

**WARID:** Georgia (Abkhazia) 1992-1993  
**STARDATE:** 18 August 1992  
**ENDDATE:** 1 December 1993  
Related cases: Russia (Chechnya) 1994-1996  
Last update: 15 October 2015  
Authors: Julian Demmer, Johanna Speyer  
Reviewer: Günther Bächler

### **Conflict overview**

Abkhazia used to be an Autonomous Republic within the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic, part of the Soviet Union. When the Soviet Union fell and Georgia gained independence, ethnic Abkhaz living in Abkhazia desired to either stay part of the Soviet Union or to become independent rather than join Georgia. However, Georgia – pursuant of nationalist policies under its first president Zviad Gamsakhurdia – considered Abkhazia an integral part of its territory and denied it even partial autonomy. The situation was exacerbated by the fact that the majority of Abkhazia’s inhabitants were ethnic Georgians (45.7%) compared to 17.8% Abkhaz.<sup>1</sup> On 14 August 1992, the Georgian military deployed troops to Abkhazia. On account of its superior force and the element of surprise, it rapidly occupied large amounts of territory, including the capital Sukhumi. The Abkhaz – largely aided by fighters from the North Caucasus and Russia (after 2 October 1992) and supported by the ethnic Russian and Armenian minorities in Abkhazia – quickly gained superiority after winning the Battle of Gagra on 26 September 1992. Thereafter, ceasefire agreements were forged and subsequently broken on various occasions. Following a surprise attack along two fronts on 16 September 1993, the Abkhaz expelled all Georgian soldiers from Abkhazia. The Abkhazian victory led to its de facto independence. Since then, the conflict has been labeled ‘frozen’ as a return to large scale warfare has not taken place. As the status of Abkhazia remains disputed, tensions have remained high with sporadic violent incidents occurring frequently and the danger of renewed warfare always present.<sup>2</sup>

On 1 December 1993, a ceasefire agreement ended the fighting. Under Russian and UN mediation, a packet of peace agreements was signed in Moscow in April and May 1994.<sup>3</sup> Thus, the

---

1 Population shares according to a 1989 census (ICG 2006: 9).

2 Cheterian 2008; Chirikba 2008; Coppieters 2004; De Waal 2010; ICG 2006; ICG 2010; Khutsishvili 2006; Kokeev 1993; Ozgan 1998.

3 These agreements include the ‘Declaration on Measures for a Political Settlement of the Georgian/Abkhaz Conflict’ and the ‘Quadripartite Agreement on the Voluntary Return of Refugees and Displaced Persons’, both signed in Moscow on 4 April 1994, the ‘Proposal for the Establishment of a Coordinating Commis-

Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) assesses that the war ended by way of a peace agreement [**WARENDUC=1**]. This agreement came into being after the military victory by the Abkhaz. Hence, case-specific literature concurs in characterizing the end of the war as a victory [**WARENDOS=4; WARDUR=15**]. The UCDP's best estimates indicate that about 2,250 people were killed in battle or by one-sided violence in the wake of the war between 1992 and 1993 [**FATALUC=2000**].<sup>4</sup> According to Cheterian (2008: 201-202), the fatalities suffered by Abkhaz fighters alone totaled 2,800. A 1995 Human Rights Watch Report on the Georgia/Abkhazia conflict estimates a death toll of approximately 8,000, citing both the Georgian Government and the Abkhazian Committee on Human Rights (Human Rights Watch 1995: 5). This figure is also cited by the International Crisis Group (ICG) [**FATALOS=8000**].<sup>5</sup>

The 1989 Soviet census put Abkhazia's population at 525,061 [**PREWARPO=500000**].<sup>6</sup> Thus, according to the UCDP, the war claimed the lives of 0.4% of Abkhazia's population; according to the death toll put forward by Human Rights Watch, it was considerably more intense, leaving 1.6% of the population dead [**INTENSUC=0.4; INTENSOS=1.6**].

### **The military balance at the end of the war**

Although warfare formally ended with a ceasefire agreement in December 1993, the Abkhaz forces had already managed to expel all remaining Georgian troops from Abkhaz territory by October 1993, establishing a clear military victory [**VICTORY=1**].<sup>7</sup> As a result, Abkhazia gained de facto independence while the pro-Georgian wing of its government fled to Tbilisi, becoming the Abkhazian Government in exile. By the end of the war, Abkhaz forces controlled all of Abkhazia except for the upper Kodori Gorge that remained under Georgian jurisdiction [**REBTERR=1; MORETERR=1**].<sup>8</sup>

Cunningham et al. (2009) along with case-specific literature judge the Abkhaz' fighting capacity as 'moderate' [**REBFIGHT=0**].<sup>9</sup> Even though Georgian troops outnumbered Abkhaz fighters at the beginning of war, they were unable to continue fighting during the final stages of war. In late September 1993, Abkhaz forces started an offensive during which they overran

---

sion', signed in Moscow on 11 May 1994 and the 'Agreement on a Ceasefire and Separation of Forces', signed in Moscow on 14 May 1994.

4 [http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=61&regionSelect=9-Eastern\\_Europe#](http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=61&regionSelect=9-Eastern_Europe#), [http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=61&regionSelect=9-Eastern\\_Europe#](http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=61&regionSelect=9-Eastern_Europe#) (23. Apr. 2014).

5 ICG 2006: 1.

6 ICG 2006: 9, Zürcher 2009: 117.

7 Kokeev 1993: 1, 25.

8 Cunningham et al. 2009, ICG 2006: 6.

9 Cunningham et al. 2009; Kokeev 1993: 23.

the isolated Georgian soldiers in Sukhumi and managed to push the remaining enemy forces back in a subsequent advance (Cheterian 2008: 200-201). Concurrently, Georgian president Eduard Shevardnadze faced further internal struggle from a militant opposition group – the Zviadists. This desperate military situation even caused him to call on Russian military assistance in order to uphold his government and the remaining stability in Georgia [CONFLICT=1].<sup>10</sup> The Abkhaz forces killed Zhiuli Shartava, Chairperson of the Council of Ministers of Abkhazia’s pro-Tbilisi government (Cheterian 2008: 201), but neither the leader of the Abkhaz nor a member of the Georgian Government was killed [LEADER=0].<sup>11</sup> In sum, the military balance at the end of the war was strongly in favor of the Abkhaz forces [WARBAL=0.67].

### **The post-war military balance**

Since Georgia did not control Abkhazia, the government did not recruit young men in Abkhazia for the compulsory military service. Though there is no data about the ethnic composition of the Georgian armed forces or police, it is highly unlikely that ethnic Abkhaz served in the Georgian military. This can be concluded from demographic facts: in 1993, Abkhazia’s population halved mainly on account of the flight of 250,000 ethnic Georgians in the course of the war. Of the roughly 200,000 people that remained, only 44% are of Abkhaz ethnicity (ICG 2006: 1, 9). While the 2003 census counted 96,000 Abkhaz in Abkhazia, the entity’s de facto president stated in 2005 that there were less than 70,000 Abkhaz left in Abkhazia (ICG 2010: 8). At the same time, Abkhazia’s own standing army is estimated to have consisted of 1,000 to 5,000 soldiers with a reserve of 25,000 to 50,000 people (ICG 2010: 5; IISS 1993/1994-2013). This would equal the entire male population of Abkhaz. Moreover, the Constitution of the Republic of Abkhazia declares “defense of the motherland” to be the duty and responsibility of all its citizens (art. 33). We therefore presume that there is no significant Abkhaz participation in Georgia’s military forces [STATEFOR 1994-2012=n.r.]. Georgia’s military – consisting of ground troops, an air force, paramilitary coast guards and troops subjected to the ministry of the interior – can therefore be considered a separate force of the Georgian Government. Until 2004, the Georgian ministry of defense had also funded Georgian guerilla troops who operated outside of the defense ministry’s command structure in order to pressure the Abkhaz. These groups, namely the ‘White Legion and the Forest Brothers’, dedicated themselves to a low intensity guerilla war, criminal activities and smuggling. From 2004 on-

---

10 Cheterian 2008: 200, 205; Chirikba 2008: 56; Kokeev 1993: 25-26.

11 The Georgian president at the time was Eduard Shevardnadze; Vladislav Ardzinba led the Abkhaz separatist movement.

wards, however, the government ceased providing military assistance; it detained several members of these groups and confiscated their arms (ICG 2006: 20). As outlined above, the Abkhazian side also commanded its own army, established in 1992 as a purely Abkhaz national guard [**SEPFORCE 1994-2012=0**].<sup>12</sup> Tables 2 and 3 in the annex provide an overview of the troops and arms commanded by the Georgian and Abkhazian sides after the war. As the IISS Yearbook 1992/93 does not provide data on the Georgian troops in 1994, indicating that an army of up to 20,000 soldiers was in the planning, we extrapolate the 1993 figure based on data from 1994 in order to calculate changes in the post-war years. Despite the high variability of the figures, we still detect a growing preponderance of the Georgian army. This trend corresponds to information taken from case-specific literature that indicates that Georgia modernized its army with support from American military instructors (Cornell et al. 2005: 20-21). Abkhazia, on the other hand, did not invest in its military and relied instead on Russian protection, at least since the mid-2000s (ICG 2010: 3–5). We lack data on Abkhaz troops from 2009 to 2012 or on their arms throughout the period under investigation [**TROOPS 1994=0, TROOPS 1995=1, TROOPS 1996=0, TROOPS 1997-2008= -1, TROOPS 2009-2012=n.d.; ARMS 1994-2012=n.d.**].

After the victory of the Abkhaz forces in 1993, Abkhazia de facto broke away from Georgia (Kokeev 1993: 27). The ‘Declaration on Measures for a Political Settlement of the Georgian/Abkhaz Conflict’ – part of the peace agreement from spring 1994 – stipulates that Abkhazia should have its own constitution and legislature as well as state symbols such as flag, emblem and anthem (para. 6). ‘Joint political action’ that was envisaged for various fields in the same declaration was never realized. While the Georgian Government remained in control of Georgia proper, local state structures were established in Abkhazia under the control of the Abkhaz, now the ethnic majority [**TERRCON 1994-2012=0**].<sup>13</sup> Nevertheless, smaller territorial changes also occurred. In July 2006, Georgian troops invaded the Kodori Gorge, an area located in Abkhazia but controlled by the Svans up to that point, a people ethnically related to the Georgians but independent of both sides [**TERRWIN 1994-2005=0**].<sup>14</sup> The Kodori Gorge became the location for the central office of the Abkhazian Government in exile, which the Georgians claim to be the legitimate government of Abkhazia. Abkhaz and Russian troops entered the territory during the Russian-Georgian war in August 2008, which was thereafter controlled by the Abkhaz [**TERRWIN 2006-2007= -1, TERRWIN 2008-2012=1**].<sup>15</sup> As both

---

12 Kokeev 1993: 9; Kolsto/Blakkisrud 2008: 488; Lynch 2002: 836-837.

13 ICG 2006: 12.

14 Cornell 2001: 162; Kolsto 2008: 488-489; Zakareisvili 2009: 8.

15 BTI 2014: 6; Freedom House 2014.

sides controlled significant territory and there were no indications of greater vulnerability for either party, neither side is to be considered more vulnerable [**VULNERAB 1994-2012=0**].

The ‘Agreement on a Ceasefire and Separation of Forces’ from 14 May 1994 stipulated the installation of a CIS Peacekeeping Force inside a security area around the administrative borders dividing Georgia and Abkhazia. This force was virtually comprised of only Russian soldiers. Its activities were to be supervised by the unarmed United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) that was created in 1993 to monitor previous ceasefire agreements. When Georgia left the CIS after the violent conflict with Russia in August 2008 and Russia vetoed the renewal of UNOMIG’s mandate in the Security Council, both the UNOMIG and the CIS peacekeepers were forced to leave [**PEACKEEP 1994-2008=0, PEACKEEP 2009-2012=n.r.**].<sup>16</sup> They were replaced by an unarmed European Union Monitoring Mission. Abkhazia, with Russian support, has denied the observers entry into its territory up to now.<sup>17</sup>

Russia always played an important role in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict: as a mediator, peacekeeper, partner and protecting power. In the 1992/93 war, Russia heavily supported the Abkhaz fighters with arms, ammunition and aircraft (Cheterian 2008: 198–199). Volunteers from the North Caucasian republics and Russian Cossacks also supported the Abkhaz fighters (Kokeev 1993: 18). In 1996, Russia refused to participate in a Georgian land and sea blockade against Abkhazia (Ozgan 1998: 193). Georgian-Russian relations deteriorated greatly after Michail Saakashvili became the Georgian President in 2004 and declared Georgia’s foreign policy goal to be membership in NATO and the EU. Sporadic outbursts of violence took place between the two countries.<sup>18</sup> From December 2005 onwards, Russia closed its market to Georgian agricultural products, wines and brandy and also closed the only border crossing. After 3 October 2006, all transport and postal communication was blocked. Russia deported more than 1,000 Georgians and doubled gas prices (ICG 2007: 1–2). As Russia and Georgia became alienated, Russia and Abkhazia grew closer. There was strong Russian interference in the 2004/2005 Abkhazian presidential elections (ICG 2006: 12–13). The Georgian attack on the Kodori Heights in 2006 likewise strengthened the Russian-Abkhazian bond. Abkhazia began to increasingly rely on Russia for military security (ICG 2006: 8). In the 2008 armed conflict with Georgia, Russia militarily defended Abkhazia’s position and used Abkhaz territory as a base to launch attacks on parts of western Georgia. After the war, Russia formally recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, signing agreements on econom-

---

16 Fortna 2008; IISS Yearbooks the Military Balance.

17 <http://escolapau.uab.es/conflictosypaz/ficha.php?idfichasubzona=61&paramidioma=1> (10 Apr 2014).

18 <http://escolapau.uab.es/conflictosypaz/ficha.php?idfichasubzona=61&paramidioma=1> (10 Apr 2014).

ic and military cooperation with both and maintaining a military presence there.<sup>19</sup> By 2009, Russia had several thousand troops stationed in Abkhazia, including a naval base in the town of Ochamchire, 10 to 15 kilometers from the Georgian border, and an airbase in Gudauta, staffed by 1,500 soldiers. Based on satellite imagery, analysts believe that 4,000-5,000 Russian security personnel are present in Abkhazia, including coast guard units, border forces and regular troops. Due to this massive Russian presence, Abkhazia does not invest in its own military (ICG 2010: 3–5). The signing of the ‘Treaty on Alliance and Strategic Partnership’ on 24 November 2014 between the Russian Federation and Abkhazia signified that, in the case of a conflict with neighbors, a permanent member of the UN Security Council would endorse common military activities along with a collective defense system and a Russian chief commander.<sup>20</sup> Consequently, we conclude that Russia increasingly became a protector of Abkhazia since the civil war in 1992/3 and would intervene on its behalf in the case of a renewed war [**P5ALLY 1994-2012=1**].

In sum, the post-war military balance slightly favored the government until 2007. However, after the armed conflict between Georgia and Russia and owing to Russia’s strong support for Abkhazia, the balance gradually tipped in favor of the Abkhaz [**POSTBAL 1994=0.14, POSTBAL 1995=0.29, POSTBAL 1996=0.14, POSTBAL 1997-2005=0, POSTBAL 2006-2007= -0.14, POSTBAL 2008=0.14, POSTBAL 2009-2012=0.4**].

In terms of the overall military balance, we detect a slight predominance of the Abkhaz separatists, which became especially pronounced after the 2008 armed conflict [**BALANCE 1994=0.4, BALANCE 1995=0.48, BALANCE 1996=0.4, BALANCE 1997-2005=0.33, BALANCE 2006-2007=0.26, BALANCE 2008=0.4, BALANCE 2009-2012=0.53**].

## Economy

Georgia’s gross domestic product (GDP) per capita multiplied during the post-war period.

Table 1: GDP per capita in current USD<sup>21</sup>

<i>Year</i>	<i>Population</i>	<i>GDP per capita</i>
1994	4,861,600	517
1995	4,734,000	569
1996	4,616,100	670
1997	4,531,600	775
1998	4,487,300	805
1999	4,452,500	629

19 <http://escolapau.uab.es/conflictosypaz/ficha.php?idfichasubzona=61&paramidioma=1> (10 Apr 2014).

20 <http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/23562> (12 Feb 2015).

21 Data on GDP per capita and the population available at: <http://api.worldbank.org/v2/en/country/geo?downloadformat=excel> (8 Apr 2014).

2000	4,418,300	692
2001	4,386,400	734
2002	4,357,000	779
2003	4,328,900	922
2004	4,318,300	1187
2005	4,361,400	1470
2006	4,398,000	1765
2007	4,388,400	2318
2008	4,383,800	2920
2009	4,410,900	2441
2010	4,452,800	2614
2011	4,483,400	3220
2012	4,511,800	3490

### **The scale of compromise after the war**

The disputed territory in the Georgian-Abkhaz War was Abkhazia. Considering that the Abkhaz established their own state structures and government following de facto independence in 1993, the following items will only be assessed in reference to Abkhazia.

Abkhazia has a presidential system. Since the end of the war, Abkhazia has been governed solely by ethnic Abkhaz. Although the Constitution of the Republic of Abkhazia established in November 1994 provides for free and universal presidential and parliamentary elections (Art. 37, Art. 48), the president must be ethnically Abkhaz (Art. 49). Some ethnic Georgians work as support staff in the Gali Region but they are not present in the ruling elite [**GOVERN 1994-2012=1**].<sup>22</sup> The Georgia based pro-Tbilisi Abkhazian government in exile has long been the mouthpiece of the Georgian refugees/internally displaced persons (IDPs) who fled Abkhazia during the war and were denied return; this government lacks any influence in Abkhazia (ICG 2006: 21-22).

The Abkhazian parliament consists of 35 deputies. Neither ethnic quora nor veto rights are in place. Most decisions are taken by simple majority [**VETO 1994-2012=1; VETOSAT 1994-2012=n.r.**].<sup>23</sup> The members of parliament and the president serve five-year terms, though with terms that do not coincide. Every two to three years, there are either parliamentary or presidential elections. In the 1994 and 1999 presidential elections, the sole candidate was Vladislav Ardzinba, the former leader of the separatist movement (ICG 2006: 5). Freedom House has no data on political rights in Abkhazia until 1997/98; considering that Ardzinba was the only person to run for election, Georgians clearly did not participate. For the following years until 2005, Abkhazia was ranked as ‘not free’; the first basically free and fair election was in 2007

---

22 ICG 2006: 12; ICG 2010: 2.

23 Constitution of the Republic of Abkhazia, art. 37, 44.

[**ELECT 1994-2006=1**].<sup>24</sup> In the 2001 parliamentary elections, ethnic Georgians won 3 of the 35 seats, dropping to two after the 2007 election (ICG 2010: 10). This is far less than the Georgian share of the population. Political competition generally takes place between Abkhaz elites and there is practically no Georgian participation. This is exacerbated by the fact that many ethnic Georgians living in Abkhazia refuse Abkhazian citizenship.<sup>25</sup> Consequently, they neither have the right to vote nor run for office [**ELECT 2007-2012=1**].<sup>26</sup>

The status of Abkhazia was the main issue in the 1992-1993 war. Georgians insisted that it is an integral part of Georgia. Internationally, Abkhazia was unequivocally recognized as such until 2008 when Russia recognized it as an independent state and three countries (Nauru, Nicaragua and Venezuela) followed its lead (ICG 2006: 2). The Abkhaz refused to become part of a centralized Georgian state after the break-up of the Soviet Union. In the ‘Abkhazian Letter’, they demanded their independence back in March 1989 (Kokeev 1993: 6). In the end, Abkhaz forces triumphed over the Georgians and Abkhazia henceforth enjoyed de facto independence. There were a number of half-hearted attempts to solve the status question. The Abkhaz proposed a confederation in February 1996, while Georgia repeatedly offered the Abkhaz broad self-governance within a Georgian state (Tarkhan-Mouravi 2008: 100-101). The internationally mediated Geneva Talks were often obstructed and were therefore far from reaching a solution.<sup>27</sup> In summary, there were no compromises to the advantage of the Abkhaz [**EXBORDER 1994-2012=1**].

Since the warring parties fought over Abkhazia’s secession, neither borders between sub-state units nor the distribution of competences between these units were an issue [**INBORDER 1994-2012=n.r.; COMPETEN 1994-2012=n.r.**]. Similarly, economic issues, the promotion of special groups and other demands were all superseded by the overall claim for independence [**ECONOMY 1994-2012=n.r.; SPECPRO 1994-2012=n.r.; ISSUE 1994-2012=n.r.; ISSUE2 1994-2012=n.r.**].

The war in Abkhazia displaced about 250,000 ethnic Georgians. Georgia and the United Nations insisted on the Georgians’ right to return to their homes; this was also agreed on in the ‘Quadripartite Agreement on Voluntary Return of Refugees and Displaced Persons’ from May 1994 (para. 3). The agreement further stipulated the creation of a quadripartite commission to supervise their safe return. However, the commission only operated for one year. In

---

24 Freedom House 2014: Freedom in the World Territory Rankings 1972-2013.

25 If they accepted Abkhazian citizenship, they would be required to renounce Georgian citizenship which is out of the question for most ethnic Georgians.

26 Barry, Ellen: President of Abkhazia re-elected by wide margin, *The New York Times*, 13.12.2009, [http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/14/world/europe/14abkhazia.html?\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/14/world/europe/14abkhazia.html?_r=0) (14 Apr 2014); ICG 2010: 10-11; Constitution of the Republic of Abkhazia: art. 2, 28; ICG 2006: 9, 12.

27 <http://escolapau.uab.es/conflictosypaz/ficha.php?idfichasubzona=61&paramidioma=1> (10 Apr 2014).



1994, around 70,000 Georgians returned to the Gali district that had been inhabited almost exclusively by Georgians before the war [NEWCON 1994=0].<sup>28</sup> The security situation was consistently very poor. In 1998, about 30,000 to 40,000 people were again displaced in the wake of renewed fighting between Georgian guerillas and the Abkhaz militia. In 2006, the Gali district presumably had a population of 45,000, though Abkhaz authorities report 65,000. Many Georgian refugees/IDPs either commute across the border daily or migrate seasonally (ICG 2010: 10-12). Georgia has always pressed for the mass return of refugees to all of Abkhazia, thereby making use of grossly inflated refugee/IDP figures (ICG 2006: 23; Tarkhan-Mouravi 2008: 98). The Abkhaz strongly oppose the mass return of refugees, as this would tip the demographic balance against them (Cornell et al. 2001: 178-180; ICG 2013: 3). They therefore only envisage their return to the Gali district. The Abkhaz also insist that any Georgian who took part in the war should be denied entry (ICG 2010: 2; Tarkhan-Mouravi 2008: 102). In 2005, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees counted 209,013 refugees/IDPs in Georgia. These are among the poorest and most vulnerable parts of the population who are also either unwilling or unable to integrate into Georgia proper (ICG 2006: 23). The Georgian Government adopted a state strategy on IDPs in 2007; however, the integration process into Georgia proper only started once an action plan to implement the state strategy for 2012-2014 had been adopted.<sup>29</sup> Up to the end of our investigation period, there were no compromises implemented concerning the return of refugees to Abkhazia [NEWCON 1995-2012=1; NEWCON2 1994-2012=n.r.]. In sum, there was only one compromise implemented in 1994; this may be assessed as a slight success for the Georgians. However, in order to prevent overstressing the compromise in 1994 in our coding, we will not evaluate it as a benefit for either side [BENEFIT 1994-2012=n.r.; BENEFIT2 1994-2012=n.r.].

Over all, the post-war order always favored the Abkhaz [COMPROM 1994=0.8, COMPROM 1995-2012=1].

### Stability of peace

Despite the fact that the conflict between Abkhazia and Georgia remains unsolved, and international negotiations hardly led to any results, there have not been any renewed wars between the two entities. According to the UCDP, the 2008 armed conflict involving Russia, South

---

28 Chirikba 2008: 58.

29 <http://caucasusedition.net/analysis/idps-in-georgia-still-waiting-for-better-life/> (12 Feb 2015). The action plan focuses on the IDPs' socio-economic integration by providing sustainable solutions to housing problems, reducing dependency on the state, and integrating vulnerable IDPs into the state's social assistance programs. However, due to limited funding and high urgency, the Government of Georgia puts more emphasis on ensuring durable housing solutions for IDPs than on providing employment opportunities.

Ossetia and Abkhazia against Georgia did not surpass the war threshold of 1,000 fatalities. Moreover, only a small amount of the fighting in August 2008 took place in or around Abkhazia [**SAMEWAR 1994-2012=0; DATESAME 1994-2012=n.r.; ANYWAR 1994-2012=0; DATEANY 1994-2012=n.r.**].<sup>30</sup> The situation has developed into a frozen conflict with occasional outbursts of violence. Although the coding might seem disturbing, we must conclude that the situation was, by and large, peaceful until the end of the period under investigation [**PEACMON1 1994-2012=229; PEACMON2 1994-2012=229**].

## References

- Agreement on a Ceasefire and Separation of Forces, signed in Moscow on 14 May 1994, U.N. Doc. No. S/1994/583, annex I.
- Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) 2014: Georgia Country Report 2014, [http://www.bti-project.de/reports/laenderberichte/pse/geo/index.nc?tx\\_itaoreport\\_pi1\[action\]=show](http://www.bti-project.de/reports/laenderberichte/pse/geo/index.nc?tx_itaoreport_pi1[action]=show) (23 Feb 2014).
- Cheterian, Vicken 2008: *War and Peace in the Caucasus. Russia's Troubled Frontier*, London.
- Chirikba, Viacheslav A. 2008: The Georgian-Abkhazian conflict: In Search for ways out, in: Coppieters, Bruno/Nodia, Ghia/Anchabadze, Yuri (eds.): *Georgians and Abkhazians. The Search for a Peace Settlement*, Cologne, 49-61.
- Constitution of the Republic of Abkhazia, 26 Nov 1994, <http://apsnypress.info/en/constitution> (24 Apr 2014).
- Coppieters, Bruno 2004: The Georgian-Abkhaz Conflict, in: Coppieters, Bruno et al. (eds.): *Europeanization and Conflict Resolution. Case Studies from the European Periphery*, Gent.
- Cornell, Svante E. 2001: *Small Nations and Great Powers. A Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the Caucasus*, London.
- Cornell, Svante E. et al. 2005: *A Strategic Conflict Analysis of the South Caucasus with a Focus on Georgia*, Prepared for the Swedish Development Cooperation Agency, [http://www.silkroadstudies.org/docs/publications/2005/050601Caucasus\\_Total.pdf](http://www.silkroadstudies.org/docs/publications/2005/050601Caucasus_Total.pdf) (27 Feb 2014).
- Cunningham, David E./ Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede/ Salehyan, Idean 2009: It Takes Two. A Dyadic Analysis of Civil War Duration and Outcome, in: *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 53: 4, 570-597, data available at: [http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/data/nsa\\_v3.3\\_7March2012.asc](http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/data/nsa_v3.3_7March2012.asc) (22 Nov 2013).
- Declaration on Measures for a Political Settlement of the Georgian/Abkhaz Conflict. 4 Apr 1994, S/1997/397, annex I.
- De Waal, Thomas 2010: *The Caucasus. An Introduction*, New York, NY.
- Fortna, Virginia Page 2008: Data Notes, <http://www.columbia.edu/~vpf4/pk&pkept%20data%notes.pdf> (22 Nov 2013).
- Freedom House 2014: Freedom in the World Territory Rankings 1972-2013: Abkhazia, <http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Territory%20Ratings%20and%20Status%2C%201973-2014%20%28final%29.xls> (20 Apr 2014).
- Human Rights Watch 1995: *Georgia/Abkhazia: Violations of the Rule of Law and Russia's Role in the Conflict*, vol.7, no.7, March 1995.
- IISS 1993/1994-2013: *The Military Balance*. London.
- International Crisis Group (ICG) 2006: *Abkhazia Today*. 15 September 2006, ICG Europe Report no. 176, Tbilisi and Brussels.
- ICG 2010: *Abkhazia: Deepening Dependence* ICG Europe Report no. 202, Suchumi et al.
- ICG 2013: *Abkhazia: The Long Road to Reconciliation*, ICG Europe Report No. 224, [http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/europe/caucasus/georgia/224-abkhazia-the-long-road-to-reconciliation.pdf](http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/caucasus/georgia/224-abkhazia-the-long-road-to-reconciliation.pdf) (23 Feb 2014).
- Khutsishvili, George 2006: The Abkhazia and South Ossetia cases. Spoilers in a nearly collapsed peace process, in: Newman, Edward/Richmond, Oliver P. (eds.): *Challenges to peacebuilding. Managing spoilers during conflict resolution*, Tokyo, New York, NY, 282-300.
- Kokeev, Alexander 1993: *Der Kampf um das Goldene Vlies. Zum Konflikt zwischen Georgien und Abchasien (PRIF-Report)*, Frankfurt/Main.

---

30 See [http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdata/gpcountry.php?id=61&regionSelect=9-Eastern\\_Europe#](http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdata/gpcountry.php?id=61&regionSelect=9-Eastern_Europe#) (28 Apr 2014).

- Kolsto, Pal/Blakkisrud, Helge 2008: Living with Non-recognition: State and Nation Building in South Caucasian Quasi-states, *Europe-Asia Studies*, 60: 3, 483-509.
- Kolsto, Pal/Blakkisrud, Helge 2013: Yielding to the sons of the soil: Abkhazian democracy and the marginalization of the Armenian vote, in: *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 36: 12, 2075-2095.
- Ozgan, Konstantin 1998: Abkhazia - Problems and the Paths to their resolution, in: Høiris, Ole/Yürükel, Sefa M. (eds.): *Contrasts and solutions in the Caucasus*, Aarhus, Oakville, CT, 184–198.
- Lynch, Dov 2002: Separatist States and Post-Soviet Conflicts, in: *International Affairs* 78: 4, 831-848.
- Quadripartite Agreement on the Voluntary return of refugees and displaced persons signed on 4 April 1994, U.N. Doc. No. S/1997/397, annex II.
- Souleimanov, Emil 2013: *Understanding Ethnopolitical Conflict. Karabakh, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia Wars Reconsidered*, New York, NY.
- Tarkhan-Mouravi, Gia 2008: The Georgian-Abkhazian conflict in a Regional Context, in: Coppieters, Bruno/Nodia, Ghia/Anchabadze, Yuri (eds.): *Georgians and Abkhazians. The Search for a Peace Settlement*, Cologne, 90–112.
- Zakareisvili, Paata 2009: Georgia's Relationship with Abkhazia, in: *Caucasus Analytical Digest* No. 7, 6-11.
- Zürcher, Christopher 2007: *The Post-Soviet Wars: Rebellion, Ethnic Conflict and Nationhood in the Caucasus*, New York, NY.

## Annex

Table 2: Troops in post-war Georgia (IISS 1993/94-2013)

<i>Year</i>	<i>Georgia</i>	<i>Abkhazia</i>	<i>Ratio</i>	
1993	10200 <sup>31</sup>	4000	2.55	1
1994	10200	4000	2.55	1
1995	9000	5000	1.8	1
1996	13000	5000	2.6	1
1997	33200	5000	6.64	1
1998	33200	ca 5000	6.64	1
1999	32800	ca 5000	6.56	1
2000	33400	ca 5000	6.68	1
2001	28500	ca 5000	5.7	1
2002	29200	ca 5000	5.84	1
2003	29200	ca 5000	5.84	1
2004	29500	5000	5.9	1
2005	23000	1500+	15.34	1
2006	23000	1500+	15.34	1
2007	32900	1500+	21.94	1
2008	32900	1500+	21.94	1
2009	32900	n.d.		
2010	32400	n.d.		
2011	32400	n.d.		
2012	32350	n.d.		

Table 3: Arms in post-war Georgia (IISS 1993/94-2013)

<i>Year</i>	<i>Georgia</i>	<i>Abkhazia</i>	<i>Ratio</i>	
1993	120 MBT <sup>32</sup> 180 AIFV <sup>33</sup> /APC <sup>34</sup> 60 artillery	n.d.		

31 As the IISS Yearbook 1992/93 does not provide data on the Georgian troops in 1994, indicating instead that an army of up to 20,000 soldiers was planned, we extrapolate the 1993 estimate using data from 1994.

32 Main battle tank.

33 Armored infantry fighting vehicle.

34 Armored personnel carrier.

1994	50 MBT 70 AIFV/APC 60 artillery	n.d.		
1995	48 MBT 51 AIFV/APC 60 artillery	50+ MBT 80+ AIFV/APC 80+ artillery		
1996	70 MBT 77 AIFV/APC 80-100 artillery	50+ MBT 80+ AIFV/APC 80+ artillery		
1997	79 MBT 92 AIFV/APC 92 artillery	50+ MBT 80+ AIFV/APC 80+ artillery		
1998	79 MBT 111 AIFV/APC 110 artillery	50+ MBT 80+ AIFV/APC 80+ artillery		
1999	79 MBT 111 AIFV/APC 110 artillery	50+ MBT 80+ AIFV/APC 80+ artillery		
2000	79 MBT 185 AIFV/APC 110 artillery	50+ MBT 80+ AIFV/APC 80+ artillery		
2001	90 MB 185 AIFV/APC 159 artillery	50+ MBT 80+ AIFV/APC 80+ artillery		
2002	90 MBT 185 AIFV/APC 159 artillery	50+ MBT 80+ AIFV/APC 80+ artillery		
2003	86 MBT 185 AIFV/APC 159 artillery	50+ MBT 80+ AIFV/APC 80+ artillery		
2004	86 MBT 185 AIFV/APC 159 artillery	50+ MBT 80+ AIFV/APC 80+ artillery		
2005	86 MBT 180 AIFV/APC 109 artillery	n.d.		
2006	86 MBT 180 AIFV/APC 109 artillery	n.d.		
2007	128 MBT 134 AIFV/APC 109 artillery	n.d.		
2008	53 MBT 109 AIFV/APC 109 artillery	n.d.		
2009	66 MBT 112 AIFV/APC 185 artillery	n.d.		
2010	93 MBT 200 AIFV/APC 185 artillery	n.d.		
2011	93 MBT 200 AIFV/APC 185 artillery	n.d.		
2012	93 MBT 200 AIFV/APC 185 artillery	n.d.		