Spotlight 03/23: Muddying the Waters: Official Russian Disinformation on Chemical and Biological Weapons

by Kristoffer Burck | To the Publication

1 The cases selected here are the chemical weapons attacks in Khan Shaykhun (2017) and Douma (2018) in Syria and the poisoning of Sergei and Yulia Skripal in Salisbury (2018). There have been further instances in the Syrian context, as well as the poisoning of Alexei Navalny.

2 Final Report of the Formal Consultative Meeting BWC/Cons/2022/3 (2022).

3 https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/10/1129952 (2022).

4 https://apnews.com/article/public-health-north-america-health-ap-top-news-in-state-wire-0cf158200e674f41bd3026133e5e043d (2018).

5 See, for example, here how state media display the initiation of proceedings as an indicator in itself that the claims are legitimate: https://tass.com/politics/1457265 (2022); https://tass.com/world/1531197 (2022); https://tass.com/politics/1454717 (2022).

6 OPCW Third Report by the IIT, OPCW S/2125/2023 (2023), p. 118 para 8.55.

OPCW Executive Council Statement EC-M-54/NAT.13 (2017).

See for example: https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/russia-snubbed-us-syria-chemical-weapons-probe (2017).

See for example: OPCW Executive Council Statement EC-99/NAT.51 (2022).

10 OPCW Executive Council Statement EC-87/NAT.9 (2018).

11 https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2018-11/news/russia-charged-opcw-hacking-attempt (2018).

12 OPCW Executive Council Statement OPCW EC-M-59/NAT.3 (2018).

13 OPCW Compendium Russia Note Verbale 5, 17, 23, 28, 29, 33, 34, 37, 38 (2022).

14 OPCW Compendium Russia Note Verbale 18, 19, 26, 39 (2022).

15 OPCW Compendium Russia Note Verbale 5, 17 (2022).

16 OPCW Compendium Russia Note Verbale 17, 27 (2022).

17 OPCW Compendium Russia Note Verbale 29 (2022). This allegation was walked back to some extent in the subsequent note 31 after strong protest by the OPCW Technical Secretariat in OPCW Compendium NV/ODG-290/22 (2022). Even harsher allegations were made here: https://tass.com/politics/1477007 (2022).

18 OPCW Third Report by the IIT, OPCW S/2125/2023 (2023), p. 119 para 10.1.

19 See for example: https://russische-botschaft.ru/de/2023/01/31/foreign-ministry-statement-on-the-report-released-by-the-opcw-investigation-and-identification-team-regarding-the-april-7-2018-douma-chemical-attack/ (2023).

20 https://tass.com/world/1532105 (2022).