To Save Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation
A new type of arms race seems to be underway. Led by Western democracies, especially the United States, revolutionary and novel ways of conducting conventional warfare are currently being developed. In response, other countries are attempting to compensate for their relative weaknesses by arming themselves with nuclear and conventional weapons and making use of asymmetric means. Asymmetric options are also gaining in appeal for smaller states in conflict with larger ones, a situation that could accelerate the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Nuclear states, on the other hand, have reacted by maintaining, modernizing and expanding their nuclear weapons arsenals. Though arms controls and nonproliferation could fulfill vital stabilizing functions in this context, influential voices within the United States have confronted binding multilateral security policies with growing skepticism. Unilateralism has become a threat in the politics of international security. This projects aims to develop German and consensual European options for strengthening arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation.
This entails: developing realistic approaches for on-going negotiations along with identifying additional opportunities for cooperation; determining the options available to the non-governmental sector for supporting arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation; and providing consultative services for European governments and institutions and creating a network of European experts.
This project is oriented at developing practical applications and, as such, belongs to the applied research portion of this research department. Financing from PRIF’s core budget is periodically supplemented by smaller contributions from diverse funding providers.
- Von der Sonnenscheinpolitik zum Säbelrasseln und zurück? | 2011
Hans-Joachim Schmidt, Von der Sonnenscheinpolitik zum Säbelrasseln und zurück? Zur politischen Lage der koreanischen Halbinsel, September 2011.
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- Die multilaterale Rüstungskontrolle von chemischen Waffen am Scheideweg | 2003
Kathrin Höhl/Alexander Kelle, Die multilaterale Rüstungskontrolle von chemischen Waffen am Scheideweg. Das Chemiewaffen-Übereinkommen und seine erste Überprüfungskonferenz, HSFK-Report Nr. 15/2003, Frankfurt/M.
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