ELDAD BEN AHARON //

HOW DO WE REMEMBER THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE AND THE HOLOCAUST? A GLOBAL VIEW OF AN INTEGRATED MEMORY OF PERPETRATORS, VICTIMS AND THIRD-PARTY COUNTRIES
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In 1915, during World War I, the declining Ottoman Empire carried out an extended campaign of genocide against the Ottoman Armenians. From massacres to death marches, 1.5 million of the Armenian population were exterminated.

The Holocaust, in which six million European Jews were exterminated as part of what the Nazis called the ‘Final Solution of the Jewish Question,’ was perpetrated during World War II. Over the last forty years, the memorialisation of the Holocaust has become a distinct aspect of Western culture, encompassing reparations, museums, memorials and documentaries, and even legislation criminalising its denial. Education about the Holocaust, and its continued memorialisation is led by, among others, powerful transnational organisations such as The International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA), and by national research institutions such as Yad Vashem in Jerusalem and the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (USHMM).

However, there is no comparable culture of memorialisation of the Armenian genocide. In fact, that genocide has been subjected to a vigorous campaign of denial led by the Republic of Turkey, and by a marked reluctance of worldwide governments and parliaments to recognise its existence formally. Only recently (from 2016–2019), have parliaments in the US, the Netherlands and Germany recognised the Armenian genocide, yet others, such as those of Israel and the UK, continue to reject such recognition.

What drives these divergent trends in Holocaust and Armenian genocide memory? Why is there a significant difference in the way in which these two genocides have been represented in the public, political and international arenas by the perpetrators, victims and third-party countries? This report aims at finding answers to these key questions by assessing the perpetrator states’ trajectories of Holocaust and Armenian genocide memory from the early years of the Cold War into the post-Cold War world order. In doing so, the report will highlight some of the most important milestones, actors and patterns that shaped the memory (politics) of the Armenian genocide and the Holocaust. Finally, conclusions are drawn for current domestic and foreign policy realms.
1. Introduction 1

Part I 3

2. The Holocaust and the ‘Final Solution’ of the European Jews 3
   2.1 Developments in Holocaust Memory and Historiography During the Cold War 3
   2.2 The Cold War and Nation Building in Israel and the Two Germanies 5

3. The Cold War and American Foreign Policy 6
   3.1 Holocaust Memory Culture 6
   3.2 Holocaust Uniqueness versus Armenian Genocide 8

4. Post-Cold War: Global Holocaust Memory Culture 9
   4.1 International Organisations and Transnational Holocaust Memory: IHRA 9

Part II 11

5. The 1915 Armenian Genocide: A Very Short History 11

6. Turkish Nation Building 12
   6.1 Constructing Turkey's Denial at Home during the Interwar Years (1921–1939) 12
   6.2 Turkey's Denial: The Cold War and Nation Building After 1945 13
   6.3 The 1915 Genocide in Armenian Diasporas During the Cold War (1945–1985) 13

7. The Contested Memories of the Armenian Genocide in International Relations 16
   7.1 Post-Cold War: A Boost of Parliamentary Recognition? 16
   7.2 Holocaust Memory and Armenian Genocide as A Zero-Sum Game? 18
   7.3 The Act of Recognition: First Moments of Relief 20
   7.4 Parliamentary Recognition versus Governmental Pragmatism 21

8. Conclusions and Recommendations 22

References 24
1. INTRODUCTION

This report grapples with one of the crucial problems of the modern world and international relations: genocide. Specifically, how genocide is remembered. Over the last forty years, the memorialisation of the Holocaust has become a distinct aspect of Western culture, encompassing reparations, museums, memorials and documentaries, and even legislation criminalising its denial. Education about the Holocaust, and its continued memorialisation is led by, among others, powerful transnational organisations such as IHRA, and by national research institutions such as Yad Vashem in Jerusalem and USHMM. However, there is no comparable culture of memorialisation of the Armenian genocide. In fact, that genocide has been subjected to a vigorous campaign of denial led by the Republic of Turkey, and by a marked reluctance of worldwide governments and parliaments to formally recognise its existence. Only recently (between 2016–2019), have parliaments in the US, the Netherlands and Germany recognised the Armenian genocide, yet others, such as those of Israel and the UK continue to reject such recognition.

This report takes a step back from contemporary public discourse about global Holocaust memory and the still-disputed history of the 1915 Armenian genocide, to contextualise and historicise the global trajectories of the memorialisation of both these events, encompassing perpetrator states, victim groups and third-party countries. This report will focus on two key questions: firstly, what drives these divergent trends in Holocaust and Armenian genocide memory? Second, why is there a significant difference in the way in which these two genocides have been represented in the public, political and international arena by the perpetrators, victims and third-party countries? I structure an answer to those questions by undertaking a thematic chronological approach. I begin by assessing the trajectory of the Holocaust, reinterpreting a story that will be familiar to most readers in order to provide a template against which to read the somewhat less familiar case study of the Armenian genocide.

At the beginning of the Cold War, three states existed that had perpetrated genocide within the preceding forty years: The Republic of Turkey, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) (1949–1989/90). Furthermore, each had been established immediately after these genocidal moments. The founders of these states thus had to decide from the outset which path to take: denial or acknowledgement of past crimes. Meanwhile, Israel, although not a perpetrator state, had also been established three years after the end of World War II, and was also shaping its identity and security around the victimisation of the Holocaust and its relations with the FRG and GDR. By contrast, there was no independent state of Armenia, which remained subsumed as an autonomous republic within the Soviet Union, and this clearly had a significant influence on how different Armenian diaspora communities commemorated the genocide of 1915. The report aims to explore how and why Turkish, German and Israeli diplomats, but also Armenian diaspora communities and other transnational organisations, responded to the denial or acknowledgement of past

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crimes by Turkey, the FRG and GDR, contextualising these decisions in how Western and Eastern bloc states addressed question of human rights, memory and restitution.

The first step in the search for answers to these questions is to examine how the bipolar rivalry of the Cold War became visible in varying values in respect to human rights. The different priorities given to human rights values directly influenced the extent to which the memory of the Holocaust, and of the Armenian genocide, was a political and diplomatic priority in perpetrator states and among victims’ groups and third-party countries. Broadly, and in contrast to the Western bloc countries, the Soviets, including most Eastern European states and also proxy states in the Middle East and Africa, sought to interpret individual human rights as less important than the perceived good of the collective. It should be noted, however, that this was a dynamic discussion with different emphases in different periods of the Cold War, and in different geographical areas.

This report primarily draws on secondary sources, including the extensive secondary literature on the Holocaust, the Armenian genocide and memory studies. Additionally, it draws on some material gathered in oral interviews and archival research conducted by the author since 2013 for his master’s and PhD theses, numerous peer-reviewed articles, and op-eds and news analyses published in recent years. The report embeds this data within the author’s new research project as a PRIF associate researcher and Minerva post-doctoral fellow. While this recent research focuses on the early stages of the Cold War and the response of the three perpetrator states – Turkey, FRG and GDR – to the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 1948 (UNGC), this report also encompasses consideration of victims and third-party countries, including transnational organisations and diaspora communities, to show how the interrelationships between these groups played a vital role in shaping the memory of the Armenian genocide and the Holocaust. I make a twofold argument: (I) recognition of the Armenian genocide could highlight the significance afforded in international relations to genocide, the protection of minority rights, human rights, and indeed the global lesson of the Holocaust. Placing such an emphasis also helps strengthen international principles such as the UN’s Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and bodies such as the International Criminal Court (ICC); (II) recognition of the Armenian genocide could also help to reduce competition among victims’ groups, specifically the assertion that the Holocaust is ‘unique’ in human history, and to underpin the universal lesson of the Holocaust by affirming protection of minority rights.

This report is divided into two main thematic parts. The first part examines the developments in Holocaust memory and historiography in Israel and the two Germanies as important foundation stones in these countries’ nation building in the early Cold War. Subsequently the report proceeds to examine the trajectory of the Holocaust in the post-Cold War as a global memory whose lessons are used as a symbol for the protection of minorities. The second half of the report outlines the development of Turkey’s nation building and the denial of the Armenian genocide in the interwar and the Cold War periods. This latter section outlines the trajectory of Turkey’s denial in line with the development of international pressure, both from the Armenian diaspora and third-party countries. This final section concludes by examining the role of parliaments in recognising the Armenian genocide, and the relationship between Holocaust memory and denial of the Armenian genocide.
HOW DO WE REMEMBER THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE AND THE HOLOCAUST?

PART I

2. THE HOLOCAUST AND THE ‘FINAL SOLUTION’ OF THE EUROPEAN JEWS

The Holocaust has been the most studied event in the twentieth century. Over the last five decades, and especially since the end of the Cold War, the memorialisation of the Holocaust has experienced a boost from reparations, museums, memorials and documentaries. In the historiography, the lines of inquiry have changed during the period since World War II. During the Cold War, the archives of communist countries were not accessible, limiting historians to narrow aspects of the Holocaust such as the role of race or German and Nazi anti-Semitism in the decision to exterminate all European Jews, and the suffering of the Jewish victims (Stone 2010: 1–2). The end of the Cold War has allowed a broader understanding of the unfolding of the Holocaust, however: As noted in the work of Dan Stone, there is a need to examine how Roma, Poles, Ukrainians and political prisoners or smaller groups such as Jehovah’s Witnesses, and homosexuals were also targeted by the Nazis (Stone 2010: 2). Other themes that have become prominent in recent years include the contextualisation of the Holocaust in the wider story of European history since the late 1900s, especially the decline of imperial competition and the emergence of the nation-state system. These new debates have created a significant challenge for the traditional Holocaust studies pursued by the first generation of Holocaust historians in Israel, the FRG and the US, given that they extend the debate far beyond the boundaries of Jewish victims-German perpetrator relations. The new generation of Holocaust historians broadly argue that victims and perpetrators and their descendants need to step out of their comfort zones of simply acknowledging the collective trauma. Although the Holocaust was a Nazi-directed programme, it is an umbrella term that includes many smaller examples of persecution of Jews and non-Jews that were undertaken under Nazi protection, especially in occupied countries (Stone 2010; Segal 2018). The Holocaust was also the last phase of colonial violence and the last product of the ‘racial century’ (1850–1950) which included competition between different nation-building projects (Moses 2002: 33).

2.1 DEVELOPMENTS IN HOLOCAUST MEMORY AND HISTORIOGRAPHY DURING THE COLD WAR

From the early 1950s up to the early 1990s, many American Jewish and Israeli scholars sought to situate the Holocaust as a distinct category of genocide. Generations of historians in Israel and Jews in North America focused on the victim group to emphasise the suffering of the Jewish victims during World War II. These scholars also perceived any debate on perpetrators or bystanders as a threat to the ‘uniqueness’ assertion (Bauer 1978; Gutman 1988: 349–380; Lipstadt 1992: 64–76). This term needs to be explained: the uniqueness of the Holocaust refers to the view that the extermination of European Jews during World War II was unique in human history, not only in the sheer number of Jewish victims (around six million) but also in the industrial nature of the extermination and the simplistic explanation that all Jews were murdered based on German anti-Semitism. The Jewish victims of
World War II are therefore referred to using the term ‘Shoah’ in Hebrew – a great tragedy or a distinct category of genocide that should not be compared to other mass atrocities.

In relation to the Zionist world, and Israel specifically, a subgroup developed within this school of Holocaust uniqueness scholars in the 1950s (Ofer 2000: 24–55). These were survivor-scholars such as Israel Gutman, Shalom Cholawsky and Aharon Weiss, who shaped the Israeli realm of memory and set the initial research priorities. Dalia Ofer and Boaz Cohen, who have both conducted extensive research on this period, noted that the survivors did not simply establish archives and databases, but in the late 1950s also laid the foundation for Holocaust education in Israeli universities and Zionist curricula (Cohen 2011: 25–36; Ofer 2009: 1–35).

Furthermore, from the mid-1950s this Israeli school of survivor-scholars also developed Yad Vashem as an institute to study the Holocaust as an academic discipline (Segev 1997; Stauber 2007). This school, shaped by Ben-Zion Dinur, the first director of Yad Vashem (1953–1959), was influenced by the work of Dina Porat, Joseph Michman, Yehuda Bauer, Israel Gutman and others who sought to study the Holocaust as a distinct phenomenon in modern history spanning different geographical regions and periods, and who focused on the Jewish victims and emphasised their multifarious voices – for example children and women. Although the concept of Holocaust has become contested in the academic field of genocide studies in the last two decades, it was the dominant approach to the study of the Holocaust in Israel from the 1950s, and especially during the 1970s and 1980s. Given the centrality of the Holocaust to Israel's nation-building process, it is this thinking that has shaped Israeli memory culture and thus ultimately Israeli politics during the country's formative decades, becoming embedded as a national myth in a way that makes it difficult for attitudes to the Holocaust in Israel to mirror the changes in Holocaust historiography elsewhere. Specifically, the ‘post-uniqueness’ approach that began to develop in the US in the early 1980s, especially with the establishment of the USHMM, did not penetrate at all into Israel's cultural memory of the Holocaust (Blatman 2014: 38). Both Yad Vashem and the Israeli school of Holocaust historians rejected developments in the field. Even though Yad Vashem aims to act as a centre for the global memory of the Holocaust in the 21st century, the museum still functions as the dominant agent in Israel that shapes the memory, culture and politics of the country, in all of which the Holocaust is regarded as a unique event. Yad Vashem encourages visitors to identify with the Jewish victims and blocks any other more complex understanding of the events (Goldberg 2012: 187–213).

Two additional milestones add further useful background to understanding how and why the changes in Israeli memory culture did not mirror the changes in global Holocaust historiography, but were more closely attached to changes in Israeli politics. First was the Eichmann trial in 1961, which re-triggered Israeli awareness of the suffering of the European Jews and catapulted the suffering of the victims into mainstream cultural and political arenas. Second and even more important was the 1967 Six-Day War. This war not only changed the borders of Israel in a way that has persisted until today, but also led to a perception that it was a triumph that prevented ‘another Holocaust’, thus providing an associated sense of legitimation for Israeli territorial expansion and occupation in the Palestinian territories (Confino 2008: 297–312). The metaphor of Israel as a country under blockade explains why and how the concept of the uniqueness of the Holocaust was leveraged to support Is-
Israeli territorial expansion and for associated political, cultural, military and diplomatic ends (Rothberg 2009: 29; Zertal 2005).

Moreover, during the 1980s, the voices of the second generation began to appear in Israeli Holocaust writings, movies and art, documenting the 'new Jews', in other words, those born in Israel, and raised by parents who had survived the Holocaust, and had lived with the trauma and silence of their parents (Grossmann 2002; Kidron 2007). This second generation of Holocaust survivors is represented by scholars such as Tom Segev, Idith Zertal, Boaz Cohen and Dan Michman, who all wrote about the Holocaust and its appearance in Israeli politics, culture and memory. Although all of these are second generation in relation to the survivors, they do not belong to a single stream of scholarship. Scholars such as Adi Ophir, Idith Zertal and Tom Segev represent the school of 'new historians' that challenge the Israeli Zionist narrative and the accounts of the wars from 1948 to 1967 and are critical of the Israeli memory of the Holocaust as a nationalist construction that describes Holocaust memorialisation as a civil religion (Ophir 2006: 19–20; Zertal 2005).

These scholarly works flesh out the Israeli memory culture of the 1970s and 1980s, of which Yad Vashem was the flagship, and also show how this culture penetrated into other Israeli institutions, such as the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) and, most importantly, the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). Visits to Yad Vashem were not just de rigueur for foreign diplomats and heads of governments but a core component of the education of all Israelis, from high school and university students to IDF combatants and Israeli diplomats themselves. This shared experience served to build a nationalist awareness of the 'never again for us' lesson of the Holocaust. Furthermore, Yad Vashem and its historians were, and to some extent still are, the dominant international agents of Holocaust memory.

2.2 THE COLD WAR AND NATION BUILDING IN ISRAEL AND THE TWO GERMANIES

It should be noted at the outset of this section that the norms and practices of commemoration in the FRG were quite contested in the 1950s and 1960s. As noted by Sabine Mannitz, for example, the FRG struggled to cope with the Nazi past, as some parts of society were still enmeshed in Nazi ideology; this suggests that critical self-reflection was not the dominant desire in the country at the time (Mannitz 2018: 18–21). Although the uniqueness debate was coined and developed in Israel, it penetrated the cultural and political arenas in the FRG, where constant questions of guilt drove (West) German historians to support the uniqueness assertion (Diner, D. 2000: 219; Jaspers 2001). For example, the work of Eberhard Jäckel, Hitler’s World View (1981) is an excellent example of a non-Jewish defender of the uniqueness claim (Jäckel 1981). On the other hand, Arno J. Mayer, a Jewish-American historian, presented an opposing view to that of Jäckel by arguing that Jews were only a component in Hitler’s anti-communist ideology (Mayer 1988).

With respect to domestic practices/memory cultures of the Holocaust, the key event in the immediate post-war period for both Germanies was the ‘1952 Luxembourg Reparations Agreement’, which committed the FRG to compensating Israel for resettling Jews from Europe as well as individual Jews for loss of property during the war. Although the FRG’s foreign policy did not foster Holocaust
commemorations directly during the 1950s, the Luxembourg agreement stimulated debates and media coverage in both Germanies.

In respect to the FRG, these debates can be argued to have come to fruition with the trial of Adolf Eichmann in the early 1960s, which can be seen as the first real opportunity for the FRG to showcase to the Western world how it had understood and implemented the lessons of World War II through its commitment to the human rights regime and the 1948 UN Genocide Convention. As Michael S. Bryant has shown, the FRG used the testimony of Jewish survivors in the Eichmann trial to prosecute and convict other Nazi perpetrators. Bryant argues that the Jewish witnesses at the Eichmann trial provided FRG courts with the crucial evidence to incriminate former Nazi death camp guards as perpetrators of the genocide of the Jews (Bryant 2012).

In the GDR, however, the reparations agreement was met with hostility, with the political elite arguing that the best and most moral compensation they could offer was to uproot all traces of the Nazi regime and of German fascism, thus removing that threat to the security of civilians of the GDR, including Jews (Timm 1997: 271–272). This criticism was founded on the belief that singling out groups, whether on account of their religion or their ethnicity, undermined the communist social system. Jewish suffering in the Holocaust was therefore not explicitly recognised on its own terms by the Warsaw Pact states. In Soviet historiography and history textbooks, the Holocaust was subsumed within a socialist narrative of the sacrifice of those who resisted Hitler and Nazism (mainly domestic Marxist groups) and the heroism of the Red Army as a liberating force (Fox 1999: 25–30; 2004: 420–440). In practice, therefore, the murder of the Jews was not given as much significance within the Soviet bloc’s narrative and memory discourse of the War.

In respect to the particular paths followed by the FRG and the GDR, recent ground-breaking scholarship emphasises how the Luxembourg Reparations Agreement and the associated interaction between the two Germanies actually fuelled Cold War bipolar tension in respect to the Arab-Israeli conflict in the Middle East (Gardner Feldman: 2012). The combination of Arab attempts to scupper the agreement, and German bipolar rivalry and associated Holocaust acknowledgement/denial led the FRG and GDR to choose sides – as in a zero-sum game – in the Cold War arms race in the Middle East. As the recent work of Lorena De Vita shows, the 1952 Luxembourg agreement did not just provide essential financial aid in building Israel’s arms capacity, but also placed Israel in a powerful position vis-à-vis the Arab countries, which could not receive similar financial aid from the GDR (De Vita 2017: 361–362).

3. THE COLD WAR AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

3.1 HOLOCAUST MEMORY CULTURE

As noted in the previous section, the concept of the uniqueness of the Holocaust originated in Israel during the 1950s and then developed and was internationalised through the 1960s and 1970s. The
memory of the Holocaust followed a slightly more delayed trajectory in the US. The Holocaust was marginalized in American culture between the 1950s and the 1970s, partly because the trauma of the survivors and the repressed memory of the American Jews themselves limited the visibility of the Holocaust in American Jewish communities during that period. An additional explanation for the Holocaust not being part of the Jewish identity of American Jews during the initial post-war decades is Jewish demography. In the late 1940s, only 100,000 Holocaust survivors emigrated to the US, representing only a relatively minor addition to the existing population of American Jews (Diner, H. 2005: 245; Novick 2000: 6).

The turn in Holocaust memory culture occurred in the late 1970s: there was significant growth in public manifestations of engagement with the Holocaust during the late 1970s in the United States, including Holocaust curricula in high schools, Holocaust seminars at universities, events held by American Jewish organisations about Holocaust memory, academic conferences and publications. As noted in the work of Jacob Eder, “the broadcast of the NBC miniseries *Holocaust* in 1978/1979 […] both marked a significant shift in Holocaust consciousness in the United States and served as the catalyst for discussion on the Federal Republic’s coping with the Nazi past” (Eder 2016: 17).

The growing memorialisation of the Holocaust in the US was given a further boost by Jimmy Carter in November 1978 when he established a ‘Presidential Commission on the Holocaust’. Its task was to plan how to formulate the Holocaust days of remembrance, shaping the education and memory of the Holocaust in the American public sphere. The strategy of the Carter administration was to use the Holocaust as a universal lesson for genocide prevention to help reinforce ties with Jewish voters. Committee members included, among others, Holocaust survivors such as Elie Wiesel and Benjamin Meed, American senators and Jewish-American Congress members such as Stephan Solarz, Jewish-American journalists such as Hayman Bookbinder and academic specialists on the Holocaust such as Raul Hilberg, each of whom contributed their own expertise and insights to the initial planning of the US memorial.

The memorial, the report they wrote said, should focus on one specific aspect of the Nazis’ many crimes: the ‘unique’ and unprecedented nature of the murder of the Jews – even over other victims of the Nazis. The commission noted that:

> Millions of innocent civilians were tragically killed by the Nazis. They must be remembered. However, there exists a moral imperative for special emphasis on the six million Jews. While not all victims were Jews, all Jews were victims, destined for annihilation solely because they were born Jewish (Report to the President 1979: 3).

The report issued by the commission was greatly influenced by the concept of the uniqueness of the Holocaust. This led to recommendations for special days of remembrance for the Jewish victims of the Holocaust, a dedicated education programme, and the establishment of the USHMM as a national memorial. To some extent, however, this redoubled focus on seeing the Holocaust as an entirely singular and unique event was unhelpful for Carter, since it clashed with his developing foreign policy agenda in the latter half of the 1970s that sought to highlight the broader commitment by
the US to the prevention of genocide and the promotion of human rights. Such an agenda implied the historical occurrence of, and potential for, other genocides.

A fundamental problem that arose with the prospective project of the USHMM was that it provoked a major dispute concerning who should be regarded as victims of the Holocaust, as noted above. Was it only Jews, or should non-Jewish victims of the Nazi regime, such as Roma, homosexuals, Jehovah’s Witnesses and the disabled, be included in the exhibition narrative? This debate also posed the wider question of whether the memorial should include victims of other genocides, as part of an attempt to prevent future genocides and highlight the modern commitment to human rights.

The FRG also engaged with the USHMM initiative for most of the 1980s. Eder’s work argues in essence that the government of the FRG, especially during Chancellor Kohl’s administration (1982–1998), saw themselves as ‘victims’ of the Holocaust’s afterlife in the US. Eder’s specific chapter ‘Confronting the Anti-German Museum: (West) Germany and the USHMM, 1979–1993’ taps into the intensive diplomatic manoeuvres pursued by Kohl’s government, which was anxious that the USHMM would propagate a militantly anti-German narrative in the heart of the capital of FRG’s most important Cold War ally. As a US-based memorial, the history of the US as the liberators of the Nazi concentration camps was magnified and become a dominant feature of the USHMM, whereas the totality of German history was condensed to the miserable and murderous 1933–1945 Nazi dictatorship. Such a Jewish-American narrative – according to Kohl – dismissed the great achievements of the FRG since 1949, namely the establishment of liberal democracy, and the binding of its destiny with the West, specifically the US (Eder 2016: 84). The FRG employed German diplomats and non-governmental officials to penetrate the USHMM planning committee, and thus influence the narrative of the prospective museum. Eder captured the essence of the FRG’s concerns with a quote from Hubertus von Morr, a German official and one of Kohl’s closest advisers: “We cannot understand why America wants its young people to go to that museum [USHMM] and come out saying, ‘My God, how can we be allies with that den of devils?’” (Eder 2016: 84).

**3.2 HOLOCAUST UNIQUENESS VERSUS ARMENIAN GENOCIDE**

The 1915 Armenian genocide will be fully introduced to readers in the second part of this report. It makes its first appearance here, though, with regard to the ‘Campaign to Remember’ and the intersection with American Holocaust memory culture.

A particularly heated discussion in respect to the USHMM was who should pay for the estimated US$100 million cost of the initiative. While the land allocated on the National Mall in Washington D.C. was a contribution by the federal government, the remaining money to build the USHMM was to be donated mainly by the American public through a ‘Campaign to Remember’. This was the moment – the convergence of Carter’s vision of human rights protection and the ‘Campaign to Remember’ – that the organised Armenian-American community believed could bring the hitherto almost-forgotten memory of the Armenian genocide into public consciousness (Ben Aharon 2020).
The governor of California, George Deukmejian, an Armenian-American, pressured the museum leader to appoint Set Momjian, Armenian-American philanthropist, as the community representative. The Armenian community in the US made a donation of $1 million, aiming to be able to include the Armenian genocide in the museum’s focus. In August 1983, the Armenian expectations became reality when the museum commission reached a decision to include the Armenian genocide in the exhibition narrative. Although the decision about the 1915 genocide was informal, it was still a commitment that later would be difficult to reverse.

Turkey, however, unsurprisingly, felt a similar concern regarding the risk to its reputation in the US, as had Kohl in respect to the FRG. In fact, von Morr’s quotation above could have easily also captured the concerns of Turkish government officials during the 1980s, especially those of Turgut Özal’s government of the mid-1980s which was pro-Western. The possible inclusion of the ‘Armenian question’ in the USHMM could have had serious consequences for US-Turkish relations and for Holocaust memory. Turkey faced the same problem as the FRG as a powerful Cold War ally: the golden opportunity that the public funding provided for the Armenian-Americans could have severely damaged the already problematic reputation of Turkey in the US, and with it the Cold War alliance with the Americans, making Turkey, like the FRG, a ‘victim’ of the USHMM.

This is a suitable time to revisit a core question which guides the inquiry contained in this report: Why is there a significant difference in the way in which these two genocides (the Armenian genocide and the Holocaust) have been represented in the public, political and international arena by the perpetrators, victims and third-party countries? As shown in the previous parts of this report and its closing section, the concept of the Holocaust being ‘unique’ introduced a zero-sum competition that played a role in blocking recognition of the Armenian genocide, and the concerns provoked concerning Cold War collective security and Turkey’s role as a core member of NATO also played a significant role. As noted, when memories of slavery and colonialism or the Armenian genocide clashed with memories of the Holocaust in contemporary multicultural societies such as in the US, a competition of victims had to ensue. Only, in this case, the competition was driven not only by the victim groups themselves within the American cultural and political arenas, but also by the involvement of foreign governments and Cold War allies: namely Turkey and the FRG.

4. POST-COLD WAR: GLOBAL HOLOCAUST MEMORY CULTURE

4.1 INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS AND TRANSNATIONAL HOLOCAUST MEMORY: IHRA

The end of the Cold War and the turn to the unipolar world also had an impact on the view of the Holocaust as a global memory that is not only ‘unique’ but also a symbolic lesson on human rights and the protection of minorities. The first steps towards the ‘internationalisation of Holocaust memory’ begin with a conference on the Holocaust held in Stockholm in January 2000, attended by representatives of 46 governments. This conference marked the breakthrough in the task of establishing a
transnational organisation as an international norm of Holocaust education (the International Forum on the Holocaust) and also led to the declaration of 27 January (the date which marks the liberation of Auschwitz) as International Holocaust Remembrance Day (ITF/IHRA 2000).

The forum concluded that “The Holocaust (Shoah) fundamentally challenged the foundations of civilisation. The unprecedented character of the Holocaust will always hold universal meaning” (Article 1 of the Stockholm Declaration). Here, it is evident that the word unique was replaced by unprecedented. Although unprecedented is actually a lower scale term than unique, it still implies something completely different from earlier events. Unprecedented says nothing about what might have happened since and does not carry the same sense as unique that the event was entirely singular. It could simply be read as saying that the Holocaust was unprecedented in its scale, for example in the level of mechanisation and organisation that it eventually acquired, which would be an historically accurate statement but might also imply that there were no genocidal events prior to the Holocaust.

Yehuda Bauer from the Yad Vashem acted as the Honorary Chairman of IRHA, and since this point in the early 2000s ‘unprecedented’ has tended to replace any reference to the word ‘unique’ in his publications. As noted above, Bauer was one of the founding fathers of the Yad Vashem school of Holocaust uniqueness and he embedded its conservative approach to the Holocaust and the focus on Jewish victimhood into the IHRA’s approach to Holocaust memory and, since early 2000, into his publications. As he noted in his book published in 2001, “The Holocaust was a genocide, but of a special and unprecedented type” (Bauer 2001: x).

The trigger event for the 2000 Stockholm declaration occurred three years earlier in the Swedish public debate regarding the lack of knowledge about the Holocaust among young people in Sweden. It was noted in the Swedish media that only two-thirds of Swedish youth believed that the Holocaust had occurred (Kaiser/Storeide 2018: 800). This public discussion led to a parliamentary debate regarding the need to inform Swedish education about the facts of the Holocaust and its lessons, and this in turn led to a campaign entitled ‘Levande historie’ or ‘living history’. In parallel with this initiative, the Swedish Prime Minister in 1997–1998, Göran Persson, turned to the international front and tried to establish a transnational alliance to promote Holocaust education. Persson brought together a network of politicians and state elite each of whom were busy with establishing a new world order for the post-Cold War (Ladrech 2000). In Europe, their search was closely connected with the notion of the EU as a ‘normative power’ which was the subject of considerable debate around the turn of the century (Manners 2002). Persson also invited British Prime Minister Tony Blair (1997-2007) and the American President Bill Clinton (1993-2001) to establish international cooperation on Holocaust education (Kaiser/Storeide 2018: 800; The Stockholm International Forum Conferences 2006: 5). So far, Persson’s initiative seems quite similar to the initiative of President Carter in November 1978, which established the ‘Presidential Commission on the Holocaust’, although this ultimately failed to establish a ‘global lesson’ based on the Holocaust.

Much like the question of the presence or not of the Armenian genocide in the USHMM, and whether this challenged the Holocaust’s uniqueness and the suffering of the Jewish people, the new members of the EU from eastern Europe tried to implement a different more pan-European narra-
tive that challenged the unique or unprecedented nature of the Holocaust by including the suffering incurred in their wartime experiences fighting against the Nazi occupation. This approach has been called the totalitarian paradigm, emphasising that a key to understanding the history of twentieth-century Europe is the common structural basis of totalitarian regimes from those of Nazism, fascist Italy and authoritarian military dictatorships in Spain and elsewhere, to those of Stalinism and communist systems more generally (Kaiser/Storeide 2018: 801–802; Mälksoo 2009: 654).

PART II

5. THE 1915 ARMENIAN GENOCIDE: A VERY SHORT HISTORY

The 1915 Armenian genocide is not widely known and took place during World War I. In the declining Ottoman Empire, the elite of the governing Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) organised and executed the deportation and displacement of ethnic Armenians within the empire. It is estimated that between 800,000 and 1.5 million Ottoman Armenians were deported and then killed, while thousands more were Turkified, becoming part of the new social fabric of the Republic of Turkey that emerged after World War I (Ekmeçcioğlu 2016; Jinks 2018; Dixon 2018). Several factors contributed to the Armenian genocide: the decline of the Austro Hungarian Empire and the associated steady shift to a system of relatively ethnically homogenous nation-states across Europe. In that context, the Armenians, who were a minority Christian population, were deported and then killed by the CUP elite to establish a homogenous Muslim nation-state (Akçam 2004; Bloxham 2005; Üngör 2008). The extent of the organisation that underpinned the genocide is evident in the special warrants that were issued which allowed the CUP to confiscate Armenian properties, including their business wealth and belongings (Üngör/Polatlı 2011; Akçam/Kurt 2015). These warrants created a ‘legal’ framework for achieving two key aims: firstly, to remove Armenians, paving the path to the genocide and secondly, to resettle hundreds of thousands of Muslim refugees who had fled from the Balkans during the Balkan Wars in 1912 and 1913 to formerly Armenian towns and properties in eastern Anatolia. Indeed, this need for housing was perhaps a key factor in the deportation of the Armenians.

As noted by British scholars such as Christopher J. Walker and Donald Bloxham and others, independent eyewitness accounts, notably that of Henry Morgenthau, who was United States Secretary of the Treasury during the administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt, and the American representative in the Ottoman Empire, agreed that the Ottoman Armenians were being systematically driven to their deaths by the CUP authorities. It was only in 1944, however, that the term ‘genocide’ was coined to describe such events, in the context of the UNGC (Walker 1980: 379).

On the other hand, a more substantive case can be made for the similarities between the Holocaust and the Armenian genocide. The argument that the Armenians were ‘deported and killed’ plays down what was actually a relatively highly organised genocidal process involving the incitement of Turks against Armenians, death marches, property confiscations (as noted) and massacres. The main difference between the two is that even though both were premeditated genocides the human rights regime was established only after World War II. The awareness and sensitivity of the interna-
tional community and transnational organisations to the act of genocide was rather different at the time of the events directed against Armenians, and there was simply no widely agreed language for articulating them. This was a key reason why the Armenian genocide did not acquire the notoriety of the Holocaust. In what follows I will assess how the divergent trends in Holocaust and Armenian genocide memory continued from this initial basis and why a significant difference remains in the way in which these two genocides are represented in the public, political and international arena by the perpetrators, victims and third-party countries.

6. TURKISH NATION BUILDING

6.1 CONSTRUCTING TURKEY’S DENIAL AT HOME DURING THE INTERWAR YEARS (1921–1939)

Because international norms regarding human rights were not formally considered after the end of World War I and into the interwar period, the creation and formative years of the Republic of Turkey were able to take place without any formal acknowledgement of the 1915 genocide. It is also significant that the Republic of Turkey was very much the creation of a founding father, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881–1938). Beyond secularism, or the central role of the Turkish military in maintaining Turkey’s democracy, a key element in Atatürk’s legacy was to ‘Turkify’ all ethnic minorities by having them assimilate into the Turkish culture and language (so-called ‘Turkification’). A substantial part of this Turkification and social engineering during the interwar period entailed the silencing of the social memory of the Armenian genocide. Although many direct eyewitnesses to the genocide were still alive, and the traumatic memories of the 1915 genocide were an important component of the Turkified Armenians’ identity and collective memory, the official, sanitised, state narrative was continually reinforced as part of the national narrative both via history textbooks and school curricula, and via the systematic removal of physical traces of Armenian culture in Turkey, such as Armenian architecture (Ekmekçioglu 2016; Üngör 2013, 2014). The cultural and urban elements of the cities that had been created by the Ottoman Armenians who had lived there were eradicated. Furthermore, the subject of the Armenian genocide became taboo and its very mention could, and still does, lead to indictment on charges of insulting the Turkish nation. These denial mechanisms have been problematised by generations of scholars who have studied the transformation from the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic during the interwar period under the one-party state led by Atatürk (Akçam 2004; Müge Göçek 2015; Üngör 2012).

The Turks exploited the conspiracy of silence surrounding the fate of the Armenians in Turkey to foster an institutionalised denial of the 1915 genocide. Successive generations born and raised in Turkey after World War I and brought up and educated on nationalist Kemalism, and the young citizens of the secular Republic of Turkey were taught to deny the Armenian genocide as part of the nationalist narrative and reengineering of Turkish society (Üngör 2014).
6.2 TURKEY’S DENIAL: THE COLD WAR AND NATION BUILDING AFTER 1945

With the end of World War II, Turkey’s political elite reassessed Kemalist values in the light of East-West polarisation. Most importantly in this context, in June 1945 the Soviets stipulated two conditions for signing a new alliance treaty with Turkey: firstly, a revision of the borders between the countries that would force Turkey to return territories that had been part of the Russian Empire between 1878 and 1918; secondly, the formation of a Turkish-Soviet defence force to secure the Bosphorus and Dardanelles (Zürcher 2004: 206–209). These demands, set alongside the US’s recognition of Turkey’s strategic value in blocking the spread of communism in Southern Europe and into the Middle East, and their subsequent eagerness to win Turkey’s allegiance, exemplified by Turkey’s inclusion within the Marshall Plan, encouraged the Turks to join the Western bloc. Turkey’s post-war affiliation with the Western bloc, however, provoked tensions in domestic issues, its political instability – specifically the regular occurrence of military coups to ‘protect the secular heritage of Kemalism’ (1960, 1971, 1980, 1997 and 2016) – as well as the suppression of discussion of its violence against Armenians, Cypriots and Kurds.

6.3 THE 1915 GENOCIDE IN ARMENIAN DIASPORAS DURING THE COLD WAR (1945–1985)

Turkey’s nation building and the associated denial of the Armenian genocide was not the only component that shaped the trajectory of the latter’s memorialisation. Another important driving force for that memorialisation was the efforts made by the Armenian victims of the 1915 genocide, and the pressure they exerted on the perpetrators to acknowledge their crimes (which at times included violence). Yet, the context in which the Armenian victims could exert pressure differed substantially from that of the Jews and Israel in respect to the Holocaust.

In contrast to the experience of the Jews after World War II and the Holocaust, where broad cooperation between the wartime allies allowed the establishment of Israel in 1948 and the signing of the UNGC, and to a large extent the wider UN-driven human rights agenda in the ensuing years, the polarisation of the Cold War greatly contributed to silence on the topic of the genocide among Armenian diaspora communities (Laycock 2012: 105). During the first years following the Armenian genocide, the survivors and their descendants spread around the globe, creating small communities. These Armenian communities settled and put down new roots in the interwar years, but remained silent about their suppressed memories of 1915. This relative silence arose from the disconnectedness of these communities, remembering that communications in the 1920s and 1930s were significantly less easy even than in the immediate post-war years, the trauma of the survivors and the lack of freedom to commemorate the genocide in the communist parts of the world, for reasons that will be explained further below. Together, these factors greatly affected the Armenian diaspora’s ability to create a substantial dialogue and to construct a coherent and shared position with respect to claims for justice from Turkey (Laycock 2016: 127).

After World War II the Armenian diaspora faced a new reality that reshaped their commemoration priorities with regard to the 1915 genocide. The Armenians in the communist bloc states were sup-
posed to ignore the memories of the Armenian genocide, mainly because the Kremlin delegitimised a Western style of protection of human rights as inimical to the collectivist outlook of communism. As a result, even though Soviet Armenia was an integrated part of the Soviet Union the Armenian genocide was by and large not recognised by the Kremlin at all.

The 24th of April 1965 was a turning point. During the 50th anniversary of the 1915 genocide, the Soviet Armenian communities had an official, albeit relatively low-profile, event organised in the opera building in Moscow, attended only by the political leadership and prominent intellectuals (Libaridian 2005: 5). This one event, however, was the catalyst that set loose the forces of nationalism in Soviet Armenia. While the official ceremony was taking place, 100,000 to 200,000 people spontaneously gathered outside, chanting “Our Lands! Our Lands!” (i.e. western Armenia) and “Justice! Justice!” (i.e. genocide recognition) (Panossian 2006: 320).

The silence further continued to crumble when the issue burst onto the international stage in various forums in 1973. It was at this time that two transnational non-governmental actors: both of which were Armenian terrorist organisations, began mounting operations against Turkish targets around the world, mostly in Western capitals: The Hague, London and Sydney (Tölölyan 1992: 18). The first group, the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), operated out of Lebanon and Soviet Armenia. Their competitors operated mainly out of North America and Western Europe under the name the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide (JCAG). As a result, between 1975 and 1983, Armenian terrorists mounted 168 operations and assassinated more than sixty Turkish diplomats and their family members (CIA 2013: 9; Dixon 2018: 50). Beyond targeting Turkish targets worldwide and seeking to compel Turkey to recognise the 1915 genocide, pay reparations, and return territory in eastern Anatolia, the Armenian terrorists also urged their communities living on both sides of the Iron Curtain to work together to remind the world about their common tragedy (Panossian 2006; Walker 1980: 320).

Armenian political scientist Razmik Panossian explores how Armenian terrorism and the ASALA were viewed by Armenian diaspora groups. Panossian notes that “most diasporans found terrorist attacks against civilians repugnant, but a good number of Armenians showed some sympathy for acts committed against Turkish diplomats” (Panossian 2006: 311). Members of the Armenian diaspora sought to bring their tragedy to the world’s attention and to gain acknowledgement of the genocide and reparations from the Turkish Republic. On the other hand, as some accounts have pointed out, some of the diaspora’s communities, in particular those which were part of the Western bloc, had reservations about aligning themselves as supporters of the violent and terrorist component of the Armenian campaign. Few Armenian historians have addressed this period of terrorism in their writings, and those that have done so have tended to downplay its significance, presumably due to the complexity of the opinions within the diaspora.
Fig. 1: A Chart of Armenian terrorism and number of incidents per country between 1975 and 1983 (CIA 2013: 8).

Western scholars, however, especially those from the UK, have adopted a more critical position towards Armenian terrorism. Donald Bloxham’s *The Great Game of Genocide* addresses, among other related issues concerning the campaign in the 1970s and 1980s to highlight the Armenian genocide, ‘the geopolitics of memory’. Bloxham proposes that the media coverage in Western countries of ASALA’s assassinations of 60 Turkish diplomats “was not everything that the terrorists would have wished for.” In Bloxham’s assessment, the ASALA’s activity served merely to shift the discussion regarding the 1915 genocide in Western countries from a ‘certainty’ that the events of 1915 were genocide, to a ‘language of disputed history’ between the Armenians and the Turks regarding an ‘uncertain past’ (Bloxham 2005: 207–235). Bloxham’s nuanced critique focuses, in other words, on the ‘boomerang effect’ of ASALA’s terrorism. In particular, it shows how the ASALA terrorist campaign was leveraged by the Turkish MFA so that the events of 1915 became a contested history between the Armenians and the Turks. Furthermore, as the press counsellor at the Turkish embassy in Paris noted in 1982: “Ten years ago we could have admitted there was some kind of massacre, but for some reason the Government decided not to. Now it’s too late. Who can bend to the demands of terrorists?” (Bakkalbaşi quoted in Davidian/Ferchl 1982; Turkish embassy official quoted in Adams 1983; also quoted in Dixon 2018: 44).
7. THE CONTESTED MEMORIES OF THE ARMEÑIAN GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

As noted, the terrorism directed against Turkish embassies in Western countries in the early 1980s did in fact provoke mixed responses to the Armenian cause. For the most part, western Europeans merely expressed routine sympathy with the victims (Kuznetsov 2015: 35–53). Some countries, however, including Israel, but also the US and Canada, condemned the terrorism more directly and leveraged the opportunity to improve ties with the Turkish foreign ministry. Israel's foreign ministry, for example, took the initiative to disrupt ASALA cooperation with Palestinian terrorists in south Lebanon during their invasion of Lebanon in the early 1980s. In this way they conveyed a message to Turkey's elite that fighting regional terrorism was in both Israel and Turkey's interests (Ben Aharon 2019b: 283).

Despite the international condemnation, the Armenians also achieved some success during those years. There was an increasing amount of discussion of the Armenian genocide in international forums during the 1980s, and in the second half of that decade the 1915 genocide was also debated in legislatures worldwide.

Armenian terrorism had declined in the mid-1980s as a result of the disintegration of both ASALA and JCAG. Many of the terrorists’ leaders had been arrested and imprisoned, especially after the Orly bomb in 1983. The result was a shift to more positive channels in the Armenian diaspora's efforts. Genocide recognition bills were tabled by pro-Armenian lobbies in the US House of Representatives (1985) and the European Parliament (1987). The result was what Armenians may have hoped for: a confrontation, although not always successful, with Turkey's dark past. While the European Parliament formally acknowledged the Armenian genocide in June 1987, US Congress did not do so until 2019 (Ben Aharon 2019c).

From the perpetrator's perspective, in the early 1980s, the Armenian campaign forced Ankara to launch for the first time an international campaign aimed at exerting pressure on Western countries to support the Turkish denial narrative. The arguments made in support of Turkey’s narrative were related to the risk of countries which themselves suffered from terrorism being perceived as rewarding terrorism, as well as the importance of Turkey as a strategic NATO ally.

7.1 POST-COLD WAR: A BOOST OF PARLIAMENTARY RECOGNITION?

As the Cold War reached its final moments in the late 1980s many parliaments worldwide followed the US House of Representatives and the European Parliament in adopting an 'Armenian genocide bill', especially countries which had good relations with Turkey and or had a strong Armenian diaspora community asking for recognition of the 1915 Armenian genocide.

In 1991, however, after the Republic of Armenia received its independence following the collapse of the Soviet Union, there was a surprising development in respect to international recognition of the
genocide and demands for reparations: namely, a gap emerged between the Armenian diaspora and the Republic of Armenia regarding the core of Armenian genocide recognition and Armenian identity politics. As noted in the work of Khatchik DerGhougassian, Yerevan has been reluctant to include the memory of Armenian genocide in its political agenda or foreign policy. Since Armenia has a significant economic incentive to establish diplomatic relations with Ankara and open their shared borders for trade and economic development, Yerevan has insisted on ‘relations without preconditions’ with Ankara. “The Turkish-Armenian agreement [to open the mutual border] seems to illustrate the clash of raisons d'état (reasons of state) with diaspora activism” (DerGhougassian 2014: 193–207, especially, 195). Even after the Armenian terrorism of the late Cold War had declined, as well as the importance of Turkey’s NATO status, a point at which it might have seemed that new opportunities were presenting themselves for genocide recognition as desired by Armenians, this clash between national interest and diaspora activism seems to have created a new dynamic in the trajectory of Armenian genocide memory. Specifically, the fact that the Armenian homeland and the diaspora appeared to assign a different degree of importance to the Armenian genocide as a totem of Armenian identity meant that both Turkey and third-party countries could continue using the more moderate term ‘Armenian massacre,’ especially where the diaspora was politically weak.

Two contrasting examples can be given to demonstrate the latter point. In Israel, from 1989 and thorough the 1990s, several opposition parties had called for recognition of the Armenian genocide. This campaign was silenced by successive Israeli governments on account of the good relations with Turkey during those years (Ben Aharon 2018: 465–467). The outcome was, and still is, that a seemingly substantial discussion appeared to be taking place in the Israeli parliament which was reported in the Israeli and international media as a demonstration of the positive treatment of minority rights in Israel. In practice, however, many of these resolutions were blocked by successive governments. One of the main reasons for this is that there is only a very small Armenian community in Israel. As explained by Alon Liel in an oral interview, “the Armenian-Israeli community is relatively small with a weak lobby. There was never a Knesset member of Armenian descent who might have been able to mount a serious [parliamentary] campaign for recognition of the Armenian Genocide” (Alon Liel, interview with the author, 2015; quoted in Ben Aharon 2018: 465).

The second example is France. There, the substantial Armenian community in Marseille, Paris and Lyon had been pressuring the France National Assembly to recognise the 1915 massacre as genocide since the 1980s, and this led to a 2001 law that had no provisions other than stating that “France publicly recognises the Armenian genocide of 1915”. (Marchand/Perrier 2015: 4). This statement may be merely a symbolic recognition, yet it is an important statement not just with respect to the Armenian-Turkish narratives regarding the 1915 genocide, but in demonstrating a strong democratic parliament that could follow through and enact a law which though symbolic may still have further implications. Although there were attempts to follow this law with sanctions against attempts to deny the Armenian genocide, these all failed.

These examples show how the Armenians themselves have played a vital role in shaping the trajectory of the international memory of the Armenian genocide. The contested historical narrative of the memorialisation taken by the Armenians, which in turn, was violent during the mid-Cold War, and
subsequently during the post-Cold War, was non-violent but raised significant barriers to creating a peaceful reconciliation between the Armenians and the Turks. In particular, the divisions among the Armenians – terrorists vs non-terrorist and diaspora vs the Republic of Armenia – put third-party countries in a delicate situation when they came to address the question of the Armenian genocide, and gave them some reason for leaving Turkey’s denial narrative unchallenged for over forty years. This part of the report, therefore, offers meaningful explanations as to why there are significant differences in the ways in which the Holocaust and the Armenian genocide have been represented in the public, political and international arena by the perpetrators and victims and third-party countries.

7.2 HOLOCAUST MEMORY AND ARMENIAN GENOCIDE AS A ZERO-SUM GAME?

The various points of contestation explored above are not the only dilemmas raised by recognition of the Armenian genocide and the associated embedding of that event in national and transnational memory. In particular, a further question related to the recognition of the Armenian genocide that concerns governments is the so-called ‘uniqueness’ of the Holocaust. As noted in the opening section of this report, this concept of the singularity of the Holocaust implies that recognition of the Armenian genocide would ipso facto diminish the suffering inflicted on Jews in the Holocaust.

For example, since the 1980s, parliaments in Israel, the Netherlands and Germany have tended to see the relationship between Holocaust memory and the Armenian genocide as a ‘zero-sum game’: in other words, the more the Armenian genocide is recognised, the less ‘unique’ the Holocaust will become. This assertion has been underpinned by a number of factors in each of these states:

1. In the case of the FRG, and starting in 1990 unified Germany, the main explanation is related to the fact that, since the 1960s, a considerable Turkish minority (close to three million immigrants) has lived in FRG and later reunified Germany, and it was feared that should the Armenian genocide be formally recognised they would find themselves in a state of conflict between their loyalties to Germany and Turkey (Kebranian 2020: 18–19). The second factor is related to European diplomacy and its lower-level role in the Armenian genocide. Although the great powers were not co-perpetrators in the 1915 genocide, Germany had partial culpability for it (Bloxham 2005: 11). The German and Ottoman Empires had been close allies during World War I, and the Germans provided considerable assistance to the Ottoman elite. Examples include helping the Ottomans confiscate bank accounts, insurance policies, and deposits in the Reichsbank belonging to Ottoman Armenians (Karagueuzian/Auron 2009: 99–135). The continued suppression of the memory of the 1915 genocide in international fora enabled Germany to refrain from addressing its own guilt as a facilitator (Ben Aharon 2019a: 343).

2. For the Netherlands, the reason for marginalising the memory of the Armenian genocide is related to the centrality of Holocaust commemoration in public discourse in that country, along with the story of the destruction of the country's Jewish community and the German occupation from 1940 to 1945 (Ben Aharon 2019a: 343–344). As one of the countries occupied by the Nazis during World War II, the Dutch people also considered themselves, to some extent, victims. In the past 20 years, however, there has been considerable academic and public debate on the
HOW DO WE REMEMBER THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE AND THE HOLOCAUST?

question of Dutch culpability in the persecution and extermination of Jews in the Netherlands. On the one hand, despite its small size, the Netherlands boasts the largest per capita number of people recognised by Yad Vashem as Righteous Among the Nations, in other words, non-Jews who rescued Jews during the Holocaust (5,778 in total). On the other hand, the fact that almost 104,000, or 75 per cent of the entire Jewish population in the Netherlands were transported to German death camps in occupied Poland can be explained largely by the partial collaboration of some non-Jewish Dutch citizens (Ben Aharon 2019a: 343–344; Tammes 2017: 293–318). The centrality of Jewish victimhood in the Netherlands, and the extent to which the Dutch view themselves as victims of Nazi occupation eclipsed the discourse on the Armenians. It was only in 2004 that the Armenian genocide received formal Dutch recognition for the first time when Dutch parliament acknowledged that crimes against humanity had been committed in the Ottoman Empire, although it continued to refrain from explicitly employing the word ‘genocide’. After a crisis between The Hague and Ankara in 2018, however, the Dutch parliament decided to formally acknowledge the mass killing of Armenians by Ottoman Turks in 1915 as genocide, although no further steps were taken to memorialise the Armenian genocide.

3. For Israel, even though the question of the 1915 genocide has been discussed in the Israeli parliament (the Knesset) since 1989, as noted previously, Israel’s legislators have not strayed from the position of their foreign ministry and have consistently eschewed formal recognition of the 1915 genocide. The basic position of Israel’s legislators has been that recognition by the Knesset and the government would not serve Israel’s geopolitical interests in the Middle East, especially its strategic and economic cooperation with Turkey and Azerbaijan. Relations between Israel and Turkey have been in decline since 2008, however, and despite considerable criticism of Erdoğan from across Israel’s political spectrum, the Knesset has still refrained from passing a resolution that would acknowledge the Armenian genocide. Hence, the Knesset appears to be giving particular weight to the diplomatic cost of formally recognising the genocide given that its strategic alliance with Azerbaijan, which is engaged in a longstanding conflict with the Armenians, would also suffer as a result of such recognition. The Knesset’s other main concern is to refrain from compromising a deeply-rooted element of Israeli-Jewish identity associated with the most tragic event in Jewish history: the memory of the Holocaust as ‘unique’. Israel may fear that symbolic recognition of the Armenian genocide could pave the way for the future legislation of a national memorial day that could ‘compete’ with Yom HaShoah, also marked in Israel in late April of each year. It may be concluded, therefore, that Israel’s continued adherence to its traditional position is mainly due to its desire to preserve the uniqueness of the Holocaust and its place in the hierarchy of victimhood.

This reading of the memorialising of the Holocaust vis à vis that of the Armenian genocide as a zero-sum game has been challenged in the historiographical debate, specifically in the context of post-colonialism and Holocaust memory. Specifically, Michael Rothberg has problematised “contemporary multicultural societies and the relationship between different social groups’ histories of victimisation”. He further poses the question: “When memories of slavery and colonialism bump up against memories of the Holocaust in contemporary multicultural societies, must a competition of victims ensue?” Rothberg further argues that “against the framework that understands collective memory as competitive memory – as a zero-sum struggle over scarce resources – I suggest that we
consider memory as *multidirectional*: as subject to ongoing negotiation, cross-referencing, and borrowing; as productive and not privative” (Rothberg 2009: 2–3).

Borrowing Rothberg’s question above, but using the Armenian genocide as the comparative example instead of slavery and colonialism, it can be seen that until recently consistent policies by Israel, Germany, the Netherlands and the United States regarding the Armenian genocide, in other words these countries clinging to the concept of the uniqueness of Jewish victimisation in the Holocaust, align with the zero-sum assumption that Rothberg problematises. Between 2016 and 2019, however, the legislatures of Germany, the Netherlands and the United States have each taken decisions that demonstrate that recognition of both the Holocaust and the Armenian genocide need not create a zero-sum game in which the former’s importance is diminished, but a productive multidirectional process in which the overall understanding of human rights abuses and genocide can be enhanced in order to improve the climate of protection for current and future generations.

### 7.3 THE ACT OF RECOGNITION: FIRST MOMENTS OF RELIEF

Lastly, I would like to address the practical question – what is the actual meaning of the expression ‘recognition of the Armenian genocide’? In this regard, it should be noted that the term ‘recognition’ is an emerging one in several scholarly disciplines spanning philosophy, sociology, political theory, international relations and international law. Since there is as yet no widely accepted definition across those disciplines, for the purposes of this discussion it is taken as a *normative* expression of the acknowledgement of something that is a valuable human need (Taylor 1994: 26). The valuable normative expression here is the understanding that the Ottoman Armenians went through a genocide in 1915.

The actual act of recognition itself could take the form of a *normative* statement, such as shaking the hand of a former enemy (Geis et al. forthcoming: 2021). The hand-shaking image is important here because this act, although only symbolic, delivers an important twofold message: firstly, using *soft power* as a means to challenge Turkey’s denial narrative on the official level; second, providing the first moments of relief to generations of Armenians after many years of false representation of their history. The first step of such ‘recognition’ is therefore exactly what the legislatures of Germany, the Netherlands and the United States have done between 2016 and 2019. This step arises from the understanding that such recognition could advance peace among conflicting parties. On the other hand, one of the most important questions in international relations scholarship on recognition is how mis- or non-recognition by a third-party state could advance a conflict (Geis et al. forthcoming 2021: 3, Hayden/Schick 2016: 1–2).

The following text from House Resolution 296 from 2019 affirmed that the United States recognises the Armenian genocide (116th Congress 2019: 1) and serves as a recent example of normative expression of such acknowledgement (H. Res. 296 – In the House of Representatives, U.S., October 29, 2019.)
Whereas the United States has a proud history of recognising and condemning the Armenian Genocide, the killing of 1.5 million Armenians by the Ottoman Empire from 1915 to 1923, and providing relief to the survivors of the campaign of genocide against Armenians, Greeks, Assyrians, Chaldeans, Syriacs, Arameans, Maronites, and other Christians (H. Res. 296, Affirming the United States record on the Armenian Genocide, October, 2019).

7.4 PARLIAMENTARY RECOGNITION VERSUS GOVERNMENTAL PRAGMATISM

Now, who is expected to recognise the Armenian genocide? This calls for a short analysis since a distinction should be made between the roles played by governments and parliament regarding the Armenian genocide. As an unwritten rule, the Armenians (mainly in the diaspora) continue to ask legislatures around the world to recognise the 1915 genocide (Ben Aharon 2019a: 340–341). Why? It is important to emphasise that legislatures and executives could have different and even conflicting interests in respect to recognition. From the mid-1970s, many governments have chosen not to recognise the Armenian genocide because of their concerns over bilateral ties with Turkey. The basic understanding was that such an act would lead to a significant and almost automatic deterioration of relations with Turkey which, in some cases, could cause grave harm to vital interests. As a result, governments with good diplomatic relations with Turkey would have no interest in recognising the genocide. In fact, it was in their clear interest not to do so. Legislatures, however, give voice to a broader range of norms and values, offering a platform for the discussion of minority rights.

Parliamentary recognition of the Armenian genocide could also be critically important to what next steps could follow because there is a ‘spectrum of acts’ of recognition. This concept should also be clarified: on that spectrum, the above recognition is the first step. But it could be extended at a later period to further action and measures. For example establishing a special commission of experts as with the ‘Presidential Commission on the Holocaust’ instituted by President Carter. This future commission could possibly recommend that the country hold official commemoration days, build local memorials and museums and set up educational programmes. Moving further along the spectrum, the Armenian genocide could be included in national curricula which, after implementing the above practices, could be more easily grasped and assimilated by educators and minorities as well as immigrant communities. All in all, the measures that go beyond symbolic recognition, however, are quite advanced steps which could take some time (years) and come at a later time or not at all.

These more advanced steps could contribute not only to the commemoration of the genocide but also to the preservation of the historical heritage of ethnic minorities, and minorities more generally. The efforts for recognition are thus significant for three groups: Armenians, Turks (both in Turkey and the diaspora), and the third-party countries. It is also of critical importance to appreciate that legislatures and governments are most likely to have different and even conflicting views on this issue.

The basic understanding that should be emphasised here is that when parliaments face a choice to take some of the steps on the spectrum of recognition of the 1915 genocide, this would lead to a significant and almost automatic crisis with Turkey, an immediate recall of ambassadors, and a pos-
sible rupture that could cause grave harm to vital interests. Consequently, governments with good or even average diplomatic relations with Turkey have an interest in avoiding discussions about the word ‘genocide’ in the context of 1915. The progress towards recognition, therefore, also depends on the nature of the local democratic culture and freedom of speech of the opposition. Legislatures, however, should give a voice to a broader range of values and ethics, and offer at least a platform within which the discussion of minority rights could take place. For this reason, recognition of the Armenian genocide could cause tension between a country’s legislature and its government branches.

It is for the above reasons that during the late 1980s and early 1990s, the legislatures of Australia, the UK, Canada, the US, Israeli, Germany, the Netherlands, and scores of other countries, had bills formally tabled for recognition that were then voted down. In these cases, the recognition of the Armenian genocide was postponed and rejected due to concerns over bilateral ties with Turkey or issues with Armenian terrorism operating on their soil or against Turkish institutions.

8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This report has outlined the developments and key milestones in the Armenian genocide and Holocaust memory encompassing the interwar period, the Cold War and the post-Cold War. The first part of this paper examined the trajectory of Holocaust memory from the early stages of the Cold War into the post-Cold War world order. It first demonstrated how Holocaust acknowledgement and denial mediated the Cold War relations of both Germanies with Israel and how that dynamic played a valuable role in the three nations’ respective nation building, German-German Cold War rivalry, and superpower competition. In this period, we saw how the development of the historiography and memory culture of the Holocaust as a unique event in human history was unhelpful in a number of ways. First, it created an unofficial hierarchy of Jewish victims as different from non-Jewish victims from other groups whose members were targeted by the Nazis, as well as different from victims of other genocides. As noted in the work of both Mannitz and Stone (116th Congress 2018: 26; Stone 2004: 129), placing victims in a hierarchy as implied by the uniqueness paradigm is problematic if we want to emphasise education about and prevention of mass atrocities.

Second, this contradicts the global lesson of the Holocaust in the post-Cold War world order: that the Holocaust is a symbol of the abuse of minority rights and dehumanisation of any religious, ethnic group. This important message contradicts in many ways how the Holocaust is commemorated as unprecedented, especially in Israel but also in the US and western Europe, especially by IRHA member countries. The uniqueness assertion has another role in blocking recognition of the Armenian genocide, especially in Israel and the US, namely that such recognition would intrinsically undermine the suffering of the Jewish victims. As an essential part of any discussion of minority rights, however, the global lesson of the Holocaust must include the value of human lives regardless of ethnicity, religion and race. This means that, ultimately, the global lesson of the Holocaust must itself imply recognition of the Armenian genocide.
The second part of this report examined the trajectory of Armenian genocide memory. Set against Turkey’s denial and the nation building of the new republic, I have examined why the Armenian diaspora’s campaign for recognition of the 1915 genocide was controversial. While the focus is usually on Turkey’s denial, it has to be recognised that this was, at least in part, shaped by the developing Armenian narrative of the events of 1915. That narrative is somewhat unusual in the sense that parts of the campaign were violent and provoked negative attention which not only intensified the incentives for Turkey’s elite to deny the genocide, institutionalising that denial, but also provided a reason for third-party countries to leave Turkey’s denial narrative unchallenged (especially given the considerations around Turkey’s status as a Cold War ally). Cold War geopolitics and their intersection with the very different perspectives of the FRG and Turkey on the genocide each country perpetrated must therefore be seen as central to the different paths taken in the memorialisation of the Holocaust and the Armenian genocide. In the case of the memory of the Armenian genocide, the Cold War years (1945–1990) gave root to the positions of all the parties involved: Turkey’s denial, both at home and in international forums, the Armenian diaspora’s nationalist claims for recognition and for territorial and financial restitution, and third-party countries such as Israeli, Germany, the US and France, among others, most of which were Turkey’s allies, and who have played both active and passive roles in the process of restoring justice between Armenians and Turks.

As Armenian terrorism declined and the post-Cold War world order emerged, from the 1990s and into the first decade of the millennium it is possible to identify a change in how third-party countries began to address the question of the genocide of 1915, especially in their parliaments. Gradually the parliaments of Canada, in 1996, France, in 2002, Germany, in 2016, the Netherlands, in 2018, and the US Congress, in 2019, have officially recognised the Armenian genocide.

On the basis of the evidence presented in this report, but also after clarification in the final section of the paper of the expression ‘recognition of the Armenian genocide,’ unpacking the possibilities facing legislators worldwide within the ‘spectrum of recognition,’ I thus recommend that parliaments worldwide who have not yet recognised the Armenian genocide should do so, beginning with (see US House Resolution 296, for example): (I) Recognition of the Armenian genocide which would highlight the significance afforded in international relations to the protection of minority rights, human rights and genocide, and indeed the global lesson of the Holocaust. Such statements would also help strengthen international principles such as the UN’s R2P and bodies such as the ICC. And lastly, it would help the new generation of Armenians to experience closure. (II) In most cases, initial recognition of the Armenian genocide would attract local and international media coverage, which is important in documenting these milestone decisions that hold symbolic value not only for descendants of the victims of the Armenian genocide but also to many other victims of genocide and mass atrocities.


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What drives divergent trends in Holocaust and Armenian genocide memory? Why is there a significant difference in the way in which these two genocides have been represented in the public, political and international arenas by the perpetrators, victims and third-party countries? This report aims at finding answers to these key questions by assessing the perpetrator states’ trajectories of Holocaust and Armenian genocide memory from the early years of the Cold War into the post-Cold War world order. The author presents answers and causes and concludes with recommendations for current domestic and foreign policy.

Dr. Eldad Ben Aharon is a Post-Doctoral Minerva Fellow and Associate Researcher in PRIF's "Glocal Junctions" research department. He obtained his PhD in history from Royal Holloway University of London in 2019. Dr. Ben Aharon specializes in the diplomatic history of the Middle East during the Cold War. He carries out research on Israel’s and Turkey’s foreign policy and his other main areas of research interest are Holocaust memory, comparative genocide studies, counter-terrorism and theory and practice of oral history.