantage of the MDD troops: they eventually found themselves isolated and under heavy pressure, even in their former strongholds around Lake Chad. According to the ICG (2011: 6), MDD combatants loyal to Habré were expelled to the neighboring territories of Niger and Nigeria, where the majority of them were captured. Whereas the MDD rebels were mostly expelled, Hissène Habré fled and the group's leadership splintered into various factions at the end of the war, which clearly lacked the ability to continue fighting [CONFIGHT=1].<sup>5</sup> Despite the military leader of the MDD, Goukoni Guet, being captured on Nigerian territory in April 1992 and later executed by the republican guard<sup>6</sup>, we cannot consider one side to have captured or killed the other side's political leader with an impact that would prove decisive. Déby has been ruling Chad until the present day; Hissène Habré assumed political asylum in Senegal [LEADER=0].<sup>7</sup>

In sum, there was a strong military imbalance in favor of the MPS rebels led by Déby [WARBAL=0.83].<sup>8</sup>

### **The military balance in the post-war period**

After the end of the war in February 1993, reports of inter-ethnic rivalry still prevailed while the new government's policies set out the terms of cooperation and reintegration of MDD rebels into the Chadian national army (Bangoura 2005: 363). MDD troops were ousted from the state's territory. Concerning the structural changes in the Chadian army after 1993, the regime change was strongly connected to a widespread program of demobilization, disarmament and reintegration (Caramés/Sanz 2009: 45f.). According to different sources, 20,000 to 27,000 soldiers were demobilized between 1992 and 1996 and around 14,000 were dismissed (Debos 2013: 185). These dismissals were made under consideration of ethnicity and in favor of the Zaghawa and the government. This was especially true in the regrouping of republican guard that was launched during wartime. The present FIR (Forces d'Intervention Rapide) boasts 7,000 men that are exclusively under the mandate of President Déby and overwhelmingly comprised of

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5 Burr/Collins 2006: 274.

6 <http://www.amnesty.org/es/library/asset/AFR20/008/1992/es/e4eea8e1-edc1-11dd-a95b-fd9a617f028f/afr200081992en.html> (6 Mar 2014)

7 Buijtenhuijs 1998b:101; <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/03/chad-hissene-habre-charged> (3 Feb 2015).

8 Burr/Collins 2006: 259; 268; Clayton 1999: 162.

Chadian and Sudanese Zaghawa (Bangoura 2005: 380; Buijtenhuijs 1998b: 97). In general, the government made few efforts to reintegrate former MDD rebels into the ‘Armée Nationale du Tchad’<sup>9</sup> [STATEFOR 1993-2012=1].<sup>10</sup> Both warring parties had separate armed forces at their disposal, even though the armed forces of the MDD were considerably smaller. The IISS yearbook only documents the MDD as an opposition force until 1995; however, since an agreement was made between a major faction of the MDD under Moussa Medella in 1999, we conclude that the MDD had separate forces until 1999 [SEPFORCE 1993-1999=0, SEPFORCE 2000-2012=1].<sup>11</sup>

There is no data available in the IISS yearbook on the number of armed forces or the amount of equipment held by the MDD [TROOPS 1993-1999=n.d., TROOPS 2000-2012=n.r.; ARMS 1993-1999=n.d., ARMS 2000-2012=n.r.].

After December 1990, Déby and the MPS controlled N’Djamena, an area that constitutes one of the most important territories in Chad. Even though the MDD attacked Déby’s regime from Nigeria in January 1992, they were unable to achieve meaningful control of important territory; they suffered a major defeat by one of Déby’s commanders close to Lake Chad [TERRCON 1993-2012=1].<sup>12</sup> Since the MDD rebels associated with Habré first fled to Nigeria and then to Niger after having been defeated by Déby’s army, we deem it appropriate to conclude that the MPS controlled more important territory than the MDD throughout the post-war period [TERRWIN 1993-2012=1].

The MPS – the side that rebelled at the beginning of the war – was successful in conquering all of Chad and seizing control of the government. The side governing at the beginning of the war, represented by the group MDD, did not control any territory for a significant period of time once the MPS assumed power. The MPS is therefore less vulnerable in its territory [VULNERAB 1993-2012=1].

Until the recent EUFOR TCHAD/RCA and MINURCAT (Mission des Nations Unies en République Centrafricaine et au Tchad) operations coordinated by the European Union and the United Nations at the beginning of 2007, there were no peacekeeping missions carried out in Chad. Consequently, no peacekeeping troops were present in Chad due to the conflict between

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9 ANT.

10 HIIK 1995: 4.

11 Azevedo 1998: 112; Mehler 2000: 216.

12 Burr/Collins 2006: 273f.

MPS and MDD [PEACKEEP 1993-2012=n.r.].<sup>13</sup> Even though France had supported Hissène Habré and even brought him to power in 1982 in cooperation with the USA, these two states did not assist Habrés when Déby and the MPS became a real threat to Habré (Nolutshungu 1996: 242). Though not actively supporting Déby in his fight against Habré in 1990, they did provide Déby with military aid when the MDD launched its attack in the western Lake Chad area (Clayton 1999: 162). The French government maintained a military presence in Chad and continued to support Déby's regime [P5ALLY 1993-2012=1].<sup>14</sup>

In conclusion, the military balance in the post-war period was clearly in favor of Déby and his MPS [POSTBAL 1993-1999=0.83, POSTBAL 2000-2012=1.]. The combined score of the military balance at the end of the war and in the post-war years show a clear imbalance to the advantage of the side rebelling at the beginning of the war [BALANCE 1993-1999=0.83, BALANCE 2000-2012=0.92].

## Economy

Compared to other francophone African states, Chad's gross domestic product (GDP) per capita is among the lowest, reflecting the country's history of permanent civil wars that have devastated its economy.<sup>15</sup> Nevertheless, not including the civil war between MPS and MDJT in the fall of 1999, we can observe a constant increase in the population as well as the GDP per capita.

Table 1: GDP per capita in current USD<sup>16</sup>

<i>Year</i>	<i>Population</i>	<i>GDP per capita</i>
1993	6542419	224
1994	6755540	175
1995	6980351	207
1996	7216321	223
1997	7463347	207
1998	7724316	226
1999	8002899	192
2000	8301151	167
2001	8620917	198
2002	8959964	222
2003	9311234	294

13 Fortna 2008.

14 Azevedo 1998: 112; <http://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/autres-operations/operations-achevees/operations-epervier-1986-2014/dossier/les-elements-francais-au-tchad-eft> (2 Feb 2015); ICG 2008: 19.

15 <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTPOVERTY/EXTPA/0,.contentMDK:20204304~menuPK:435735~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:430367~isCURL:Y,00.html> (6 Mar 2014).

16 <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?page=3> (4 Feb 2015); <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD> (4 Feb 2015).

2004	9665024	456
2005	10014413	664
2006	10356822	717
2007	10694366	808
2008	11030628	939
2009	11371325	814
2010	11720781	909
2011	12080037	1006
2012	12448175	1035

### **The scale of compromise**

The case-specific literature is very consistent in its assessment of the CNS (Conférence Nationale Souveraine), the constitution (1996) and the alleged free elections: executive power was de facto monopolized by Idriss Déby while the MPS dominated the hollowed out democratic institutions (Bangoura 2005: 345f, 355f.; Buijtenhuijs 1998b: 29f., 128f., 349; ICG 2008: 2). Only after elections in 1997 did minor constraints on Déby's executive power emerge; but a large discrepancy between democratic rhetoric and authoritarian practices prevailed (May/Massey 2002: 75ff.). Considering that the MDD boycotted the CNS and that there was an absence of information about MDD members in the government, the former rebelling side did not have any influence on governmental decisions. Moreover, the Dougia Accord between MDD and the Chadian Government did not reserve any important positions for the rebels within the government. An agreement in 1999 between a faction of the MDD led by Moussa Medella led to the appointment of Medella as an ambassador; we do not, however, consider this to constitute MDD participation in the government [**GOVERN 1993-2012=1**].<sup>17</sup>

According to Freedom House (2014), there were not any free and fair elections held in Chad between 1993 and 2012. Buijtenhuijs (1998a: 36f.) did recognize some progress in the development of political rights in Chad but also assessed the elections as flawed. Owing to the fact that Idriss Déby ruled the country after December 1990 without a single change in the government during the post-war period, the lack of freedom in the elections is to his advantage and to that of the MPS [**ELECT 1993-2012=1**].<sup>18</sup>

As the MDD declined to participate in the CNS, it forwent veto rights in the transitional phase (1993-1997) as well as in the period thereafter, when executive power was concentrated in the hands of MPS leader Idriss Déby. For the entire post-war period, we do not identify any

17 Lanne 2003: 208; Mehler 2000: 216.

18 Atlas/Licklider 1999: 46; ICG Report 2008: 3; <http://www.bti-project.de/fileadmin/Inhalte/reports/2003/pdf/BTI%202003%20Chad.pdf> (5 Feb 2015).

obligations or commitments that would have forced the MPS to find consensus with former MDD rebels [**VETO 1993-2012=1; VETOSAT 1993-2012=n.r.**].

In the civil war between 1990 and 1993, the MPS and MDD primarily struggled over access to governmental power. Among others, the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FEF) reports that the MPS had challenged the authoritarian leadership of Habré at the beginning and had aimed for a systemic change to free and multi-party democracy in the Republic of Chad (FEF 2008: 13f.). Afterwards, MDD rebels loyal to Habré explicitly aimed to overthrow and remove President Idriss Déby.<sup>19</sup> Although the MDD temporarily declared the Lake Chad region to be its own territory, there is no evidence of any compromises concerning the borders or the distribution of responsibilities among the various administrative levels [**EXBORDER 1993-2012=n.r., INBORDER 1993-2012=n.r., COMPETENT 1993-2012=n.r.**]. Since the MPS took power in 1990, a shift towards a market-oriented order can be observed, a fact reflected in numerous commitments to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).<sup>20</sup> Neither the MPS nor the MDD challenged the (liberal) economic order [**ECONOMY 1993-2012=n.r.**].

Even though the allocation of resources is primarily based on ethnicity, there do not seem to have been any explicit demands by either side regarding the promotion or protection of specific groups [**SPECPRO 1993-2012=n.r.**].<sup>21</sup> The warring parties did not fight over any other explicit issues –the only proclaimed goal of the MPS was keeping Déby as head of the state and that of the MDD was restoring Habré to power [**ISSUE 1993-2012=n.r.; ISSUE2 1993-2012=n.r.; NEWCON 1993-2012=n.r.; NEWCON2 1993-2012=n.r.**]<sup>22</sup> There were no compromises implemented between the warring parties [**BENEFIT 1993-2012=n.r.; BENEFIT2 1993-2012=n.r.**].

In conclusion, the interests of the former rebelling party clearly dominated throughout the period of investigation [**COMPROM 1993-2012=1**].

### **Stability of peace**

There were no cases of renewed civil war between the same warring parties up to the end of the period under investigation [**SAMEWAR=0; DATESAME=n.r.; PEACMON1=238**]. However,

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19 [http://www.start.umd.edu/tops/terrorist\\_organization\\_profile.asp?id=4136](http://www.start.umd.edu/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=4136) (9 Mar 2014).

20 <http://www.bti-project.de/fileadmin/Inhalte/reports/2003/pdf/BTI%202003%20Chad.pdf> (9 Mar 2014).

21 Berg 2008: 14.

22 Buijtenhuijs 1998b: 101.

a new civil war according to the broad definition did occur between the Chadian Government and the ‘Mouvement pour la Démocratie et la Justice au Tchad’ (MDJT) in 1999. The MDJT is a rebel organization that was formed by Youssouf Togoïmi, Déby’s former Minister of Defence (May/Massey 2002: 89). The renewed civil war, according to UCDP data, began on 31 January 1999<sup>23</sup> and lasted until the 31 December 2002 [ANYWAR=1; DATEANY=31 Jan 1999; PEACMON2=71].

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23 One source reports that Radio France Internationale first documented an activity by the MDJT against government forces on 16 October 1998. The beginning of war on 31 December 1999, as coded by the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset from 2010 ([http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp\\_conflict\\_termination\\_dataset/](http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp_conflict_termination_dataset/) (10 Feb 2015)), seems to be an estimation of the start date, set quite late, since other sources mention bloody fighting between government troops and the MDJT rebels as early as January 1999 (Mehler 2000: 216). The determination of the start date of the conflict as 30 October 1997, as coded by the UCDP Armed Conflict Dataset from 2014 ([http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp\\_prio\\_armed\\_conflict\\_dataset/](http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp_prio_armed_conflict_dataset/) (10 Feb 2015)), appears highly unlikely since the movement only came into being in October 1998. Regarding the end date, there is also a lack of accord between the two UCDP datasets. The dataset from 2010 codes the end date as the 31 December 2002 and the 2014 version determines the end date to be 14 December 2003. In the case-specific literature, we found a peace agreement between a moderate faction of the MDJT under Adoum Togoï and the Chadian government on 14 December 2003 (Basedau 2004: 206). However, on 8 December 2002, the military command of the MDJT announced the dissolution of the political organs of the MDJT (Basedau 2003: 232). Due to the split in the MDJT after Togoïmi’s death in September 2002 and a significant decrease of military action and members of the MDJT towards the end of 2002, we adhere to the end date suggested by the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset from 2010, namely 31 December 2002.

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## Annex

Table 2: Troops (IISS 1993-2013)

<i>Year</i>	<i>Government</i>		<i>Rebels</i>	<i>Ratio</i>
	<i>Army</i>	<i>Paramilitary</i> <sup>24</sup>		
1993-1994	25,000	9,500	n.d.	n.d.
1995-2005	25,000	9,500	n.r.	n.r.
2006-2012	17,000-20,000	9,500	n.r.	n.r.

Table 3: Arms (IISS 1993-2013)

<i>Year</i>	<i>Government (Army)</i>	<i>Rebels</i>	<i>Ratio</i>
1993-2012	60 main battle tanks 105 total artillery	n.d.	n.d.

24 Both the Republican Guard and the Gendarmerie are considered to be paramilitary.